THE IDEA OF A FICTIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA:

FINNEGANS WAKE, PARADIS, THE CANTOS

by

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ABSTRACT

This study concerns itself with the phenomenon of literary encyclopaedism, as especially evident in James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*, Philippe Sollers' *Paradis* and Ezra Pound's *Cantos*. The study focuses on developing the notion of an encyclopaedic literary mode and on establishing the existence of a genre of fictional encyclopaedias. It finds an encyclopaedic mode in literature to be one comprehending and imitating other literary modes, both mimetic and didactic. Further, the idea of a fictional encyclopaedia is developed through an understanding of the traits of the neighbouring forms of essay, Menippean satire and epic, and through an understanding of the paradoxes associated with the making of the non-fictional encyclopaedia.

The fictional encyclopaedia thus comprehends and exceeds the following traits:

1. A tension, characteristic of the essay, between integrated autobiography and impersonal (and ultimately fragmented) exposition of the categories of knowledge.

2. A tension, characteristic of the Menippean satire, between tale and digression, between a single narrating subject and a multiplicity of transient narrating voices. The menippea also contributes a simultaneous preoccupation with the most sacred and the most profane subjects.
3. A totalizing drive characteristic of the epic, a desire—
rivalling the urge to tell a story—to list or include all
aspects of the culture in the epic past.

The fictional encyclopaedia also translates into fiction the following
paradoxes associated with the encyclopaedic enterprise:

1. The recognition, implicit in the drive to trace a complete and
eternally-perfect circle of the arts and sciences, that
encyclopaedic knowledge is always ultimately incomplete and
obsolete.

2. The recognition, at the heart of the attempt to produce an
objective and unmediated picture of the world, that
encyclopaedic knowledge is ideologically shaped and textually
mediated.

The dominance of the encyclopaedic gesture in *Finnegans Wake*,
*Paradis* and the *Cantos* allows us to account for the characteristic
length, obscurity and "bookishness" of these works; they absorb the
traits and tensions of essay, Menippean satire and epic while yet
exceeding these traits in their fictional translation of the
encyclopaedic paradoxes noted above. This translation manifests itself
in each work as a characteristic parodic hesitation before the authority
of totalizing predecessors; it manifests itself in the texts' fascination with images of a paradisiacal completion and timelessness, a
tendency that is undercut by a repetitive, digressive or fragmented
form which asserts the inevitability of time and incompletion. Further,
the *Wake*, *Paradis* and the *Cantos*, in their overt and extensive
intertextual activity, emphasize the textual boundaries of encyclopaedic knowledge. Nonetheless, in their foregrounding and valorization of speech rhythms, the works also repeat the challenge that the encyclopaedia brings to its own limited nature as written book.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Genre and mode: general discussion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The essay</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Menippean satire</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The epic</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The encyclopaedia: introduction and general discussion</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Problems in the totalization of knowledge</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Problems of time</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Relation to other books</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ideology and writing</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The fictional encyclopaedia: introduction</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Problems in the totalization of knowledge</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Problems of time</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Relation to other books</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Problems of writing</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Formal consequences</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II: FINNEGANS WAKE</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Special problems</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. The pun</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The portmanteau word</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Punning portmanteau words</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Lexical chains</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Problems of totalization</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Modes of inclusion</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. External modes of inclusion</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Internal modes of inclusion</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Imitation of literary modes and forms</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Treatment of encyclopaedic models</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Giambattista Vico</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Giordano Bruno</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Images of completion</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. The rainbow</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The musical scale</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Alpha-Omega</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. The alphabet</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Time and Timelessness</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Finnegans Wake: the Book and books</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Finnegans Wake: writing and gesture</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Past-present-future groups</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Repetition and narrative</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Digression and narrative</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Finnegans Wake: the Book and books</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Finnegans Wake: writing and gesture</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Special problems: non-punctuation</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Study example</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Paradisiacs writing</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Paradisiacal writing</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Paradis as fictional encyclopaedia</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Problems of totalization</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Modes of inclusion</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Inclusion by lexical series</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Inclusion by formal equivalence</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Rhetorical strategies</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Number-parallelism</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. The catechism</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Imitation of literary modes and forms</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Totalization versus infinity</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Morcellation of the subject</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Images of completion</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Alpha-Omega</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. The alphabet</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Paradise and Hell</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Time, timelessness and the problem of beginnings...... 255
   a. Grammatical time............................................... 256
   b. Beginnings....................................................... 257
4. "Pancyclopédie": the Book and books....................... 259
5. Paradis: writing and orality................................. 266

CHAPTER IV: THE CANTOS........................................ 270
1. Special problems: the canto form............................ 270
   a. Canto LXXXI................................................... 277
2. Problems of totalization...................................... 285
   a. Modes of inclusion........................................... 288
      i. The ideogrammic method................................... 289
      ii. Historiography and law................................ 299
      iii. Formal equivalence.................................... 307
   b. Imitation of literary modes and forms.................... 313
   c. Paradise via periplum...................................... 319
      i. Versions of paradise.................................... 320
      ii. Evasions of paradise.................................. 331
3. Time and timelessness........................................ 339
   a. Multitemporal layering.................................... 342
   b. Memory................................................................... 344
4. "In principio verbum": textuality and speech............. 349

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 359
1. Summary........................................................... 359
2. Encyclopaedism in the twentieth century................... 365

FOOTNOTES.................................................................. 368

BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................... 402
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INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of encyclopaedism in literature has been noted by a number of critics and has been given a variety of names: an encyclopaedic form, an encyclopaedic narrative, the encyclopaedic Book, an encyclopaedic impulse or fictional encyclopaedism, an "encyclopoétique." The epithet "encyclopaedic" has been applied to novels, to poetry, to mixed forms such as the anatomy or the Menippean satire, and to the autoportrait. Several points need to be made at the outset. First, these critics have all noted a similar literary "fact." Despite the variety of responses, the responses themselves indicate the existence of a phenomenon that provokes discussion. Second, in such critical discussions, encyclopaedism in literature is not studied for its own sake, but is, rather, mentioned in passing, as something taken for granted to exist. The precise nature of the phenomenon, however, is ignored. Are we, for example, talking about a literary genre or a mode of literary presentation? If a genre, what other genres are related to it? Does the pedagogical encyclopaedia have any bearing on the problem? Such questions are basic to a study that would focus upon encyclopaedism in literature as worthy of investigation in its own right. The following study will undertake such a theoretical investigation of what we shall call the "encyclopaedic text" or the "fictional encyclopaedia."

Edward Mendelson, in his articles "Encyclopaedic Narrative from Dante to Pynchon" and "Gravity's Encyclopaedia," posits the existence of
a historical genre of encyclopaedic narrative, a genre having only a handful of members: Dante's *Commedia*, Rabelais' *Gargantua* and *Pantagruel*, Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, Goethe's *Faust*, Melville's *Moby-Dick*, Joyce's *Ulysses* and Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*. This genre has an external, historical significance with respect to the national literary traditions; it also exhibits a set of internal, formal traits. Historical and formal traits together form a set specifying the genre. "Near-encyclopaedias" do not fulfill all the formal conditions and do not occupy a special historical/cultural position. Gabriel García Márquez' *Cien años de soledad* is, according to Mendelson, such a "near-encyclopaedia."

Mendelson's view does not take into account the great number of works whose encyclopaedic quality we sense while reading them. When we say that a work we have just read is "encyclopaedic," we surely follow the literal meaning of the word and mean that the work encircles or comprehends—or, more accurately, strives to encircle—all human knowledge. This is surely to say more than that the work fulfills x, y and z generic conditions—for example, that it contains a discussion of statecraft, features giants and provides a history of languages.8 The term "encyclopaedic" should not be so broad that it loses descriptive precision; however, it should not be so narrow, as in Mendelson's "genre," that it excludes many likely works.

The necessary narrowness of an exclusively generic approach to the problem may be countered if we develop alongside this approach the idea that the encyclopaedic text features the functioning of a certain mode,
potentially present in all literary texts, but in some genres more important, and in encyclopaedic texts dominant. This is something like the idea of an encyclopaedic form developed by Frye in his *Anatomy of Criticism*. In his theory of fictional modes, Frye has an encyclopaedic or continuous form playing against an episodic or discontinuous form; both forms are at work, implying one another, throughout Western literature. The encyclopaedic form, embracing the entire vision of a culture, is inconceivable without the episodic forms (based on discontinuous moments of vision) out of which it is built and against which it takes its meaning. For Frye, the sacred scriptures form the paradigm for all encyclopaedic forms; these are built out of the episodic forms of the parable, the prophecy, and so on.

This dialectical notion of encyclopaedic form would seem to contradict the simple generic notion of Mendelson. For Frye, non-encyclopaedic works would be episodic works; they would not simply be works lacking in a few properties, the complete set of which would make them encyclopaedic. In Frye's literary universe, there are no near-encyclopaedias. There is a danger in such a dichotomous approach to the problem, the danger being that in wrapping up the "encyclopaedic" so neatly in terms of its opposition to the "episodic," this approach cannot take into account the reader's experience that some texts are less encyclopaedic than others: some texts may contain certain pertinent features and lack others; in some texts an encyclopaedic mode is less important than in others. Frye's approach cannot take into account this important intuition of continuity or degree.
Several other approaches to literary encyclopaedism have already been referred to, and bear further though briefer mention. Vincent Descombes contributes the following qualification to our topic: "... any book aspires to be encyclopaedic, i.e., to go around its subject, so as to be equal to that subject (to say everything, all that must be said from the point of view that had initially been decided). . . ."\textsuperscript{11}

Countering this universal aspiration, on the part of the book, toward summation or completion, we find that encyclopaedias and dictionaries very often include, not only an original body of articles, entries, but also an appendix or supplement. Descombes argues that the very possibility of a supplement undermines the comprehensiveness implied by the term "encyclopaedic"; paradoxically, it is of the essence of encyclopaedic summation not to be able to close itself in a circle from A to Z. The problem of completion in the encyclopaedic work will be central to this study.

Ronald T. Swigger approaches our topic from the perspective of a general encyclopaedic impulse in literature, an impulse toward comprehensiveness in cognition, an "impatience for cognition." Such an impulse involves a gesture of both unification and division, both universalism and encyclopaedism; an "ultimate vision of mystic union is preceded by a survey of the varieties and categories of existence."\textsuperscript{12}

That there is an impulse toward knowledge at the base of all literature, an impulse that is especially dominant in certain literary works, is taken as a given in this study. The issue of encyclopaedism, then, involves not only formal questions of genre and mode but also the domain of communication and cognition.
Michel Beaujour, in his definition of the "autoportrait" (as opposed to the autobiography), outlines certain traits that could also apply to the fictional encyclopaedia. In Montaigne's autoportrait, for example, there is "pas de récit suivi, ni d'histoire systématique . . ."; instead, there is "une sorte de bricolage . . . assemblage peu cohérent . . . de petits essais hétéroclites." Linear narration gives way to an analogical or thematic organization which is open to any number of additions. In fact:

... l'autoportraitiste ne sait jamais clairement où il va, ce qu'il fait. Mais sa tradition culturelle le sait bien pour lui: et c'est elle qui lui fournit les catégories toutes faites . . . catégories des péchés et des mérites, des vertus et des vices . . . les cinq sens . . . les humeurs . . . les facultés . . . l'astrologie . . . la race, le milieu . . .

The subject disappears behind a mass of material that begins to organize itself according to its own internal system of order. This notion of a special non-narrative principle of order based in the knowledge-categories of a culture will be important in our discussion of the fictional encyclopaedia.

Mikhail Bakhtin has unwittingly (it seems) sketched around the topic of literary encyclopaedism in certain of his formulations on the novel. In distinguishing between the novel and the epic, Bakhtin suggests that the novel is characterized by a familiarly manipulative or comic attitude toward its subjects and by an open-ended or inclusive form which accords as much importance to present-day reality as it does to the glories of the (epic) past: "... the subject of serious literary representation (although, it is true, at the same time comical)
is portrayed without any distance, on the level of contemporary reality, in a zone of direct and even crude contact. . . . ¹⁵ Now, an imitative familiarity with a diverse array of topics, literary modes and forms is a trait that will be central to our discussion of the fictional encyclopaedia. Philippe Sollers' remark that the novel is a form including everything in the culture is also applicable to the encyclopaedic form.¹⁶ Why, then, speak of the idea of a fictional encyclopaedia when the idea of a novel might do just as well? This study attempts to develop the former idea in the interests of making clear distinctions: if the term "novel" must cover both encyclopaedic-parodic (for example, Sterne) and realist (for example, Austen) narratives, then as a term it is somewhat ambiguous. The idea of a fictional encyclopaedia develops the non-realist or parodic vein separately, in the interests of exploring its special links with the forms of essay, Menippean satire and epic, and with the encyclopaedia itself, that repository of the knowledge of a culture. An examination of the traits of these other forms will provide us with a better insight into works sensed to be parodic and all-inclusive, than is provided by their consideration—under the appellation of "novel"—alongside conventional realist narratives.

All the approaches discussed above illuminate the phenomenon of literary encyclopaedism,¹⁷ that impulse betrayed in a text by a love for pieces of wisdom, for their gathering and hoarding following the logic of their associations in the writer's culture. In the pages that follow, literary encyclopaedism is explored in its generic and modal
dimensions. The phenomenon refers both to a genre of works illuminated by the forms of encyclopaedia, essay, Menippean satire and epic, and to a mode encompassing other literary modes in a gesture of appropriation and parody. Literary encyclopaedism is evident in different cultures and times, but seems to be especially prevalent in writings of the twentieth century. The chapters on *Finnegans Wake*, *Paradis* and the *Cantos* should indicate the variety of forms in which a modern (and post-modern) literary preoccupation with encyclopaedic compilation manifests itself.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Genre and mode: general discussion

In thinking about fictional encyclopaedism, it is important to begin with a clear distinction between genre and mode. In order to be certain, for example, of what a literary mode is, we must recover its original meaning in Plato's Republic and in Aristotle's Poetics. In Book III of the Republic, Socrates speaks of methods of story-telling:

... there is one kind of poetry and tale-telling which works wholly through imitation ... tragedy and comedy, and another which employs the recital of the poet himself, best exemplified ... in the dithyramb, and there is again that which employs both, in epic poetry and in many other places ... 1

The methods of telling are to be distinguished from the content of works. Further, in the Republic it is still somewhat unclear whether ways of telling should be distinguished from the forms or genres in which they appear; form and method seem to be used interchangeably, while both are set against content. In Aristotle's Poetics, however, mode (method) and form are more distinct. We again find three basic modes—narration, the mixed mode characteristic of epic, and dramatic representation:

Given both the same means and the same kind of object for imitation, one may either (1) speak at one moment in narrative and at another in an assumed character, as
Homer does; or (2) one may remain the same throughout, without any such change; or (3) the imitators may represent the whole story dramatically, as though they were actually doing the things described.

These modes, when applied to different objects—high or low sorts of men—result in different forms such as tragedy, comedy, epic. Again, Aristotle carefully distinguishes the modes of presentation and narration from the means and the object of imitation; this distinction precedes an analysis of the forms of tragedy and epic. Mode and form or genre are thus not to be confused with one another.

Plato and Aristotle, then, isolate three modes of telling in literature: narration, direct presentation, and mixed narration-presentation. Genette has described the historical changes that these modes went through before and during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The three original modes were rebaptised "genres" and were elevated to the status of eternal, great forms existing above a clutter of individual forms or species. In the Renaissance, an evaluative distinction was made between the three great genres of lyric, epic and drama, and the individual species such as the ode, the epistle, etc. This distinction continued in Romantic poetics. Goethe, for example, elevated the traditional triad to the status of "natural forms"; these, unaltered by history, were not to be confused with the changing, appearing and disappearing historical kinds. The eternal forms were seen as genres ("archigenres"), not modes.

Generic theory slipped, then, from a conception of three basic mimetic modes of telling, to a conception of a glorious triad of eternal
genres. The distinction between mode as a way of telling in literature, and genre as the specific, historical form this manner of telling may take, has been pursued recently by Genette, who puts the distinction the following way:

As two distinct domains, mode and genre can be independent of one another. A mode is broader in scope than the individual kinds. Not necessarily eternal, but extending indefinitely over time, a mode will operate in historical genres that may change, be replaced, disappear, without the mode itself ever disappearing (since it is an aspect of our use of language). Thus a literary work can involve a mode (or modes) and be a member of a genre (or genres), even while the two domains are distinct. Within a given work, the relation of genre to mode involves not a one-to-one correspondence but rather a habitation, to a certain degree, of a genre by a modes or modes; the relation involves the establishment of a hierarchy of modes whose arrangement characterizes the particular genre of the work.

Not all theories of genre have honoured the traditional generic triad of drama-epic-lyric. Some have conceived of another genre: the didactic. This new category takes the essay into account as an
honourable member of the literary canon. The Chicago critics, for example, divided literature up into two basic genres—the mimetic and the didactic. These "genres," I would argue, are surely modes, in the meaning of the term that we have developed. Again, Frye has posited, in a similar vein, four basic "genres"—the old triad of epos, drama and lyric plus something that he calls "prose": the latter can comprehend both an "intellectual" orientation (covering the didactic forms) and a fictional one.

I submit, then, that the didactic "genre" discussed by these critics should be renamed a mode and added to the other three modes, also re-established according to their traditional meaning. Such a grouping of modes will account better for the "manner of telling" in the different forms of literature. I would further suggest that an encyclopaedic mode must also be added to this group. What does such a mode involve? Like the others, it must be a manner of telling in a text; it is, however, a manner which brings together and comprehends all of the others.

In Aristotle we saw the modes operating individually to the end of imitation of an object. What, as distinct from this mimesis, does a didactic mode involve? This takes over any or all of the basic mimetic modes, not to the end of mimesis but to the rhetorical end of persuasion, perhaps, the teaching of a moral order or doctrine. A didactic mode, like the others, is present to a varying extent in different genres.

Now, an encyclopaedic mode functions rather like the didactic in
that it, too, takes over other modes and adapts them to new ends. Unlike the didactic, however, its gesture of appropriation is by definition a comprehensive one: it comprehends and transcends mimesis-oriented modes (telling and presenting, or both) and a didactic mode (teaching or persuading by telling and presenting). An encyclopaedic mode swallows up the pleasure versus instruction debate: the forms in which it operates offer a synthesis of the two sides. Bakhtin's label of "serio-comical" is appropriate to such forms. Further, the end of the encyclopaedic differs from that of the didactic: its end is imitation, certainly, but an imitation of what has already been said in books; it takes over epic, lyric, dramatic and didactic modes in one sweeping gesture, in the interests of imitating these modes for their own sake and not for the sake of any reality imitated or doctrine upheld.

An encyclopaedic mode, then, comprehends other modes in order to imitate them. The fictional encyclopaedia imitates the literary kinds in which these modes have been embodied over history; it includes and plays with specific styles, works, books. Such mimicry may aim at pleasure; it may be critical (as in parody); or it may be a blending of the two in a joyful critique or "serio-comedy." In texts such as Bouvard et Pécuchet, Don Quixote, and the "Oxen of the Sun" episode of Ulysses, books, genres or styles replace the world as object of direct imitation. The knowledge imparted by such texts, such "imitations of imitations," is of a refracted, "literary" sort. If it can be argued
that mimesis itself mediates or shapes reality, then so much the more must encyclopaedism do so, as the latter disperses—or, on the contrary, concentrates—reality through the lenses of the other literary modes and kinds, of books.

I have been arguing for the establishment of an encyclopaedic mode. Beyond this, I also submit that there exists a genre of fictional encyclopaedias. Let us recall the relation of genre to mode: a genre is never in a one-to-one correspondence with a mode; just as a particular mode may operate in a number of different kinds (being dominant in some, less dominant in others), so a kind may have functioning within it more than one mode. In tragedy, for example, where the (mimetic) dramatic mode is dominant, the representation of action wins out over narrative or lyrical elements, didactic intent, or the (encyclopaedic) recasting of previous genres and styles. Now, fictional encyclopaedias constitute a genre wherein the encyclopaedic mode is dominant and didactic and mimetic modes are subordinated and brought into the service of an over-all "intellectual" or "bookish" (or perhaps parodic) orientation.

Let us put these ideas in diagram form:
Modes

encyclopaedic mode (comprehensive—a mode of modes—mimetic, but at a higher level or at a remove, i.e., mimics mimetic modes)

didactic mode (may take over any of the individual mimetic modes)
mimetic modes (narration, representation, mixed)

The above diagram does not necessarily represent a valorization of the most comprehensive mode. Our ideas on genre can be arranged in a similar "hierarchical" form:

Genres

fictional encyclopaedia

essay

Menippean satire

epic (→ novel)

The essay, the Menippean satire and the epic are genres in which an encyclopaedic mode is important. Further discussion of the traits of these encyclopaedic kinds should determine how they qualify for the epithet "encyclopaedic"; a discussion of their traits may also add to an understanding of the genre of fictional encyclopaedias, inasmuch as the latter features these characteristics while comprehending and exceeding them. Finnegans Wake, the Cantos and Paradis are examples of such a
gathering-up of essayistic, Menippean and epic traits—plus others as well. Moby-Dick and the Commedia, mentioned by Mendelson as examples of encyclopaedic narrative, also perform such a gathering and exceeding.

1.a. The essay

The essay can be both didactic and autobiographical in nature. Montaigne's essays, for example, demonstrate how frequent citations from other authors, and use of moral exempla from other books, cause an autobiographical intent to be cut across by a didactic realization. Montaigne builds his essays as a fabric of citations of the Ancients and allusions to great men as chronicled in previous histories. The supposedly autobiographical thrust of the essays runs up against this didactic tendency to acknowledge intellectual debt to others and to write within the public domain. Very little of the material on which his moral conclusions are based is actually personal; most is public knowledge, book knowledge.

Pound's literary essays begin from the opposite direction: unlike Montaigne, Pound begins with a didactic intent, but this is cut across by a strong autobiographical presence. His precepts in the ABC of Reading, for example, as much record a personal artistic programme and set of discoveries as instruct upon on the writing and reading of poetry. Both Pound and Montaigne, no matter what their intent, must end by working within a public/personal tension at the heart of the essay form.

A variation of this equivocation between the personal and the public, the autobiographical and the didactic, is the interplay, in the
essay, between fiction and non-fiction: it is often difficult to decide which of these two characterizes the form. This interplay is allied with that occurring between the occulting and the unveiling of an ideological nature: "... cette oscillation entre deux attitudes qui consistent, l'une, à dévoiler les modalités du faire idéologique, l'autre, à les occulter, conditionne, dans l'essai, la possibilité même du discours." The essay hovers between, on the one hand, a didactic nature initiating forays into the public domain of other texts, a nature prompting an acknowledgement of sources and an examination of its own ideological premises, and, on the other hand, an autobiographical nature more closely linked to fictions and ideologies. Beaujour has discussed a similar ambiguity in the autoportrait: the autoportraitist begins with a desire to paint himself—as, for example, do Rousseau and Montaigne. But in his desire to fill in a perceived void with his own person, the autoportraitist instead reproduces the public domain of "les bêtises, les fantaisies, les fantasmes . . . le code moral de son époque ou de sa classe, les bienséances, les conventions psychologiques et culturelles." Perhaps the autoportrait, then, in this inability to decide between the personal and the public, is simply another name for the essay.

The essay potentially includes an encyclopaedic range of topics (moral, political, scientific, etc.): essays may be written about anything. We think, for example, of the variety of titles in the essays of Montaigne and Bacon. Each essay-topic is explored on its own terms, according to its own logic: there is no predetermined path to be
followed. Like the autoportrait, the essay often follows a method of "bricolage" in which everything that comes to hand (including segments of other texts) is used in the exploration of the theme. The essay is both self-sufficient and tentative (open to further "assaying"); a collection of essays has no over-arching, predetermined order of its own. Such order is usually decided after the components are complete; headings or larger thematic units may be inserted in order to group individual essays, which were not, however, originally written with an eye to such categories. The writer of an essay is somewhat like the writer of an article within an encyclopaedia: the latter is concerned with discovering and following the internal logic of his topic, and not with the over-all order of the work that will enclose it.

The essay qualifies for the epithet "encyclopaedic" in several of the traits already discussed. First, it has at its disposal an encyclopaedic range of possible topics. Although each individual essay will tackle (usually) only one topic, one tiny segment of the entire circle of knowledge, the fact that the essay in general has the desire and the potential to work with any aspect of knowledge qualifies the form as being encyclopaedic in impulse and in over-all realization. Second, the essay features an encyclopaedic mode; this mode, we recall, characterizes those works which gather into themselves and imitate different modes, forms, styles. In reading an essay we often have difficulty in deciding just what mode, form, style, it is taking up. Essays often seem to be now one thing, now another: they may seem to be fictional or non-fictional; they may, as noted above, be now didactic,
now autobiographical. Within this indecisiveness there are local problems: is this or that essay lyrical? dramatic? narrative? mixed?
One author has given a list of ten types of essay: literary, poetic, fantastic, discursive, interpretive, theoretical, literary critical, expository, journalistic and chronicling a time or a life.15 There are shades, here, of Polonius' types in drama;16 only a truly protean, assimilative form could generate such a list. In its assimilation of generic boundaries, then, the essay enacts, on the formal level, an assimilation of knowledge on the cultural level.

Certain traits of the essay are to be found in the fictional encyclopaedia. An awareness of these can enhance our understanding of the more comprehensive form. First, in both the essay and the fictional encyclopaedia there is a coexistence of an autobiographical element, or knowledge gained from personal—and perhaps unwritable—experience, with a public element, or knowledge mediated by letters. In the fictional encyclopaedia, autobiography cannot be effaced by the essential anonymity of the enterprise of compiling an encyclopaedia: fictions presuppose persons writing, and the fictional encyclopaedia differs in this respect from other fictions only in its relatively greater emphasis on anonymity as opposed to autobiography. For example, Pound's Cantos as fictional encyclopaedia feature the pressure of the public domain of documents, histories, texts, upon the record of a life. Nonetheless, the long poem, in the very manner of its selections from the public domain, attests to a peculiarly personal "voyage" through and toward knowledge: "Knowledge the shade of a shade,/ Yet must thou sail after
knowledge/ Knowing less than drugged beasts." (Ca. XLVII)\textsuperscript{17}

A second essay trait imitated in the fictional encyclopaedia is the peculiar fragmented format of the essay-collection. We have noted that such compilations follow no over-all order that is not imposed on them externally; each essay follows its own logic. Similarly, the order of the fictional encyclopaedia is thematic and associative rather than narrative and linear; it is weighted more toward a constellation of independent pieces than toward any teleological movement. A work such as \textit{Moby-Dick}, for example, features the interplay of one order with another; it features the breaking-up of narrative by a whale thematic which is explored independently and in counterpoint to the narrative line.

1.b. The \textbf{Menippean satire}

The genre has been discussed by Frye and Bakhtin;\textsuperscript{18} Petronius, Varro, and Apuleius—and later Burton, Sterne and Swift—are "Menippean" authors. The genre's traits will be briefly summarized here. The Ancients placed the Menippean satire along with the Socratic dialogue in the special category of the "serio-comical." These genres were felt to be quite distinct from the "serious" genres of epic and tragedy. Presumably they were also distinct from comedy. The serio-comical emphasizes what Bakhtin calls a "carnival attitude to the world": "... in all the serio-comical genres there is a strong rhetorical element, but that element is radically altered in the atmosphere of \textit{jolly relativity}... of the carnival attitude: its one-sided
rhetorical seriousness, rationality, singleness of meaning, and
dogmatism are made weaker." This dissolution of single-mindedness is
matched, at the level of form, by a multiplying of styles and genres, a
mixing of high and low styles, verse and prose forms.

The Menippean satire exemplifies the serio-comical traits,
above. It is often more comical than serious. It displays a high
degree of fantasy, and at the same time is concerned with a philoso-
phical search for, and testing of, the truth; in this search it often
ranges from earth to the heavens and down to the underworld. The form
brings together the highest mystical elements with the lowest human
types of character in its characteristic fantastic journey after truth
or "ultimate questions." In this quest, it reflects the epoch of its
first emergence, "an epoch of the decay of the tradition of a nation and
the destruction of those ethical norms which made up the antique ideal
of 'seemliness' . . . an epoch of intense struggle among multitudinous
heterogeneous religions and philosophical schools and tendencies
. . . ." Petronius' Satyricon is an early example of Menippean satire.
It exhibits the form's definitive satirical bent, ridiculing prevalent
oratorical practices and social excesses. There is also, in the
Satyricon, a hero's (or antihero's) fantastic journey through many
divagations and low-life sequences in a quest for a mystical/erotic
knowledge—and a cure for impotence. The sublime and base are
indistinguishable in this strange genre.

A summary of the more formal traits of the Menippean satire would
include the following: a heterogeneous nature (the text is a
collection of smaller texts with no apparent over-all relation) and a related tendency to fragmentation; a mixing of prose and verse, and of forms such as letters, songs, epigrams, oratory, symposia, etc.; and the presence of many voices, refracting the originary voice of authority and creating an effect of anonymity, and a related use of masks or personae. Further, the form demonstrates an autobiographical impulse (the author may become a character within the body of the work) that is in a paradoxical relation to the above anonymous impulse. Finally, it presents a vision of the world in terms of a "single intellectual pattern"—that is, it is organized symbolically. The Satyricon illustrates these traits save, perhaps, the element of autobiography. Its narrative is (literally) fragmented: the reader jumps from one low-life scene to another. Its prose is abruptly interrupted by verse segments, oratorical speeches, etc. Its "single intellectual pattern" is an eroticized quest-theme. Sterne's Tristram Shandy is similarly "Menippean" in its fragmented, digressive narrative, its mixing of the forms of main text and footnote (the latter becoming so lengthy that it is often confused with text), and its patterning according to an all-informing theme of birth and receiving of identity.

In the Menippean satire, the sublime exists alongside the grotesque; the single-minded philosophical quest is never far from the duplicities of irony—or the (encyclopaedic) multiplicities of parody. Indeed, parody is one of the chief drives in the form, the parodic gesture organizing its borrowing and mixing of forms, its relativizing of their difference. The form's satire empties its characters, making
them less people than "mental attitudes." Further, it is prone to expand into an "encyclopaedic farrago" based on a "magpie instinct to collect facts." The Menippean satire's ostentatious "bookishness," its pointed reference to earlier works, is one aspect of this tendency toward encyclopaedic compilation. Further, its "magpie instinct" is indistinguishable from the operation of the parody: the gathering of references is simultaneously a parody of the learned activity of gathering references. Thus, Petronius, for example, operates a parody of past forms or works. Petronius aims his pen at the *Odyssey*, and at the wrath of Poseidon against Odysseus, when he presents the wanderings of Encolpius and his quest to overcome a god-induced impotence. Within the *Satyricon*, this Odyssean parody is with difficulty distinguished from the practice of making references (via the poet Eumolpus) to painters and to other poets, including Homer and Virgil. Rabelais, in another case, parodies medieval romance and its treatment of the exploits of the hero when he presents such exploits, blown up to grotesque proportions, at the hands of Gargantua and Pantagruel. In Rabelais' work, as in Petronius', such parody coexists with a heterogeneous collection of forms—narration, dialogue, verse-intervals, riddles, lists.

How is the Menippean satire an encyclopaedic genre? First, it is eager to take on any topic for discussion (and usually ridicule). Like the essay, it may potentially speak about anything; however, unlike the essay, this encyclopaedic range of topics is usually kept within the boundaries of a narrative which, even if fragmented, is still
operative. The essay is encyclopaedic in its potential, while not so in its individual realizations. On the other hand, the Menippean satire does collect, like Frye's magpie, many unrelated pieces of knowledge; however, this activity of collecting is usually subordinated to the narrative by being kept in the form of references made by the characters, or by the narrator in the form of footnotes. It is only when references threaten to overtake narrative, when the encyclopaedist's love for his topics threatens to overtake the narrator's desire to tell a story, that we begin to cross the tenuous boundary separating the Menippean satire from the fictional encyclopaedia.

Just as the Menippean satire absorbs an encyclopaedic range of cultural topics or items of knowledge into its narrative (a process threatening the narrative or master line with fragmentation), it also gathers up a multitude of specifically literary forms and imitates them while parodying them. Like the essay, the genre features the simultaneous functioning of encyclopaedism in both its literary and cultural manifestations. For example, Rabelais' Gargantua and Pantagruel includes the arts of military strategy and of statesmanship, the types of children's games and methods of education; these are included in a narrative which also mimics the heroic chronicle or the romance, and which features a parodic imitation of the "x begat y, etc. . . ." of Genesis. The interpenetration of objects of knowledge and types of literature, of encyclopaedic inclusion and parodid imitation, is further evident, for example, in the lists of the games to which
Gargantua is addicted before his educational reform: these lists, besides collecting games, also recall the literary (or epic) tradition of extravagant list-making. Like the essay, the Menippean satire submits this activity of inclusion and imitation to certain limitations: the essay, for didactic reasons, concentrates on a fragment only of the circle of knowledge, while the Menippean satire is first and foremost a narrative.

Certain traits of the Menippean satire are important in the fictional encyclopaedia. In the essay, an autobiographical drive works against a didactic or public tendency; similarly, in the Menippean satire—and the encyclopaedia—autobiography is countered by anonymous composition. In the menippea, one is never sure who is speaking or writing. This is somewhat the case in the Satyricon: Encolpius is so clearly visualized as a participant in the action that it is easy to forget that his is also the narrating voice. Tristram Shandy features an even more extreme confusion of narrating subject and object of narration. These confusions provoke the question, "Who speaks?"; they thus lend anonymity to the work. With such a problematic narrator, anyone or no-one may be writing the tale. And yet Tristram Shandy is at least formally autobiographical: the narrative, of the birth and coming to identity of a baby, is a self-narrative. Further, in a work such as Ulysses (which I would argue is a fictional encyclopaedia), an autobiographical narrative (Stephen Dedalus' coming into self-knowledge) encounters the anonymous pressure of many different voices, with the result that the narrative is as much Dublin's as Stephen's or Bloom's.
Other Menippean traits which may be taken over in the more comprehensive encyclopaedic genre are its "serio-comical" tone and, especially, its fragmented and digressive form, its mixing of genres and styles, its organization according to a "single intellectual pattern" or symbol. Narrative in Sollers' *Paradis*, for example, is an endless digression, a kaleidoscopic sweep through countless fragments of the world's knowledge, through many forms of discourse. Oddly enough, this formal "dissolution" or "rhizome"-like multiplicity coexists with an emerging symbolic shape: evocations of an unattainable or unwriteable paradise form the symbolic or intellectual crux of Sollers' text as much as they do in Dante's *Commedia*.

1.c. **The epic**

A distinction between the epic and the fictional encyclopaedia needs especially to be made, as they are often confused with one another. Pound's long poem has particularly lent itself to this confusion; it has been called an epic (and a menippea). This confusion is possible because the epic, like the menippea, is "encyclopaedic" in scope. The fictional encyclopaedia, however, may have elements of epic, but it still has special concerns, arising from its relation to the encyclopaedia, which are not epic concerns.

What are the traits of epic? The classical epic is at the base of the genre; its major traits should offer us a guide. The distinction between oral and literary epic is essential to the classical epic: Homeric and Virgilian epics are based on an oral and a written
tradition, respectively. The epic as a long narrative poem thus began as an oral performance drawing upon many past performances and upon the gradual building-up of formulas (regularly-used word-groups) and thematic groups. Oral telling under the pressure of performance is facilitated by this use of fixed structures or themes, within which a good deal of variation is possible. Oral epic thus does not simply memorize past performances: its formulae involve an interplay between repetition and innovation or variation; its composition proceeds via an addition and expansion of themes or units of telling. Authorship in the oral epic is not as clear-cut as it is in the literary epic. A particular performance, by a particular singer, of a song or tale draws on past performances for the existence of the tale, its composition and many of its very lines and images; this dependence differs from the literary work's reference to, and incorporation of, its predecessors. Oral epic is thus neither authored nor anonymous; it is at once an individual and a cultural product. In this sense it is very much like the encyclopaedia, as we will see shortly.

The classical epic, whether oral or written, has several traits which are relevant to the idea of a fictional encyclopaedia. Such epic is a verse narrative, usually of some length, whose action is taken to have some historical basis. The epic's elevated tone arises from its desire to have a direct or privileged insight—via the Muse or, within the tale, via the oracle—into the truth of events and into divine nature and motives. Competing with this desire to sing the historical and the eternal is a need to sing the magical, to digress into
marvellous or supernatural sights and events. The classical epic is thus built on the tension between truth and fiction, between its traditional calling as an imitation and its nature as a creation. In spite of its overwhelming desire to tell things as they were, to sing of wars and heroic achievements, Homeric and Virgilian epic sings equally of voyages—Odysseus' and Aeneas'in which the historical and magical fuse.

The gods are constantly interceding in the action of classical epic. It is perhaps due to their persistent presence that time in epic narrative becomes quite complex: the narrative line is broken up or interrupted by flashbacks to events preceding the main action, and by premonitions of events consequent on this action. Such narrative creates a global view of events, a perspective in which past, present and future are one, in which historical events are seen as a whole and in their essential truth. This perspective taken by the epic poet simulates a divine one. Further, linked to a global perspective is the favoured use, in the epic, of the extended simile. Such a device, extending over some length, includes any diverse areas of knowledge or experience that might be helpful in evoking an idea. A global temporal perspective is thus inseparable from an encyclopaedic inclusiveness.

The classical epic hero needs to be mentioned briefly, as he often reappears (transformed) in the fictional encyclopaedia. The hero battles for honour and journeys in obedience to divine impulses; he pits his strength and valour against monsters and monstrous situations. He is viewed externally, via actions which have a real effect upon the world. His "larger-than-life" quality is, nonetheless, countered by
his mortality and his frequently being in disfavour with the gods. Aeneas, as the paragon of classical heroism, must ultimately subordinate his desires to divine ones.

To take account of medieval and later epics, we must characterize the genre more broadly. The epic has the quality of expansiveness, the impulse to extend its own luminosity in ever widening circles.\(^{33}\) This drive to extend its limits outwards, to include all that may be sung, is a totalizing drive: Lukacs' characterization of the epic, in his *The Theory of the Novel*, as presupposing a totality of vision, is certainly applicable here.\(^{34}\) Expansiveness and totalization mean inclusiveness: the epic is a "poem including history," in Pound's definition;\(^{35}\) it is a poem including past, present and future, indeed all time, in its global temporal perspective. As Aristotle puts it, in the epic:

\[\ldots\text{ it must be possible for the beginning and end of the work to be taken in one view.}\ldots\text{ For the extension of its length epic poetry has a special advantage, of which it makes large use.}\ldots\text{ in epic poetry the narrative form makes it possible for one to describe a number of simultaneous incidents.}\ldots\text{ This then is a gain to the Epic, tending to give it grandeur, and also variety of interest and room for episodes of diverse kinds.}\]

Beginning and end of an action, beginning and end of a time or of all time: this grandly comprehensive temporal scope enables the epic, according to Aristotle, to include variety or diversity—a movement found, in miniature, in the epic simile.

The encyclopaedic nature of the epic form should be obvious: the
epic draws into itself everything known at the time of writing, including the art of warfare, names and nature of the heroes and the gods, domestic and social custom, and so on. We have shown how this encyclopaedic inclusion of a whole culture is responsible for the essay-form's thematic or non-narrative organization; it is also the force behind the Menippean satire's tendency to introduce lengthy digressions into the narrative line. An encyclopaedic inclusion of a culture might also lie behind the epic's episodic form: episodes form a loose chain, with each piece being interesting for its own sake. The elements of a culture are evoked and repeated for their own intrinsic interest, not solely as steps in the service of a tale to be told. As previously mentioned, Frye sees a link between an encyclopaedic form implying a totalizing knowledge of a culture, and an episodic form complete in itself. The first, he says, is built out of the second. An episode in an epic is one of these units pressed into the service of an over-all narrative, yet still retaining something of its original, self-sufficient nature.

The epic, while undoubtedly encyclopaedic in its impulse to transmit the totality of a culture, must nonetheless be clearly distinguished from the fictional encyclopaedia. Even more than the Menippean satire, the epic channels its "magpie" tendencies in the service of an all-important tale to be told:

The Wrath of Achilles is my theme . . .

I sing of arms and of a man . . .
Unlike the encyclopaedist, the epic singer or writer is not concerned with fields of knowledge outside his range of experience. Within this limitation, the epic totalizes and encloses a small, perfect cosmos; it treats a past absolutely sealed off from the flux of the present. The encyclopaedia, on the other hand, writes on the edge of contemporaneity, in a present always threatening to become the past. In this openness to the present, the form—whether fictional or non-fictional—is open to new areas of knowledge; it does not enclose or encircle once and for all, so much as create a structure capable of supporting an indefinite number of inclusions. Further, the encyclopaedia treats its material with none of the awe accorded to the epic object; its seriocomical or parodic tone brings all of its inclusions onto the same level, where they may be subjected to playful manipulation.

The fictional encyclopaedia exceeds the epic, imitating it as one form among others. Nonetheless, it is the case that definitions of epic already mentioned—that is, a "poem including history," that it has the quality of "expansiveness, the impulse to extend its own luminosity in ever widening circles"—are relevant to the idea of a fictional encyclopaedia. The epic's length is another relevant trait: the work must be roomy or long enough to comprehend a totalizing vision of a culture and to include a global perspective on time. The past, present and future of an action, and more importantly the beginning and end of
history itself, are brought within its bounds. Correspondingly, the fictional encyclopaedia, as it rewrites the sacred scriptures and reenacts sacred ritual, is particularly concerned with the Creation, the Fall and the possibility of an (often erotic) Redemption.

The epic's hesitation between telling history and making beautiful fictions is very much a trait of the fictional encyclopaedia. A work such as Dante's *Commedia* (which, in the sense that it includes topical issues, is more encyclopaedic than epic) is concerned with history but is not content merely to report it. It must place events within a larger fictional structure, place historical figure next to angel, place Italy next to the cosmos and God's scheme of things. In this sense it imitates the encyclopaedia itself which, while professing to be working objectively with the real, shapes and takes liberties with knowledge in a manner reminiscent of fiction.

The epic hero finds his double or his extension in the fictional encyclopaedia. We recall that in the epic scheme of things, in an order bounded by the will of the gods (or by God's foreknowledge), the hero is ultimately limited in his capabilities and recognizes his own mortality. This is the case even though the hero is larger in stature than any other figure. Now, the epic hero takes two different forms in the fictional encyclopaedia, depending on whether the work is ironic or not. In both cases the hero's nature is bound up in the pursuit of knowledge—a pursuit which was not foregrounded in the epic, or at least not in the classical variety. In works such as *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*, the epic hero faces his ironic double. Bloom and HCE are based on
the larger-than-life heroes, Ulysses and Adam; they move through the 
respective works in a grandiose manner, having adventures and mishaps; 
their actions are commented upon from the perspective of myth and 
history. And yet both figures are voyeurs and tricksters. Both are 
magnified in order to be deflated: Bloom becomes Henry Flower and HCE 
becomes Humpty Dumpty. What would be known in these works, a set of 
truths at once erotic, nostalgic and mystical, is balanced by this 
ironic perspective and hence is rendered somewhat ambiguous.

In less ironic works such as Faust and Moby-Dick, the epic hero 
facing his extension into an untenably extreme form. Faust, obviously 
captured up in the pursuit of knowledge, overshoots the epic mark, 
transgresses the boundaries traditionally limiting the epic hero's 
capacities. Faust would go beyond God's order and accede directly to 
the truth of things. Now, in the ironic world of Finnegans Wake, 
HCE/Adam's fall from grace is turned from tragedy by being compared to 
Humpty Dumpty's tumble. Faust, like HCE, wants to know too much, but 
his Fall is not ironized; he loses far more than his reputation. Like 
Aeneas, Faust towers over his contemporaries; unlike the prudent epic 
hero, however, he does not ultimately submit his will to a divine one. 
Similarly, Ahab in Moby-Dick is modelled on the epic voyager after 
knowledge; however, in his desire to see into the heart of evil in the 
form of the white whale, he transgresses like Faust the boundaries of 
cosmic order and ultimately falls from grace. Thus the fictional 
encyclopaedia repeats and transforms the epic hero differently depending 
on whether it is a modern (ironic) work or not.
The oral/written tension in the epic is also repeated in the fictional encyclopaedia. Oral epic is more or less anonymous: it may be performed and transformed by a particular bard, but it is actually authored by a whole community of singers who have contributed versions of tales to a common pool of formulae, themes and ideas. In the epic, as in the Menippean satire and the essay, anonymous composition (the text as a wide assimilation of cultural categories) is in tension with authored composition (the text as a personal project). This tension within the epic genre is precisely the distinction between primary and secondary epic. Now, the fictional encyclopaedia often gives the impression of having anonymous authorship. A multitude of categories of knowledge are drawn into it and enter into play; clichés, proverbs, direct transcriptions of signs, snatches of songs, weave through the text. A culture or community, not a particular person, seems to be authoring the work. So much information is included that one person, it seems, could not possibly have transmitted it. This effect is particularly marked, for instance, in *Finnegans Wake*: this work, along with Pound's *Cantos*, requires a collective venture of annotation.

Like oral epic, then, the fictional encyclopaedia has an anonymous aspect; however, like written epic (and, of course, like all written works), the genre remains an authored one. Indeed, it goes further in being quite conscious of its nature and limitations as writing. Images of writing, of the book, in examples of the form are an important indication of this literary, or even scriptural, self-consciousness. *Finnegans Wake*, for example, while often giving
the impression of being a compendium of popular, orally-transmitted knowledge, a chorus (or, better, cacophony) of voices from different cultures and times, nonetheless features specifically literary images: Anna Livia's letter and the exegete's activity in deciphering it transmit a consciousness of the literary (epistolary) nature of the enterprise of the book;\textsuperscript{43} further, the parody of literary conventions of marginal commentary and footnoting indicates a textual tradition to which the book, however much it may aspire to a condition of orality, necessarily belongs.\textsuperscript{44} Similarly, Pound draws upon the resources of the scriptural in his exploitation of the Chinese ideogram; his poem's imitation of numerous literary styles likewise moderates its tendency to be a direct medium for a multitude of voices from history. Thus we cannot simply say that our genre takes over the oral qualities of epic; it absorbs, rather, the conflict between oral song and written book that stands at the heart of the epic as genre.

2. The encyclopaedia: introduction and general discussion

We have seen an encyclopaedic mode to be operating, to varying degrees, in several historical genres, and to be determining our perception of their "encyclopaedic" nature. These genres are the essay, the Menippean satire, and the epic. It is clear, however, that there exist certain texts that transcend these generic boundaries or include them all. Such texts contain aspects of the more limited genres, and yet seem to form a group on their own—the genre that we have
tentatively called "the fictional encyclopaedia." This term places emphasis on the notion of an encyclopaedia, and especially, by opposition to "fictional," on the non-fictional encyclopaedia. Our task will now be to establish the traits of the latter as it provides a model for the fictional encyclopaedia. In doing so, we must realize that the encyclopaedia is only a metaphor for its fictional counterpart; we must not posit direct relations between the two levels. Characteristics of the non-fictional work are not taken over directly by fictional texts such as Moby-Dick and Finnegans Wake: instead, they are translated or transposed by a fictional universe and intent.

In discussing the encyclopaedia, we shall be concerned with a number of different questions, all useful in filling in more completely, later, the traits of the fictional encyclopaedia. We will look at the etymology of the term itself; at other, related forms or metaphors for the encyclopaedia, such as the thesaurus, etc.; at the different formats possible in the encyclopaedia, the different ways in which it arranges its material and hence conceives of knowledge; and at the different kinds of authorship possible in it. These questions suggest more general ones focusing on the ambivalent relation of the encyclopaedic project to its own limitations: to its own necessary incompleteness (as opposed to a totalization of knowledge); to its own historical specificity (as opposed to a timelessness of knowledge); to its reliance on other books, sources (as opposed to an unmediated knowledge); to its own status as an ideological construct and as writing (as opposed to being a mirror of the world). Thus a number of assumptions as to
possibilities for knowledge underlie the encyclopaedic undertaking—underlie it and at the same time are put into question by it.

The term "encyclopaedia" derives from the Greek term for "encyclical education": the term refers to the circle of arts and sciences considered by the Greeks to be essential to a liberal education. The notion of an encyclopaedia, then, before referring to a book charged with including within its covers this circle or circular body of learning, referred just as importantly to a body of ideas, a course of education or instruction, which could conceivably have been held and practised in oral, as well as literate, cultures. We must think about both a body of knowledge and a course of instruction or doctrine; the encyclopaedia, that is, concerns both the object of knowledge and the process of coming to know. The term has more commonly come to refer to a book or set of books containing information on all aspects of knowledge, or on one particular branch of knowledge. The term has even come to be synonymous (or almost so) with the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert, such that many encyclopaedias neglect to include articles on their own form, its special problems and history, while nonetheless including an article on their famous predecessor. It is important for a consideration of the fictional encyclopaedia, however, to avoid exclusive emphasis on the notion of the book, and to return to the roots of the term "encyclopaedia," emphasizing the notions of circularity (comprehensiveness, totalization of knowledge) and of education ("paideia" means "culture"). Besides being Books containing, and somehow replacing, the world, encyclopaedias (and, indirectly, their
fictional counterparts) are engaged in the process of education, formation, acculturation. What is important is not simply the knowledge included in itself, but also the act of building up this body or circle of "connaissances" and communicating it to the public. The notion of "paideia" is thus important to keep in mind; it has the same root as "paideuma," that notion which Pound places at the base of his vision in the later Cantos, and which comes to mean, for him, that body of ideas, rooted in a culture, that forms the basis of its ways of ordering experience. In this sense it has a meaning something like Foucault's "episteme." Whether we are concerned with a body of ideas--"paideuma"--or with the process of assuming this body, the process of education--"paideia"--we are dealing, in the encyclopaedia, with one step in the communication, circulation, distribution of knowledge. A notion of knowledge as arcane possession, store or treasure is definitely not lacking in the encyclopaedic endeavour; this hoarding for purposes of power is nonetheless balanced, or undermined, by the above drive toward a clear distribution of ideas. Magical or conservative and populist or distributive tendencies both compete in the encyclopaedic impulse.

It is illuminating to look at names, often metaphorical, that encyclopaedias may take or have taken in different cultures; these tend to reflect the opposing impulses, magical and social, noted above. There is the term "reference work," which assumes the communication of ideas, grounding this process in the material support of the book, a social product. Other cultures have played with terms such as "book
of categories" (Chinese) and "tree of knowledge" (India). Other terms include a "key to knowledge" (Islam) and a "necklace" (Islam), a circle of treasures. The treasure metaphor is transcultural and underlies our "thesaurus." Another universal metaphor is that of an image of the world—e.g., *Imago Mundi* (1410)—transmitted by the encyclopaedia as mirror—e.g., *Speculum Universale* (1192-3). The "circle" in the term "encyclopaedia" joins the above metaphors; one must also include a notion of a "thirst" or desire for knowledge, a notion engendering such aquatic metaphors as a "fountain of words," an "ocean of jade," an "ocean of words" (all Chinese). Tree, book, key, necklace, treasure, circle, mirror, ocean: all are concrete words figuring, in different ways, the disposition of knowledge in the book, the relation of the work to its object. The relation is one of desire—or, in the metaphor, "thirst"—with the qualification that such thirst is self-engendering and endless. This is the "magical" drive for arcane knowledge and power, a drive that conflicts with the encyclopaedia's communicative function.

There are two general ways in which the encyclopaedia can arrange its material. These are the alphabetic and the systematic orders. Both orders work under a common assumption: that one is aiming at a comprehensive account of all that is known, that one can indeed provide such an account. Within this totalizing framework, the two orders are quite distinct, and presuppose different world-views and historical conditions. Systematic arrangement (used, for example, in the *Encyclopédie de la Pléiade*) is that in which the areas of knowledge are
presented according to their "natural" logic, divided up into chapters and sub-chapters; each area is intended to be read in its entirety. There is a strong sense of a whole behind the parts: this discourages any desire, on the reader's part, for quick reference.\textsuperscript{55} It is not surprising that systematic arrangement has a longer history than alphabetic, which did not even appear until the end of the seventeenth century:\textsuperscript{56} the former is "une structure fermée, se donnant pour naturelle et parfois pour divine";\textsuperscript{57} it presupposes a logical, if not theological, order of things, which must be respected and treated in its entirety and integrity. The alphabetic order (used, for example, in the \textit{Britannica}) is, on the other hand, allied with empirical theories of knowledge; this is why it has come to the fore only relatively recently. Unlike the systematic order, it does not presuppose closed or previously-given systems of knowledge. Each object of knowledge is to be attended to separately, and is important in its own right; one can thus "look up" such an object to the exclusion of all others. In alphabetic ordering, one finds the most bizarre, non-systematic juxtapositions of objects or entries.

The two encyclopaedic formats thus presuppose different conceptions of the nature of knowledge, although both assume, it would seem, the possibility of attaining to it to some degree. The systematic arrangement, in progressing confidently through categories of knowledge, structures assumed to be given as such, obviously does not question the possibility of knowledge itself. The alphabetic format does not question the possibility of knowledge either: it posits the existence
of a body of knowledge, or at least of an array of individual objects of knowledge, on which it can draw for its individual articles or entries. There might seem to be other possible arrangements of knowledge, such as the tree of memory-reason-imagination placed at the head of the Encyclopédie of Diderot; these do not dislodge the two major orders from their primacy. (The Encyclopédie still follows the alphabetic order.) Whatever the principle of order used, a body of knowledge is assumed to exist, which requires such ordering for its communication. No one format is inherently superior to the others.  

There are two kinds of authorship possible in an encyclopaedia: the book(s) may be the work of a single person, or they may have joint (or communal) authorship. These may ally themselves with the two principles of order, discussed above—over history, at least, if not at the present time. A single author may write an encyclopaedia when the available body of knowledge is compact enough to be digested, ordered and transmitted by one scholar. A single encyclopaedist, that is, is more common in times, such as the Middle Ages, when the body of available knowledge is limited and submitted to an overriding (usually theological) order. (This type of authorship is also possible in encyclopaedias dealing with only one, narrow segment of the total circle of arts and sciences.) Knowledge capable of being gathered and ordered by one author is also more likely to be conceived of as a whole; that is, it is more likely to be set out in a systematic fashion, its areas being arranged from their general traits to their particulars, from one limit to the other. We should caution, however, that this correlation
between single authorship and systematic arrangement does not always hold, especially at the present time (the *Encyclopédie de la Pléiade* is a case in point).

Joint or communal authorship becomes more common as the knowledge available grows too much and too quickly to be assimilated and transmitted by a single author. This type of authorship is thus especially prevalent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As the amount of information grows, so does the number of specialists required to order and present it. With each edition of an encyclopaedia such as the *Britannica*, more experts must be invited to contribute. To follow this trend to its logical conclusion would be to project an edition requiring thousands of volumes and countless contributors. Now, the greater the number of specialists involved in the work of the encyclopaedia, the more its authorship becomes essentially anonymous. In modern alphabetic encyclopaedias, authors are listed at the beginning of each volume, but are only indicated by initials at the end of the articles for which they are responsible. The work is not, strictly speaking, anonymous, but it is nearly so: the information it contains is looked up for its own sake, and might as well have been written by anybody—or nobody. Such essentially anonymous and expanding knowledge is likely to be alphabetically arranged: its body will not be seen as a whole, but in its individual parts; the objects of knowledge will not be connected, or will only be related by a few cross-references (which are, like the selection of articles, always arbitrary and susceptible to change).
Encyclopaedic authorship thus covers the range from single (and singular—the work being read as much as a work of its author or of God as for the integrated body of knowledge contained therein) to communal (and essentially anonymous, indeterminate—the work being conceived as an ordered collection of fragments of knowledge, with certain fragments only, rather than the whole, being read). In a similar way, encyclopaedic orders may be systematic or alphabetic, according to whether the body of knowledge is conceived as being unified, circular and relatively stable, or infinitely divided, expanding and unstable.

The encyclopaedia, then, is the result of a basic impulse to know all there is to know. One arranges such knowledge according to modes of order reflecting, to some extent, both a historical moment and an encyclopaedic tradition. Encyclopaedias, it has been argued, flourish especially in times of transition between one social order and another, seeking to comprehend all past knowledge to the end of understanding a sensed new order of things. A tradition is recovered, stabilized, and included in an uncertain present; the enterprise may be "to make a man whole . . . to make a man Christian . . . [or] to make a man free," according to whether we are in Classical Greece, medieval Europe, or eighteenth century France.

2.a. Problems in the totalization of knowledge

That the encyclopaedic enterprise is characterized by a drive to encircle or include all there is to know, for ends that vary historically, does not preclude the possibility that there are
limitations to this drive. Such limitations are, I would argue, built in to the enterprise itself. No matter how confident an undertaking it may be, no matter how much faith the encyclopaedist(s) may have in the possibility of mastering and communicating the body of knowledge at hand, the totality of this body is an elusive thing. One can thus speak of an erotics of knowledge, a recognition of loss at the very heart of its quest.

Equivocation (or a simultaneous attraction to opposites) characterizes, first of all, the encyclopaedia's relation to a totalization of knowledge. It is both confident of achieving such comprehensiveness—this according to its very definition as being the circle or complete figure of knowledge, of the arts and sciences—and susceptible to the awareness that it has not achieved it, if not to the awareness that total comprehensiveness can never be attained. The modern encyclopaedia's continuing sense of its own incompleteness is implied in its practice of publishing new editions involving new or revised articles; it is suggested in its continuing enterprise to keep up with, comprehend and transmit, an ever-expanding body of knowledge. Older encyclopaedias may seem by hindsight to have been markedly incomplete. Indeed, it has been claimed that a mania for totalization was not even characteristic of encyclopaedia-making before the nineteenth century: for example, works before the end of the eighteenth century did not consider it desirable to include entries for living people.

There seem, then, to be two attitudes towards totalization: the first sees it as being desirable but only possible within an ongoing
process of revision, updating and expansion; the second sees it as being not always either possible or desirable. The first attitude may also involve the realization that totalization is desirable but only possible when pursued by more than one encyclopaedist: one man, says Diderot, can never in his single lifetime "connaître & . . . développer le système universel de la nature & de l'art." Thus the possibility of totalization, the circle as complete course of instruction, may tantalize the encyclopaedist or editor; this circle as completion must contend with the vicious circle of desire as endless deferral. The desire to achieve encyclopaedic closure involves the desire to write the one Book that will render all other books obsolete and unnecessary. As Mallarmé discovered, this hope remains a hope only: the Book is always deferred to an indefinite future. This hope also informs Borges' story, "The Library of Babel." Here one is hoping to come upon the one book that will contain all the other books, the whole infinite (and hence meaningless) Library of the universe:

In some shelf of some hexagon . . . there must exist a book which is the cipher and perfect compendium of all the rest: some librarian has perused it, and it is analogous to a god. Vestiges of the worship of that remote functionary still persist. . . . To me, it does not seem unlikely that on some shelf of the universe there lies a total book . . . I pray the unknown gods that some man—even if only one man, and though it have been thousands of years ago!—may have examined and read it. . . . Let me be outraged and annihilated, but may Thy enormous Library be justified, for one instant, in one being.

The search for completeness in the mastery of knowledge is evident in the very appearance of new encyclopaedias (an occurrence that
is frequent, especially in this century as the body of knowledge to be transmitted expands almost exponentially). If a single encyclopaedia could really do what it desired to do—that is, resume all knowledge and all books for all time within its covers—then new attempts to master the body, or deal with its parts, would be rendered unnecessary. Evidence, then, of a quest for completion is also, paradoxically, evidence of the failure of this quest. Similarly, the publication of new editions (and often the discarding of earlier ones) and the publication of supplements and yearbooks attest to a double movement, in the encyclopaedia, of the mastery of knowledge and the acknowledgement of its loss.

The phenomenon of the suppression and disappearance of older encyclopaedic editions is suggested in Borges' story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," and is made the vehicle of a characteristic air of metaphysical mystery. Until it is finally located, and even upon its perusal, a missing volume of an older edition carries a body of truth, a key to a mystery. This volume in turn points to the existence of a whole set of volumes (only one of which surfaces) encompassing the knowledge of an imaginary culture. The optimistic process of discarding the old in the quest for ever-new editions, and hence for ever-more-complete knowledge, is here undermined: the old edition was more complete than the new; something essential has been lost. An optimistic view of knowledge, one which sees knowledge as capable of being mastered and distributed, encounters—in Borges' encyclopaedia—a pessimistic or conservative tendency, in which knowledge is seen as something mystical
or arcane, reserved for a selected few and threatened by extinction upon their deaths. Thus the loss or destruction of older editions suggests a movement whereby completion of knowledge is undermined; the unity of the present edition is shadowed by the notion that it is perhaps not more, but less, complete than an earlier edition, that it is omitting something vital that may only be found in its predecessor.

The publication of supplements suggests a similar knot in the totalizing process. Whereas the existence of back editions initiates a search backward in time for articles that may have been suppressed, for pieces to fill in gaps in the circle of knowledge, the publication of supplements initiates a forward temporal movement whereby gaps in the encyclopaedia must be filled by articles or work published after the present edition. In both cases, holes are evident in the work, holes which must be filled as part of the general drive to completeness motivating the encyclopaedic enterprise. There are always more articles that could be written, as the objects and fields of knowledge grow in number, or as systems of classification or principles of order change. Encyclopaedic completeness is thus a virtuality only. It is kind of "leurre" or "will-o'-the-wisp" that cannot be pinned down in any one edition; it escapes its bounds and must be caught in a supplement—or in another edition. As a kind of alphabet, the encyclopaedia must always project more letters beyond Z: according to a voice in *Finnegans Wake*, the "importunate towns of X, Y and Z are easily over reached." The supplement is one instance of a constant deferral of totalization in knowledge that is characteristic of the encyclopaedic enterprise; this
deferral plays against a desire for completeness (for "presence", in Derrida's terms). Such a desire may either be manifested as a nostalgia, a turning back to lost works or editions in which the missing fragments of the puzzle might be found, or as a looking-forward to a Book to resume—and end—all books. It seems then that notions both of the Fall and of the Apocalypse must inform any thinking about encyclopaedias.

Why are these images of beginnings and endings so important? The sacred scriptures, strictly speaking, do not form an encyclopaedia in themselves: encyclopaedias are interested in preserving and transmitting not only sacred truths or systems, but also secular ones, and the latter often for their own sake. Nonetheless, the Old and New Testaments, in being bounded by the Creation and the Apocalypse, possess a circularity or completion, the nostalgia for which motivates the encyclopaedic project. It is thus the Bible's interpretation as being the Book containing all there is, that is important here. As A to Z, Alpha to Omega, the Creation/Fall and the Apocalypse form the boundaries of human history; the encyclopaedia, attempting to bound human knowledge, must thus return incessantly to these terms of loss and redemption.

2.b. Problems of time

A desire to achieve completeness is bound up, in the encyclopaedia, with a desire to achieve a state of timelessness for the knowledge contained therein. If a circle could be drawn around all knowledge, catching it between the covers of a single Book (which may
include many volumes), then, as a figure of perfection, this circle would exist above the domain of temporal flux, and knowledge would be immune to the pressure of history and the real. Diderot, in the Prospectus of the Encyclopédie, expresses such a desire, but in rather equivocal terms:

Qu'elle [la postérité] ajoute ses découvertes à celles que nous aurons enregistrées, & que l'histoire de l'esprit humain & de ses productions aille d'âge en âge jusqu'aux siècles les plus reculés. Que l'Encyclopédie devienne un sanctuaire où les connaissances des hommes soient à l'abri des temps & des révolutions . . .

The Encyclopédie is a closed sanctuary for knowledge, maintaining it outside the mainstream of history and violent change; it is, at the same time, open to change and to the contributions of posterity. To this encyclopaedist, the circle of knowledge can be perfected, but only in an indefinite future time. Perfection can thus be made one's goal, while being at the same time deferred as one struggles, in the present, with the temporal limitations of the undertaking. These limitations are, again, those of totalization: more material may always be found, more articles may always be written; material, once seized, may become obsolete in the time it takes to arrange it, write and print articles. The longer the encyclopaedic work takes, the more problematic it becomes:

. . . si le travail tire en longueur, on se sera étendu sur des choses momentanées, dont il ne sera déjà plus question; on n'aura rien dit sur d'autres, dont la place sera passée; . . . l'ouvrage se défigurera sans cesse sous les mains des travailleurs; se gâtera . . . par le seul laps de temps . . . & deviendra plus
défectueux & plus pauvre par ce qui devrait y être ou raccourci, ou supprimé, ou rectifié, ou suppléée, que riche par ce qu'il acquerra successivement.\textsuperscript{73}

One can imagine a feverish race to "beat the clock," in which a limit-state of simultaneity (of conception, writing, publication and reading) is projected. Perfection or completion, that is, accompanies simultaneity, a lifting out of time. Contemporaneity could also, in the Encyclopedists' aim at least, go with such simultaneity: the past is disregarded,\textsuperscript{74} the clock starts only now, as posterity is invited to join in the enterprise; the pastness of the past, and hence any real historical understanding, is lost. The testimony of one encyclopaedist—Diderot—underlines the paradox wherein one can be aware, in practice, of the difficulties for production posed by the passage of time, and yet believe that ultimately knowledge and understanding have no temporal horizon, that knowledge can be shared by all times in a common encyclopaedic endeavour—the making of a single great Book of the world.

2.c. \textbf{Relation to other books}

The (wishful) notion that knowledge has no temporal limits suggests the converse notion that it is indeed time-bound, and this because it is text-bound. Time enters the picture, that is, because the encyclopaedia works with the tradition in the form of texts. The circle of instruction is a circle of ideas that are only accessible via the reception of texts. (In oral cultures, the circle would draw upon a tradition of oral "texts," or bodies of ideas transmitted from
generation to generation. The tradition is no less structured for being unwritten. In matters of knowledge, this conflict between immediacy and textuality, between "experience" and "books" is dramatized by Goethe's Faust, who would go straight to the heart of nature (the spirit world) and who scorns the scholar Wagner's bookish method of acquiring knowledge:

How strange, that he who cleaves to shallow things
Can keep his hopes alive on empty terms
And dig with greed for precious plunderings,
And find his happiness unearthing worms!
   How dared this voice to raise its human bleat
Where waits the spirit world in immanent power? . . . 76

The tension is between the lowest of the low—worms—and the heights of spirit. But, of course, as Faust progresses the opposition must be inverted, as the "spirit" to whom the seeker of knowledge aspires turns out to be the Serpent itself. Faust's soaring flight is actually his fall. His aspirations, aside from being sacrilegious, are impossible: as Eve discovered, the fruit of the Tree of (unmediated) knowledge is bitter to eat, and the knowledge gained is mediated by the experience of loss of originary innocence. Wagner's aspirations, though more plodding, are closer to the nature of available knowledge.

There is thus a third paradox associated with the making of encyclopaedias. The ideal to which one aspires, along with the ideals of totalization and timelessness, is knowledge in an unmediated state; the problem with which one lives is that an encyclopaedia relies on a whole fabric of other books, sources, and hence that its material is multiply mediated and second-hand. Other books form the basis for the
individual articles, which may or may not acknowledge them via references or citations. These others (making up the encyclopaedic "intertext") may be the anonymous texts, or fragments of texts, or proverbs, etc., which form the unconscious base for the education of a people; or they may be specific texts, such as the "classics." The question of intertextuality, then, should be at the heart of our consideration of the status of the knowledge organized by the encyclopaedia. At this point we should digress briefly into a discussion of intertextuality, in its general features and in its bearing on the nature of the encyclopaedia and of encyclopaedic knowledge.

Intertextual functioning characterizes not just encyclopaedias but all texts, to the extent of being a major constituent of textuality itself. Each text functions both horizontally (taking its place in a communicative circuit) and vertically (taking up a relation to a corpus of other texts). The vertical dimension is an intertextual one: "... tout texte se construit comme mosaïque de citations, tout texte est absorption et transformation d'un autre texte. A la place de la notion d'intersubjectivité s'installe celle d'intertextualité, et le langage poétique se lit ... comme double." The vertical dimension lifts the text out of any simple concern with communication, and places it in relation to a whole universe of other texts (and thus, indirectly, to a whole universe of knowledge). The intertextual space is "un espace ... où les livres se liraient, s'éclaireraient, s'écriraient les uns les autres, laissant place à un texte enfin réel qui serait
l'explication permanente du monde . . ."; the intertextual dimension, that is, ultimately produces or ends in a great Book, into which all other books are written and which becomes reality itself. The old dichotomy between word and thing, book and world, is finally dissolved. But this Book is a virtuality only: here, the notion of intertextuality is taken to its logical limit. The idea of the Book results from an emphasis on the vertical dimension of textuality at the expense of its horizontal, or communicative, dimension. Earlier semiotic accounts of intertextuality are responsible for this emphasis on an autonomous poetic functioning. I would argue that communication—the production and reception of texts—must be what ultimately directs such functioning, which is not, in the last word, autonomous.

A "horizontal" theory of intertextuality would emphasize the role of the reader in reconstituting the intertext behind a text—and, indeed, in perceiving the need for such a reconstitution. Riffaterre's theory of intertextuality, for example, differs from earlier semiotic accounts on just this direction of emphasis. A close text-reader interaction is posited: the reader perceives certain irregularities in the text's surface—certain "agrammaticalities"—that point in the direction of a significance not present in the text at hand. The reader must construct a significance—or reconstruct an intertext or subtext—which is in no way arbitrary, but is, rather, tightly determined textually. Readers' capacities to uncover the intertext may vary individually and over time; nonetheless, intertextuality will remain functional because it involves the perception of irregularities,
even without the possibility of sketching in their source.\textsuperscript{79}

Intertextuality, under this view, comes very close to the workings of nostalgia, the desire to return to an originary text, while the present text becomes "un système de signes du désir".\textsuperscript{80} It is the nostalgia of a reader for lost significance that sets the reconstitution of this body into motion. From a "horizontal" point of view, then, intertextuality is a hermeneutic function which ultimately rests in a communication of desire to understand, to make significance. This function must orient a vertical relation to a space of discourse, other texts.

We should keep these notions in mind as we consider the question of intertextuality in non-fictional texts—specifically, in the critical article and in the encyclopaedia article. Intertextuality in criticism is explicit or declared according to the conventions governing the practice of this genre. The writer must indicate the text or texts with which he is engaging in dialogue or argument; (s)he must acknowledge any other sources in footnotes or internal references. The critical text submits itself to the authority of its model or parent text; this holds even if the younger text takes issue with its authority or wishes to exceed it. The relation is one of inequality.\textsuperscript{81} Encyclopaedias, on the contrary, are not constrained to submit to a law of explicit acknowledgement of sources and submission to their authority. They claim for themselves the ideal and the privilege of dealing with knowledge as such, and not engaging in a dialogue with other texts. But, as we have seen, the encyclopaedia cannot actually attain to knowledge without the mediation of other texts. The article in the
encyclopaedia does, in fact, relate to these texts as much as the critical article does; the process of submission to authority is the same, even though such submission may be unconscious or unacknowledged. Some articles contain references to sources on which they have relied for their material, and may have bibliographies. This is especially the case in longer articles with subsections, such as those on the geography, history, etc., of a particular country. Other articles, often very short and dealing with a simple unit of knowledge, contain no references whatsoever. The point to emphasize here is that a convention of acknowledgement, that would govern the writing of encyclopaedias, is lacking. In this sense, the encyclopaedia article exists somewhere between the work of criticism and the work of fiction, the latter's reference to other texts being even more tacit than the encyclopaedia's. The encyclopaedia article, in other words, has already been moved one step toward fictionality, toward a free or unacknowledged play with other texts.

Thinking about intertextuality, then, leads one to a notion of texts as being "second-hand". The knowledge to be gained from texts is thus also never innocent, never unmediated, never "natural." Knowledge that would escape the domain of subjective states must be gained via the public arena of writing, must be gained from texts which are "never moments of origin...." Further, like knowledge, language and writing have always escaped the state of nature, and cannot directly represent or mirror it. In order for language to bear some relation to nature, the latter must be seen as itself being a kind of writing or
book—nature itself must be made non-simple—and so the knowledge one can have of it through the book must be even more multiply mediated and problematic. As Sollers says of Mallarmé's notion of writing as "totale arabesque," "c'est ... une écriture qui va se situer du même côté que le monde, dans la mesure où le monde est une écriture qu'une écriture, seule, peut faire apparaître et continuer." Only if we see encyclopaedic writing as being such an "arabesque," as being a writing indebted to other writing (however much it would deny it) rather than to nature—only then does such writing come, under the above view, paradoxically close to rendering the world visible to the reader.

We can draw several conclusions from the above ideas on intertextuality. There is a tension, in the encyclopaedia, between non-fiction's (especially criticism's) urge to cite its sources, and fiction's tendency to dissimulate its sources, or at least to display a cavalier attitude toward them, now citing (in a parodic fashion, as in *Finnegans Wake*), now neglecting to do so. The encyclopaedia article, we saw, may cite or give further references, or it may not do so. There appears to be no explicit convention guiding its relation of dependence on other books, and this is because in it the ideal of an unmediated knowledge ultimately overrides any duty to signal such dependence. Thus the ambiguous status of the encyclopaedia article with respect to its sources reflects its paradoxical aspiration to a direct relation to knowledge, while nonetheless having recourse only to "words, words, words."
2.d. **Ideology and writing**

Mallarmé's notion of writing as being a "totale arabesque", a notion of artifice or divorce from nature not ordinarily associated with such writing, brings in a fourth paradox in the encyclopaedic enterprise. This concerns the encyclopaedia's—and more generally the book's—relation to the world. There is a tension between the book's aspiration to mirror the world, to stand in a direct, (again) unmediated relation to it, and its status as an ideological and written construct. This tension is, one might say, between two notions of the mirror: between the book as mirror reflecting the world, and the book as mirror creating illusions. Borges, in his story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius," opens with the following line: "I owe the discovery of Uqbar to the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopaedia." The narrator goes on to elaborate that "... one of the heresiarchs of Uqbar had stated that mirrors ... are abominable, since they ... multiply the numbers of man." Uqbar is a land existing only in an encyclopaedia, and only in one copy in particular. Mirrors in Borges' story are somehow associated with encyclopaedias in that they suggest mysteries and illusions: they multiply images rather than faithfully reflecting nature. Both encyclopaedia and mirror, then, have an ambiguous relation to truth, even while the encyclopaedia maintains a strong nostalgic bent toward the metaphor of mirror as simple reflector.

The encyclopaedia, we have said, is ideological in nature: it selects and orders its material on the basis of the historical moment and of certain timely interests of the encyclopaedist(s) or editor(s).
Just as conventions of citation and source-acknowledgement are held in suspense owing to the overriding "objective" drive of the work toward absorbing knowledge in an unmediated state, so principles of order and selection guiding the work often remain implicit—or are assumed to be the only such principles possible. Such structures or 'codes':

... relevent de facteurs ... qui organisent la pédagogie tout entière et le modèle de communication par le livre ... En un mot, loin de refléter le monde comme un miroir, selon la métaphore bien connue, l'encyclopédie construit son image comme le cartographe fait sa carte, toujours incomplète ... toujours arbitraire, mais selon un arbitraire contrôlé et cohérent (un code) ...

Any work aspiring to a disinterested mimesis of reality can be shown to be responding, whether consciously or not, to exigencies of time and place. It might at first seem that encyclopaedias should escape such dissembling of historical conditions and interests—that they should clarify the premises underlying their selection and presentation of objects of knowledge. This supposition springs from the myth of, and nostalgia for, objectivity at the heart of the encyclopaedic enterprise. And yet we see, for example, how Diderot, in his Prospectus to (or apology for, or celebration of) the Encyclopédie, creates an impression of new beginnings, of a rupture with past efforts, when it is obvious that the work takes its place in a tradition and is but one more response to a continuing and probably universal drive to comprehend and order knowledge. The Encyclopédie, Diderot says, is to be a new repository of knowledge to be added to by all posterity; what a pity
that the Ancients did not make anything similar:

Quel avantage n'aurait-ce pas été pour nos pères & pour nous, si les travaux des peuples anciens ... avaient été transmis dans un ouvrage encyclopédique ... Faisons donc pour les siècles à venir ce que nous regrettons que les siècles passés n'aient pas fait pour le nôtre.

Diderot ignores, here, an entire tradition of pre-medieval and medieval encyclopaedias; he also ignores the fact that Bacon's division of knowledge, inspiring the "système figuré des connaissances humaines" which supposedly schematizes the ordering principles of the Encyclopédie, is actually indirectly a product of this "forgotten" tradition. Diderot's "vision partielle et partiale" of the tradition thus indicates a certain "parti pris 'philosophique'".

Why this blind spot in an "enlightened" encyclopaedist? The encyclopaedia aspires to deal with knowledge in itself, "objectively"; it aspires to be a mirror of the world without the intervention of interests, dissimulations. But knowledge is intimately connected with concerns of power: events such as the publication of an encyclopaedia should not be analysed in terms of structures of meaning, but as implying certain relations of power:

... one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.

The domains of knowledge, Foucault says, each imply certain political,
or power, relations; their discourse is governed or organized by an "internal régime of power" which may, at certain points in history, undergo a sudden transformation. If each domain of knowledge is organized by relations of power, then so much the more must the encyclopaedia, as the sum of all these domains, attest to the presence of an "internal régime," certain principles of order not necessarily evident even to the encyclopaedist/editor himself. Such régimes and their succession in time might underlie, or contribute to, the successive flourishing of the systematic and the alphabetic encyclopaedic formats.

Thus each encyclopaedia, in its quest to be an objective sum of knowledge and a mirror directly reflecting the world, turns out to be organized by relations which are a function of the historical moment of compilation and which determine the work's place in existing structures of power. Such relations are not necessarily conscious ones; this does not, however, deny their effectiveness. Diderot's "forgetting" of the encyclopaedic tradition up to all but its most recent manifestations (the latter including, especially, Chambers' Cyclopedia) should indicate an interest (whether conscious or not) in being part of a rupture—especially an epistemological one—with the past. This deeper motive would be effective apart from any more superficial reason to promote the Encyclopédie's uniqueness to its potential readership. The encyclopaedia, then, is checked by certain impediments (often not conscious, appearing only through their effects or "symptoms") in its search for totalization, timeless relevance and unmediated access to
knowledge. The fact that the work, besides aspiring to be a reflection of all that is, involves a shaping of knowledge by certain power relations, simply indicates one more equivocation, one more check to its expansiveness.

The question of the encyclopaedia's relation to the world thus brings into focus its nature as an ideological construct; further, it is a question of the encyclopaedia's nature as writing, as against its desire to reflect the world. If the work sees itself as a mirror of all that is (see the titles of medieval encyclopaedias such as the *Speculum Universale*), then it is the mirror's function here as a metaphor that should be investigated. As metaphor it has two sides: a mirror reflects the world outside and a mirror indicates, via an infinite regression, a world within its frame. Hamlet's "mirror held up to nature" is never far from Borges' mirror which multiplies nature and creates illusions of creation.

The notion that the book can be a mirror of nature develops from the traditional view of art as being a mimesis of nature, of the world. In Book X of the *Republic*, Socrates suggests the holding-up of a mirror as a metaphor for the artist's making of his object:

> You could do it [what the artist does] most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects . . .  

Art is thus a direct reflection of all that is in the world. It is nonetheless removed from all that is true, from the eternal Forms, of
which all that is in the world is only a reflection. The metaphor of art as a mirror is thus not, for Plato, an unproblematic one: there is direct reflection, certainly, but it is reflection of something in itself diminished in value. The knowledge we gain from art is mediated by an intervening set of illusions or shadows. The mirror metaphor thus does not guarantee a simple account of the knowledge to be gained from a work of art.

Aristotle’s theory of poetry as being an imitation seems, at first, to be a little more straightforward: “Epic poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all, viewed as a whole, modes of imitation.” And yet the kinds of poetry, and the kinds of art, are made to differ from one another by differences in their means, or by differences in their objects, or in the manner of their imitations. The statement, then, that poetry imitates human action is not a simple one; the notion (already problematic) of a mirror held up to the cosmos has been dropped in favour of a set of distinctions, a more complex concept of imitation, better adapted to accounting for the specificity of each of the arts.

In retaining the mirror metaphor of art, we run into difficulties when we ask of what art is a mirror. Plato ranges the entire visible cosmos as his object; Aristotle takes human action as his starting point. Abrams, in *The Mirror and the Lamp*, divides the possible objects of imitation, in the mimetic tradition, into the empirical and the transcendental, this division being, roughly, between the Aristotelian
and the Platonic (and neo-Platonic) traditions. Art can, that is, either find its objects in the world available to the senses, or in the ideal forms (God's) to be found either outside man—or in his soul. Such differences in the nature of the objects of imitation attest to the problematic nature of the notion of imitation itself. The mirror requires many qualifications when it is applied to art in general (it soon becomes discredited, for example, as applied to the art of music). Further, it must be approached with caution in any consideration of the book and its relation to the world. The nature of writing complicates the mirror metaphor, especially if we think of the tradition of phonetic writing: "Writing, in Western culture, automatically dictates that we place ourselves in the virtual space of self-representation and reduplication... since writing refers not to a thing but to speech..." Just as in the Platonic view art has only a mediated access to reality, and this despite its nature as a mirror, so writing can provide only an indirect glimpse of all that is, because it refers, in an infinite play of mirrors, not only to speech itself, but also, in another turn, to other writing. Within this view of multiple mediation, one can hold to the notion that writing provides access, however indirect, to the world; however, one can, in another direction, cut even these tenuous ties and free writing from any representational function whatsoever. In this view, writing's mirror is not a reflector, but is, rather, an opaque shield erected against death:

Headed toward death, language turns back upon itself; it encounters something like a mirror; and to stop this death which would stop it, it possesses but a single power: that of giving birth to its own image in a play of mirrors that has no limits.
Language, in its non-mimetic aspect of infinite self-representation, thus suggests the model of mirrors reflecting one another endlessly. In this view, even texts written fully within the mimetic tradition (e.g., epics) are based on a play of mirrors as a foil against death; however, they attempt to evade their real nature: "The mirror to infinity . . . was not displayed without an evasion: the work placed the infinite outside of itself—a real and majestic infinity in which it became a virtual and circular mirror, completed in a beautifully closed form." If mimetic writing is an "evasion," then the encyclopaedia's claim to erect a "circular mirror" of a "real . . . infinity" available for knowledge is put into question. The encyclopaedia, then, in its nature as writing finds its relation to the world of objects of knowledge to be complicated far beyond what a mirror metaphor would want to suggest.

Let us recall Sollers' summary of Mallarmé's concept of writing: "c'est . . . une écriture qui va se situer du même côté que le monde, dans la mesure où le monde est une écriture qu'une écriture, seule, peut faire apparaître et continuer." Here, writing crosses over into the world, breaks down the barrier between signifier and signified, alters the relation of the book to the world. It makes the book a complete world, and the world a book. It makes the library of all books a universe, and the universe a library, if we recall Borges' story "The Library of Babel." In this story, it is no longer a question of the library reflecting a "real and majestic infinity" within a finite space, a circular mirror; instead, the library itself becomes the real infinity, the universe, while the reflection of its contents within the
completion of a finite space (the space of a book) remains a hope, a virtuality only. Each book is potentially the entire library. If we hold to a non-simple notion of writing, then the encyclopaedia is not a circular mirror of, or window upon, the totality of things, but rather a library aspiring to contain all the books—on all subjects, in every language—that have been, are, or ever will be written. Again, Borges anticipates such a view of the encyclopaedia, in which language "crosses over," in his story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius." Here, the encyclopaedia comprehends a world which would not exist without it:

". . . I had in my hands a substantial fragment of the complete history of an unknown planet, with its architecture and its playing cards, its mythological terrors and the sound of its dialects, its emperors and its oceans, its minerals, its birds, and its fishes, its algebra and its fire, its theological and metaphysical arguments..." Our suspicion, voiced earlier, that encyclopaedias practise a certain licence toward reality, a licence which is more often associated with fiction, finds a confirmation in Borges' story. Book and world are interchanged: the book creates a world, and not simply a "fictional" one. Relics of this new world are discovered that attest to its alternative presence. This view of the passage of the book into the world, and vice-versa, this view of their confusion, is the negative image of the mimetic view of the book as existing in the world, reflecting it in an enclosed totality. The encyclopaedic activity of encircling knowledge is greatly complicated by the possibility of such a "shadow" enterprise, in which the encyclopaedia creates one world, a
universe of books and letters, even as it reflects, like a mirror, another.

3. The fictional encyclopaedia: introduction

We are speaking, here, of works which display traits of essay, epic and menippea, but which go beyond these into the domain of the encyclopaedia itself. Ultimately, the fictional encyclopaedia is distinguished by its basis in sacred texts. A nostalgia for paradisiacal or daemonic states of knowledge is at the centre of works such as Dante's *Commedia*, Goethe's *Faust*, Melville's *Moby-Dick*, Joyce's two later works, Sollers' *Paradis*, Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*.

The preceding study of the problems associated with the idea of an encyclopaedia should enable us to look anew at the traits of a group of fictional works which, we have decided, are legitimately encyclopaedic. Armed with these observations, in addition to those already arising out of our discussion of the neighbouring genres of the essay, the menippea and the epic, we will soon be in a position to study individual cases.

We recall that an encyclopaedic mode is one which imitates other literary modes; it undertakes an imitation not of nature, but of books, styles, literary genres. It is linked, more generally, in the domain of culture, with encyclopaedism, that drive whereby the book strives to comprehend all that can be known. The encyclopaedia manifests this general impulse to knowledge in its purest and most obvious form. The
fictional encyclopaedia is that genre in which an encyclopaedic mode is dominant; this mode translates a general impulse to knowledge into an impulse to gather together specifically literary forms, styles. In other words, we are not simply applying the traits of the non-fictional to the fictional form; we are not talking about a direct relation or correspondence between the two kinds of encyclopaedias. The non-fictional work functions in this study as a model or metaphor for its fictional counterpart. Hence, encyclopaedism in culture, and the problems specific to the making of encyclopaedias, are transposed, in the fictional work, into a literary space, and are discoverable in a form whose difference bears witness to the specificity of literature and of the literary tradition.

Now, despite these general observations, it is nonetheless the case that fictional encyclopaedias can operate on both the above levels: they can work on including directly (and what appears to be "non-fictionally") all known domains of knowledge, and they can include them indirectly ("fictionally") via a mimesis of all known literary styles and kinds. In the individual work, these two types of inclusion may be often difficult to distinguish: this is probably due to the fact that even the cultural knowledge brought into encyclopaedias is already mediated by other books—and often by literature itself.

In our discussion of encyclopaedias we isolated four areas of concern: the work's relation to, and desire for, a totalization of knowledge, a timelessness of knowledge, an access to a knowledge unmediated by other books, and a direct access to the world as expressed in the notion of mirroring. The first two areas, we discovered, imply
one another, and it further appears as though the latter two problems are related. However, isolating all four as problems associated with the making of encyclopaedias is useful in that each in turn suggests interesting issues that have some bearing on a discussion of the fictional encyclopaedia, in its general traits and in its individual cases.

3.a. Problems in the totalization of knowledge

The non-fictional encyclopaedia, we saw, has as its center the intention or desire to draw a circle around the totality of human knowledge and to encompass it within the covers of a book. This desire is realized, in the body of the encyclopaedia, in the inclusion of many domains of knowledge (those of the natural and social sciences, the humanities, morality, etc.). Such an achieved inclusion is, however, accompanied by a recognition of the inevitable and constant incompleteness of the knowledge-gathering enterprise. This recognition of impossibility, of gaps in the encyclopaedic enterprise, is manifested in the continual appearance of new encyclopaedias, in the publication of new editions of a particular work containing new or rewritten articles, and in the appearance of supplements intended to make up deficiencies in a particular edition, bringing it up to date, extending the circle of knowledge ever wider. The perfect or complete encyclopaedic Book, that is, is a virtuality only, a limit, like perfect knowledge itself, toward which each actual encyclopaedia can only tend.

Let us see how the fictional encyclopaedia enacts the paradox of totalization at the heart of the encyclopaedic enterprise. Like its
model, our genre is vitally concerned with knowledge, with the inclusion of all that is and can be known (the domains of the arts and sciences, ultimate questions of good and evil, the beginning and end of time). In the literary work, the intent to encompass all knowledge need not be conscious or made explicit, as is the case, by definition, in the encyclopaedia proper. Nevertheless, what is manifest is an achieved inclusion of many domains of knowledge. Associated with this inclusion is that of many literary styles, models, forms. The impulse to include all knowledge receives its working out, then, on two levels—the fictional and the extra-fictional or cultural; both these levels of inclusion are reconciled in the fictional encyclopaedia. Pound's *Cantos* offer such an interpenetration of inclusions, a reconciliation of objects of knowledge and literary approaches to knowledge. Canto XLVII, for example, includes instructions on ploughing at certain optimum times of the year; his Canto LI is an account of fly-tying for flyfishing. Both pieces of knowledge, however, have been obtained from books—from Hesiod's *Works and Days* and from Charles Bowlker, respectively. Such book-mediated know-how is one expression of a literary encyclopaedic impulse that also drives the poet of the *Cantos* to imitate the *Odyssey*, the *Metamorphoses*, Anglo-Saxon and Chinese poetry, Browning's and Tennyson's styles, and so on.

We have already seen such a reconciliation of literary and cultural encyclopaedism to be operative in the other encyclopaedic genres—especially in the essay and the menippea. The literary work, then, will always translate the impulse animating its cultural model
into a peculiarly literary expression while still retaining that impulse at its base. The other encyclopaedic genres have, however, priorities that are not dominantly encyclopaedic: they must write on a single theme, they must tell a story. The fictional encyclopaedia, in the end, is the only genre whose enterprise is first and foremost the gathering of literary and cultural knowledge; it is the only genre which gives free rein to encyclopaedism, to a thematic arrangement of categories of knowledge, at the expense of its other functions such as telling a story and revealing character.

We noted that there is a dialectic, in the encyclopaedia, between a drive to totalization and a recognition of inevitable incompleteness. In the literary text, the encyclopaedia's anxious activity of continual re-editing, publication of supplements, etc., is transposed into an essential uncertainty as to the possibility of encompassing knowledge. This built-in doubt as to its own efficacy and as to the possibility of knowledge itself may be manifested textually in an ironic or parodic perspective on past works, forms, styles. In Flaubert's *Bouvard et Pécuchet*, for example, the possibility of absorbing the complete circle of the arts and sciences is held up, tantalizingly, to the two autodidacts. Nonetheless, as each area of knowledge is tried and discarded, it becomes increasingly obvious to Bouvard and Pécuchet that such encyclopaedic completion is unattainable. Such an awareness is enacted textually in an ironic perspective on the books that promised to communicate so many different kinds of knowledge.

An ironic perspective may coexist with a nostalgic attitude toward knowledge and its possibility, an attitude again resulting from
an uncertainty towards its own enterprise essential to the fictional encyclopaedia. Both irony and nostalgia presuppose an awareness of a remove (or turning-away) from a supposed positive or full state of being and knowledge; this gap stimulates an attempt on the part of the writer and the reader to fill it in, to turn back, a goal which is, of course, never fully realized. On the level of form, this ambivalence is manifested in a fragmentation and digressiveness obstructing any movement of the text toward coherence and completion. Bouvard et Pécuchet, in its simultaneous attraction to, and rejection of, encyclopaedic completion, finds its narrative rendered practically non-existent as it divagates, instead, from one domain of knowledge to another. Any purposeful movement is abandoned; the novel becomes a "péríple encylopédique"¹⁰⁶ in the Odyssean sense of a digressive wandering in the direction of an ever-receding homeland.

Let us look at a few more examples. In Moby-Dick, the object of knowledge is the great white whale, which comes to embody everything—the nature of evil, the unknown, man's life and death on the sea. The whale hunt becomes a knowledge-quest which has mortal consequences for Ahab, just as it does for Faust. The white whale as object of knowledge is suitably unattainable; the paradoxical juxtaposition, in its nature, of whiteness and malignity deepens its ambiguity. The narrator's recognition of the impossibility of coming to know this mystery spawns, on the formal level, a large number of digressive disquisitions on whales and whale-lore. It is as though by multiplying the number of words about whales, one can capture the
"obscure object of desire" which is Moby-Dick. The tone of Melville's novel is perhaps not so much ironic as nostalgic, a nostalgia pointing to an encyclopaedist's despair over the possibility of totalization of knowledge. The novel's digressions are formal symptoms of this ambivalence at the heart of any knowledge-gathering endeavour. Pound's Cantos, to take another example, display an increasing fragmentation: the later cantos are constellations of short notes, allusions, images, ideograms, etc. These fragments enact a growing sense of the impossibility of including everything; time, a life, is passing in the writing of the long poem. Accompanying this sense of failure is a growing nostalgia, a growing pressure on the text to break open and reveal divine states of being.

Joyce's Ulysses, in its parodic imitation of past literary styles and forms, and in its nostalgic perspective, for example, on love, is another fictional encyclopaedia, like Moby-Dick and the Cantos, which has at its base a desire to include everything known—and an uneasiness as to whether anything can be known any more. This ambivalence is worked out in the novel's parody of literary forms. The parody of the "Oxen of the Sun" episode, for instance, is a virtuoso masking of something to be known—the basic fact of childbirth. This parody's removes are equivalent to the subterfuges of Molly with respect to her adultery and to the gaps established, via the nostalgic musical refrains in the "Sirens" episode and all through the novel, between sentimental accounts of love and an unattainable Real Thing (a gap epitomized in Gertie McDowell's fruitless yearning for the perfect lover). What would
be known is never fully clear (and this is the basis for its potency as lure): in Ulysses it seems to be an Edenic blend of sexuality and innocence. The burgeoning of domains of knowledge in the novel takes its possibility from this sense of incongruity between ideal and actual love or knowledge; the novel's stylistic multiplicity and its episodic quality begin where nostalgia ends, affirm encyclopaedic play as reborn from the ashes of the Fall.

Similarly, Finnegans Wake, in its symbolic preoccupation with the Fall (Adam's, Humpty Dumpty's, HCE's), is concerned with the unrecoverable distance between a desire to include everything known and a realization of the impossibility of fulfilling this desire. On the one hand, Joyce does appear to write the encyclopaedic Book of culture; his puns are a method (like the epic simile) of condensing a great number of objects of knowledge into a finite space; his polyglot practice is a kind of shorthand for this encyclopaedism. And yet the novel's pervasive sense of a Fall betrays an uncertainty at the heart of this optimistic encyclopaedic enterprise, a sense that unmediated and complete knowledge is no longer possible. The novel's parodic imitation of literary and non-literary forms (the epic list, the letter, the telegraph, the song) further establishes a relation of remove with respect to some Real Thing, "one stable somebody." The "formlessness" or digressive logic of the narrative also attests to the strain created by encyclopaedic inclusion: digressions are at once a way of facilitating and a way of evading knowledge, the pressure of things to be known.
3.b. *Problems of time*

Encyclopaedias, we saw, have at their center a temporal paradox as much as an epistemological one. These works run into problems as soon as they aspire to encircle all the knowledge available to them and maintain it in a state of timelessness, of enduring relevance. The encyclopaedist may even be aware that his knowledge has a horizon or limit to it, and that this limit is a temporal one. In other words, the knowledge taken into a work is never independent of time, of the historical moment of its appearance. The knowledge contained within a encyclopaedia, however much the encyclopaedist would have it attain a condition of timelessness, of absolute contemporaneity, is necessarily doomed to be dated. Articles may become obsolete in the time it takes to write and print them. Even the processes of revision and expansion are no guarantee against obsolescence. In the fictional encyclopaedia, the desire for contemporaneity is translated into a desire for a simultaneity of past, present and future, or for a mystical vision of a state lifted out of time; nonetheless, the text encounters and recognizes its own necessary temporal limitations even as it has a tantalizing glimpse of a static or eternal domain of knowledge beyond its grasp. The sweep of history, the pressure of change, play against such epiphanies or glimpses of eternity, of knowledge held or encircled once and for all. In the fictional encyclopaedia, which in this respect resembles the "magic realist" work or even the epic, the quotidian may be suddenly intersected by the divine, the miraculous or the daemonic. The genre thus ultimately finds its model (beyond the encyclopaedia,
that is) in the sacred scriptures, while it finds its significance in the religious sphere.

Dante's Commedia exemplifies this interplay between the quotidian and the eternal, between a topical perspective (in which one cannot see beyond one's historical moment) and an oracular or global summary of past, present and future. The first, limited view on events is taken by historical figures, Dante's contemporaries or predecessors, whom he encounters on his movement through Hell, Purgatory and Paradise. These characters are frozen in their historical moment; they must ask the traveller, who has acceded to a global perspective on events, to supply their deficiencies in knowledge and to tell them of their offspring and of events they have missed. Similarly, topical conversation may suddenly be interrupted by a divine apparition: for example, the Purgatorio features the appearance of angelic guides, fearful signs of a divine order, to lead the travellers from each circle, each scene of worldly encounters and reminiscences. The effect of this is to suggest an all-embracing presence of divine will and foreknowledge, a presence which deepens and becomes more insistent as the traveller proceeds. In the Commedia, a nostalgia for a timeless state of knowledge is a desire to move within and come to know God's order. That the narrative is not simple and linear but tends to be recurrent, moving towards a center in rings or waves that relate analogically to one another, suggests, on the formal level, an ambivalence at the heart of a desire for direct access to eternal knowledge; it suggests the poet's sense of his human and historical limitations.
In Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow*, another work that has been called an "encyclopaedia", we again find the fictional encyclopaedia's nostalgia for states of eternal knowledge. The characters would like to make sense of the bleak chaos of the War by coming upon states of knowledge transcending their everyday condition. Certain characters rely on erotic stimulation or romantic communion; others turn to seances and conversation with the dead; others, again, take the "scientific" route, via Pavlovian conditioned reflex studies, to a material knowledge of a state of mind which is nonetheless characterized in the most mystical way as an "ultraparadoxical phase . . . this transmarginal leap, this surrender. Where ideas of the opposite have come together, and lost their oppositeness." Pynchon scatters his pages with returned dead souls, human-like animals, divine apparitions. In a distinctly Dantesque move, Pynchon has fiery angels appear to bomber pilots in flight:

... others remembered how, for the few moments the visitation lasted, even static vanished from the earphones. Some may have heard a high singing, like wind among masts, shrouds, bedsprings or dish antennas of winter fleets down in the dockyards ... but only Basher and his wingman saw it, droning across in front of the fiery leagues of the face, the eyes, which went towering for miles, shifting to follow their flight, the irises red as embers fairing through yellow to white, as they jettisoned all their bombs in no particular pattern ... bewildered at their unannounced need to climb, to give up a strike at earth for a strike at heaven.

This sudden intersection, by another level of being, of the daily business of war recalls the coexistence of the divine and the worldly in the *Commedia*. In *Gravity's Rainbow*, all this divine and daemonic
traffic within the everyday points back to a moment sensed to be lost forever, the birth of the Child at Christmas. The novelist would like to see all time arrested in this moment of perfection, just as the encyclopaedists would have their work fix knowledge for all time.

3.c. **Relation to other books**

Another problem we have seen to be suggested by a study of the encyclopaedia is that of intertextuality—the pointing, by a text, to other texts via allusions, citations, etc. This property of "bookishness" or "second-handedness" is intensified in the encyclopaedia, as its articles rely on source-texts which in turn may derive from other texts, and so on endlessly. At the end of an article, there may be explicit references to other works in the article's particular area of specialization. However, there is no convention requiring such reference in the encyclopaedic article, as there is in the critical article. Even where sources are not mentioned, where the knowledge appears to be everyday and common to all, one can ultimately trace it back to anonymous schoolbooks, proverbs and so on. The encyclopaedia is thus a great Text which, even were it written "out of the head," without references, nevertheless would have other texts written into it. Each encyclopaedia forms a patchwork of debts, with the result that encyclopaedic knowledge is firmly second-hand, irremediably text-bound. Pound's *Cantos* provide the fitting symbol for this process whereby comprehending other texts is equivalent to comprehending knowledge: the notion of the palimpsest is important in the late cantos, and is applicable to the encyclopaedic book, where
layer upon layer of texts, partially-erased or fully present, compose the text at hand.  

Inclusion of a wide text-bound knowledge is also the mark of the fictional encyclopaedia: the whole of history, all culture, various languages, are written into such a text. Consequently, it may be filled with allusions to other texts, with actual citations, with parodic inversions, and so on. *Moby-Dick*, for example, begins with a collage of literary treatments of the theme of the great whale or Leviathan. At one point in Pound's *Cantos*, in other instance, the poetic voice begins to argue directly with its textual source about a detail in translation (end of Canto XCVI). In studying the fictional encyclopaedia, then, the problem becomes one of determining the degree of explicitness of its references to other texts. Since intertextuality is a feature of all literary works, and not just of those in which the encyclopaedic mode dominates all others, the distinction of the latter sort of works must rest in the frequency and the degree of explicitness of their references to and citations of other texts. Fictional encyclopaedias may display a desire to acknowledge their debts to others, although, as in the encyclopaedia, there is no rule requiring that they do so; they may desire to discharge these debts by bettering the originals; they may present a new synthesis, include more details, or attempt to come closer to an object of knowledge that has up to this point evaded a perfect understanding.

*Bouvard et Pécuchet* is an example of such a literary work depicting an attempt to bring about a new synthesis of knowledge. This attempt is inseparable from a close attention to specific titles,
authors, even while it implies the use of each as a stepping-stone only, a tool to be discarded in the critical quest. This is something like the process, in *Don Quixote*, whereby the reader arrives at a synthesis of all that has ever been said in the domain of chivalry. *Moby-Dick*, again, attempts to approach an object of knowledge—the great white whale and its metaphysical status—via an explicit commerce with all the texts that have ever dealt with whales, via a concern with all the fields of knowledge and technique that could ever touch upon this object.

An indebtedness to other texts, which we have seen to be clearcut in critical non-fiction, and not so clearcut in the non-fictional encyclopaedia, is thus problematic in the fictional encyclopaedia (and, equally, in the encyclopaedic forms of the Menippean satire and the essay). Both encyclopaedia and encyclopaedic literature seem to follow their own rules in the question of whether to acknowledge indebtedness or not. We can clarify these issues in the following manner. Taking non-fiction and fiction as two limits, we might see texts as being ranged along a continuum between them, a continuum, that is, of explicitness of acknowledgement of debt. This ranges from the explicit subordination of the critical text to its master text, to the dialogue of equals occurring in fiction; it ranges from citation by convention (and a corresponding concept of plagiarism) to free incorporation of other texts (leaving the reader guessing, hunting for significance). Intertextuality in the sense of indebtedness operates differently accordingly to whether a text is closer to non-fictional or fictional
limits. Thus, the encyclopaedic article, which would be classified as non-fiction, is closer to fiction than the scholarly article: the former may acknowledge its debts, but need not do so, whereas the latter must do so. Similarly, some forms of fiction are more "fictional," under this way of looking at things, than others. Realistic fiction would seem to occupy the extreme position at this end of the intertextual continuum: direct imitation of a world entails a concealing, to varying degrees, of a relation to other texts which is nonetheless, under our definition, constitutive of textuality as such. Now, the fictional encyclopaedia, fiction which we have seen to be based, consciously or not, on the model of the encyclopaedia, will be more "non-fictional" than realistic fiction: it may use citation, footnoting, etc., freely; it is (more obviously than realistic fiction) dependent on other texts, especially scholarly texts which have explicitly contributed to knowledge; it jumps from one domain of knowledge to another, unconstrained by, or subverting, conventions of verisimilitude. Encyclopaedic fiction is nonetheless not the same thing as encyclopaedic non-fiction. The former's use of nonfictional conventions of acknowledgment is parodic or, at the very least, ambiguous, whereas the latter, when it conforms to these conventions, does so to the letter. Footnotes in the fictional work, for example, cannot be read as explicating the text they annotate. Encyclopaedic fiction thus parodies and uses for its own purposes the conventions which encyclopaedias need not actualize, yet which remain implicit in their very undertaking as non-fiction.
The fictional encyclopaedia, like its non-fictional counterpart, thus relates a quest for knowledge to a journey through a course of books. Queneau, we have seen, uses the phrase "péríple encyclopédique" to refer to this wide-sweeping (and often seemingly aimless) itinerary; one never knows, when one is engaged in this quest, where, or how, it will end. It is relevant to Pound's work, at least, that the quest for knowledge be placed in this Odyssean context of the "péríple" or periplum, "... cette errance à travers la Méditerranée du savoir."\(^{112}\) Pound is quite conscious that the course on which he is engaged in seeking divine states of being is an Odyssean periplum:

By no means an orderly Dantescan rising
but as the winds veer
... as the winds veer and the raft is driven
and the voices, Tiro, Alcmene
... Eurus, Apeliota as the winds veer in periplum
Io son la luna". Cunizza
as the winds veer in periplum.\(^{113}\)

The poet must skirt around uncharted coastlines, without any specific destination at which to aim, blown by chance winds. This method of quite conscious "errance" is associated with a female principle—with nymphs, breezes and historical heroines. The poet must approach an ever-receding shoreline of unmediated knowledge indirectly, via the mediation of books. Knowledge of past cultures, states of being, is gained, in the Cantos, by reading—of Chinese histories, of historical letters and archives, of translations (sometimes in many versions) of basic texts such as Dante and Homer. Book-knowledge, multiply indebted,
multiply removed, paradoxically coexists with moments (questioned immediately) of acute, unmediated apprehension of divine nature. Books form the coastline that must be followed—endlessly and in a circular fashion—in order to come upon such tenuous moments of knowledge.

3.d. Problems of writing

A final problem that we discovered to arise in the making of encyclopaedias is that the encyclopaedia would be a "mirror held up to nature," but finds itself, as well, to be writing, to be a self-sustaining creation as much as a reflection. The fictional encyclopaedia repeats the encyclopaedia's equivocation in the matter of its relation to the world. In its twentieth-century incarnations, especially, representation of the world becomes increasingly tenuous. (This trend accords with the thinking of Modernism and Postmodernism.) The modern fictional encyclopaedia (Cantos, Finnegans Wake, Ulysses, Paradis) no longer seems to be interested, as the encyclopaedia is, in being a mirror on the world or an objective reporting of all the domains of knowledge. Instead, it introduces the reader into a sort of phantasmagoria of knowledge, a review of all its domains, all the books, in the modes of subjectivity, delirium, "errance," dream (or automatism) and myth. Pre-twentieth-century examples of the genre, existing before the influence of Modernism and such anti-representational trends, nonetheless share with the modern examples a desire to run through the entire spectrum or circle of knowledge in a way dictated by the internal
organization or order of this body, and not by the assumed structure of the world; encyclopaedism again becomes anti-representation. What was noted in the non-fictional encyclopaedia to be a tension only, a complication of ideal by practice and vice-versa, becomes in the fictional text a preference for a formal or internal order of knowledge at the expense of representation.

3.e. Formal consequences

One more formal characteristic of the fictional encyclopaedia has already been mentioned, but deserves elaboration: this is its breaking-up of linear narrative, which nonetheless seems to remain as a base to which the work returns after its numerous digressions—or to which the work refers if only implicitly. A delight in digressions into the nooks and crannies of knowledge, often at the expense of a story, may be the transposition into fiction of the ordering principle of the encyclopaedia, whereby discursive pieces are arranged on the basis of an order that has come to be internal to the knowledge-gathering enterprise, an order which may be alphabetic or systematic. This order is not, then, a narrative order. In the fictional encyclopaedia, similarly, the internal relation of the domains of knowledge takes precedence. In Bouvard et Pécuchet, for example, each domain naturally suggests itself in its conventional relation to all the others; the work often gives in to the temptation to digress into this order, to embark on a "périple encyclopédique," and to transgress the narrative line. Perhaps the form of such a text, in addition to being thematic or systematic, also follows the episodic
order of the early epic. In the fictional encyclopaedia, such an order manifests itself in the emphasis accorded to segments of the whole at the expense of any sense of a coherent totality or completed work. Digressions and fragments fit into this pattern, in that they are given as much emphasis, take up as much of our attention, as parts of the text more in conformity with a linear narrative. In the fictional encyclopaedia, then, a principle of order that may be called, variously, thematic or episodic (or symbolic) is constantly in tension with, and breaking into, a linear (or teleological) mode of order, with the latter nonetheless remaining operative in the text—or at least in the reader's expectations.

An encyclopaedic breakdown of linearity is evident, for example, in Dante's *Commedia*, where the journey-narrative is regularly interrupted by digressive commentary made by the traveller on contemporary politics, on the lives of friends, and on literary works and literary ancestors. In another example, the linear movement of Sollers' *Paradis*—linear in the sense that it follows the continuous onrush of the voice reading aloud—is in tension with the multiplicity of vertical topics (autobiographical, political, psychoanalytic, etc.) which appear and disappear, following an inner logic of the text, the logic which we have seen to link the domains of knowledge in the encyclopaedic Machine. Both the *Commedia* and *Paradis*, and the fictional encyclopaedia in general, are importantly concerned with evoking, or attaining to, paradisiacal states of being. Digressive or discontinuous form, then, enacts on one level the essential discontinuity of such states.
CHAPTER II
FINNEGANS WAKE

1. Special problems

Our task in studying Finnegans Wake will be to determine how it translates into a fictional context the equivocations basic to the knowledge-gathering enterprise of the encyclopaedia. It will be useful, however, to look first at certain formal difficulties or eccentricities of the work, as a base for a discussion of fictional encyclopaedic traits. One of these eccentricities—the central use of wordplay in the form of puns, portmanteau words and combinations of these two is well known. The other involves a building of lines by an association of words which is not free (that is, automatic or directed by the unconscious), but rather tightly controlled by the cultural or ready-made categories of knowledge. These two operations, basic to the Wake, of wordplay and "automatic" metonymic expansion have implications for our discussion of fictional encyclopaedism. The presence of these processes in Finnegans Wake emphasizes the question of the nature of the knowledge dealt with in the encyclopaedic work, and the relation that the work takes to this material. Wordplay has been linked by Freud to an evasion of psychic expenditure; this evasion is linked, in the Wake, to an indiscriminate multiplication and manipulation of the categories of knowledge; wordplay and word association simultaneously work through all the domains of knowledge in such a way as to avoid or defer the
prescriptions of a literary Reality Principle which would edit semantic abundance and restrict any multiplication of connections among ideas.

For Freud, wordplay foregrounds the principle of economy or compression; diverse materials are brought together in the smallest possible space—the word. Pleasure derives from such a "short-circuit," which is even more effective (more pleasurable) "the more alien the two circles of ideas that are brought together by the same word." Rational discourse, on the other hand, emphasizes the separation between ideas. The joke performs an evasion of this principle and pleasure results. In Finnegans Wake it is the categories of knowledge—its subdivisions into flora and fauna, trades and sciences, theology, practical wisdom, and so on—whose disparities are overcome in the most startling juxtapositions. In the pun, for example, a similarity in the sound of two words will bring together and compress widely divergent categories. Further, the portmanteau word effects such a compression via similarities in both the sound and the appearance of the words involved. Finally, word association of course expands rather than compresses significance; like the joke, nonetheless, it presupposes an evasion of "rational" processes; semantic paradigms are actualized for their own sake and are not controlled by an over-all narrative order.

Similarity of sound coupled with disparity of meaning: the joke, then, compresses a great deal into a small space. Indeed, in the context of encyclopaedism, we might say that the joke has at its disposal the entire circle of knowledge. It may select from any segments of the circle, and may combine widely-separated areas of
knowledge. The joke is thus potentially an encyclopaedia in miniature: in its overcoming of semantic incongruities via the principle of similarity of sound, it recalls another arbitrary order— that of the alphabetic encyclopaedia. Both orders may create humour in their unexpected and often grotesque conjunctions of disparate elements of knowledge.

1.a. The pun

In Finnegans Wake there are three main mechanisms of wordplay. The first, the pun, is perceived only by the ear: a word suggests another word of similar sound but different meaning; a phrase may point to another phrase, to a snatch of song, a proverb, prayer, and so on. Thus words are hidden behind words, so to speak. This mechanism has also been called "klang-association." The following examples demonstrate such "double talk":

(Shaun the Post)
Show'm the Posed: . . . the captivating youth . . . (92.13-.16)

(Shem the Penman)
Shun the Punman!: . . . that fenemine Parish Poser . . . (93.13-.14)

(If I have not charity it profiteth me nothing)
If I hope not charity what profiteers me? Nothing! (448.22-.23)

I should tell you that honestly, on my honour of a
(Earwicker) (Wordsworth)
Nearwicked, I always think in a wordworth's of that
(Dante, Goethe and primed favourite continental poet, Daunty, Gouty and Shakespeare)
Shopkeeper . . . (539.04-.06)
(Where the bee sucks, there suck I)
... where the bus stops there shop I; here which ye see, yea rest. (540.15-.16)

Here, the word that one reads is undeformed (or nearly so) and easily recognizable. The word evoked is not manifest in the text, but is latent, depending on the reader's memory (of this text and of other texts, of proverbs, of names, and so on) for its reconstruction. Words or phrases evoked function very like an intertext (in Riffaterre's sense), a body or subtext hinted at by clues in the manifest text, by slight stylistic anomalies or other clues that signal its latent presence. The reader of the *Wake* must read this other text in between the lines of the text at hand. What results is a sort of double (or multiple) text, where the levels or parts are related by sound but are often widely divergent in meaning. The reader must proceed stereoscopically, as it were, keeping the levels simultaneously in mind. The wider the separation of the punning levels, the greater the effect of humour or grotesqueness—as in the "poets" example, above, or the banal version of Ariel's song. However, the pun may also be particularly just, depending on the context already established: the "Nearwicked"/Earwicker rapprochement takes its appropriateness from the myth, endlessly repeated in the novel, of Earwicker's folly or Fall.

In the *Wake*, then, the punning text one reads is something like the most recent layer of a giant palimpsest, where earlier layers are effaced but may be summoned up by the reader's memory of context and intertext. As in the palimpsest, the relation between the layers or texts is an arbitrary one: in the palimpsest, the connection is simply
the paper they are written on; in the pun, the connection is shared sound. In both cases, diverse meanings may be grotesquely juxtaposed. What is read beneath the manifest text is not, as in Freud's notion of the dream, an integrated other text; the palimpsestic or punning text is not the "mutilated and altered transcript of certain rational psychical structures . . .," but is rather the playful record of structures arbitrarily brought together and bearing no rational relation among themselves. Words, phrases, proverbs, bits of song and prayer are read "beneath" the Wake via the pun; diverse categories of knowledge are evoked, but to no single great end, in no "rational" structure. "Palimpsestic" punning, then, selects from the circle of knowledge but ignores the internal or systematic order of this circle, extracting its elements for a new, poetic end.

1.b. The portmanteau word

The second important type of wordplay in Finnegans Wake is that performed by the portmanteau or composite word. Here both the ear and the eye come into play, whereas the pun, we have seen, is a purely aural phenomenon. Just as the pun as palimpsest performs a displacement, via shared sound, from a manifest to a hidden level of sense, so the composite word involves another dream-mechanism, that of condensation. Here an element in the dream does the work of several elements in the dream-thoughts: "... an element in the dream corresponds to a nodal point or junction in the dream-thoughts, and, as compared with these latter, must quite generally be described as 'overdetermined'." Now,
in wordplay the principle of semantic overdetermination creates a preference for words "the sound of which expresses different meanings." A single word may have several meanings, as, for example, when Polonius uses the multivalent "tender" in his warning to Ophelia about Hamlet:

... Think yourself a baby
That you have ta'en these tenders for true pay
Which art not sterling. Tender yourself more dearly,
Or (not to crack the wind of the poor phrase)
Tend'ring it thus you'll tender me a fool.

Different words (homonyms) may have the same sound, as in the Wake's 
"... a potion a peace, a piece aportion" (397.18). Finally, composite words are constructions which compress, via their similarity in sound (and sometimes spelling), several different words into one. In Finnegans Wake, there are numerous cases of composites. For example:

Terror of the noonstruck by day, cryptogam of each nightly dividable. (261.26-.27)

Idle were it ... to inquire whether I, draggedasunder, be the forced generation of group marriage, holocry togam ... (546.11-.13)

Here, the Letter or "mamafesta" ("holo-," "crypto-," "-gramme," "gamme") is associated with ALP and marriage. In another example:

... erigenating from next to nothing and
celesc edating the himals and all,
hierarchitectitiptitoploftical ... (4.36-5.02)

Referring to the Masterbuilder, Finn or man, the first term combines "celestial" and "escalating," while the second combines "hierarchical,"
"architectural," "tiptop" and "lofty." Finally, we find the following:

... till light kindling light has led we hopas but hunt we the journeyon, iteritinerant, the kal his course, amid the semitary of somnionia. Even unto Heliotropolis, the castellated, the enchanting.

(594.06-.09)

"Iteritinerant" combines "iterate" and "itinerant" and refers to the form of the Wake's "journeyon," which proceeds by repetitions and digressions. "Heliotropolis" (combining "Helios," "heliotrope" and "metropolis") is a variant of Celestial City, a cherished goal which yet paradoxically contains its own evasion or turning ("trope").

Composite words are distinguished from puns or "double talk" by their evident status as neologisms. In the pun, the word recalling another is itself a familiar word; it is not taken apart and reassembled by the process of condensation. The composite words above look unfamiliar; further, they do not recall other words latent beneath them. The words condensed in a composite word remain at the manifest level of the text; all may be seen, in various degrees of fragmentation and recombination, in the larger word itself. In reading puns, one reads a second text between the lines of the surface text; in processing portmanteau words, one breaks the text apart into its components and holds these suspended in one's mind.

Relations among the components of the portmanteau word follow the same general principles operative in all wordplay. When the components are close in sense, the composite word is more poetically "just"; for example: "... most surely I pretend and reclam to opt for
simultaneous. Till daybowbreak and showshadows flee" (546.22-.23). Here, "daybreak" or dawn and "rainbow" share the signified "beautiful colours"; their condensation into "daybowbreak" epitomizes metaphorical "opt[ing] for simultaneous." On the other hand, when the components are far apart in sense, the composite word is humorous or even grotesque. For example, the phrase, "... the euphorious hagiohygiecynicism of his die and be diademned" (353.08), refers to the figure Butt (Shem). "Hagios" (saint) and "hygiene" are linked only by similarity of sound; their conjunction has a grotesque effect which is nonetheless in keeping with the figure of Butt—to whom "-cynicism" certainly applies. Shem's paradoxical quality is also evoked in the pun "die and be diademned" ("die and be damned"), in which the saint's "diadem" contains the devil's damnation.

In these humorous portmanteau words the separation between encyclopaedic categories is overcome. Such a synthesis of the sublime and the base is also evident in puns such as "Daunty, Gouty and Shopkeeper" (539.06) already mentioned. In the pun, latent and manifest levels develop new and surprising connections with one another. Similarly, portmanteau words (especially those relying on sound-, rather than sense-, similarity) bring together, at the surface of the text, widely-divergent categories of knowledge. The study of the lives of saints and the science of health, for example, are mutually illuminated. Discontinuities among the orders of knowledge are overcome, then, in the wordplay of the Wake; such discontinuities also tend to be absorbed within the continuous syntactic onrush of the text. 14
Overcoming discontinuities among the parts of knowledge is a way of overcoming the Fall (Adam's, Humpty Dumpty's, etc.) informing the *Wake*. HCE's folly—an ironic version of original sin—prompts, not an admission of guilt, but rather the oxymoronic "felix culpa" in various punning versions (for example, "felicitous culpability," p. 263.29). In certain composite words, an admission of guilt encounters an evasion of guilt: "amenessy meeting" is "amnesia" and "amnesty meeting" in one motion (513.31); "incalpable" is both "incapable" and "culpable" (363.32). Discontinuities in the circle of knowledge function something like a metaphor of the Fall. Joking one's way through the Encyclopaedia—overcoming its discontinuities in the connections of new wordplay (and consequently overcoming limitations to human knowledge)—is a way of regaining Eden or "Heliotropolis." The perfect circle—or, better, the perfect map—of knowledge, where each part connects with all the other parts, is of course a virtuality only; it is a figure if not of original innocence, then at least of redemption. The *Wake*'s puns and composites, which maximize connections among the parts of knowledge, attempt to trace this figure.

1.c. *Punning portmanteau words*

The third major kind of wordplay in *Finnegans Wake* combines the traits of the other two to produce composite words that are also punning words. This is by far the most common type of wordplay in the *Wake*. For example:
Silence was in thy faustive halls, 0 Truiga, when thy green woods went dry but there will be sounds of manymirth on the night's ear ringing when our pantriarch of Comestowntonobble gets the pullover on his boots. (74.09-.12)

Here, in the neologism "faustive," "Faust" both combines with and recalls (sounds like) "feast" or "festive"; similarly, "pantry" and "patriarch" merge in an apt characterization of HCE. "Comestowntonobble" recalls "Constantinople" and "comes down to nothing"; such punning combines with "to nobble," a dishonest practice. Thus the patriarch of Constantinople in his festive halls falls (Faust-like) and becomes the petty lord of a pantry; both senses are contained in the punning composites, above. Let us look at a few more examples:

80.25 . . . the obluvial waters of our noarchic memory withdrew . . .

367.29-.30 . . . the bounds whereinbourne our solied bodies all attomed attain arrest . . .

553.19-.20 . . . I fenced it about with huge chesterfield elms and Kentish hops and rigs of barlow and bowery nooks and greenwished villas . . .

"Obluvial" is a composite of "oblivion" and "alluvial," with "obluvial waters" recalling "alluvial waters" and "waters of oblivion" (in keeping with our "noarchic memory" of the Flood). "Solied bodies" combines "sullied bodies" with "solid" and "soul." "Greenwished villas" combines "Greenwich Village" and the pastoral image "whitewashed villas" with a paradisiacal "green wish" (recalling Marvell's "green thought" in "The
Garden”), the whole according with the garden context of "bowery nooks."

In the punning portmanteau word, there is a balance of the familiar and the unfamiliar: the recollection of a familiar word ("festive," "patriarch") is accomplished by the unfamiliar conjunction of two or more words ("Faust"/"festive," "pantry"/"patriarch"). This type of wordplay is actually two types of joke in one: the reader has the pleasure of both deciphering the "double talk," the words beneath the words, as well as breaking the words apart and testing their relations. This double economy—in which disparate elements are connected twice over—characterizes most of the wordplay in the Wake.

Wordplay, then, in general involves the interplay of familiar and novel elements. In the pun, familiar elements are linked (via similarity of sound) in novel ways; it is the conjunction of elements, in themselves familiar, which is unfamiliar. In the composite construction, familiar elements are condensed into novel combinations. Thus, the composite word that also puns on other words enacts a dual discovery of familiarity in strangeness, sameness in difference. This discovery is also what constitutes the experience of repetition: the Wake is thus one of the most repetitive texts written as well as one of the most anomalous. In the over-all movement of the text, lexical neologism is balanced by syntactic familiarity; the text as a whole thus demonstrates the movement of repetition which is found in a nutshell in each instance of wordplay. It is not surprising, then, that the punning composite—a type of wordplay enacting a double or multiple discovery of familiarity in novelty—should be so ubiquitous in the Wake.
1.d. **Lexical chains**

In *Finnegans Wake* the phenomenon of word association, which works through the semantic pathways of the language, is a necessary counterpart to the practice of wordplay. Word association is linked to wordplay in the same way that metonymy or contiguity is inseparable, in the code, from metaphor or substitution: "L'imagination n'aurait pas la capacité d'inventer (ou de reconnaître) une métaphore si la culture, sous la forme d'une structure possible du système sémantique global, ne lui fournissait le réseau sous-jacent des contiguités arbitrairement stipulées."\(^{17}\)

Wordplay, then, is a form of metaphor-making. In the *Wake*, the pun as "double-talk" involves a semantic short-circuit, a bringing-together of two or more diverse areas of sense, one latent, the other manifest; the composite word also involves this juxtaposition of incongruous meanings as manifest in the word on the page. The basis for both types of metaphorical rapprochement (or recognition) is either a phonetic or a semantic similarity. Eco has shown, however, that in the case of the metaphor, what looks like an analogical relation turns out to be, at base, a relation of contiguity already established within the cultural network, language or code. He has shown how a pun in the *Wake*, such as, for example, "meandertale" (18.22), is formed by a clustering of words around an initial word, "Neanderthal," to which they are related by a phonetic contiguity.\(^{18}\) Thus wordplay, in the *Wake*, is based on conventional word associations as much as it is on the perception of new resemblances. A metaphorical substitution or
short-circuit is based on the previous establishment of a metonymic network, a list of possibilities for metaphoric substitution related among themselves by phonetic and semantic contiguity. In deciphering Joyce's wordplay, we recapitulate this process, work backward through it.

Word association—normally, then, a process of the linguistic unconscious—is pursued in the text of the *Wake* alongside the wordplay it normally underpins. The associative chains of the *Wake* rely on a network, noted above, of semantic relations; these chains suggest that a knowledge of things in themselves is actually a knowledge of relations, of the classes of things, of their kinds. Let us look at an example of such word association. Here, the reader moves along a chain of semantic equivalents. As J.-M. Rabaté notes: "Un élément suffit pour déclencher une réaction en chaine, et aimer les autres éléments d'un groupe latent."¹⁹

—Faith, then, Meesta Cheeryman, first he come up, a gag as a gig, badgeler's rake to the town's major from the wesz, MacSmashall Swingy of the Cattelaxes, got up regardless, with a cock on the Kildare side of his Tattersull, in his riddlesneek's ragamufflers and the horrid contrivance as seen above, whisklyng into a bone tolerably delicately, the *Wearing of the Blue*, and taking off his plushkwadded bugsby in his perusal flea and loisy manner, saying good mrowkas to weevilybolly and dragging his feet in the usual course and was ever so terribly naas, really, telling him clean his nagles and fex himself up, Miles, and so on and so fort, and to take the coocoomb to his grizzlies and who done that foxy freak on his bear's hairs like fire bursting out of the Ump pyre and, half hang me, sirr, if he wasn't wanting his calicub body back before he'd to take his life or so save his life. Then, begor, counting as many as eleven to thritytwo seconds with his pocket browning, like I said, wann swanns wann, this is my awethorrorty, he kept forecursing hascupth's foul
Fanden, Cogan, for coaccoackey the key of John Dunn's field fore it was for sent and the way Montague was robbed and wolfling to know all what went off ... (516.03-.22)

Here, one animal is named—"badgeler" or badger—and this naming initiates a lexical "chain reaction." A number of animal words, members of the latent paradigm or list of all such words in the language, enter the text by virtue of their association with the initiating word: "Cattelaxes" (cattle), "cock," "grizzlies," "foxy," "bear's hairs," "calicub" (bear cub), "wolfling." An insect chain breaks off from the animal one and develops within the larger animal context: "bugsby," "flea and loisy" "weevilybolly," "cocoomb." We can see from such terms as "flea and loisy" and "weevilybolly" that "flea", "louse" and "boll weevil" do not add themselves to the chain of insect equivalents simply because they are insects. If this were the case, any insect—ant, cockroach, etc.—would do. The terms that are actually selected and used are those that have, beyond their semantic association with the insect paradigm, a phonetic contiguity with words in common syntactic constructions, in clichéd phrases ("free and easy manner," "good morrow to everybody"). Resulting from this phonetic contiguity are the punning expressions, "flea and loisy manner" and "good mrowkas to weevilybolly." Word association is not, then, the same thing as psychic automatism. The drive to scan the paradigm or encyclopaedic category and expand, from an initial element, into a chain of equivalents is consciously controlled, in the fictional text, by theme and character requirements, by syntactic rhythms and by intertextual factors (interference by proverbs, clichés, song-titles, etc.).
There are yet two other lexical chains in the passage above. A haberdashery/dandy chain has been developed prior to this point, and is continued in "rake," "Tattersull" (tatters/Tattersall check tweed), "ragamufflers" (ragamuffin, muffler), "Wearing of the Blue," "plushkwadded bugsby," "clean his nagles," "fex himself up," "coocoomb" (comb), "calicub" (calico). This chain is associated with Earwicker, whose voice comes to dominate the end of this chapter (Book III, Chapter iii); HCE is commonly characterized in terms of outlandish costumes. There is also a literary chain, a series of authors' names or book-titles developing out of "pocket browning": "wann swanns wann" (Swann's Way), "Fanden" (Fagan?), "John Dunn" (Donne), "Montague" (Montaigne). This series might actually begin with "Cattelaxes," which looks, and somewhat sounds, like Swann's and Odette's "cattleyas"; and it also recalls the Irish epic, The Cattle-raid at Cooley. 20

All the chains (animals, insects, haberdashery, literature) intersect at certain nodal points, in terms such as "calicub," "coocoomb," "Tattersull" (Tattersall is also a horse-betting firm), "bugsby" (busby hat) and "pocket browning" (recalling "pocket watch" in the haberdashery context). Lexical expansion in the Wake is thus never simple or linear; it is, rather, multidimensional, owing to the ubiquitous wordplay by means of which two or more chains may meet in a single word. Lexical chaining is also, and most importantly, not free association, not a form of psychic automatism. In it, instead, a free semantic scanning is interrupted by the pressure of context and intertext, resulting in very conscious lexical selections that still
satisfy the impulse to write lists.

2. **Problems of totalization**

A central problem in the nature of the encyclopaedic enterprise is the totalization paradox: the encyclopaedia, in its drive to include the totality of things known, engages in practices (continuous revision, publication of supplements and new editions) which betray the actual impossibility of such a total inclusion. Translated into fiction, this means that the book achieves an inclusion of many domains of knowledge, while nonetheless betraying a sense of the virtuality of any totalization of knowledge. This "wariness" often works itself out in a parodic treatment of totalizing or encyclopaedic systems, works or authors. It is also manifested, in the opposite direction, in the book's nostalgic play with images of completion, fullness, such images being nonetheless subject to play, to the insistent repetitions and digressions of the text.

*Finnegans Wake* takes the fictional encyclopaedia's ironic attitude toward knowledge—and yet a search for knowledge is at the very center of its endeavour. In the pages to follow I will consider the nature of the *Wake*'s treatment of knowledge and of the possibility of its totalization. The work's heterogeneous inclusion of many domains of knowledge is achieved through the functioning of certain modes of inclusion. Nonetheless, the work retains a critical attitude towards such inclusion, as indicated in its parodic imitation of the encyclopaedic systems or philosophies of Vico and Bruno. My second
major consideration will be the way in which certain images in the *Wake*—the rainbow, the musical scale, the alphabet—suggest circularity and completion, with their insistence in the text betraying a certain nostalgia for these qualities. Such images are repeated in the synthetic play of Wakean language itself, and yet they are also belied by the digressions and repetitions of the narrative.

2.a. **Modes of inclusion**

*Finnegans Wake*, as fictional encyclopaedia, refers to many domains of knowledge, to a multitude of odd facts and names and items. As the basic narrative kernels—HCE's indiscretions in the Park, his persecution and resurrection, plus the tales of Tristan and Isolde, Jacob and Esau, and so on—are repeated endlessly and in various permutations, elements of human knowledge are drawn into the text in a seemingly all-encompassing centripetal movement. The medium of this inclusion is, of course, the language of the *Wake*: the omnipresent puns and portmanteau words are the means whereby several categories of knowledge may be drawn, or collapsed, together; further, lexical chains work through such categories metonymically—and theoretically endlessly—in the aspiration to name an infinity of things known. Often the *Wake*'s forays into the circle of knowledge seem to be at odds with its narratives. It is as much a reference work as it is a story. And yet as a fictional work, the *Wake* has a different intent and draws on a different tradition and set of expectations than does the non-fictional encyclopaedia. The criterion of objective truth, by which
the latter is judged, is suspended in the former. Inclusion of all knowledge is not the only goal of theWake; it is linked with a concern for the telling, and retelling endlessly, of the Fall. TheWakeas fictional encyclopaedia is the scene, then, of an interplay between narrative and encyclopaedic digression. The tension between tale and reference work is resolved, in theWake, in two different ways. Encyclopaedic digression may have an arbitrary shape imposed upon it, a shape deriving from certain conventions—such as the epic list—external to it but in sympathy with it. Within these boundaries, such knowledge is free to expand and digress according to its own categories, independently of the narrative. Alternatively, certain domains of knowledge may be called into play, usually by some aspect of one of the characters, which from then on are permitted to follow their own inner logic, converging and diverging among themselves in ways that illuminate the fiction. The first arrangement, we shall see, is external to the fiction; the second is directed by the fiction.

2.a.1. External modes of inclusion

The two main external orders imposed, in theWake, on the mass of material to be known are those of the catechism and the list. (Others include the children's rhyme—for example, "The House that Jack Built," p. 580.26-.36—and the proverb, p. 579.10-.25). In Book I, Chapter 6 of the novel, both the catechism and the list are extensively used: one question may evoke a list as its answer (no. 4); another question, itself including a long list, may evoke a short answer (no. 1).21 This
chapter is, accordingly, a good example of a fixed order or framework supporting and generating a mass of elements of knowledge (such an order being used as well in *Ulysses*, in, for example, the questions and answers of "Ithaca"). Lists are to be found at other points in the *Wake*: there are, for example, the lists naming HCE (pp. 71-2) and naming ALP's Letter (pp. 104-7). This use of an arbitrary order to generate a multitude of elements of knowledge also recalls Lautréamont's and the Surrealists' practice of using a fixed structure such as the "beau comme" or epic simile to generate a great number of disparate items of knowledge.  

Paradoxically, in the *Wakean* list as in the surrealist metaphor, the more rigid or conventional the external framework, the more freedom there is for inclusion of, and expansion upon, elements of knowledge. (In realist narrative and metaphor, on the other hand, where a more elastic form responds more to demands of verisimilitude, the inclusion and expansion of encyclopaedic categories is strictly limited.)

Let us see the sort of encyclopaedic diversity the question and list forms encourage, taking as our first example parts of the first question in Book I, Chapter 6, and its answer:

1. What secondtonone myther rector and maximost bridgesmaker was the first to rise taller through his beanstale than the bluegum buaboababbaun or the giganteous Wellingtonia Sequoia; went nudiboots with trouters into a liffeyette when she was barely in her tricklies; ... thought he weighed a new ton when there felled his first lapapple; ... like a heptagon crystal emprisoms trues and fauss for us; ... is escapemaster-in-chief from all sorts of houdingplaces; ... from zoomorphology to omnimalism he is brooched by the spin of a coin; towers, an eddistoon amid the lampless, casting
swannbeams on the deep; threatens thunder upon malefactors and sends whispers up fraufrau's froutrous; . . . arches all portcullised and his nave dates from dots; . . . hock is leading, cocoa comes next, emery tries for the flag; . . . is a simultaneous equator of eliminated integras when three upon one is by inspection improper; . . .

[etc.]

Answer: Finn MacCool!

(126.22-131.33)

Here, a question involving a long list of attributes (extending over a number of pages) receives a short answer, the name at the base of the book. The attributes of Finn or HCE are piled up, as each segment of the list makes a fresh attempt to pose the riddle of the Father's nature and power. Each segment appears to be independent of those segments preceding it; each draws upon a different field of knowledge.

Vertically, then, in its relation to culture and encyclopaedic paradigms, the list is composed of discrete elements. Horizontally, however, the list overcomes the gulfs separating these elements. The over-all effect of this, for the reader, is one of straddling, Gulliver-like, the gulfs separating the miniaturized domains of knowledge (an effect similar to that experienced when reading consecutively the articles of an alphabetic encyclopaedia). So, consecutively, this passage scans the circle of knowledge and casts up the following: the mythical giants at the beginning of the world and Vico's theory of origins, plus Ibsen's Masterbuilder ("which . . . maximost bridgesmaker was the first to rise taller through his beanstale . . . "); myths and fairy tales ("myther rector," "beanstale" or "Jack and the Beanstalk"); botany, or trees—especially large ones
("buaboababbaun" suggests the baobab tree, while the Sequoia is a giant evergreen); the Wellington Monument or obelisk in Phoenix Park\(^2\) ("Wellingtonia," "towers" in line 31); trout-fishing ("went nudiboots with trouters"); Dublin geography, or the River Liffey ("liffeyette"); Newton's discovery of the law of gravity ("thought he weighed a new ton when there felled his first lapapple"); Genesis and the eating of the fruit ("first lapapple"); the sciences of optics ("crystal emprisoms" or the prism) and of geometry ("heptagon"); Houdini and the art of magical escapes ("escapemaster-in-chief . . . houdingplaces"); zoomorphism or the creation of gods in animal form, plus animal morphology ("zoomorphology"); animism and pantheism ("omnianimalism"); Thomas Edison and the invention of the incandescent lamp ("eddistoon amid the lampless"), plus \textit{Swann's Way} and the famous magic lantern (" . . . casting swannbeams on the deep"); Jove the thunderer and Vico's version of the beginning of human history ("threatens thunder upon malefactors"); architecture, especially medieval ("arches all portcullised"); drinks and horse racing (" . . . hock is leading, cocoa comes next . . . "); mathematics ("equator . . . integras"). At this point, the reader has lost any sense of reading a question; each new digression into the Encyclopaedia leads further away from a conventional question-and-answer structure. Thus, when an answer is finally reached ("Finn MacCool!") it falls a little flat. The emphasis, of course, has been not on reaching an answer, but on the elaboration of the question.

The list, in its heterogeneous composition, is the ideal form to use for encyclopaedic digression. The catechism, as well, rests on the
question of knowledge, the naming and retrieval of its elements. These forms are pedagogical and may even function as markers of encyclopaedism in a literary text; yet they are neutral with respect to the actual elements of knowledge evoked. These forms also function in the fiction to intensify the representation of character and myth in the Wake. Such representation is at work in the passage examined above. Each item in the list simultaneously refers to a fragment of cultural knowledge and to the central themes and character configurations in the Wake. For example, "... is a simultaneous equator of elimbinated integras when three upon one is by inspection improper" refers as much to the narrative kernel of HCE's impropriety in the Park, with its repeated numerical configuration of three/two/one, as it does to mathematics. The resonance of each segment in the list is, then, both vertical and horizontal, both cultural (intertextual) and narrative (contextual). The tendency with the lists in the Wake, however, is to emphasize the categories of knowledge over the narrative material; this, because it is so simple and so often repeated, offers little ballast to the reader to counteract a dizzying journey through the categories of the Encyclopaedia.  

In another example—a list of the attributes of HCE, in the form of abusive names that have been given him—we see a similar tension between intertext and context, between the categories of knowledge and the character traits and exploits of HCE. This time the making of lists is thematized, while abuse gets the upper hand over encyclopaedic allusion: "Earwicker, that patternmind, that paradigmatic ear ..."
compiled . . . a long list (now feared in part lost) to be kept on file of all abusive names he was called . . .: . . . Old Fruit, Yellow Whigger, . . . Yass We've Had His Badannas, . . . Cainandabler, . . . Ireland's Eighth Wonderful Wonder, . . . Hebdromadary Publocation, . . . Magogagog, . . . Gouty Ghibeline, . . . Scuttle to Cover, . . . Edomite, . . . Bad Humborg . . .," etc. (pp. 70-2). The reader, lending a "paradigmatic ear" to the text, encounters the following allusions in the epithets: Genesis, and Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit; the Whig or English Liberal party along with the earwig (HCE); the popular song, "Yes, We Have No Bananas"; Genesis, and the conflict of Cain and Abel; the Seven Wonders of the World—plus one; zoology (the dromedary) and numbers (hebdomad, the group of seven so important in the Wake); a pub's location and the activity of publication; the Book of Revelation, and the nations of Gog and Magog warring against God; medieval Italian politics, and the rival factions of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines; Vico's notion of the origin of the family in the "scuttling to cover" of wild men under the thunder of Jove; the Bible, and the distance travelled between Eden and Sodom; German cities. These references exist within a context of abuse ("Old Fruit," "Yellow . . .," "Scuttle to Cover"); they add another layer of meaning to this abuse.

A similar double movement is to be found in the list of names for ALP's Letter or the "mamafesta." A plunge into the Encyclopaedia is balanced by references to the surface context of letters, literature, and ALP's relations with HCE. To take just a few of these titles: " . . . Rebus de Hibernicus, The Crazier Letters, . . . For Ark see
Zoo, . . . Try our Taal on a Taub, The Log of Anny to the Base All, 
. . . Abe to Sare Stood Icyk Neuter till Brahm Taulked Him Common Sex 
. . . ," etc. (pp. 104-106). "Rebus" suggests Freud's theory of the 
dream-work, while "Hibernicis" emphasizes this sleepy activity as well 
as referring to Hibernia or Ireland. There is also the Book of Genesis, 
with Noah and his ark; Swift's Tale of a Tub and The Drapier's Letters 
("the Crazier Letters"); mathematics, and in particular logarithms; 
Abraham and Sarah, Isaac Newton, Johannes Brahms. The discontinuities 
of this vertical or "paradigmatic" array of items contrasts with the 
continuities established by a contextual (or "syntagmatic") reading of 
the list, in which meanings relevant to ALP and her Letter are common to 
all the elements of the list. So, "rebus" is a picture-writing; "The 
Crazier Letters" suggests ALP's Letter and its motley, eccentric aspect; 
"For Ark see Zoo" suggests the cross-referencing found in an 
encyclopaedia, and also refers to the totality of the alphabet, A-Z, and 
further the zoo in Phoenix Park 25; and Swift's digressive and 
heterogeneous Tale is an apt metaphor for the hen's Letter. 

Thus the lists in the Wake elicit a double or palimpsestic 
reading, balancing paradigm (intertext) and context. This double 
movement, of course, constitutes reading in general; however, reading a 
fictional list emphasizes this experience. Discontinuities between the 
elements of the list emphasize the heterogeneity of the elements of 
knowledge. There may be a discrepancy between the fictional context and 
the knowledge paradigms referred to, as in the case of the list of 
abusive names; there may, however, be points of contact between context
and paradigm, as in the "mamafesta" list above. The list, like the catechism, is thus an external order shaping the multiple narratives of *Finnegans Wake*. The associations of these orders with pedagogical practice means that they function as a shorthand for encyclopaedism; paratactical tools, they break open the text to receive encyclopaedic expansions. The list of famous names in the margin of pp. 306-8 is an extreme example of this emphasis occurring in the appropriate context of the lesson notebook.

2.a.ii *Internal modes of inclusion*

A second mechanism of encyclopaedic inclusion is also at work in *Finnegans Wake*. Here, character and theme determine the selection and inclusion of the elements of knowledge. Character and theme, that is, often appear to determine which elements of the Encyclopaedia surface in the text; they appear to put some brake on an indiscriminate expansion of these elements, channelling such expansion into appropriate paths. Several of these "paths" or lexical series may be found in a single passage and may lend themselves to the evocation of character or the development of theme. They may converge or diverge, reinforce or undermine one another. Two examples of this more "intrinsic" mechanism of encyclopaedic inclusion are the Butt and Taff episode (Book II, Chapter iii) and the portrait of Shaun the Post (Book III, Chapter i). Owing to the length of these passages, my citations will be very inadequate, merely suggesting an over-all "channelling" movement.

Butt and Taff are one pair in a series of pairs of warring
twins. Like Shaun, Taff pounces upon everything that Butt/Shem says, abusing his twin and discounting his words: "The lyewdsky so so sewn of a fitchid . . . his boney bogey braggs." (340.02-.03). Butt the trickster springs back easily, continuing his insinuations as to the Father's misdoings in the Park: "With guerillaman aspear aspoor to the prink the pranks of primkissies. And the buddies behide in the byre . . ." (340.10-12). This conflict between the twins is repeated, at the formal level, in the dialogue form taken by the text; dialogue is a kind of institutionalized conflict undertaken for the positive end of knowledge of the truth. And so both Butt and Taff merge in the end, "by the coincidence of their contraries reamalgamerge"27 into one ambiguous figure cowering in fear of the thundering Father, "Old Erssia's magisquammythical mulattomilitiaman" (354.10).

The conflict of Butt and Taff, repeated in the dialogue form and in the conflict of Buckley and the Russian General being discussed, is also worked out at the level of word-formation. That is, the theme of conflict or war determines the selections that are made from the Encyclopaedia, determines what categories will be opened up and developed. It is clear in this episode that the art of war—and the related domains of weaponry, history of war, and so on—dominate the lexical selections in this passage and are responsible for the turns of the wordplay. Any other categories of knowledge evoked are subordinated to these dominant areas and enter into resonance with them. For example:
BUTT (at the signal of his act which seems to sharpnel his innermals menody, playing the spool of the little brown jog round the wheel of her whang goes the miliner). Buckily buckily, blodestainted boyne! Bimbambombumb. His snapper was shot in the Rumjar Journaral. Why the gigls he lubbed beeeyed him.

TAFF (obliges with a two stop yogacogasumphoty on the bones for ivory girl and ebony boy). The balacleivka! Trovatarovitch! I trumble!

BUTT (with the sickle of a scygthe but the humour of a hummer, 0, howorodies through his cholaroguled, fumfing to a fullfrength with this wallowing olfact). Mortar martar tartar wartar! May his boules grow wider so his skittles gets worse! The aged monad making a venture out of the murder of investment. I seen him acting surgent what betwinks the scimitar star and the ashen moon. By their lights shalthow throw him! Piff paff for puffpuff and my pife for his cgar! The mlachy way for gambling . . . (341. 03-.17)

War and weaponry semes are being expanded in the following selections: "sharpnel" (shrapnel) "his innermals" (inner pain or wound); "Buckily" (Buckley, the foe of the Russian General, these two being another warring pair in the Wake); "blodestained boyne" (bloodstained boy and Battle of the Boyne); "bimbam . . ." (a bomb); "shot in the Rumjar Journaral" (the shooting of the Russian General); "balacleivka" (Battle of Balaclava, balaclava helmet, balalaika); "sickle" and "hummer" (weapons, also Soviet symbols); "scygthe" (scythe, another weapon); mortar fire; martyrs; Tartars; war; murder; "acting surgent" (acting sargeant, insurgent); scimitar. A Russian theme, developed in the selections above, ties in with that of war: the Russian elements that appear are linked to the Russian Revolution ("my pife for his cgar") or to the tale of Buckley and the Russian General. While the Russian and the warring strands reinforce one another in the above passage, other themes surface which appear to contrast with
these. The art of music, for instance, is suggested by "menody" (melody, threnody), "little brown jog" (the popular song "Little Brown Jug"), "playing the spool" (playing the spoons), "two stop . . . somphoty" (two step, symphony), "ivory girl and ebony boy" (piano keys), "balacleivka" (Russian balalaika), "pife" (fife, a military flute).

Popular games, further, are suggested by "boules" and "skittles" and "gambling." Musical and ludic strands do not, however, remain untouched in the predominantly Russian/military mode of the Butt and Taff debate: the balalaika links the musical and the Russian themes; the fife is both military and musical. In something like the process of condensation noted by Freud in the dream, the Wakean text condenses, in items such as the fife and the balalaika, several pathways developed from the Encyclopaedia, which is the repository of all those pathways that could be taken, all those items that could be selected but are not—owing to the particular pathways or selections demanded by Butt and Taff's sparring dialogue. Even musical and ludic paths, then, are not superfluous here. The dialogue form, especially the Wakean sort in which characters do not talk to one another but carry on something like two monologues, is analogous to musical counterpoint; the two speakers, again, are two players in a kind of game.

The warring twins, then, provide a shape for encyclopaedic expansion in *Finnegans Wake*, limit it to paths that more or less reinforce a character configuration of aggressor and defender. Another case of such intrinsic control on expansion involves the character of Shaun and its evocation in Book III, Chapter 1. In this chapter, a
number of strands determined by the Shaun character run alongside one
another—often with hilarious effect—and sometimes converge (or become
condensed, above) in certain words. To take a few examples from a very
lengthy text:

... and the damasker's overshirt he sported inside, a
starspangled zephyr with a decidedly surpliced
crinklydoodle front with his motto through dear life
embrothred over it in peas, rice, and yeggy-yolk, Or
for royal, Am for Mail, R.M.D. hard cash on the nail
and the most successfully carried gigot turnups ... 
breaking over the ankle and hugging the shoeheel,
everything the best—none other from (Ah, then may the
turtle's blessings of God and Mary and Haggispatrick
and Huggisbrigid be souptumbling all over him!) other
than (and may his hundred thousand welcome stewed
letters, relayed wand postchased, multiply, ay faith,
and pluhtiply!) Shaun himself.
(404.27-405.02)

—Goodbye now, Shaun replied, with a voice pure as a
churchmode, in echo rightdainty, with a good catlick
tug at his cocomoss candylock, a foretaste in time of
his cabbageous brain's curlyflower. Athiacaro! ... 
How are them columbuses! Lard have mustard on them!
... Poumeerme! My heaviest crux and dairy lot it is,
with a bed as hard as the thinkamuddles of the Greeks
and a board as bare as a Roman altar.
(409.11-.19)

The character Shaun is a dandy and a "gourmand"; he fancies
himself as a singer and, at other points, as a writer to rival his
brother Shem ("... my trifolium librotto, the authordux Book of Lief,
would, if given to daylight ... far exceed what that bogus bolsy of a
shame, my soamheis brother ... is conversant with in audible black and
prink," 425.20-.24). Shaun is also a postman carrying Shem's Letter,
and he is Christ Himself in His perambulations ("salve a tour, ambly
andy", 409.31). The text accordingly draws from, and expands metonymically, the domains of haberdashery, cookery, music, the postal service and religion. In "damasker" (damask), "overshirt," "surpliced" (surplice), "embrothred" (embroidered), "turnups" (trouser cuffs), a haberdashery strand is developed. A surplice is, in addition, a garment of the Roman Catholic or Anglican clergy. "Surpliced", then, is the point of intersection of two series—those of clothing and religion. The latter series of Shaun as Christ is developed in "God and Mary and Haggispatrick" ("hagios" or Saint Patrick as well as Scottish haggis), "pure as a churchmode" (poor as a churchmouse, pure in the church manner), "catlick" (Catholic), "heaviest crux" (heaviest cross to bear), etc. The "haggis"/"hagios" pun is likewise a point of intersection of the religious and culinary domains, an intersection fundamental to the Roman Catholic Church in the ritual of Communion.

A culinary theme is developed in "peas, rice, and yeggy-yolk," "gigot" (French for a joint of meat and slang for a man's leg), "turnups" (turnips, and also trouser cuffs, above), "Haggis", "soup-tumbling," "stewed letters", "cabbageous" and "curlyflower" (cabbage and cauliflower), "Lard have mustard" (Lord have mercy . . . ), "my . . . dairy lot," "board" (as in room and board), etc. Music is developed in the song-titles "starspangled zephyr" ("Starspangled Banner") and "crinkleydoodle" ("Yankee Doodle") and "Athiacaro" (Bellini's "A te o cara"). The wandering postman theme is developed in "Or for royal, Am for Mail," "letters," "relayed," "postchased" (postchaise, posthaste), and "columbuses" (messenger pigeons, Columbus
the explorer). Sometimes the conjunction of two strands—say, haberdashery and food—in one word or phrase creates an amusing effect of a literal or physical proximity, as in the culinary embroidery (food stains) on Shaun's front. Shaun as a character seems to draw the most widely-separated themes together, thus drawing the reader through diverse domains of the Encyclopaedia. This mode of encyclopaedic inclusion, where contrasting strands are played against one another to humourous effect (as opposed to the subordinating order noted in the Butt and Taff episode), is analogous to the practice of joke-formation\(^3\), with the qualification that it is not collapsing domains of knowledge into a single word, but rather over an extended passage.

2.b. **Imitation of literary modes and forms**

In thinking, earlier, about a literary encyclopaedic mode, we suggested that it has something to do with a sweeping inclusion and imitation of the other literary modes (mimetic and didactic), of the particular forms or genres in which these modes work themselves out, and of the styles which, within a particular genre, are the mark of an age or an author. We have called *Finnegans Wake* a fictional encyclopaedia because in it such an all-inclusive mode is operative and, indeed, dominant. In the *Wake*, in other words, it is not only the domains of knowledge, the entries in the Encyclopaedia, that are drawn into the orbit of each page and worked out or expanded there; it is also the literary modes, forms and styles that are included there. For
example, the literary mode of dramatic presentation is frequently imitated—and, in this imitation, is parodied. The interchanges of Jute and Mutt (pp. 16-18), Taff and Butt (pp. 338-354), the Mookse and the Gripes (pp. 152-157), and the Four Old Men (pp. 477-554, with the intervention of HCE) are in this mode. They parody the mode of direct representation of speech in their undermining, via wordplay, of clear speech itself, and in the fact that the players do not really communicate with one another, but rather pick up each other's puns and pursue chains of lexical association:

Jute.—But you are not jeffmuate?
Mutt.—Noho. Only an utterer.
Jute.—Whoa? Whoat is the mutter with you?
Mutt.—I became a stun a stummer.
Jute.—What a hauhauhauhauhdibble thing . . .
(16.14-18)

The lyrical mode is also imitated in the *Wake*. In this mode (equivalent to Jakobson's "poetic function"), formal regularities in the form of rhyme, repetition of words, assonance and alliteration are foregrounded over a matter told or a speech represented. For example, at the end of the washerwomen's gossip sequence (Book I, Chapter 8) we find the speaker turning into a tree and fading into the night:

Can't hear with the waters of. The chittering waters of. Flittering bats, fieldmice bawk talk. Ho! Are you not gone ahome? What Thom Malone? Can't hear with bawk of bats, all thin liffeying waters of. Ho, talk save us! My foos won't moos. I feel as old as yonder elm. A tale told of Shaun or Shem? All Livia's
As the *Wake* parodies the dramatic mode by twisting it into a purely formal interplay or word association, so it emphasizes the regularities of the lyric mode, formal from the start, to an almost hypnotic extent, to the point where lyricism becomes self-parody. The washerwoman's words imitate or recall not nature, but other words—rhymed verses, songs, incantations. Instead of direct or "pure" lyricism, what we have is lyricism at a certain remove, at "second hand." Encyclopaedic imitation, then, is a mimesis of a mimesis; in this gesture, lyricism becomes self-reflexive and parodic.

Didactic and narrative (or epic) modes are also often imitated in *Finnegans Wake*. The didactic mode is represented and parodied in the analysis of the hen's Letter, pp. 107-125. An example of epic narration is the following passage on HCE and Anna Livia:

For they met and mated and bedded and buckled and got and gave and reared and raised ... and planted and plundered and pawned our souls ... and fought and feigned with strained relations and bequeathed us their ills and recrutched cripples gait and undermined lungachers ... and tried to mingle and managed to save and feathered foes' nests and fouled their own ... and rolled oiled logs into Peter's sawyery and werfed new woodcuts on Paoli's wharf and ewesed Rachel's lea and rammed Dominic's gap ...  

(579.27-580.06)

Just as lyricism turns into lyric parody in an excessive emphasis on the formal regularity at the base of the mode, so the imitation, above, of
narration (in the epic or chronicle vein) involves a self-parody, a
narration at "second hand." Here as before parody involves the use of
overkill or excess, and the foregrounding of formal regularities over
any matter imitated. The passage above multiplies to excess the word
"and"—the conjunction normally ensuring the proper flow of a
narration. This use of polysyndeton is a sign of self-consciousness, a
sign that, besides telling a tale, the passage is imitating telling in
general (in its essential form of statements following one another
consecutively). Further, the alliterations of the passage ("planted and
plundered," etc.) direct attention away from the matter narrated,
focusing it, rather, on the formal or poetic nature of the language.
The word-associations of "feathered . . . fouled" (feathers, foul or
birds), "logs . . . woodcuts," "ewesed . . . rammed" (ewe, ram) are also
evidence of a foregrounding of formal regularity at the expense of
contextual sense; such word-associations involve the expansion of
categories of knowledge, the scanning of paradigmatic catalogues, in a
vertical movement interfering with horizontal or linear narration.

As a fictional encyclopaedia, *Finnegans Wake* also imitates
various literary forms or genres, and in this imitation parodies them.
In this imitation, the forms are appropriated and retained in the text,
while being used for ends quite different from, or opposing, those
usually associated with them. 33 Parody of forms in the *Wake* also seems
to involve the coexistence of recognizable forms with unrecognizable
language. In fact, the perception of parody might in general be seen to
consist in a recognition of the familiar in the unfamiliar, or vice-versa (this mechanism further being that which Freud posited for the perception of the uncanny\(^34\)).

The ballad form, for example, is imitated by "The Ballad of Persse O'Reilly" (pp. 44-7): the ballad's central narrative nature is repeated in this song's telling of Humpty Dumpty's/Earwicker's fall. The ballad's characteristic repetitions are to be found in the rhymes and repeated phrases of the parody: "With the bailiff's bom at the door,/ (Chorus) Bimbam at the door./ Then he'll bum no more."

(46.08-.10). "The Ballad of Persse O'Reilly" continues in the vein of accusation against, and persecution of, Earwicker already established in Book I, Chapter ii. It is one more shout against the "fafafather" (45.13): "Then we'll have a free trade Gaels' band and mass meeting/For to sod the brave son of Scandiknavery./ And we'll bury him down in Oxmanstown/ Along with the devil and Danes . . . " (47.20-.23). Thus the ballad is drawn into the *Wake* in its narrative and in its mob-rallying aspects; it is being used, here, not for customary political ends, but rather to invite a lynching mob to destroy the "fafafather" Earwicker.

The "Night Lesson" of Book II, Chapter ii, is similarly a form which is both recognizable and alien to the reader's expectations. It imitates the pages of a student's notebook, complete with marginal notes and footnotes. A schoolchild's studies in grammar ("And egg she active or spoon she passive," 269.28), in French ("Aujourd'hui comme aux temps de Pline . . . ", 281.04), in arithmetic ("Ace, deuce, tricks, quarts,
quims. Mumtiplay of course and carry to their whole number,"
283.04-.06), in geography or cartography ("Mux your pistany at a point
of the coastmap to be called a but pronounced olfa," 287.13-.15), and so
on, form the encyclopaedic or paradigmatic dimension through which the
obsessive concerns of the Wake—the sin in the Park, the family
configurations—can be read again and again. But like the ballad form,
above, the student's workbook is transformed by the parodic
(encyclopaedic) mode of the text. As a workbook, the piece is no longer
entirely recognizable. Its internal relations have been altered: the
marginal glosses bear no logical relation to the point in the text they
accompany and upon which they "comment"; the footnotes do not develop,
elaborate upon, the text from which they depart. Rather, the glosses
and the footnotes follow their own paths; each, corresponding to one of
HCE's children, exhibits a stylistic uniformity and a characteristic set
of preoccupations emphasizing its independence from the main body of the
text. The glosses belonging to Kevin/Shaun, for instance, exhibit
consistently a rather pompous pedagogical character, even when they
trade typeset and side of page with the glosses belonging to
Jerry/Shem. The parody of the school workbook thus consists in this
familiar form having its elements and their relations slightly changed,
such that the reader perceives the familiar through an alien lens, the
familiar form turning out, under closer inspection, to be
unrecognizable. Further, the parody consists in the use of the form for
a new purpose at odds with its original one: the "Night Lesson"
episode, in its preoccupation with the sexual configurations of HCE's
family, works against the scholarly concerns of its formal model.

Thus *Finnegans Wake* as fictional encyclopaedia incorporates and imitates literary modes and forms under the functioning of an encyclopaedic mode. Such literary inclusion and parody cannot easily be distinguished from the inclusion of cultural categories. We noted earlier how, in *Don Quixote*, parody of literary romance is equivalent to a course of education on romance conventions of courtly love and conflict. In just this way, in *Finnegans Wake* (as in other fictional encyclopaedias such as *Moby-Dick*) the incorporation and imitation of literary forms is equivalent to the inclusion, in the text, of segments of the circle of knowledge. We have seen, for example, how the epic form of name-lists becomes, in the *Wake*, a vehicle for encyclopaedic inclusion and expansion. And it appears that other literary forms, when imitated, entail the inclusion of a multitude of items of knowledge related to them. The opening to the mock-play, "The Mime of Mick, Nick and the Maggies" (Book II, Chapter i, pp. 219-222), for example, is equivalent to an education on stage and film conventions, theatre props, and so on. The schoolbook parody discussed above is indistinguishable from a survey of the topics studied at school. Thus the encyclopaedic or meta-mimetic mode characterizing the fictional encyclopaedia is related to the totalizing drive also characterizing this genre--and its non-fictional model. This is probably because the varieties of knowledge are generically mediated--usually being made available to us, in other words, only via the medium of the kinds of discourse, whether fictional or non-fictional.
2.c. **Treatment of encyclopaedic models**

An uncertainty as to the possibility of a totalization of knowledge is basic to the encyclopaedic work, both fictional and non-fictional. One aspect of this attitude, already noted with respect to *Finnegans Wake*, is a tendency to parody literary forms and modes, to transform them. Parody seems to be an expression of ambivalence towards an original or master text: "le rapport du texte à ses origines . . . est essentiel à tout écrit parodique. La parodie se pose en effet toujours par rapport à un original/originel auquel les versions détournées sont reliées par tout un ensemble de dégradations plus ou moins radicales." It is as though all the modes, forms, works, authors, when taken together could constitute the great body of knowledge so steadily desired. But because they do not do so—attesting, instead, to the mere virtuality of such totalization—they are opened up to parody in the fictional encyclopaedia. If the individual modes and forms of discourse are questioned in this way, then so much the more should be the great systems of thought which profess to be totalizing, to be inclusive of all that could be said on humanity, the world, the universe.

2.c.1 **Giambattista Vico**

Vico's universal history is the most visible of these encyclopaedic systems to be exploited and transformed in *Finnegans Wake*. J. Mitchell Morse has said that the *Wake* appears to be a "burlesque—not a parody but a burlesque—of *The New Science* . . . The
New Science and Finnegans Wake illustrate for literature Marx's remark to the effect that great events . . . in history occur . . . twice, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce." Now, if we take the distinction between parody and burlesque to be that parody is the more literary critical practice, focusing on an individual style or work, while burlesque is a looser form of deflation, aimed at a wider field of eccentric ideas, then perhaps we should understand Finnegans Wake to involve both a parody and a burlesque of Vico's New Science. If, to put it broadly, parody aims at words, while burlesque aims at ideas, then the Wake undertakes both with respect to Vico; both activities signal the text's fundamental ambivalence toward the notion of an encyclopaedic system, a system, in Vico's case, which would comprehend all human history in all the peoples of the world.

The Wake's parody of Vico involves the repetition of certain key words from the work, including the author's name; being transformed, or found in an incongruous context, these words take on a new meaning. Such parody is not always negative; it may involve a critical renewal. The most important word to be repeated is the proper name "Vico" itself, as it comes to stand for an entire system of thought. This name goes through a wide variety of transformations and surfaces in a number of different contexts. This is probably because it is overdetermined in the Freudian sense, referring both to an encyclopaedic thinker and to a location—Vico Road—in Dalkey. So we find the expressions "commodius vicus of recirculation" (3.14); "Dr. Tipple's Vi-Cocoa" (26.31), an actual brand of cocoa; "vicious circle" (98.19); "moves in vicious
cicles yet remews the same" (134.16); "The seim anew. Ordovico .. " (215.23); "Mr. John Baptistister Vickar" (255.27); "Old Vico Roundpoint" (260.27); "Old Vickers" (330.13); "The Gracehoper who . . yet knew . . . his good smetterling of entymology . . . tossed himself in the vico . . ." (417.03-.06); "The Vico Road goes round and round to meet where terms begin" (452.21-.22); " . . . from America Avenue and Asia Place and the Affrian Way and Europa Parade . . . and from Vico" (497.11-.13); "Vicus Veneris" (551.34); "Our whomole millwheeling vicociclometer" (614.27). In these expressions, the name is often integrated into the system of thought which it represents or sums up; in this case it becomes an adjective ("vicous cicles") or a common noun ("commodius vicus," "vicociclometer," "tossed himself in the vico"). The name may remain a proper noun but be inserted into a new context ("from America . . . Asia . . . Africa . . . Europe . . . and from Vico"—the name becomes the name of a place, no longer of a person). Or the name may be altered but not, this time, be thereby subject to deflation: " . . . made not I to pass through twelve Threadneedles and Newgade and Vicus Veneris to cooinsight?: my camels' walk, kolossa kolossa! . . . " (551.33-.35). In this latter expression, Vico's system becomes the way to truth, to a simultaneous or universal insight ("cooinsight") into human history.

Besides the name of the author, words or expressions from the *New Science* may be appropriated, transformed and placed in new contexts. For example, from Vico:
We postulate . . . that for many centuries, sodden with humidity from the Flood, the earth ejected neither dry exhalations nor burning matter into the air, to generate thunderbolts.

We observe that all nations, barbaric or human, though separately founded because of immense distances of time and space between them, preserve these three human customs: all have a religion, contract solemn marriages and bury their dead. And among the nations, no matter how savage and crude they be, no human actions are celebrated with more revered ceremonial and more sanctified solemnity than religion, marriage and burial . . . Hence we have adopted these three eternal and universal customs as the three first principles of this Science.

Compare the following passage from Book IV of Finnegans Wake:

Signifying, if tungs may tolkan, that, primeval conditions having gradually receded but nevertheless the emplacement of solid and fluid having to a great extent persisted through intermittences of sullemn fulminance, sollemn nuptialism, sallemn sepulture and providential divining, making possible and even inevitable . . . at the place and period under consideration a socially organic entity of a millenary military maritory monetary morphological circumformation in a more or less settled state of equonomic ecolube equalobe equilab equilibbrium.

Vico's vision of the origins of men in primeval thunderous conditions, and of the universal nature of human society and customs, is, of course, alluded to throughout the Wake, but achieves an extended expression in Book IV or the book of new beginnings. Vico's presence in this book serves to emphasize its place as a "ricorso," or return to origins, in the over-all scheme of the Wake.

Another expression resuming Vico's system, the "ideal eternal
history, traversed in time by the history of all nations," is to be found—transformed in sense but imitated in style—in several of the marginal notes attributed to Shaun in the "Night Lessons," Book II, Chapter ii: "... Prolegomena to Ideareal History" (262.05-.08); "Early Notions of Acquired Rights and the Influence of Collective Tradition upon the Individual" (268.07-.16); "Panoptical Purview of Political Progress and the Future Presentation of the Past" (272.09-.16). This imitation of key words ("Ideareal History" for "ideal history") and of a dry, professorial style, as well as of the themes of Vico's system as it is worked out in the margins of a child's workbook, deflates the original pronouncements and style; it makes of them a commentary on an apparently unrelated text. Such pronouncements are only marginal notes, and stylistically incongruous notes at that. Similarly, Vico's words on order in families being the foundation for cities—"Thus they [the first fathers] founded families and governed them so that later as cities arose they taught the necessity of obedience and order"—are recast in Dublin's motto, "Obedientia civium urbis felicitas," with this coincidence being one reason behind Dublin's importance for the Wake. HCE's failure to respect family order and to follow his civic duty is a "municipal sin business" (5.14), a sin of the family and the city, which is at the heart of the narrative repetitions and character displacements in the novel.

The Wake, then, appropriates and transforms words and expressions from Vico's encyclopaedic work. The parody has two effects, extending both to the parodied text and to the text undertaking the parodic
commentary. The *New Science* is obviously affected; it is fragmented and certain of the fragments are inserted into new—and often highly incongruous—contexts. As such Vico's totalizing thesis is put into question. If a work can be dismantled in this way, if its premises can be removed from their proper context and scattered through another text, then it cannot be the unified account of the whole of history that it would like to be. Similarly, the parody of Vico feeds back into the *Wake* itself, providing thematic material that is overdetermined because it is perceived by the reader to have come from another text, another system. The parody is thus both an incorporation and a fragmentation of another text; it is both an acknowledgement of debt and an attempt to throw off that debt. As such it reflects an encyclopaedic work's paradoxical evasion of an encyclopaedic model or Master.

If we can say that burlesque concerns itself with eccentric ideas rather than with specific words, then the *Wake*'s treatment of certain notions from Vico's system (those that render it the most bizarre and unforgettable) is certainly in the nature of a burlesque. In Vico, for instance, Jove's thunderbolt initiates the human order of marriage, family, and civic duty:

> Jove *strikes* by thunderbolt and lays low the giants
> 
> . . .

> . . . When Jove's first thunderbolts struck not everybody was laid low . . . the more alert . . . who had taken refuge in caverns through fear of the thunderbolts began, in that state of stupor, to feel human . . . desire . . . they used force to seize women and drag them into caves, where they kept them . . . through this first human custom, certain children were
born, from whom came certain families, which were the
basis of the first cities and, thence, of the first
kingdoms.

This emphasis on the thunderbolt is repeated in Joyce's text; Jove's
great sign is both imitated and deformed by means of linguistic
composites or gigantic interlingual portmanteau words. For example:

The fall (babadalgharaghtakamminarronkonnbronntonn-
erronntuonnthunntrovvarhounawmskawntooohoohoordenenthu-
rnuk!) of a once wallstrait oldparr is retaled early in
bed and later on life down through all christian
minstrelsy. (3.27-.30)

In these monstrous words, Joyce seems to be as much working through
Vico's notions on the origins of language, as he is illustrating the
original thunder. That is, according to Vico, "... through all these
three ages [of the gods, of heroes, and of men], three languages had
been spoken ... These were the hieroglyphic or sacred language, the
symbolic language or [the language of working] by means of resemblances,
which is the heroic language, and the alphabetic or vulgar language of
men, [working] by means of conventional signs ... ." 49 Concerning the
most primitive or sacred mode of language, Vico has the following to
say: "The dumb express themselves through actions or objects which bear
some natural relationship with the ideas they wish to signify ... This
axiom is the principle of the hieroglyphics in which all nations spoke
during their first barbarism ... The poetic idiom, involving images,
likenesses, comparisons and natural properties, must have been
subsequent to this natural speech." Or again: "Language must have
begun with monosyllabic words, just as ... children begin with such
words ..." 50
These ideas of Vico on language are put to use in the *Wake*; there is a recasting or reworking—and imitation, that is, which nonetheless operates in a new context and hence constitutes a form of critique. The thundering composite words are made up of a number of onomatopoeic monosyllables; they evoke Vico's primitive language seeking to imitate the terrifying sound of Jove's thunder. ("... [I]n its childhood the world consisted of poetic nations, since poetry is nothing but imitation^51^). They also work on the three levels, distinguished by Vico, of hieroglyph, symbol and conventional sign: first, they are the mark of the thundering god, a gesture of intercession and beginnings; second, they resemble the sound of thunder in their piling-up of expletives and rolling "n"'s; third, they are composed of conventional signs or actual words from a number of languages. Vico's ideas on language and origins are thus incorporated in these words—and yet changed in them as well. The Babel of languages, the bristling monstrous shape and sound of these constructions, enacts a fall away from the sacred and heroic origins envisioned by Vico. The over-all context of *Finnegans Wake* is a Catholic one, deeply informed by a sense of original sin; Vico's thought, on the other hand, is not particularly Christian even though it professes to be (having divine providence as the first principle of the world and history of the nations^52^). In Vico, divine intervention initiates order, a turn toward a morally better state, and man's language begins with this new order. In *Genesis*, on the other hand, the Babel of languages exists in the context of a fall away from divine grace. The *Wake* sums up, works through this
confusion of tongues linked with the Fall.

The parody of Vico, then, betrays a nostalgia for a sacred, unmediated language—as espoused by Vico—and for a past free of Christian sin. The transformations of the name of Vico, however, indicate an irretrievable turn into the fragmentation of fallen experience, into a play with the conventional basis of language; this is so even while the play with the name would elevate the name to the status of an object, and thus overcome the dichotomy of word and thing. Parody, as we have seen, involves both an imitation of (nostalgia for) a revered origin, and a transformation (or eluding) of it. It is an expression of ambivalence toward authorial origins. The attitude of burlesque is the same: it would replay an idea, while it nonetheless makes it ridiculous to varying degrees. The Wake repeats the thunder of the gods, yet turns it into a Babel of human tongues. In another ambivalent gesture, the novel revolves around the figure of a larger-than-life patriarch, yet also deflates the giants of Vico in its fascination with giants of many kinds, and with the number of different words that can be found to refer to giants. For example:

Yet may we not see still the brontoichthyan form outlined aslumbered . . . (7.20-.21)

The meandertale, aloss and again, of our old Heidenburgh in the days when Head-in-Clouds walked the earth. (18.22-.24)

What secondtonone myther rector and maximost bridgesmaker was the first to rise taller through his beanstale than the . . . giganteous Wellingtonia Sequoia . . . (126.22-.24)
... Who will he be, this mitryman, some king of the yeast, ... with the snow in his mouth and the caspian asthma, so bulk of build? (578.03-.05)

The examples above indicate that Vico's first giants become, in the Wake, a pretext for an exploration of synonyms for the word "giant," or of its applications in the animal, vegetable and mineral domains. So the Brontosaurus and the Ichthyosaurus, giant dinosaurs, are animal equivalents to the first father of the Wake. Their association with the remote past also repeats Vico's emphasis on the giants being at the origin of human history. "Meandertale" puns with "Neanderthal," again alluding to the first men in remote times, while "Head-in-Clouds" is an apt title for a giant (and also refers to HCE, in the play with these initials that is so common in the Wake). The giant Beanstalk reaching up into the sky, and the "giganteous Wellingtonia Sequoia," are vegetable equivalents of Vico's first men. Meanwhile, the reference to mountains in "snow in his mouth" brings in the giants of the mineral world; the pope, as another kind of giant among men, is alluded to in "this mitryman," as is Mitra of Indian myth. "King of the yeast" or East humourously deflates the giant theme even while it refers to inflation in size.

Vico's ideas are, then, reproduced to some extent in the fiction of the Wake; they are, however, transposed into the domain of word and wordplay. Such ideas, central elements of a system purporting to account for all human history, are isolated, repeated endlessly in a multitude of different forms, verbal expressions. Vico's thunder is a pretext for a foray through a virtual Dictionary of all languages; his
giants initiate a play with synonyms or equivalents for the word "giant." Such a shift from ideas into verbal play signals the deflation or burlesque of a system that professes to include all that has been, that posits an origin in which words and things are undifferentiated. Burlesque, however, does not in the *Wake* involve simple ridicule; it is an expression of ambivalence toward origins, as ideas are revered nostalgically while being nonetheless subjected to the transforming play of language, of the dictionary and the thesaurus. Neither, we have seen, does parody in the *Wake* involve the simple deflation of a text, form or style; it repeats the original, projects a total work, even as it fragments that unity and subjects these fragments—luminous pieces pointing to a larger whole—to linguistic play. The attitude of *Finnegans Wake* before the *New Science* is thus one of parody and burlesque, reflecting a desire to write a totalizing Book and a simultaneous knowledge of the impossibility of accomplishing such an enterprise. The attitude is, further, a reflection of a nostalgia for one natural or sacred tongue as this nostalgia encounters the conventional basis of language and the multiplicity of tongues.

2.c.ii Giordano Bruno

Joyce's treatment of Giordano Bruno is very similar to his versions of Vico. Both the ideas and the name of Bruno the Nolan are repeated throughout the work. Bruno's notion of the merging or coincidence of opposites is a structural base for the *Wake*; a number of
pairs of warring twins merge before, or in, the Father; each passes over into the other, "both croon to the same theme" (491.05), come to the same thing. Issy and her mirror image also take part in this configuration. The characterization of the following two pairs of twins demonstrates this symmetry and merging:

The Mookse had a sound eyes right but he could not all hear. The Gripes had light ears left yet he could but ill see. (158.12-.13)

... I cannot now have or nothave a piece of cheeps in your pocket at the same time and with the same manners as you can now nothalf or half the cheek apiece I've in mind unless Burris and Caseous have not or not have seemaultaneously sysentangled themselves ... (161.09-.13)

Again, at the end of the fable of the Ondt and the Gracehoper (pp. 414-419), a version of the twins, we find: "In the name of the former and of the latter and of their holocaust. Allmen."

(419.10-.11). Shaun says of Shem, "I'm enormously full of that foreigner, I'll say I am ... I hate him ... I love him" (463.14-.20). This last is, of course, a classic expression of ambivalence. One brother is the other's "doblinganger" (490.17). As Bruno says, "Almost all things are made up of opposites ... we shall ever find that one opposite is the reason that the other opposite ... is desired."

As parodied in the Wake, this becomes: " ... as were they isce et ille equals of opposites, evolved by a onesame power of nature or of spirit, iste, as the sole condition and means of its himundher manifestation and polarised for reunion by the symphysis of their antipathies." (92.07-.11)
Thus a principle of indecision informs the *Wake* and is responsible for the instability of its characters—this even in the midst of their endlessly repeated configurations or relationships (these returns recalling the other system—Vico's—at the base of the *Wake*). This principle of ambivalence is also behind the word-transformations, or wordplay, of the novel: "Language this allsfare for the loathe of Mares ambiviolent about it" (518.02-03). Just as Vico's returns are commented upon while being put to use, so Bruno's principle is spelled out in the frequent use of a key word, "hesitency," and its versions such as "hiscitendency" (305.09). Such commentary sums up a totalizing system in a pithy or humourous fashion, thereby framing it and putting its universal import into question:

. . . Nola Bruno monopolises his egobruno most unwillingly seses by the mortal powers alionola equal and opposite brunoipso, *id est*, eternally provoking alio opposite equally as provoked as Bruno at being eternally opposed by Nola. (488.07-.11)

Now, I am earnestly asking you, and putting it as between this yohou and that houmonymh, will just you search through your gabgut memoirs for all of two minutes for this impersonating pronolan, fairhead on foulshoulders. (490.12-.15)

As seen in the latter example, any pair of opposites can serve to evoke Bruno's system. The Yahoos and Houyhnhnms from *Gulliver's Travels* make up one such pair, with "houmonymh" also happily punning on "honym," homonyms being different words which yet sound the same. "Fair" and "foul," "head" and "shoulders" form two more such conventional couples. A hesitation between contraries can thus be both the subject of
discussion, as in the "Nola Bruno ... egobruno" passage above, and the force bringing about the selection of pairs of opposites, with the principle being enacted at both the character and the lexical levels. Equivocation is both a structural principle and a doctrine that is commented upon—with somewhat deflationary effect—in the text. The unstable structure of burlesque repeats Bruno's questioning of identity. Joyce's burlesque of Bruno's doctrine of contraries thus in itself displays an ambivalent structure: as in his treatment of Vico's system, he reveres his master Bruno, enacting or repeating his contraries in his text while yet at the same time performing a critique of a doctrine with universalizing aspirations. The critique of Bruno, as suggested in the examples above, is carried out in the mode of caricature or exaggeration; in the case of Vico, we saw, the critique involves a subjection of ideas of origin and natural language to linguistic play, to a celebration of the arbitrariness of language.

We note, in the example above, certain deformations of the name of Bruno of Nola: "Nola Bruno," "egobruno," "alionola," "impersonating pronolan." The names may have their order reversed; they may become common nouns and be expanded into composite words; they may participate in puns ("impersonating pronolan" recalls "personal pronoun"). In fact, the name of Bruno is the most frequently used of any philosopher in the Wake, probably because it is in itself overdetermined: its two-names-in-one structure enacts, in miniature, Bruno's doctrine; further, it puns with the name of the Dublin booksellers, Browne and Nolan (especially in references such as "Browne and Nolan's divisional
tables," p. 268.08-.09). Here are a few examples of the name and its transformations, the philosopher and his doubles:

... this overspoiled priest Mr Browne ... in his secondary personality as a Nolan ... (38.25-.28)

... if Father San Browne ... is Padre Don Bruno ... (which of us but remembers the rarevalent and hornerable Fratomistor Nawlanmore and Browne) ... (50.18-.23)

JUSTIUS (to himother): Brawn is my name and broad is my nature ... and I'll brune this bird or Brown Bess's bung's gone bandy. I'm the boy to bruise and braise ... Stand forth, Nayman of Noland ... (187.24-.28)

Toot! Better for you, Mr Nobru. Toot toot! Better for you, Mr Anol! (490.26-.27)

"Bruno" is taken through the route of other languages and becomes "Browne"/"Brown" and "brune." "Browne" puns with the verb "brown" and hence generates "braise." The name has it very letters rearranged ("Nobru," "Anol"), suggesting the distortions worked on words by the dream. 58

In the above example, the two words "Bruno" and "Nola," and their respective transformations, are separated but always found within a short distance of one another. They are made to stand for different figures, but yet indicate the same person. Similarly, each word and its transformations enact the theme of identity in difference: "Bruno" and "browne" or "brune" are versions, in different tongues, of the same idea. The pun, extending over the whole work, which connects the booksellers Browne and Nolan with the Renaissance philosopher is also
an example of this mechanism of identity in difference; here, different
times meet in the same word. Thus, in the parodic transformations of
the name of Bruno, we find an enactment of the principle for which the
name comes to stand. This enactment constitutes an affirmation;
nonetheless, the transformation of a name—for example, by moving its
letters around—is an act of appropriation, and hence a dismantling of
the integrity and universal import of the system behind the name. We
recall how similar parodic operations on the name of Vico imply both an
incorporation of his system (it is drawn in, in miniature, in the name
each time this appears in the text) and its fragmentation (thus
countering the system's claims to refer to all space and time) or
dispersal in a new context. Similar operations on the name of Swift and
names or book-titles associated with him (Stella, Vanessa, The Tale of
the Tub, Gulliver's Travels, etc.) indicate that Swift is another master
who must be parodied, with the added twist that Swift is already a
master of parody—and of Menippean satire. The parody on the name,
then, like the critique of the ideas or system behind it, involves the
movement of "hesitency," the repetition of a revered origin coinciding
with its metamorphosis into a ridiculed Other. The conflict of the
twins, in the Wake, could be taken as a metaphor for the relation of the
work to its encyclopaedic models.

2.d. Images of completion

While Finnegans Wake betrays a certain amount of ambivalence with
regard to totalizing models and to the project, in general, of a total
completion of knowledge, it does not, for all that, abandon the project or cease to hold it, on a certain level, as something to be desired. Recent writing on the *Wake* tends to emphasize one side of the tension between totalization (and an ultimate center or origin) and its impossibility (and the disintegration of meaning into linguistic play): such writing dwells on the work's lack of a center. Such a lack would imply an inability to encircle or contain a totality, a world. Earlier explications of the *Wake*, in their emphasis on an overarching structure, emphasize, on the other hand, the work's regularities and equivalences, its limitations and thematic centerings. The tension is between conceptions of the *Wake* as an open or a closed work, as a "writerly" or a "readerly" text, as a work in which the reader participates to produce meaning or a work whose meaning is sealed within, already, by an omnipotent author. Now, I would suggest that *Finnegans Wake* encloses this polemic, or play of contraries in Bruno's sense, within itself as the dynamic behind its "hesitencies." It is reductive, I feel, to emphasize one side or the other of the debate on open versus closed, decentered versus centered form; one takes better into account the reader's experience of texts such as the *Wake* (and the *Cantos* and *Paradise*) if one recognizes this play of opposites as being their basic dynamic; there is a vacillation between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the Law and its transgression. With respect to the *Wake*, for example, Stephen Heath remarks that this vacillation is between Shaun and Shem and what they stand for, respectively:
One must, in other words, recognize that the *Wake* is neither Shaun's nor Shem's work, but rather derives its energy from a mutual passage between the two.

In its attitude towards totalization, then, the *Wake* follows the hesitation between the twins. On the one hand, it parodies works and authors aspiring to a condition of completion; it parodies its own aspiration in its parodies on its own style; in it, perhaps, the idea of the totalizing Book disintegrates, the Letter becomes litter, the authentic Word is threatened by parody, copying, plagiarism, the "epical forged cheque" (181.16). On the other hand, the *Wake* works with a vision of a completed circle of knowledge—and it works toward the actualization of this virtuality; it works with the vision of a total Book or set of encyclopaedic categories. In the following section I will focus more upon this latter aspect of the *Wake* by looking at some metaphors by means of which this desire for completion surfaces in the text, is played out and repeated in different forms. The main images of completion are those of the rainbow and the musical scale, the Alpha-Omega pair and the alphabet.
2.d.1 The rainbow

Adeline Glasheen in her Third Census lists many references to the rainbow and its colours. The rainbow dominates the imagery of the Wake; its frequency is a sign of a fascination with the notion of completion, with completed sets which indicate both fullness and circularity. The first reference to the rainbow in the book establishes its connection with the circle:

Rot a peck of pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory end to the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface. (3.24-.26)

"Ringsome" offers "ring" and also the German word "ringsum" ("around"). This, along with "arc" in "arclight," means that the rainbow, besides containing the mystical number seven, is also associated from the first with the circle of completion. It contains all the colours there are, all in infinitely fine gradations. In this sense the rainbow is an apt metaphor for the encyclopaedia or circle of knowledge, with its categories ideally capable of being subdivided in an infinite number of ways, according to the perspective taken. With this association of rainbow and circle in mind let us look at a few more rainbows from the Wake. What is striking is that the colours are often associated with girls or girls' names:

Now, to be on anew and basking again in the panaroma of all flores of speech, if a human being . . . were at this auctual futule preteriting unstant, in the states of suspensive examination, accorded . . . with an earsighted view of old hopeinhaven . . . could such a none . . . byhold at ones what is main and why tis twain, how one once meet melts in tother wants poignings . . . the nimb now nihilant round the
girlyhead so becoming . . . what roserude and oragious grows gelb and greera, blue out the ind of it! Violet's dyed! then what would that fargazer seem to seemself to seem seeming of, dimm it all? Answer: A collideorscape! (143.03-.28)

Here, the image of the rainbow, kaleidoscope or "collideorscape" (also "collide or escape") of colours is evoked in a synaesthetic mood of "suspensive exanimation" (suspended animation), in a state, that is, of epiphany overcoming time in an "auctual futule preteriting unstant."
The girl glimpsed in such a state, the "girlyhead so becoming," recalls a similar vision in A Portrait of the Artist. The rainbow is here a nimbus (halo, circle again) around her head, with the names for the colours being modified by the cosmic or astronomical/meteorological context. The important concept here, then, is that of timelessness in its association with a contemplation of totality, the "ind of it," "old hopeinhaven." The notion of a meeting of contraries, so often worked out in the Wake, finds one of its incarnations in this context: " . . . byhold at ones what is main and why tis twain, how one once meet melts in tother wants poignings . . . ." Thus timelessness, totality and the principle of ambivalence all meet, significantly, as a constellation in the context of the rainbow.

Let us look at another example:

. . . Hadn't he seven dams to wive him? And every dam had her seven crutches. And every crutch had its seven hues. And each hue had a differing cry . . . He married his markets, cheap by foul . . . in their pinky limony creamy birnies and their turkiss indienne mauves . . . Then all that was was fair. Tys Elvenland! Teems of times and happy returns. The seim anew. Ordovico or viricordo. Anna was, Livia is, Plurabelle's to be. Northmen's thing made southfoik's place but howmulty plurators made eachone in person? (215.15-.26)
Here, again, the "seven hues" of the rainbow are linked with seven women ("dams"). The names of the colours, in this feminine context, take on diminutive or feminine forms: "pinky limony . . . indienne mauves."

The woman-rainbow complex is, further, associated with Vico's eternal returns ("The seim anew. Ordovico . . . ") and with an inclusion of all time, past, present and future, in one figure—ALP ("Anna was . . . "). It seems, here, that Vico's returns are linked with the perception of all time in an "actual futur[e] preteriting unstant"; it seems that returns in the time of history create, in the midst of time, moments of timeless order. The eternal return is also linked to the female principle in, for instance, the order of the earth's seasons, the regeneration of the earth in the spring. In the passage above, there is the further interesting development that a variation on Bruno's principle ("howmulty plurators made eachone in person") is, just as in the last example, part of the major cluster of woman-rainbow-timelessness. It seems as though the meeting of contraries must exist in the context of non-linear notions of time; ambivalence as a suspension between two choices matches forms of temporal suspension.

The spectrum doubled as the repeating band of all colours is thus a figure in *Finnegans Wake* of completion or totalization, of the work's drive to encircle all things and repeat them in microcosmic form. It makes sense that such a figure of totality should frequently be found in the company of evocations of eternal time—or timelessness; a conception of a totality of knowledge must be inseparable from a conception of a
knowledge unaffected by any temporal boundaries. The spatial circle of
the rainbow evokes its temporal counterpart, whether via reference to
Vico's returns, or via play with the group "past-present-future."

In another passage, in which Shaun gives lascivious advice to
girls, we note the familiar constellation of rainbow, girls, recurrent
time or timelessness, and the meeting of opposites. The entire cluster,
however, is cast in a new, musical mode. Reference to music and to the
alphabet suggest other forms in which a preoccupation with completion
can be cast:

Where the lisieuse are we and what's the first sing to
be sung? Is it rubrics, mandarimus, pasqualines, or
verdidads is in it, or the bruiselivid indecores of
extreme voyoulence and, for the lover of lithurgy,
hekant or besant, where's the fate's to be wished for?
Several sindays after whatsin time. I'll sack that sick
server the minute I bless him. That's the mokst I can
do for his grape. Economy of movement, axe why said.
(432.29-.35)

An ecclesiastical context has been set up prior to this passage
("purgations," "indulgences," 432.27), a context inseparable, in the
figure of Shaun, from one of lascivious pursuit ("to all practising
massoeurses from a preaching freer," 432.23). Shaun is addressing a
bevy of "goodwill girls" (430.19); it is to be expected, then, that a
reference to rainbows will be included. This particular rainbow
("rubrics, mandarimus . . . voyoulence") has the names of its colours
modified by the church and music contexts: "rubrics" refers, among
other things, to the red-printed directions in prayer books; "pasqual"
or Paschal refers to Easter; "verdidads" evokes Verdi and the opera,
plus truth (in Spanish, "la verdad"). In the latter part of the
spectrum, colour-names are modified by a context of sexual perversion:
"bruise/livid" is blue, "indecores" is indigo, "voyou/ence" (voyeurism,
vio/ence, "voyou," Rimbaud's coloured "voyelles") is violet. The
familiar rainbow constellation is thus made more complex, betrays a
greater "economy of movement," in being traversed by other currents,
other series of terms, which have come to characterize Shaun. Church
ritual—"lithurgy"—brings ritual time into play; this notion of time as
recurrence is followed up in "whatsintime," which suggests Whitsuntide
(seven Sundays after Easter, involving a week or seven days) and which
also involves a questioning of time (what's in time?). The convergence
of opposites is, further, evoked in the "sacking"/blessing opposition,
along with the reference to the Mookse ("mokst") and the Gripe
("grapce"), one pair of conflicting twins in the Wake. "Economy of
movement, axe why said": the "movement" of meaning in the text of the
Wake follows a principle of economy, a principle (like Freud's) which
makes possible the intersection of as many meanings as possible in the
smallest possible space. This principle is enacted in Joyce's wordplay,
and in the way several strands of meaning (or metonymic chains) may
converge in the sentence-unit. Such "economy" is summed up by the
alphabet ("axe why said"), which contains in potential all the words of
the language; the alphabet is, paradoxically, both economical and
all-inclusive. In this it is like the wordplay of the Wake, or wordplay
in general. This quality is the reason why, next to the rainbow, the
alphabet is one of the main images of completion in the Wake.
2.d.ii The musical scale

The musical scale is used in the *Wake* as a metaphor, like the rainbow, for completion or wholeness. However, the musical scale is not nearly so frequently found as the rainbow or the alphabet. The scale is a gradated series, like the colours of the spectrum; it is a series of tones, a complete set of values contained within one octave; between "do" and "do," as between "red" and "red," is contained a miniature totality. The musical scale also highlights the number seven, as does the rainbow. For example, on p. 260.23-.24, the musical scale is evoked in the marginal note: "Dont retch meat fat salt lard sinks down (and out)." This note accompanies a text setting out a travel itinerary, a route or passage through both space and time, envisioning both locations in Dublin and stages in intellectual history (". . . up Tycho Brache Crescent,\(^2\) shouldering Berkeley Alley, querfixing Gainsborough Carfax . . .", 260.21-.23). This itinerary is further characterized by a marginal note, on the opposite side of the text, which plays off against the musical scale note: "Imaginable Itinerary Through The Particular Universal" (260.19-.24). This is a reference to Vico's "ideal eternal history," his tracing of an "itinerary" through successive stages of world history. Vico also appears in the annotated text itself, as "Old Vico Roundpoint" (260.25-.26). The musical scale (in a gross deformation attributable to Shem)\(^70\) thus appears in a Viconian context. A figure of containment or totality is made to comment upon a space-time itinerary, Vico's model of eternal recurrence applied to all the nations of the world: "In this way the certain origins and the
uninterrupted progress of the whole universe of nations should be discovered ... this Science comes to be an ideal eternal history, traversed in time by the history of all nations." In just this way, we have seen, the rainbow as another figure of totality evokes the "happy returns" of the "Ordovico" (215.23). And just as the rainbow and the eternal return usually evoke a feminine context, so the musical scale, in the example at hand, comments upon an itinerary opened and closed (and opened again) by Anna Livia: "Long Livius Lane ... by New Livius Lane till where we whiled while we whithered" (260.20-.25).

Another musical scale is to be found in the first Shaun chapter (III.1). As noted above, the Shaun text is filled with references to music:

—Alo, alass, alladin, amobus! Does she lag soft fall means rest down? Shaun yawned, as his general address rehearsal, ( . . . with the memories of the past and the hincuncs of the present embellishing the musics of the futures from Miccheruni's band) . . . to dye his paddycoats to morn his hesternmost earning . . .

(407.27-408.01)

Shaun, in his "general address rehearsal," warms up his voice by running through two scales or complete sets—the first being a deformation of a Latin verb conjugation, the second being the musical "do si la so fa mi re do." The musical scale is closely followed by a reference to time, in the form of "past-present-future" ("with the memories of the past ... the hicnuncs of the present ... the musics of the futures"). This group is the temporal equivalent for figures of totality like the rainbow, musical scale and alphabet. Past, present
and future sum up all time, time as seen from all possible perspectives, from a global and ultimately atemporal perspective. The group is repeated in "to dye . . . to morn . . . hesternmost" (today-tomorrow-yesterday), which also contains a reference to the cycle of the day in the dawn ("to dye . . . morn . . . hesternmost [easternmost]") and to the cycle of life and death in "to dye [die] . . . to morn [mourn] . . . ." The musical scale is thus again associated with figures of temporal completion and recurrence. This is not surprising, as music is a temporal art. More importantly, however, such repeated association indicates that images of completion subsume, in the Wake, any distinction between space and time. The virtual encyclopaedic Book, in other words, is a limit towards which actual encyclopaedias, both fictional and non-fictional, tend; as such a virtuality, totality is a matter both of all things and of all time.

2.d.iii Alpha–Omega

An all-subsuming totality is often figured, in Finnegans Wake, in the movement from nought to infinity, from Alpha to Omega, or from A to Z. For example:

... whereat samething is rivirusle by nighttim, may be involved into the zeroic couplet, falls pell in his heventh glige noughty times = . . . (284.08-.11)

... Now tell me, tell me, tell me then!
What was it?
A . . . . . !
? . . . . . .0!

(94.20-.22)
Miss Oodles of Anems before the Luvium doeslike. So . . . And miss Endles of Eons efter Dies of Eirae doeslike. So. (226.35-.36)

His cheekmole of allaph foriverever her allinall . . . (242.31)

A. 1 . . . to find a locus for an alp get a howlth on her bayrings as a prisme 0 and for a second 0 unbox your compasses . . . Mux your pistany at a point of the coastmap to be called a but pronounced olfa. (287.08-.15)

Begob, he's the crux of the catalogue of our antediluvian zoo . . . (47.03-.04)

For Ark see Zoo . . . (104.32)

Huntler and Pumar's animal alphabites, the first in the world from aab to zoo. (263.29-.30)

ARCHAIC ZELOTPRIA AND THE ODIUM TELELOGICUM. (264.01-.15)

Every letter is a godsend, ardent Ares, brusque Boreas and glib Ganymede like zealous Zeus, the O'Meghisthest of all. (269.17-.19)

. . . apple, bacchante, custard, dove, eskimo, feldgrau, hematite, isinglass, jet, kipper, lucile, mimosa, nut, oysterette, prune, quasimodo, royal, sago, tango, umber, vanilla, wisteria, xray, yesplease, zaza, philomel, theerose. (247.35-248.02)

. . . he stands in a lovely park, sea is not far, importunate towns of X, Y and Z are easily over reached . . . (138.04.06)

In calculus, \( \infty \) or infinity is a limit towards which a variable may tend. It is a kind of hypothetical final Number whose use is in its positing, in its virtual rather than actual existence. In just this way we have characterized the encyclopaedic Book as having its value for books in its virtual existence. "Noughty times \( \infty \)" is a meaningless operation unless we understand it to characterize the movement from zero
to infinity—the movement, that is, through all the numbers, through everything that is. It may also characterize the coupling ("zeroic couplet" is heroic couplet—or (0,0); "noughty" is naughty in the "nighttim") of HCE and ALP who, as primordial parents, conceive and create all people for all time.

The Alpha–Omega couple is similar to the 0–∞ pair. The beginning and the end of time, the first and last thing, are summed up in God:

I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty.

... I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last...
(Revelation 1. 8-11)

God as such is absent from the *Wake*; the numerous local gods mentioned of different religions, cultures or times, point to Him—as does the rainbow to the white light it refracts. He is absent and yet present everywhere. He is the Father or Lawgiver whose will has been transgressed—and He is HCE the transgressor. The Father thus evades Himself in the *Wake*, in the practice of narrative repetitions and digressions, character ambiguities, and lexical indirections. This absent Presence can only be referred to indirectly, via the Alpha–Omega connection (and by "I yam as I yam," 604.23). The reference is at its most cryptic in the brief "A ... 0!.." This abbreviation may be made even more indirect by being reversed: "Miss Oodles of Anems ... miss Endles of Eons" contains Omega, Alpha, plus "Amen" and a reference to endless time ("Endles ... Eons") or to the end of time ("End ... of
Eons”). This version of the Alpha-Omega couple occurs in a feminine context ("Miss . . . miss"), one of desire ("Dies . . . Eirae," désirée) personified by ALP ("Luvium"). In a similar way, we saw, the rainbow as symbol of totality is always associated with seven women or girls.  

"Alpha-Omega" may also be referred to indirectly by a mention of only one of its members. This is what happens in "Allaph" (alpha), which comes to stand for the pair (also referred to by its definition "allinall"). The reference becomes even more elliptical in "the point of the coastmap to be called a but pronounced olfa." Here, "olfa" conflates "alpha" and "omega"; the resulting sound both accords with and diverges from an expected pronunciation of "a". "Olfa" thus enacts in miniature the transformation of the Name informing the Wake.

Another indirection practised on "Alpha-Omega" makes the initials "A" and "O" the first and final letters of certain other words. This play on letters also involves making the "A" of "Alpha-Omega" function doubly as the "A" or first letter of the alphabet. In this case a "Z," or last letter of the alphabet, is naturally found in the words involved. Some examples from above illustrate this merging of the "A-O" and "A-Z" groups: the first and last letters of "antediluvial zoo" are "a" and "o", while the first letters of each word are "a" and "z." This happens again in "For Ark see Zoo" and in "Huntler and Pumar's animal alphabites, the first in the world from aab to zoo." The configuration is slightly changed in "Archaic Zelotypia and the Odium Teleologicum." These examples, besides playing with letters, also contain references to the Old Testament, to the beginning of time ("antediluvial" or
antediluvian, "the first in the world"), to the Flood or the Ark and its animals ("For Ark see Zoo," "animal alphabites"). It seems that in the Viconian context of the *Wake* a Christian concern with the totality or beginning and end of things ("Archaic . . . Teleologicum") must be matched by an emphasis placed on primordial beginnings—or returns and re-beginnings.

2.d.iv The alphabet

The alphabet has an important symbolic function in the *Wake*. It contains, like the "Alpha-Omega" pair, the first and last, the totality (potentially) of all words; it contains an entire verbal universe in miniature. As a hen's Letter is the crux of the *Wake*’s narrative, so the letter itself is highlighted via the frequent references to the alphabet. There is an awareness in the book as to its own nature as writing—the world created therein being made, ultimately, of other books, words, letters. The alphabet, nonetheless, also indicates a nostalgia for a state of completion, for a beginning and an end to creation—a state belied, paradoxically, by an emphasis on the letter, this emphasis bringing in the spectre of multiple, ever-shifting interpretation and recreation. The Wakean alphabet ("apple . . . theerose," above) adds two terms beyond Z, creating the possibility of many more terms; as in the Viconian structure of the *Wake*, there are always new terms or beginnings. The "apple" alphabet is also missing a letter ("g"), thus evading the ideal of completion it would summon up.
3. **Time and timelessness**

If it is to be seen as a fictional encyclopaedia, *Finnegans Wake* should exhibit an evasiveness toward time resembling that of the pedagogical encyclopaedia. The latter, we recall, seeks to escape limitations in knowledge by escaping the constraints of time; its need to extend itself through successive editions, through revisions and supplements and so on, is an expression of a desire to push back the temporal horizon limiting what can be known or understood. Ultimately the desire is to extend itself into a single, virtual Book containing all of its corrections, editions, or rendering them unnecessary. The drive is to rise above time and the limitations it places on the encyclopaedic project, to include the past, present and future (making them one time) within its circle. Swift mocks this aspiration (noted earlier in the writings of Diderot) which would pass over the specificity of the past: "... how exceedingly our Illustrious Moderns have eclipsed the weak glimmering Lights of the Antients, and turned them out of the Road of all fashionable Commerce, to a degree, that our choice Town-Wits of most refined Accomplishments, are in grave Dispute, whether there have been ever any Antients or no..." \(^7^3\) Swift is concerned, here, with satirizing a desire for utter contemporaneity. In the *Wake*, a desire to overcome temporal differences results in an emphasis on the continuity of past, present and future: "... for ancients link with presents as the human chain extends, have done, do and will again..." (254.08-.09).
It is equally necessary for the encyclopaedia that it recognize its own temporal limitation. This split between an actual recognition and an ideal desired is the basis for an ambivalence towards time. In the fictional encyclopaedia, this ambivalence is picked up and replayed in forms responding to the specificity of fiction. Thus, a tension between time and timelessness is worked out in the areas of motif, character and narrative: a desire to escape time, or a nostalgia for "prefall paradise peace" (30.27), is worked out in an obsession with the group "past-present-future," in the atemporal or multitemporal resonance of the characters, and in the replacement of linear narrative by the repetition and transformation of a few smaller narratives, myths or "nodes." All this creates an effect of sameness in the midst of flux, of timeless order or epiphany breaking through the pressure of particular events, the mass of items of knowledge. A view of history as "not so much a continuous sequence of significant action/reaction as an impasto of activities breeding and feeding upon one another, producing nothing but more of the same in a slightly different order," suggests the temporal/atemporal tension that we have argued to underlie the enterprise of encyclopaedic gathering. Such a view of history recognizes the pressure of time upon events, but sees such pressure or limitation as working from a multitude of directions, thus creating an effect of circularity, or of an ultimate participation in something larger than, or escaping, time. This view of history, enacted in the fiction of the *Wake*, creates something like a "continuous present tense integument slowly unfolded all marryvoising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history" (186.01-.02).
3.a. Past-present-future groups

Joyce is preoccupied in the *Wake* with the alphabet, with that set suggesting both a totality (all words are contained potentially within it) and its limitation (it is only letters, it can always be exceeded, totality thereby being deferred). Often associated with an evocation of the alphabet, and occurring as regularly, is the temporal figure "past-present-future." This group enacts in the domain of time the same movement of indecision as is to be found in the alphabet, placing totality against its exceeding or against incompletion. In other words, the notion of a group, of a triad whose parts are never lacking, whose parts necessarily imply one another, suggests a totality or completed figure, even while a linear movement from past into future, always in progression (and hence in incompletion) is signified. The repetition and variation of this group in the text thus indicates its importance, indicates a fascination—in the midst of a feverish gathering and dispersal of elements of knowledge from all times—with the idea of a circle of time what would fix and master such a process. The group, then, in this indecision replays the *Wake* in miniature.  

Let us look at some variations on the "past-present-future" group or motif:

But the world, mind, is, was and will be writing its own wrunes for ever . . . (19.35-.36)

Time: the pressant.
With futurist onehorse balletbattle pictures and the Pageant of Past History worked up with animal variations amid everglaning mangrovemazes and beorbrack tors by Messrs Thud and Blunder. (221.17-.21)
And among the shades that Eve's now wearing she'll meet
anew fiancy, tryst and trow. Mammy was, Mimmy is,
Minuscoline's to be. . . . The same renew.
(226.13-.17)

. . . Thyme, that chef of seasoners, has made his usual
astewte use of endadjustables and whatnot willbe isnor
was . . . (236.27-.28)

PANOPTICAL PURVIEW OF POLITICAL PROGRESS AND THE FUTURE
PRESENTATION OF THE PAST. (272.09-.15)

Then's now with now's then in tense continuant . . .
who having has he shall have had. (598.28-.30)

This selection should indicate the insistence of the temporal figure.
We can see the variety of contexts in which it is found, and the extent
of the deformations or variations it undergoes. A striking trait of its
presentation is the frequent mixing of its parts; it is not always given
in the form "past-present-future," but present or future may precede
past, and so on. This disrupts linear sequence and suggests an attitude
toward time favouring circularity over linearity, or at least breaking
the line apart to create an impression of simultaneity.

In the first example, a change in the order of the tenses
suggests the simultaneity of all time in the world mind ("world,
mind"). Such a mind contains a totality of secret knowledge, a
knowledge that would take an infinite time to write down: "... will
be writing its own wrunes for ever. . . ." An infinity of repeated
action, of writing, suggested by "for ever," is inseparable from a
temporal simultaneity, an instant in the world mind. In the second
example, all time is contained in a series of pictures, where events are
"worked up" and varied ("with animal variations") according to the logic
of the labyrinth ("mangrovemazes") and the circle ("beorbtracktors"). Past, present and future are mixed in one total picture; time, "the pressant" (pressing) appears to have no over-all order, events appear to follow the jungle-path, from moment to moment, of the labyrinth; yet the thunder of the gods ("Messrs Thud and Blunder") intervenes and sets cycles turning where no order prevailed. Vico's "orbs" or cycles of history also appear with our time-figure in the third example, above. Here, Eve (Anna) meets her "shades" or figures at all ages; as the first seductress, she sees herself "anew" in the figure of Isolde or Issy (suggested by the reference to Tristan, "tryst") and in all love-situations ("fiancy, tryst and trow"). This return of the same seduction is "the same renew," an echo of "the seim anew. Ordovico . . ." (215.24). Vico's "order," again, is the order of "was . . . is. . .'s to be" as it is worked through and prepares to turn upon itself (to "was") once again. The twist here is that as we work from past to future, we also go backward in time via the negative progression, "Mammy was, Mimmy is, Minuscoline's [Italian for "very tiny"] to be," the movement from Eve as mother to little girl to baby (and from thence to some point of innocence from original sin). This coordination of two cycles of opposing direction recalls Yeats' negative gyres, and repeats in miniature the over-all structure of the Wake. The fourth and fifth examples, by reversing the normal temporal perspective, by playing time backward, as it were, create a perspective that might best be termed a "panoptical purview," an all-englobing or global view of time. This is, of course, the perspective contained in
Vico's "ideal eternal history" or "universal history." Such a view is non-teleological: instead of a progression toward a single end, there is a great circling toward no particular end, or toward "endadjustables." All tenses are "continuant" upon one another, as in the sixth example; they are indistinguishable ("who having has he shall have had"), in a manner especially evoked in Book IV. Here is the "still point of the turning world" evoked by Eliot; it is a moment of simultaneity or rest through which pass the flux, the repetitions and transformations, the voices, the information of the *Wake*.

3.b. **Multitemporal figures**

The tension in the fictional encyclopaedia between time "the pressant" and timelessness, a conflict enacted in the paradoxical "tense continuant" of *Finnegans Wake* and of Vico's historical cycles or spirals—this tension is as much in evidence in the nature of character in the *Wake* as it is in the "past-present-future" groups, above. Each character (or, more accurately, figure—in the sense of figuration) is resonant with a number of different significations in time; each character exhibits, as archaeological strata, a number of avatars, "shades" or versions. This makes HCE, ALP, Shem, Shaun and Issy (as well as the Four Old Men and the Twelve Questioners) each something like the intersection of many times, many figures, in one figure. Their various incarnations belong to different Viconian ages, taking on different properties according to the age; they are nonetheless, as repetitions, pointing to the same figure in this difference. Each, in
other words, embodies time in timelessness. Roland McHugh refers to this trait as "personality condensation"; there are so many persons in each character that he or she may be designated by a symbol—and each was designated as such by Joyce in his manuscripts:

Personages such as \( \text{\&} \), \( \text{\&} \), \( \text{\&} \), \( \text{\&} \) and \( \text{\&} \) are fluid composites, involving an unconfined blur of historical, mythical and fictitious characters, as well as nonhuman elements. Joyce’s technique of personality condensation is ultimately inseparable from his linguistic condensation. Coincidences of orthography and pronunciation are enforced with indifference to the ostensible logic of their past.

Characters from different times, as well as from different levels of reality, intersect in the composite figures which are the personages of the \textit{Wake}. It is important to note here the emphasis on the linguistic nature of this "condensation." As the dream creates the rebus, so the \textit{Wake} creates personages who conjoin and spell out a number of names. We may "read" behind HCE and ALP, via the punning principle of a similarity of sound, other names and hence other figures, just as we may read behind certain words or phrases other words, fragments of texts, proverbs, etc. The characters of the \textit{Wake}, then, are "palimpsests" as much as are its puns.

In keeping with this multitemporality of character, there is a concern with genealogy; there is a need to know the "genesis" of, for instance, the name HCE or Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker:

Now . . . concerning the genesis of Harold or Humphrey Chimpden's occupational agnomen (we are back in the presurnames prodromarith period . . .) . . . in prefall paradise peace . . . (30.13-.27)
In the beginning there were no surnames; there was no confusion of character, just as there was no Babel of tongues. But the *Wake* is concerned with the postlapsarian condition, with the multiplicity of languages and with the pressure of historical time; the surname thus becomes all-important as it lends itself to linguistic deformation and, through this process, to the pressure of different times and different levels (historical, mythical and fictitious) of reality. Thus Humphrey recalls Humpty (Humpty Dumpty)—or vice-versa; a nursery rhyme may be at the base of a book in which it is futile to ask which comes first, ideas and characters or rhymes, words and names. Earwicker recalls earwig, or "perce-oreille" in French, the latter in turn suggesting the name Persse O'Reilly; the whole chain, on the other hand, could just as well have run in reverse. HCE's incarnation as Porter puns with a kind of beer, and hence with his profession as publican. Another incarnation, Finnegan, evokes the hero Finn MacCool. The anonymous ballad concerning Tim Finnegan could thus, like the nursery rhyme of "Humpty Dumpty," be at the base of the work, owing to the practice of name-association. The names/incarnations of HCE thus spread out in a network throughout the book; each name is subjected to further deformations in the wordplay. Further, HCE may take on other names or forms not so much through the above process of phonetic association, as through similarities in structure: his relation to other personages, his central guilt, have structural affinities to relations among historical, mythical or fictional characters. Thus HCE is Adam, Noah.
and Abraham; he is Parnell, Oscar Wilde, and Ibsen's Masterbuilder ("Mysterbolder," 309.13). He is Wellington, Napoleon, the Russian General, Jonathan Swift, King Mark of Cornwall. Thus many different figures and hence times resonate in the figure of HCE, owing to a network of verbal and situational similarities. There are even, as McHugh notes above, nonhuman elements in the *Wake's* composite characters: HCE, for example, is mountain and city to ALP's river; HCE is "Father Times" to ALP's "Mother Spacies" (600.02-.03).

ALP, besides her watery incarnation as the river Liffey, is simultaneously Eve, Sarah, the hen Biddy Doran scratching on the middenheap, Ann Hathaway, Ann Boleyn, Anna Karenina, Annie Laurie, Lavinia, Delia (Artemis), and so on. Most of the ALP's numerous incarnations come into being as a result of linguistic condensations and correspondences. Any "Anne" in history or literature becomes a double for Anna Livia; similarities in situation follow these linguistic correspondences. The letters ALP themselves form the first part of "alphabet," which, suggesting Betty and Becky, leads to Elizabeth I and Rebecca, wife of Isaac. ALP even suggests "apple," hence Eve. An examination of Adaline Glasheen's lists of versions, deformations, of the basic name, gives some idea of the extent of this network of name-puns; it impresses on us the precedence taken by the sound of the name in the formation of ALP's avatars, and—even more than in HCE's case—the secondary status taken by structural similarities, by the female characters' situations and their relations to an HCE-like male character.
Relations among the members of the Earwicker family are, then, just as much linguistic as archetypal. The numerous incarnations of each of the other members—Shem, Shaun, and Issy (and her mirror-image)—are formed by similar punning mechanisms. "Shem the Penman" is Shem, Noah's son; Abel, from his characterization by Shaun as "shemblable" (489.28); Shemuel Tulliver or Gulliver; as well as being Nick to Shaun's Mick, and one member of a number of other pairs of twins (Burrus and Caseous, Mutt and Taff, etc.). Shaun is Ham, Noah's son; Cain; Shaunathaun or Jonathan Swift; and so on. Issy is Isolde of Tristan and Isolde; Esther, or Swift's Stella and Vanessa in one; Alice of Alice in Wonderland and Isa Bowman, the child actress who played her; Elizabeth (Lizzie) like her mother; and so on.

The multitemporal resonance of a Wake personage, its structure as layers of corresponding figures, is thus as much a function of links between names as it is a matter of repetitions of qualities, "the seim anew," over the Viconian ages. The "symbolic" nature of each personage or of the various character-configurations is thus a matter of words, of a semantic and phonetic network underlying the text and determining its choices of names and hence relations. Such a network has also been seen to account for the metaphorical selections performed by the puns and portmanteau words of the text. A phrase such as "arzurian deeps" (387.32) has, like a personage in the Wake, a multitemporal resonance owing to its condensation of two words referring to different ages or levels of reality: "azure deeps" suggests the Romantic sea-imagery of, say, Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind," while "Arthurian" legend adds
itself to the significance of the composite construction. Romantic and medieval layers coexist, then, and seem to be related analogically in the common ground of romance. It is just as much the case, however, that "azure" and "Arthur" are related by phonetic similarity. Multitemporal resonance or significance in personage or word is thus often a result of wordplay; play with signifiers results in temporal effects at the level of the signified. In just this way, we recall, manipulation of the "past-present-future" group creates global or atemporal perspectives. *Finnegans Wake*, then, evokes a state of timelessness or stasis in flux, but it does so in a mode of linguistic play that effectively puts into question this state as a signified. This is another aspect, in the domain of time, of the work's hesitation with respect to totalization: here, we recall, the *Wake* subjects totalizing works, authors, images, to linguistic play and deformation, to the extent that, even while it is suggested, the ideal or ultimate signified of totality is never properly allowed to take shape.

3.c. Repetition and narrative

Another way in which a tension between a "pressant" time and an equally pressing drive to encircle and escape time manifests itself in *Finnegans Wake* is in the work's eccentric narrative structure. As Norris has noted, the work does not depend on the linear narrative of the realist novel, a type of narrative assuming the primacy of consciousness or individual experience:
The narrative technique of *Finnegans Wake* challenges the primacy of subjective individual experience. . . . The singularity of individual experience . . . is undermined by the replication of events and the instability of characters. The causal relationship of events in novelistic narration is replaced in *Finnegans Wake* by contiguous associations on the order of psychoanalytic free associations.

We have discussed, above, the "instability" of character brought about by a practice of linguistic association which acts, over all, at the expense of any signified consciousness. We have seen lexical associations to accompany the wordplay of the *Wake*; such association is constantly interrupting and replacing a linear narration with a catalogue of semantic possibilities. "Replication of events," repetition of a few basic, short narratives or myths is another characteristic of telling in the *Wake*. Such repetition, such insistence on the same tales in the midst of their variations, subsidiary versions, fragments, is an expression of a tension between linear narrative and linguistic digression, between the succession of events in time and the turn or trope into the Encyclopaedia that would short-circuit such succession. Fragments result from this tension—but they are insistent fragments and they are narrative in nature. The impulse to tell a story seems to remain at the base of the work, or remains as an assumption to be constantly challenged. If we take "myth" to mean, first and foremost, "a short narrative," then we may see short narratives in the myths at the base of the *Wake*: these include Oedipus' crime and self-discovery, and Adam's temptation and Fall. These myths are primarily narratives and not themes or symbols; they only take on a
symbolic character with the obsessive repetition of the crime/guilt kernel via transformations of "felix culpa," and of the temptation kernel via innumerable versions of the Phoenix Park configuration (two women-three soldiers-one voyeur). Indeed, this latter (spatial) configuration is abstracted from another basic narrative, an incident (never clearly divulged) based upon the Phoenix Park murders in which Parnell was implicated.  

Other short narratives or "nodes" are repeated through the length of the text, each in primary or subsidiary versions; these include the tale of Tristan and Isolde (pp. 383-399); the tale of the writing and delivery of the Letter (pp. 615-619), and the tale of Roderick O'Connor (pp. 380-382). Each of these short narratives occurs in its clearest form at the pages indicated; each has secondary nodes at other places in the text, while each of these may generate a further system of references, and so on. This gives us, not a single, unified narrative, but rather an infinitely-subdividing network of smaller tales. The derivations, as they move away from the original tales, become smaller and smaller, may be reduced to the briefest allusion, and finally seem to disappear into the dense linguistic and encyclopaedic underbrush of the Wake.

In its repetition and variation of basic narrative kernels, then, the Wake demonstrates an ambivalence toward the traditional narrative line (or at least that associated with the realist novel), a hesitation which is basically toward one-directional time or history. The Wake both retains tale-telling ("totalled in toldteld and teldtold in tittletell tattle," 597.08-.09) and works against it in its repetitions,
which make of the narrative "a sort of swigswag, systomy dystomy" (597.21). With the realist novel, on the other hand, we have come to expect that a tale need be told only once. Perhaps in its narrative practice the Wake is closer to the ancient oral epics, where the same tale was told and retold, varying from telling to telling; the tale was not a single entity but was rather a composite of all its tellings or performances. The Wake is this composite tale; it is the oral epic transposed into written literature, an enormous manuscript where all possible versions have been written in, where the bare narrative kernels exist alongside their versions in various degrees of elaboration, where primary versions do not precede elaborated ones, but may instead come after them. The principle of composition of the Wake is not that of the Line (the progression from A to Z) but rather is that of elaboration and insertion (the addition of more letters beyond Z), elaboration of simple kernels and insertion of additions between the lines of the existing text. Under this principle, the sequence of sentences is less important than the elaboration of each individual sentence (or word).96

This method of composition must have some bearing on the status of the tale and telling within the work. In the manuscripts:

Revisions are written on top of revisions, additions are squeezed in wherever room can be found for them, crushed between the lines or crowded in the margins, upside-down or sloping across the page. Sometimes—presumably in order to avoid committing himself to any order of precedence—Joyce wrote down his notes at various angles. It looks as if he spun the page around every time he finished a note so as to produce a puzzle which can only be solved by being turned around in every direction. . .97
Such a method of composition would seem to foster a non-sequential narrative: here, units are elaborated and repeated; their relation to other units is one of interweaving or interpolation of discrete entities. Repetition works against sequential narrative in both affirming and transcending time, making it multidirectional, recovering the past in the present and making the future simply another moment of this recovery. Interpolation works against sequence by making of the text one giant manuscript or palimpsest; it spatializes narrative (if this is not a contradiction in terms), or at least makes all of its points contemporaneous. Such a view of narrative time is affirmed, in the *Wake*, by instances of time actually running backwards within the over-all cyclic movement of Books I to IV. This is the case in the Shaun chapters of Book III, where the figure Shaun-Jaun-Yawn-Kevin grows younger as the text progresses.  

3.d. **Digression and narrative**

A notion of the contemporaneity of all times is thus reinforced by textual repetitions—and by digressions. In the digression, a line of narrative development is interrupted in order to explore a new possibility, a general idea, with the interruption usually being thematically and sometimes stylistically at odds with the main body of the narrative. In *Finnegans Wake* the digression is difficult to distinguish from the narrative, since there is no single, unified narrative from which to digress, and since the digression (usually in the form of a working-out of encyclopaedic categories, an actualization
of semantic paradigms, at the expense of a tale) often seems to be the dominant mode of the work. For example, in the following passage "extraneous" elements flourish in the tale being told of the Norwegian Captain and the tailor:

—Then sahd he to the ship’s husband. And in his translatentic norjankeltian. Hwere can a ketch or hook alive a suit and sowterkins? Soot! sayd the ship's husband, knowing the language, here is tayleren. Ashe and Whitehead, closechop, successor to. Ahorror, he sayd, canting around to that beddest his friend, the tayler, for finixed coulpure, chunk pulley muchy chink topside numpa one sellafella, fake an capstan make and shoot! Manning to sayle of clothse for his lady her master whose to be precised of a peer of trouders under the pattern of a cassack. Let me prove, I pray thee, but this once, sazd Mengarments, saving the mouthbrand from his firepool... Alloy for allay and this toolth for that soolth. Lick it and like it. (311.21-.34)

These elements include references to other races (Celtic, Russian, Chinese); proverbs ("An eye for an eye . . .," "Love it or leave it"); the "felix culpa" motif ("finixed coulpure"). Can one still speak of a digression, in the *Wake*, in the absence of a single unified narrative? Smaller, inset narratives are certainly important in the *Wake*; these do not, however, offer a general rule from which the digression excepts itself. In the *Wake*, digression becomes the rule and narratives become the exception. This is as much to say, then, that the distinction between norm and exception is overcome. Everything, to use Philippe Sollers' term, becomes an "exception." 99

Like repetition, then, which makes all points in time simultaneous, digressions into the Encyclopaedia create an effect of timelesslessness in their recourse to categories that appear to be always
available, always outside the influence of time. Now, it is not unusual in the novel for linear narrative to be questioned, interrupted and often broken down. Over the history of the novel, this practice has grown up alongside realist "orthodoxy" in an officially sanctioned parody of the dominant practice: Swift's *Tale of a Tub* and Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* provide models in which the digression (and also the fictional note or gloss) occupies an important and extensive place in the body of the work. The digression and the footnote are clearly differentiated, in Swift's *Tale*, from the main narrative; in *Tristram Shandy*, the boundaries between digression/note and narrative begin to become a little unclear; *Finnegans Wake* blurs these boundaries even more, making interruptions in linear time, insertions from "atemporal" categories or paradigms, more insistently a part of every meandering line, every composite word.

4. *Finnegans Wake: the Book and books*

In the pedagogical encyclopaedia, we recall, an aspiration toward totalization and timelessness of knowledge is matched by the creation of the illusion that such knowledge can somehow be unmediated, untainted by an ever-receding series of sources. And yet, of course, the writer of an article for an encyclopaedia must rely, if only indirectly, on source-texts. The illusion of unmediated knowledge or access to the world is only possible because there is no particular convention, in such an article, requiring explicit acknowledgements of a debt to
sources. In the fictional encyclopaedia, paradoxically enough, references to other books become very insistent and often explicit, even while this type of work, in its nature as fiction, lacks (even more than the encyclopaedia does) any convention requiring explicit acknowledgement of sources.

A work such as *Finnegans Wake* is made out of other books, refers to other books in a number of different ways, to be discussed. These references or acknowledgements, both explicit and evasive, become the markers of a fundamental ambivalence toward its own nature as a book in a tradition of books, letters. The *Wake* refers to other books in an over-all vein of parody or critical transformation, indicating that it both recognizes its sources and holds itself apart from them: it would be both a book and something more, or other, than a book; it both emphasizes its nature as writing via the metaphor of the Letter, and nostalgically looks back to the sacred language envisioned by Vico, the "perfect language" (424.23-.24). We have already noted how the conflict between the opposing forces of Shem and Shaun, and their passage into one another, founds a principle of ambivalence at the base of the *Wake*'s stance toward totalization; this principle also underlies the parodic, transforming treatment of books or written authority. Books are evoked yet suffer change, undergo a critique, in the process. The *Wake* both submits to the authority of other books, and evades it by the work of linguistic indirection. Such an operation would hope to enable the work to attain to a condition beyond mere bookishness—the condition of the Book (being neither books nor life, or both at once). An accession to
the condition of the Book would overcome the distinction between word and thing in the "letter potent" (419.28). The work of intertextual indirection (punning on book-titles, authors' names, and transforming selected words or passages) and linguistic indirection (wordplay in general) is the means of this accession. The all-encompassing encyclopaedic Book involves, not a return to the "prefall paradise peace" of the first, sacred language, but the passage from this state, nostalgically evoked, into its negation in fallen wordplay, and from thence into something both originary and fallen, both origin and repetition, "this radiooscillating epiepistle to which . . . we must ceaselessly return . . ." (108.24-.25).

Before we determine what particular relations are taken by the Wake with respect to other books, we should distinguish the relations, in general, that a book may take towards other books. This relation has been given the general name "intertextuality," as coined by Kristeva (see Chapter One); Genette, however, renames this relation "transtextualité," making intertextuality only one of several relations of "transcendance textuelle du texte," or "... tout ce qui le met en relation, manifeste ou secrète, avec d'autres textes." Thus intertextuality involves "la présence effective d'un texte dans un autre," with emphasis on "dans"; it includes the practices of citation, plagiarism and allusion. Another important form of transtextuality is what Genette terms "hypertextualité": here, a text derives in its entirety from an anterior text, and could not exist without it. This derivation may take the form of a direct transformation (for example, of
the *Odyssey* by Ulysses) or it may take the form of an imitation, a transformation mediated by a generic model (for example, the epic and the imitation of the *Odyssey* by the *Aeneid*). Such derivation, when embodied in a group of texts, includes the traditional genres of parody, pastiche, travesty.

It is evident, if we recall our discussion of the presence of Vico in *Finnegans Wake*, that Joyce's text entertains "hypertextual" relations with the *New Science* in particular. The *Wake* appears to be a transformation of Vico's text (or at least of his model of history): its division into three books with a short "dawn" or transition piece translates Vico's three ages plus "ricorso" into fictional form. Joyce's text, that is, exists as a whole in a relation to an anterior whole---Vico's work. Vico and Bruno are what Atherton calls the "structural books": these are books used in their entirety for their ideas, for their "theoretical structure." Bruno's ideas are transformed by the *Wake* on the levels of character (the warring twins, discussed above) and over-all form (Books I and III are opposites facing one another across the central panel, or Book II, of a great triptych).

There is, in the *Wake*, perhaps as much a generic imitation (in Genette's terms) of these source-texts as a transformation of ideas. The work's treatment or parody of Vico's encyclopaedic aspirations could be characterized as the imitation, by a fictional encyclopaedia, of a work according to premises of totalization peculiar to the genre of encyclopaedias. Similarly, Swift's *Tale of a Tub* is a model for
Finnegans Wake via both generic imitation and transformation of ideas: the Wake uses the ideas of the Tale, transforming the story of three brothers fighting as to the meaning of their father's Will into a tale of twins warring under the shadow of a father perpetually being killed off and resurrected; the Wake also imitates Swift's Tale in an over-all attention to its generic or formal traits as a digressive work (a Menippean satire), translating the Tale's self-conscious and rather mechanical use of digression as an alternation into a principle of semantic expansion just barely kept in check by narrative and thematic requirements. Other models, or "structural books," are the Books of Genesis and Exodus. The Old Testament books undergo a transformation of ideas, as the myth of original sin is translated into a misdemeanour occurring—and recurring endlessly—in Phoenix Park. The Babel of Genesis is transformed into the tower-building (erecting a "baubletop," 5.02) and the Father's stuttering, or the multitude of tongues, in the Wake. The warring sons Cain and Abel, and Jacob and Esau, are a structural base for the Shem/Shaun conflict of Joyce's work, while their names are taken over many times and transformed or deformed ("For there's no true spell in Connacht or hell/(bis) That's able to raise a Cain," 47.28-.29; ". . . the cane for Kund and abbles for Eyolf and ayther nayther for Yakov Yea," 201.33-.34). The Biblical fathers such as Adam, Noah and Abraham are reincarnated in Finn and Earwicker, while the thundering Jehovah institutes and protects a nation—or Earwicker's family. The Old Testament books are also "generically" imitated in Book I, Chapter i of the Wake, which concerns itself with
sacred beginnings or prehistory, with the actions of God (or Vico's Jove, or the gods): "All was of ancienctry..." (19.33); "He dug in and dug out by the skill of the tilth for himself and all belonging to him... and he urned his dread... begad he did, our ancestor most worshipful..." (24.03-.08); "Now be aisy, good Mr Finnimore, sir. And take your laysure like a god on pension and don't be walking abroad. Sure you'd only lose yourself in Healiopolis..." (24.16-.18).

Finnegans Wake maintains a more properly intertextual relation to other books via its citations of authors' names, titles, lines of text. These references often seem more like indirect allusions owing to the deformations they undergo. A citation, that is, becomes an allusion to itself in the indirection of the pun; the reader reads one thing and is reminded of something else, something cited, via a similarity in their sound. There are many examples of this intertextual punning in the first Shaun chapter of Book III; such references to books are appropriate in this context—an argument over the relative merits of the two brothers' literary efforts:

... and bawling out to her Jameymock farceson in Shemish like a mouther of the incas with a Garcielasso huw Ananymus pinched her tights... all the tell of the tud... and him... making his pilgrimmace of Childe Horrid... (422.36-423.08)

The alum that winters on his top is the stale of the staun that will soar when he stambles till that hag of the coombe rapes the pad off his lock. (423.23-.25)

Prost bitten! Conshy! Tiberia is waiting on you, arestocrank! Chaka a seagull ticket at Gattabuia and Cabbiano's! (424.09-.10)
Garcilaso de la Vega's *Origin of the Incas* is suggested by "a mouther of the incas with a garcielasso". The sound and spelling of the text and its intertext are similar; "mouther" both replaces "origin" (mother) and suggests Garcilaso's role as spokesman for an oppressed race (mouth). Swift's *Tale of a Tub* is punned upon twice as "tell of the tud" and "stale of the staun." Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* is the reference "hidden" behind the transparent "pillgrimace of Childe Horrid." Pope's *Rape of the Lock* is manifestly there in the text; it is not deformed, but "lock" by verbal association gives "padlock," which enters the text and interferes with the reference. In "Prost bitten! Conshy!", a reference to Proust and to Combray is synthesized with the proverb, "Once bitten, twice shy," as well as with "frostbitten." This latter notion leads, via association, to Siberia, to Russia, and hence, in this writerly mode, to Chekhov and his play *The Seagull*. From these examples it is clear that intertextual reference in *Finnegans Wake* is rarely direct, but is, rather, troped or subject to interference from other sources or forms of reference (contextual, proverbial). There is a turning-away from a (now) hidden origin or original text toward a new form manifest in the text; the origin must be rediscovered, via clues such as sound, spelling and syntax, and reinstated between the lines of the text. As such, intertextual reference or "la présence effective d'un texte dans un autre" is another name for the general mechanism of "palimpsestic punning" discussed at the outset of this chapter. It involves words or groups of words, as they are discovered in the *Wake*,
whereas "hypertextualité," discussed above, involves the discovery of an entire text (Vico, Swift) between the lines of the text at hand.

Finnegans Wake thus relates, like any other work of fiction, to a world of sources, other books. As a fictional encyclopaedia, however, it differs from other fictional works in the extent of its dependence on other books, and in the way, and the degree to which, it acknowledges this indebtedness. Like the non-fictional encyclopaedia, the Wake contains little that does not come from other books, that cannot be "looked up" somewhere (at least after an initial deciphering). Joyce's work consists in organizing and embroidering upon the already-written:

Joyce was always an arranger rather than a creator, for, like a mediaeval artist, he seems superstitiously to have feared the presumption of human attempts at creation. The mediaeval notion that the artist may organise but cannot under any circumstance create something really new is, of course, capable of universal application but it is more than usually relevant to Joyce.

This work of "bricolage" is carried on, to some degree, in all writing: clichés, proverbs, fragments of other texts, can be found to make up a good portion of even the most realist-descriptive—or Romantic-subjective—writing. The difference between the Wake and realist works in this work of appropriation and organization is one of degree: the difference also lies in the extent of acknowledgement of these sources, however troped, tortuous or parodic this acknowledgement may be. The names of sources actually appear in the Wake, whereas in more conventional fiction they do not. This practice of "explicit"
acknowledgement marks the fictional encyclopaedia; it offers a kind of mock-objectivity, or satirical gravity, that is characteristic of 'serio-comical' works of this kind.\textsuperscript{110}

5. \textit{Finnegans Wake: writing and gesture}

If a composition out of other books is the method of the \textit{Wake}, the novel nonetheless sets up a dialectic between such practice as "plagiarism" and writing as inspired creation. This ambivalence is embodied, of course, in the brothers Shem and Shaun. The problem of plagiarism and forgery in writing haunts the \textit{Wake} even while it carries on something similar in its actual practice. Shem or "jameymock farceson" (423.01) represents a negation of creation in his writing of "piously forged palimpsests" with a "pelagiarist pen" (182.02-.03). The practices of forgery or plagiarism or "sophistry" in literature result in a creation unconnected with real life or truth:

\textit{... you should ... repopulate the land of your birth and count up your progeny by the hungered head and the angered thousand but you thwarted the wious pish of your cogodparents, soph, among countless occasions of failing ... adding to the malice of your transgression ... even extruding your strabismal apologia, when legibly depressed, upon defenceless paper and thereby adding to the already unhappiness of this our popeyed world, scribbative! (188.33-189.10)}

Shem's literary creation, an act of violence committed upon "defenceless paper," a paper moreover of his own body, is an "alphybettyformed verbage" (183.13) become a world in itself:
... this Esuan Menschavik and the first till last alchemist wrote over every square inch of the only foolscap available, his own body, till by corrosive sublimation one continuous present tense integument slowly unfolded all marryvoising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history. . . (185.34-186.02)

Writing is thus an alternate creation and projects a complete world—borrowing or "plagiarizing" all its traits from the real world, but remaining independent of it—within its body. Shem as Esau ("Esuan") or as Menshevik is a figure for writing in the *Wake*; his antagonistic twin Shaun, as Jacob or as Bolshevik, becomes thus a figure for oral language, the voice or song. Every negative thing that Shaun has to say with respect to his brother is thus also directed at writing, making the conflict of the brothers the traditional argument between the written and the spoken word, between "sinscript" and "slanguage" (421.17-.18). In Book I, Chapter vii, and in Book III, Chapter i, Shaun directs a bitter attack against Shem as representing a writing creating its own world, divorced from life:

I am, thing Sing Larynx, letter potent to play the sem backwards like Oscan Wild . . . As far as that goes I associate myself with your remark just now from theodicy re furloined notepaper and quite agree in your prescriptions for indeed I am, pay Gay, in juxtaposition to say it is not a nice production. It is a pinch of scribble . . . Overdrawn! Puffedly offal tosh! (419.24-.33)

Here Shaun contrasts what he imagines as being a pure vocal speech with a writing associated with thieving ("furloined notepaper" or Poe's purloined letter), fraud ("Overdrawn!") and homosexuality ("puffedly
offal tosh") transforming a damning remark made by Oscar Wilde on Ulysses. And yet his attack is phrased in the very indirections, the bookish allusions, for which Shem stands, and from which Shaun, it seems, cannot escape: there are references to Poe and to John Gay's The Beggar's Opera (the latter again appropriate in this context of robbery, writing as theft). It is as though Joyce recognizes that a nostalgia for the voice, or for a ritual, gestural language, is ultimately untenable in Finnegans Wake. It remains a nostalgia only, as does the desire to write "the authordux Book of Lief," a book in which Life and a controlling subjectivity are supreme.

Despite an evident recognition of the untenable nature of Shaun's position, neither of the twins is dominant in the Wake. Even though Shem is more clearly Joyce himself, Shaun could be said to be Joyce's "doolinganger," representing his brother Stanislaus with his aggressively conventional attitude toward letters and the project of the Wake. Both figures, representing writing and voice, make up one ambivalent whole or "ambitrickster" (423.06) evading any reductive interpretation; neither side of the debate on writing ultimately comes out ahead. It is evident, of course, that the life of books is an important base for the Wake and for its composition; however, it is equally evident that the Book of Life remains as an ideal of encyclopaedic totality, an ideal informing its actual practice.
1. Special problems: non-punctuation

Our discussion of Finnegans Wake, in emphasizing the work's ubiquitous wordplay, emphasizes the material mediation which ultimately characterizes any writing, whether or not it is visibly anomalous. The senses of sight and hearing—the word's physical appearance and its sound—come far more into play in the Wake than they do in the traditional work (Barthes' "classical" work), interfering with the hermeneutic gesture that would appropriate meaning.

Philippe Sollers' Paradis contains a similar major block to comprehension in that it lacks any form of visual punctuation to guide the reader in making sense, in reconstituting its units of meaning. Each page of Paradis is a solid, unbroken mass of words, whose visual density is further emphasized by the use of a very black, italicized typescript. Lacking the visual landmarks provided by conventional punctuation practice, the reader can neither encompass the entire work, nor often decide where one unit of sense takes up from a preceding unit or gives way to a succeeding one. Just as hermeneutic operations are complicated in Finnegans Wake by the materiality of its lexical constructions, so Paradis impedes these operations in the dizzying visual density of the print on each page. In the Wake we can analyze
polysemy—the existence of multiple meanings in a single word, whether pun or composite; the practice of polysemy multiplies interpretations. In Paradis, on the other hand, we must speak of the phenomenon of "polysensibilité," which is a question of literary texture, a question, that is, of the lapping or overlapping of phrases. Interpretation, here, is blocked because the reader is hypnotized by a seemingly endless sameness, sent to sleep. As Sollers says, contrasting his texts to the Wake: "... to read my texts you should be in a state something like a drug high. You're in no condition to decipher, to perform hermeneutic operations... The language of the text is a base over which something slides. That's why you don't have polysemic concretions."  

In Paradis, as in the Wake, the ear takes on an important role: when read aloud, each work takes on new layers of sense. In the Wake, an emphasis on the pun and on conventional syntactical rhythms often enables a lexical puzzle, insoluble at the visual level, to fall into place in the new aural context. Likewise, the verbal flow of Paradis, undifferentiated to the eye, is articulated by the voice and its patterns of intonation, which decide whether a unit is a sentence, a phrase or an individual word. In "grimémoires" ("grimoire"-"mémoire") like the Wake and Paradis, then, visual difficulty, linked to a heightened materiality of the word, paradoxically provokes a condition of orality or oral memory. A conflict between the free distribution of knowledge and its arcane self-generation and -preservation, a conflict which we noted to underlie the encyclopaedic enterprise, is replayed in the fictional text as a hermeneutic/hermetic tension. The fictional
encyclopaedia's tendency towards extreme obscurity or hermeticism is countered by an aspiration towards the oral expression of epic, an expression which would at its limit be accessible to all, involving one common voice and meaning. This paradox, grounded in the nature of encyclopaedism as such, informs the Wake and Paradis as well as earlier works such as Dante's Commedia. As we will see, it is also fundamental to Pound's Cantos which, in their nature as songs or chants, ground an often intransigent obscurity (forcing recourse to annotations, commentary, etc.) in a basically oral nature linked to the troubadours' "canzone," to public entertainment.

Paradis thus presents two very different, but equal, faces to the reader: to the eye is given the cryptic, crabbed surface of writing, whose unpunctuated mass recalls the Hebrew of the Old Testament, and which the eye with difficulty penetrates and divides into units of significance; to the ear is given the rhythms and intonations of speech, familiar patterns against which the verbal flow is perceived, measured, and invested with sense. As Barthes says of it: "Paradis est lisible (et drôle, et percutant, et riche, et remuant des tas de choses dans toutes les directions—ce qui est le propre de la littérature), si vous rétablissez en vous-même, dans votre œil ou votre souffle, la ponctuation." The reader's experience of Paradis enacts in an extreme form the dialectic of difficulty and familiarity which is at the base of the encounter with the literary text and with language itself, and which involves a "... mouvement d'oscillation entre deux pôles virtuels, jamais atteints ... celui d'une illisibilité, d'une opacité
infranchissable . . . et celui, symétrique, d'une transparence absolue.
Rien n'est jamais illisible, rien n'est jamais complètement lisible.
Entre ces deux pôles . . . s'étendrait tout l'espace du sens . . . "?7
The extreme edge given to this tension in Paradis hinges on the work's lack of punctuation, in the perception of which the norms of clarity or order and their subversion are inseparable.

1.a. Study example

Let us look at a preliminary passage from Paradis in order to better ground the preceding remarks:

... que la cause trébuche d'effet en effet toboggan lapsus décalé et plus elle se prend pour l'effet et plus elle s'y fait et plus elle y tient et s'y entretient et plus qu'elle y colle et y caracole felix culpa péristoire chlorant l'oxydé tourbillon d'éveurs d'adamnés parmi lesquels j'ai aussi mon compte gobé mouche arachné toile ou donc au commencement il était une fois un commencement hors-commencement vol essaim chanté sans rien voir forêt d'ondes nuée grimémoire comme c'est vrai le vrai du ça veut dire vrai vérité du vrai dérivé comme c'est vrai détaché démêlé vidé et une fois de plus déballé brouillé et puis débordé décanté brodé et encore bridé décalqué doublé comme c'est dur d'y entrer béni d'arriver au vrai ç'a m'a dit lequel vous prend largo des pieds à la tête in illo tempore périplum et péripétie . . . (p. 146)

We note than an unpunctuated work puts into question the practice of citation itself as we indulge in it here. Citation involves the marking of a passage, the imposition of a beginning and an end to something that is actually continuing; it involves a lifting out of context. The operation seizes upon the landmarks provided by punctuation, points within the original which themselves suggest beginnings and endings,
boundaries, to meaning. Without punctuation, citation is made more difficult: the beginning and ending of a quotation may conceivably be pushed back further and further, as neighbouring words, by their very proximity lending shades of meaning to the words under consideration, press for inclusion. A citation from an unpunctuated work will thus appear to be highly arbitrary.

In the sample passage above, sight-reading only partially suggests the breaks in meaning, changes in speed and repetitions that the reading voice manages to make apparent. As these breaks and repetitions become clearer, it is evident that it is they that organize significance. It is the emphases, hesitations and changes in speed of the speaking or chanting voice that punctuate the words, in the sense of giving point to them\(^8\)—making them stand out from the lexical flux around them, giving them a point (a direction, purpose) beyond their individual etymologies. The voice "toboggans," slips and slides through a mass of words; meaning, a "lapsus décalé," slips in where it can.

In a self-reflexive movement characteristic of Paradis as a whole, this passage comments upon the formal consequences of freeing the text from punctuation. Non-punctuation has certain philosophical implications. Take the following: "... la cause trébuche d'effet en effet..." In a punctuated text, sentences are distinguished from one another; each sentence, as it were, causes the succeeding sentence(s) or text, and each is caused by the preceding sentence(s) or text. In a non-punctuated text, where units of meaning are less clearly demarcated, where they are often overflowing or interpenetrating, the notion of cause and effect becomes more problematic.\(^9\) There is only a
simple consecution, before and after; units of significance surge up, are developed and drop away, without there being any causal relation between them. The uncoupling of a particular cause from a particular effect, the displacement ("lapsus décalé") of cause along a number of alternative effects, suggested by "la cause trébuche d'effet en effet," puts into question the conventional philosophical coupling. This is again suggested in "[la cause] se prend pour l'effet" and "[la cause] s'y fait . . . y colle et y caracole"; cause and effect interpenetrate, change places, and so on. The text aspires thus to a condition of simultaneity— to an "ultraparadoxical phase," in Pynchon's expression.

Cause and effect thus merge into an over-all circular, or better, spiralling movement. As one philosophical constant is thus put into question, we can expect others to be as well. The notion of truth ("la vérité"), for example, is caught up in the verbal play and ambiguity of the text, such that it loses its privileged status and is reduced to being one word among others, susceptible to transformations and manipulations: ". . . comme c'est vrai le vrai du ça veut dire vrai vérité du vrai dérivé comme c'est vrai détaché démêlé vidé et une fois de plus déballé brouillé et puis débordé décanté brodé et encore bridé décalqué doublé comme c'est dur d'y entrer bêni d'arriver au vrai . . ." (p. 146). The reader moves from one qualification to the next in a quest to arrive at an ultimate "vérité," a definition of the "vrai." "Vrai du vrai" is corrected by ("ça veut dire") "vrai vérité du vrai," the latter "vrai" being immediately dislocated by the adjective
"dérivé." The reader tries again: a second "comme c'est vrai" does not this time lead to a substantive, but rather dissolves into a series of adjectives. These appear to make sense, an illusion created by their being strung together by a series of connectives: "et une fois de plus," "et puis," "et encore." And yet one must question in what way each adjective, taken individually, modifies "le vrai"; to couple such concrete modifiers with the vague concept "le vrai" is to annul sense, not refine it. The rush of modifiers is not concerned with approaching "le vrai," but merely with formal play, with alliteration on the consonants 'd' and 'b'. Thus hesitations subvert, at the grammatical level, the process of defining, or even talking about, a word. When this word is "la vérité," a powerful concept—traditionally taken to be at the base of philosophical systems and of texts—is put into question.12 (A similar "playful" operation is carried out on "la pensée," pp. 131-2, p. 138). A questioning of such monolithic concepts as truth, cause and effect, thought itself is thus effected by the practice of non-punctuation. Free to follow the internal "pulsions" of the body and breath,13 words become ambiguous, lose their accepted meanings. Concepts lose their habitual status; they are dissolved and reassembled, reinserted into discourse at new levels, in new contexts.

In the passage above, the "felix culpa" of Finnegans Wake is associated with the circular "tourbillon d'éveurs d'adaminés" and "péristole péristoire." The question of time ("in illo tempore") and the beginning of time adds itself to the matter of original sin and circularity. Beginnings ("au commencement il était une fois un
commencement hors-commencement”), circles ("peristole" is an amalgam of "peristome" or mouth and "peristyle" or circular court, "peristoire" is "prehistoire" made circular, "periplum" is a circumnavigation of a coastline) and the Fall form a cluster both horizontally, via juxtaposition, and vertically, as juxtaposition suggests a "deeper" relation of analogy. An absence of punctuation thus brings ideas into immediate contact, dissolves the boundaries by which they are normally separated, and thereby encourages a perception of metaphorical relations among them. In the passage at hand, then, there is the idea that historical time began with the Fall; in attempting to get back to a paradise before time, one can only circle around such a state—endlessly.

Notions of circularity and a paradoxical quest for a beginning outside of time, beyond beginnings, reflect on Paradis itself. Sollers' text is a "tourbillon" of words (in his own term, a "cyclotron"); an absence of punctuation renders virtually impossible an ordered development of ideas towards an end. A principle of teleological development is replaced by a principle of repetition involving a circling upon certain obsessive themes or images or sounds. Further, where there are no majuscules and no full stops there is, for the body of the discourse, no real beginning or end. One has the impression that the text has always been speaking and will always continue to do so. A paradisiacal "hors-commencement" is thus a desired state which would remove one from the necessity of beginning (or speaking) at all, and which the "nuée" of words in the text circles and evokes endlessly. In the absence of punctuation, one is not, however, free of time; rather,
the evocation of a paradise of no-time is that much keener and more precarious.

Examining a passage from Paradis thus enables us to see how non-punctuation affects meaning. The practice of writing Paradis involves the material working-through of the consequences of a theoretical subversion of certain philosophical constants. A text such as Paradis overcomes the distinction between theory and practice, between non-fiction and fiction. In a sense, then, Paradis is a metafiction. However, its peculiar quality is not simply that it refers to its own devices and to its place as a fiction in a tradition of fictions. Rather, as a "voyage dans l'informatique" (p. 187), it passes beyond fiction entirely (and correspondingly beyond non-fiction) in its encyclopaedic incorporation of cultural categories as well as of literary modes and kinds, in a movement privileging neither side.

1.b. Paradisiacal writing

A frequent reference, in Paradis, to the institution of punctuation and to its transgression is a prime instance of its mutual reflection of theory and practice. Punctuation (and its absence) is an obsessive theme in Sollers' text; it vies in frequency with the theme of paradise and its loss. Indeed, the two themes are closely linked: in his insistence on the restrictions imposed by punctuation, Sollers suggests the possibility, in breaking apart these obstacles, of arriving at an erotics of writing, a practice which may restore paradise, or at least provide a vehicle for glimpses of it. Paradise, literally, is
written in the paradoxical practice of writing as orality, where writing is animated by the rhythms of breathing. In Paradis, the phrase as the basic unit of written discourse is also the basic unit of speech, of intonation and rhythm.\textsuperscript{19} In paradisiacal writing, the opposition between writing and speech breaks down; neither is privileged over the other, neither came first. A paradoxical identification of writing and speech is suggested at one point in Paradis: "... celui qui pourrait écouter l'ensemble du traversable visible intouché lisible pénétrerait dans la non-oreille enroulée et de là comprendrait sans comprendre l'inaudible jamais nature . . ." (p. 163). Paradisiacal writing is the "visible," the "lisible," the "inaudible" to which one nonetheless listens; it is a silent, or visible, speech.\textsuperscript{20} The book of such writing is the "volume de l'éloquence lisible."\textsuperscript{21}

The practice of "visible speech" denies the possibility of beginnings—both the beginning of historical time, and the beginning of the linear book. Indeed, if the book may be seen as a spatialization of time,\textsuperscript{22} then the categories of space and time are put into question in such writing. Such contraries are overcome in the repetitions of Paradis. Specifically, the very notion of contraries makes sense only within the context of the linear time of history. Once beginnings blend into endings, once recurrence replaces consecution as textual principle, then the separation of contraries no longer holds: one thing returns as its other at each turn of the text. For example, Paradis plays with this paradox in the following passages:
. . . le maximum est le minimum la hauteur est la profondeur développe-toi chaleur froideur joie douleur car ce que tu cherches n'est pas la ressemblance mais l'unité qui s'y est cachée et qui est vraiment père principe universel et sans principe . . . (p. 170)

. . . à la fin juste avant l'illumination les pensées doivent être comme de l'huile coulant dans de l'huile l'agitation périphérique de la pensée commence à s'enfoncer comme des pierres changées en duvet . . .
(p. 151)

We recall the merging of the warring twins in the Viconian cycles of *Finnegans Wake*, as one brother, seen from the perspective of the other, actually takes on the latter's qualities.²³ Such merging undermines the very concept of difference at the base of language and the perception of significance.

As punctuation is linked, in *Paradis*, to the repression of unconscious desires, so paradise and the practice of paradisiacal writing constitute a form of "jouissance."²⁴ In the novel, erotic situations are as frequent as evocations of paradise, and often the two are indistinguishable²⁵—or at least closely juxtaposed.²⁶ Punctuation is equated with a blockage of or "resistance" to the natural rhythms of the body:

. . . j'avais immédiatement deviné qu'il y avait une liaison entre ponctuation et procréation d'où leurs résistances . . . à savoir qu'ils n'enregistrent que les points de rencontre avec leur image virgule tiret point virgule conclusion . . . ce truc donnait directement sur leur hantise à grossesse genre sésame bloqué . . . de telle sorte que l'inconscient est bien le non-né hors-né jamais né . . . (p. 8)
Commas, hyphens, full stops divide sense, arresting its flow and forcing it to accumulate in the units of phrase, sentence, paragraph, chapter and beyond. This is the case even as punctuation appears to support "communication":

... question pourquoi la ponctuation réponse garantie de circulation d'une information donc de sa surveillance à chaque étape de la transaction question mais pourquoi le découpage de l'information réponse pour agir produire reproduire pour entretenir l'illusion ... (p. 188)

The text—"genre sésame bloqué"—is potentially a cave of treasures: it is pregnant with meaning but unable to give birth, release its abundance. This arrest or blockage is seen as being narcissistic ("n'enregistrent que les points de rencontre avec leur image"). As Barthes says: "La ponctuation, parfois, c'est comme un métronome bloqué; défaits le corset, le sens expose ... ."

The paradisiacal or unpunctuated text is the site of the birth of meaning, the final "avènement de la phrase averse" (p. 138) in the gestural and rhythmic "ponctions" of the body.

Oral punctuation, further, mimics the number and cadence of music:

1750 art de la fugue lent vague sur vague dernier message cantor infini ... thème répétition variation et antiversion de l'inversion contrethème inversion rethème réinversion de l'altération silence reprise plus bas plus rapide ralentissement accélération division clavecin ponction ... fugue art de nouer tout en dénouant sans pour autant lâcher le coulant ... aucune raison que ça finisse calme à l'intérieur dépression quelque chose est fait pour être sans fin écouté ou plutôt ponctionner le flux-nombre au-delà du son écouté quelque chose est là pour insister en cadence et dire tout ce qui se dit se dira aura été dit ... (p. 125)
The fugue's repetitions and variations on a theme—a movement enacted in the repetitions and transformations of "thème répétition variation" as "antiversion . . . invariation contrethème inversion rethème . . ."—have no logical ending. The fugue is thus an apt metaphor for the potentially endless movement of Paradis, where a theme such as paradise or punctuation is repeated incessantly, but in a slightly different form on each new occasion. The rhythms of music ("silence reprise plus bas plus rapide ralentissement acceleration," etc.), like the rhythms of the body, punctuate the text; as with a musical score, one scans each phrase, the text.

One final perspective upon Paradis' practice of oral punctuation involves seeing the work in the light of sacred texts or incantatory ritual. First, Severo Sarduy suggests a sacred (oral) context for Paradis:

Pour jouir du texte de Paradis, de son mouvement de ressac, flux phonétique et reflux, le lecteur doit défocaliser sa pratique habituelle . . . pour percevoir dans chaque ligne, entre scansion et scansion, l'effet lissé vocalique, tension, retard ou accélération, métrique saturée, dissoute, retention ou expulsion, conglomérat, grumeau. Cette lecture rapprochée et déplacée permettrait de considérer la syllabe non comme une parcelle de signification, vouée à son telos, —la constitution du sens—, mais comme un mantra: unité dont la répétition crée un modèle vibratoire . . . Chaque syllabe est un dépôt d'énergie, un noyau ondulant . . . dont récurrence, insistance dans la ligne, écho, annonce ou disparition tracent un diagramme invisible . . . de vide . . .

The rhythms of the text, already those of the body and of music, are also based in the tradition of ritual incantation or repetition. In such repetition, what is important is not the significance of what is
said, but rather its sound. Repeated sound functions to deepen the meditative state and bring the subject closer to divinity. In *Paradis*, the repeated "flux phonétique et reflux," the rise and fall, turn and return of syllables (and words and phrases) mimics the repetitions by which one accedes to divine states of mind. In place of any such real accession, however, Sarduy suggests a sketching-around, a "diagramme invisible," of paradise. *Paradis* enacts sacred ritual, but lacks an "image" of divinity to which, nonetheless, it constantly refers.

*Paradis'* oral punctuation takes on significance in the context of the Hebrew of the Bible; Sollers' work takes on greater sense in this context of sacred writing:

Rythme en lieu et place de la ponctuation. Vous savez que celle-ci n'existe pas en hébreu biblique, comme la division de la Bible en chapitres et en versets, elle est tardive . . . 'Il n'y a pas d'avant ni d'après dans la Torah, disent nos maîtres' . . . Or, vocalisation et ponctuation se disent par la même racine hébraïque. Autrement dit, celui qui savait lire le texte—le vocaliser—savait inévitablement le ponctuer—le signifier . . . C'est par la diction—lecture psalmodiée or cantilée/goutée—que le texte prend vie, s'anime, devient tissu vivant . . . Ici, la lecture solitaire et silencieuse n'est pas de mise.31

*Paradis* and the sacred scriptures are paradoxically best read aloud or chanted ("psalmodiée"). Further, Banon makes the point that "blancs" and divisions were only made relatively late in the Bible, and thus that *Paradis*, in its lack of divisions, is strikingly similar to the Biblical Hebrew. The "volume de l'éloquence visible"—and the fictional encyclopaedia in general—takes as its first model the sacred
scriptures; it does so on the level of form as well as on the level of
the thematic preoccupation with paradise and the Fall from grace.

1.c. **Paradis as fictional encyclopaedia**

The practice of non-punctuation intensifies the traits of
fictional encyclopaedism: the practice questions linear time and the
encyclopaedic dream of completion, a questioning we have seen to lie at
the heart of the encyclopaedic enterprise. Non-punctuation has other
implications—such as an overcoming of contraries and a challenging of
traditional philosophical constants—which might be applicable to our
form. Non-punctuation entails a formal circularity which undermines the
existence of contraries. The fictional encyclopaedia, based as it is on
the idea of a circle of knowledge, and enacting circularity formally in
its subversion of linear narrative, its digressiveness and
fragmentation, must also undermine traditional concepts of truth,
cause-and-effect, subjectivity in the meanderings of its form.

At its limit, the encyclopaedia (and its fictional counterpart)
would include all things and would have neither beginning nor end.
Reading such a limit-work would be something like listening to an
ongoing murmur of voices, the mad babble evoked by Foucault in
*L'Histoire de la folie*, the ground on which specific structures of
knowledge or thought are erected.32 This limit-state of an
undifferentiated ground of knowledge is evoked by Sarduy when he
characterizes *Paradis* as developing in the direction of a maximum
textual entropy: "... état de non-profération, énonciation sourde,
babil, baby-talk autonome, langage se disant lui-même, gris . . . sans gammes. Paradis doit donc arriver à un hasard absolu de mots, à la rumeur uniforme; sans direction ni sens: zénith de l'entropie. Dans cette 'mort chaude' circulera, infinie, sa vie." 33 Suspending punctuation simply renders more acute the experience of a maximum entropy of knowledge, an experience at the limit of the encyclopaedic enterprise in general (and perhaps opposing its preliminary gathering and ordering), where the line between reason and madness, knowledge and ignorance, sense and nonsense, becomes very tenuous. The experience of this limit-state is the experience of "la bêtise," 34 of hell in paradise, death in life.

2. Problems of totalization

The peculiar form of Paradis emphasizes problems of completion in the fictional text and particularly in the fictional encyclopaedia. Paradis may be fruitfully discussed from the perspective of the encyclopaedia's desire for completion and its working-out of this drive in its inclusions. We especially want to clarify the modes of this inclusion.

2.a. Modes of inclusion

Paradis' achieved inclusion ranges over the entire circle of knowledge or of memory; in Sollers' terms, there is "la narration et sa mémoire qui vont de l'horreur au comique, du constat de mort répété à
We are, however, more interested in how the elements of knowledge are included in the work than we are in enumerating these elements: we are interested in how they are drawn into the circle, how they are selected and articulated.

A preliminary point should be made: encyclopaedic inclusion in fiction works to foreground the elements and categories of knowledge over any story told. Such inclusion draws in as many items as possible in a gesture always in conflict with the central narrative thrust of fiction. Now, the modes of encyclopaedic inclusion in Paradis overlap somewhat with those of the Wake. There is first the series or list, the actualization of a knowledge-paradigm: here, a word may suffice to release a chain of words related to the first by association; what is normally a paradigm underlying single selections is now actualized horizontally as a list. Secondly, the principle of poetic or formal equivalence may determine the selection of an element and its combination with others. The practice of rhyme, for example, is common in Paradis, while repetition of certain key words over a passage also works in this manner. Sound-equivalence thus replaces plot as the key agent of selection and organization, so that the work functions more as a poem than as a "roman" (its generic appellation). Thirdly, as the Wake relies on certain "external" or stereotyped structures (such as the catechism, the list, the proverb) to generate the elements of the
Encyclopaedia, so Paradis effects its inclusions by utilizing the framework provided by rhetorical structures or strategies (for example, those of antithesis and anaphora) and by imitating certain literary modes and forms. Inclusion and imitation are thus closely linked in such play.

2.a.1 Inclusion by lexical series

Let us begin with the case of expansions of encyclopaedic categories. These series or lists of elements are perceived as being discontinuous with preceding material; nonetheless, once an initiating word establishes the new context, the words that follow are all continuous within it, all forming a homogeneous unit. Elements in a series are linked by mutual association, by common membership in a paradigm. In Paradis the series is usually short and self-contained, and several series may succeed one another consecutively or in waves. A complex crossing-over and intersection of series, such as occurs in the Wake (see discussion above, Chapter II, Sec. 1.d) is unlikely to occur in Paradis, where the basic unit is the short, simple phrase; the phrase cannot support the lengthy lexical chaining encouraged by the meandering Joycean sentence and paragraph. The following is an example of a "series of series," a Rabelaisian catalogue—under the over-all heading of "festive fare" or "viandes"—of foods:

... aussitôt le palais s'emplit de parfums ... et les tables se chargèrent de viandes chacun eut devant soi justement celles qu'il désirait oissons chapons rôtis poules cygnes paons perdrix faisans hérons butors cerfs
The series include lists of fowl ("oisons . . . butors"), game ("cerfs . . . lapins"), fish ("poissons à foison . . . harengs frais"), sauces ("toutes les sauces . . . au sainfoin"), sweets ("tartes . . . cramoignoles"), wines ("vin au piment . . . vin roux blanc . . . "). In keeping with the archaism of "viandes", the over-all heading to the list, the items selected are exotic: to list "cygnes" and "anguilles et tourterelles en pâtés" as food-items is to distance the whole, placing it in a medieval or Renaissance context.

A series may generate sub-series: an element in a series may function as a heading for a new list within the larger one. Now, a branching tree arrangement—that, for example, of biological classification—may be implicit in certain series and sub-series of the \textit{Wake}, as in the animals/insects series already discussed.\textsuperscript{36} In this arrangement one proceeds from the general categories or headings to specific items and back again, with genus and species implying one another. The food passage, above, does not depend on this branching model when its wine series digresses into the smaller series of "vin au piment au gingembre aux fleurs," "vin rosé moré hysopé claré," "vin de... (pp. 10-11)
sable...vin de gravier, "vin doux sec bordé...vin roux blanc velouté." These distinctions between wines do not presuppose a distinction between genus and species. (The latter order would underlie a progression from a Bordeaux wine, for example, to a particular vineyard and a particular vintage.) Sollers' vinaceos distinctions involve, rather, an actualization of grammatical categories within the larger actualization of knowledge categories. So the "slot" "vin à..." is filled in with several concrete examples, as are the adjectival "vin rosé...," "vin doux..." and the prepositional "vin de...". The digression or division of Sollers' series into sub-series ultimately works by an association of signifiers, not by a branching ordering of signifieds. In our *Wake* example of a sub-series and series, an association of signifiers vies with the orders of knowledge as individual, widely-separated chains begin to cross over and intersect.

In general, encyclopaedic inclusion relies on some combination of these two principles (association by signifier and association by membership in an order of knowledge—broadly speaking, by signified). Earlier fictional encyclopaedias such as *Bouvard et Pécuchet* progress from one order to another and develop sub-orders on the model of the tree of knowledge; more recent works such as *Finnegans Wake* and *Paradis*, forming part of the larger arena of postmodern fiction and sharing its emphasis on the signifier, place increasing emphasis on the play of signifiers as a means of generating encyclopaedic lists.

The nature of the series as an irruption into an established context is evident even in *Paradis*, even in a work based on digression,
a work where no sooner is one context established than it disappears and
is replaced by another. This appearance of digression-within-digression
is ensured by the homogeneity of the lexical series; in a flux of
heterogeneous fragments, the series presents by contrast a clear
beginning and end. As long as the reader possesses to some extent the
encyclopaedic categories of the culture, she or he will perceive the
onset and ending of a series as a digression into a category of
knowledge. This irruption is evident in the following:

... vous êtes bénie Marie pleine de grâce le seigneur
est avec vous oh là elle sursaute elle ramène sur elle sa
jupe bleue toujours bleue plissée profonde océane toutes
les mères de peintres ont eu des jupes bleues vous êtes
bénie entre toutes les femmes ça c'est mérité c'est vrai
au fond je suis mieux et Jésus le fruit de vos entrailles
pastèque melon pêche melba grenade est béní ... (p. 35)

The "Hail Mary" is established as a context, however fleeting (it lasts
for ten lines). Within this public and celebratory context, there are
digressions in a more personal voice into musings on the Annunciation,
the colour of Mary's robes, the tradition of religious painting. Now,
the sequence "le fruit de vos entrailles pastèque melon pêche melba
grenade est béní" constitutes a digression into an encyclopaedic
category ("fruit") initiated by the figurative expression "fruit de vos
entrailles"; such a series is in the tone neither of public ritual nor
private musing, but is rather in the impersonal tone of the
reference book. Within the series itself there is a one-word digression
into a potential new series—that of fruit desserts ("pêche melba")—a
shift effected by an association of signifiers, rather than by the
association of members of a category. Indeed, the shift interrupts this exemplary association of fruits, constituting a "fault" in the geological (rather than moral) sense. The movement of contexts in Paradis is thus something like the lapping of waves on a beach; Sollers places the wave alongside the heavenly orbit as a figure for his enterprise. One digression laps over another, proceeds over an "undertow" of meaning. In the resulting swell or "ressac, flux . . . et reflux," the encyclopaedic series is immediately perceptible. In its homogeneous or monolithic appearance, it intrudes upon the more subtle and ephemeral shifts of its context.

2.a.ii Inclusion by formal equivalence

A principle of formal equivalence or association is a second means by which the most diverse elements of knowledge are drawn into the text of Paradis. This principle is outlined by Roman Jakobson in his essay "Linguistics and Poetics," where he defines the poetic function as being that which "... projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination." The language-user associates words by sound or structure in paradigmatic groups or lists. These associations are actualized horizontally in the play of poetry or of any forms in which the poetic function is dominant. Such formal equivalence, along with association by semantic equivalence or common membership in a semantic paradigm, are the two chief modes of encyclopaedic inclusion. Both modes involve Jakobson's "projection" from paradigm to syntagm; both involve the scanning of lists of
equivalents and the actualization of these in the syntagmatic flow of the text. Formal association, as we have seen, can interfere with its semantic counterpart; it can break into encyclopaedic series, initiating sub-chains. We should now look at what happens when the mode of formal equivalence is given free rein, when it no longer functions as an interruption, but rather as the dominant means by which diverse elements of knowledge are selected and organized in the text.

A principle of formal equivalence is essentially a principle of repetition. When we encounter repeated whole words, or repeated sounds as in rhyme and alliteration, what we experience is the arrangement of equivalents over the flow of the text. Repetition as equivalence has unique events being perceived as being associated by a common membership in a paradigm. Repetition, in other words, involves the creation of similarity in difference. This contradiction is the chief principle of composition in Paradis. Composition, that is, proceeds by thematic and by formal equivalence, by theme and variation. At the level of the totality of the work, paradise, in various mystical and erotic versions, is the chief theme whose repetition lends coherence to the fragments of the text; at the level of the page or the line, the formal theme and variation of rhyme and alliteration drives the text forward. The practice of formal equivalence is responsible for the most startling conjunctions of signifieds, of categories normally well-separated in the conventional order of language and of ideas.

The simplest kind of formal equivalence is that of a word with itself; the repetition of a single word or group of words is a key mode
of composition in Paradis. Repeated, a word is the same as itself; yet it is also not the same word. Obviously, the simple repetition, although not strictly speaking tautological, cannot be a mode of encyclopaedic inclusion: unlike rhyme, for example, it projects a paradigm of identical elements. Its inclusive function in Paradis is more indirect. Repetition of a word creates a "mantra" effect, a sort of mesh or net of sound within whose folds the most diverse "catches" of information may be found. Often the repeated word is an abstraction such as God, Truth, Finitude, etc.: these are monolithic terms which the unpunctuated flux of the text works to undermine. The marked repetition of a word not only emphasizes that word but also erodes it, makes it seem ridiculous, redundant. One repetition makes for emphasis; more than this creates an effect of ambiguity. This is exactly what happens in the following:

... le dessein bien arrêté de dieu est que l'âme perde dieu quant à l'homme il doit devenir tellement pauvre qu'il n'y ait même plus en lui un seul lieu pour dieu qu'est-ce que tout cela veut dire sinon qu'il faut échapper à l'hystère croqueuse du lieu à la chienne liée au lieu donc toujours soumise à un dieu qui n'est pas un dieu même en niant dieu pour mieux affirmer que son lieu c'est dieu comment opérer en niant dieu non ce serait obéir à l'origine du lieu et en reconnaissant dieu non plus ce serait ramener le culte du lieu ...

(p. 170)

"Dieu" (already undermined by the omission of the majuscules) is repeated alongside "lieu"; the two words become interchanged over the course of the repetitions, making of "dieu" a "lieu" (commun?), a fixed place which is yet continually suffering erosion. Within the
(crumbling) framework provided by the repetition of the words "dieu"/"lieu," a condensed history of man's relation to God is implied. The repetition of an abstraction, then, paradoxically involves the simultaneous construction and deconstruction of the entire system of thought traditionally associated with the term.

The practice of rhyme is an important kind of formal equivalence: in Paradis, it brings disparate ideas together and draws them into the fabric of the text; further, it lends coherence to a fragmented text, even if only for the duration of the rhyme. Like the repetition of whole words, rhyme follows the principle of theme and variation, or sameness in difference, as it traces the same syllabic sound through its incarnations in different words. Whereas simple repetition involves the return of the same sound over a varying context, rhyme involves the return of the same sound in a new shape, in a new word. Whereas simple repetition of a term is indirectly the vehicle whereby an entire system of thought associated with that term may be drawn into the text, rhyme works more directly in the task of encyclopaedic inclusion: words, often widely divergent in meaning, are drawn together because they sound the same, usually sharing the same ending. Conventionally (in rhymed verse), rhyme is an external shape working alongside concerns with expression: a rhyme-scheme must be adhered to, but not merely any words will do to fill in its "gaps"; the selection of words is ultimately guided by the thematic matter of the verse, or at least by an intimate conjunction of matter and rhyme-scheme. In Paradis, on the other hand, the rhyme becomes a pretext for the generation of encyclopaedic lists.
Lacking any pre-existing "matter" to guide selection, rhyme becomes the sole agent of selection; it becomes the means whereby diverse elements, normally latent in the sound-paradigms of poetic language and only actualized in moderation, are now actualized all at once, "immoderately" or excessively.

The following passage demonstrates Paradis' characteristic combination of formal (or auditory) coherence and semantic dissonance. The context of the passage is a discussion of the "mother tongue" as a contradiction in terms:

... aucune mère n'a jamais eu sa langue allons voyons gros garçons cessez de la croire baleine mitaine de lui imputer vos gangrènes c'est déjà bien beau qu'elle vous borde au lit qu'elle vous rectifie en codé-permis nations tribus nutrition balbutiages dans la rembabelle sans quoi il y en aurait une seule de langue mes petits une passerelle montant loin d'ici une corde langue un tapis volant fakir et coup d'âile un manche à balai ... on sent un écran farouche une autrouche un plein ventre sphinx bourrant le pharynx une pénible odeur de larynx et tout à reprendre puisque tout s'oublie pour chacun bébé mèmeu regneugneu ... (p. 176)

The context remains that of language ("langue"), speech ("larynx," "balbutiages," "Babel" hidden in "rembabelle"), specific tongues ("hébreu" hidden in "bébreu") and the mother ("mèmeu" and hence "bébé" in "bébreu"). This background of significance is, however, stretched thin in the digressions effected by the rhyme: the "baleine"/"mitaine"/"gangrène" rhyme brings together, and into the "mother tongue" context, three semantically unrelated elements (although "mitaine" might individually relate to the mother and child theme). "Lit," "rectifie"
and "codé-permis," in contrast, follow more closely in the mother-child vein. But what do we make of the rhyme "rembabelle" (a composite, it seems, of "remballer" and "Babel")/"passerelle"/ "coup d'aile"? This group as a whole appears to underscore a passage to a paradisiacal language beyond Babel, and yet the words involved do not, among themselves, cohere. The "farouche"/"autrouche" rhyme, further, is not even based on real words: "autrouche," like "rembabelle," is a composite word, a fusion of "farouche" and "autruche." The effect of rhyming using neologisms is to blur any conventional connections rhyming words may have among themselves or with the context. The only connection that can remain is the purely formal one of sound. "Sphinx" is perhaps suggested by the exotic animal "autrouche," but now draws in with it its rhyming counterparts "pharynx" and "larynx," which are related among themselves in sound, but are semantically dissonant with respect to "sphinx." The relation, again, is a purely formal one.

Auditory returns would seem to demand a parallel flow of sense; a perception of regularity at the formal level would seem to require a base of semantic regularity, a smooth building-up of ideas. In Paradis, however, such is not always the case. Its rhymes only mimic regularity, drawing together for the ear fragments of sense and tenuous, quickly-disappearing contexts. When certain of the rhyming words are neologisms, even the perception of auditory regularity becomes tenuous. Perhaps, rather than dwelling on regularity, we should be emphasizing the other notion associated with repetition—that of identity in difference. Here meaning does not develop continuously under the
returns of rhyme; rather, sense is a heterogeneity or multiplicity in
which we perceive "identity" in sound. In this light, also, the
neologism does not interfere with rhyme but rather deepens it: it
doubles a perception of identity in difference, bringing to the rhyme a
unit already depending on the recognition of familiar words in a
"defamiliarized" or neological form ("bébreu," "memeu," "regneugneu"
each form such a unit).\footnote{5}

Alliteration is a third type of repetition in Paradis; its
practice is often linked to the creation of neologisms. There are
numerous examples in the work of a striking coexistence of alliterating
sounds and mutating words:

\begin{quote}
... les voilà de nouveau qui reniflent ronflent rotent
pêtent pensent et repêtent et repensent repêtent-repensent
...
\end{quote}
(p. 59)

\begin{quote}
... soma nous psukhé tribu tribunal tribal tridenté
triste tripe contrivialité chaleur fourrée à l'humaine
voilà nous sommes faits de la même étoffe que les rêves et
notre vie s'arrondit en zéro ...
\end{quote}
(p. 119)

\begin{quote}
... car c'est de la mort ... que nos squelettes cordés
sont chargés c'est pour ça qu'ils sont délégués vitriol
strychnine nitro-glycérine pour bouffer ce qui bouffe
bouffissure bouffante biffée ...
\end{quote}
(p. 173)

\begin{quote}
... les voilà partis dans l'enquête poursuite grif graf
et gral grad grimmé ...
\end{quote}
(p. 190)

The repetition of consonants, particularly those that are stressed and
begin a word, is an actualization of an "underlying" paradigm or finite
list of words. These words (like rhyming words) sometimes appear on the
basis of requirements of context, as "gral" (grail) arises in the
"enquête poursuite" example. More frequently, however, alliterating words (again like rhyming words) turn away from context and link up or form clusters in a manner based on a play of signifiers, a play involving the slippage of one word into another. In such a practice, of course, other forms of repetition may also come into play: the mutating words may alliterate, assonate, rhyme or may simply be repeated. There is, in this coupling of metamorphosis and repetition, an interplay of continuity or assonance and discontinuity or dissonance which Banon relates to that often occurring in Hebrew. According to him, Sollers:

\[
\text{[rend], en français, le jeu de l'assonance et de dissonance qui est possible en hébreu parce que l'homographie conduit souvent à une hétérophonie . . . [rend] ce 'jeu' par la juxtaposition d'éléments phonologiques qui sont déjà phonématisables, c'est-à-dire éléments de signification, lambeaux de sens. Par exemple . . . cette variation sur midi minuit midinuit minuté dans son minidit; variation qui forme une constellation . . .}
\]

As in Banon's example, the fragments above demonstrate an interplay of continuity of sound and discontinuity of meaning—or, at the level of sound only, an interplay of repetition and variation. The "reniflent ronflent rotent . . ." segment, for example, illustrates how words whose initial consonants repeat can slip from one into the other via a steady and subtle variation on their other sounds; the slippage from "rotent" to "pêtent," further, is affected by a common 't', in turn initiating a new alliterating series—"pêtent pensent"—alternating with the old—"repêtent repensent." Such "alliterating variations" or
"constellations" are similar to the encyclopaedic series discussed earlier, in that in their homogeneity they look and sound like a block within a larger context of sense, a block which may have little or much to do with this context. In the second example, above, "tribu" is repeated and extended in "tribunal"; the same root then finds its place in "tribal." Dropping "tribu," but retaining the initial syllable "tri," we proceed to the dissonant "tridenté" which alliterates, but is also dissonant, with "triste" and "tripe" and "contrivialité" (a composite of "convive" and "trivialité"). This entire alliterating series is inserted into a context emphasizing sleep and dreams and featuring a translation and variation of a famous line from The Tempest: the series seems to bear little relation to this context.

Like the encyclopaedic series, the alliterating series appears to be "déclenché," unleashed, by an initiating word. In the third example, above, this word is "bouffer": it suggests a chain of words all bearing the common root "bouff-" and the meaning of eating, swelling and putrefaction, all tying in with the context of death. "Bouffer" then alliterates with "biffer," as actualized in "biffée"; "biffée" now terminates the series as a figure for "mort." The "grif graf . . ." series, finally, introduces the theme of writing into a quest context: "grif" suggests "griffe" or signature, while "graf" shortens "graffiti" and "grimmé" suggests "grimoire" or hieroglyphic book. "Grad" or "grade," the step, links with "gral" in the "enquête poursuite" context. In both the "bouffer" and the "grif" examples, then, alliteration develops a community of sense because it runs through the
possibilities of a common root. Continuity of sense, or only minor variation in sense, here accompanies repeated sound; this is not the case in the "tribu" and "pêtent pensent" segments above, where alliteration merely runs through the possibilities of a common syllable or consonant.

2.a.iii Rhetorical strategies

In Finnegans Wake, "extrinsic" structures such as the list, the proverb and the nursery rhyme serve as a framework or pretext for encyclopaedic expansion (or excess, depending on one's point of view). In Paradis, such extrinsic frameworks for expansion are a little more difficult to isolate owing to the unpunctuated flux of the text, where a block of discourse may be invaded or impinged upon by rhyming (or alliterating) series, by constellations of mutating words. These pretexts do exist, however: they include the rhetorical strategies of antithesis and anaphora (the latter, moreover, already implying the principle of repetition that pervades Paradis), the principle of number-parallelism, and (as in the Wake) the catechism, the generating of questions and answers.

Antithesis is most commonly found in Paradis in the form of a repeating series of antithetical pairs. It is thus subordinated to the work's larger strategy of repetition: a single instance of antithesis, a single pair of contraries, would be swallowed up in the flux of the text, and would not be roomy enough for encyclopaedic inclusion. A series of antithetical pairs permits the generation of a list of opposites; it permits the exploration of the binary properties of
language. For example:

... au fond la situation est simple toi avoir moi pas avoir toi donc de droite moi de gauche toi exploiteur moi exploité donc toi te sortir de là et moi m'y mettre ... toi donner ce que tu as moi le prendre justice égalité fraternité moi imaginaire moi réel toi devoir accéder à la castration toi reconnaitre oblation toi t'immoler toi maître condamné moi esclave hérédier toi fort mais faux toi cultivé privilège moi dénouer sacrilège ... toi individu inutile dandy tour d'ivoire esthète juif décadent moi travailleur ombilique permanent toi cosmopolite desesperanto moi stalagmite hérédo toi pig moi smig toi multimono moi monostéréo ... (p. 158)

It is clear that a play of opposites does not preclude a formal play or use of rhyme. In Paradis, the search for equivalents (here opposites) at the level of the signified is often worked out in a corresponding play at the level of the signifier. In the passage above, formal or auditory equivalences increase as the oppositions progress. We move from a verb and its negation ("avoir," "ne pas avoir"), through opposites on the political spectrum ("droite," "gauche"), through lexical contraries ("sortir," "se mettre"; "donner," "prendre"), through opposites in psychoanalytic thought ("réel," "imaginaire"), in Hegelian dialectic ("maître," "esclave"), and so on. A play with rhyme has the effect of accentuating antithesis by emphasizing the formal similarities of the members of each pair of opposites. It is in the very nature of antithesis paradoxically to require physical contiguity of the terms in order to achieve its best effect; formal similarity serves to further sharpen this effect. Thus the rhyme between "condamné" and "héritier," between "privilège" and "sacrilège," between "décadent" and "permanent"
sketches these contraries in sharper relief in its emphasis on their similarities. Towards the end of the passage, formal play overtakes the listing of semantic possibilities, and rhyming words are paired that are not normally considered to be contraries. There is also some play with neologism: hence "cosmopolite"/"stalagmite," "desesperanto"/"hérédo," "pig"/"smig," "multimono"/"monostéréo." (In the latter pair, each element in itself contains an antithesis—e.g., "mono"/"stéréo"—while the pair features a chiasmic structure making its poles equivalent.)

In the end, that is, antithesis becomes an empty structure; the use of "nonsense" pairs shows up the nature of this (and any) rhetorical strategy as being the projection of a series of empty slots, of a structure of expectations, which may or may not be (ful)filled.

Another antithetical series is set up in the context of a meditation on Vico's three ages of man:

. . . retour villico vico 1668-1744 les dieux les heros
les hommes nécessité décadence utilité du hiéroglyphe au
billet de la stèle au téléphone de la fresque à
l'hologrammé . . . du bouclier au ticket du blason au
microfilmé du scarabée entaillé à l'azyme adénombrisé .
. . (p. 184)

Like the "toi . . . moi" structure in the previous example, the "de . . . à" structure functions as a framework for a short series of pairs of opposites; "de . . . à" implies the two temporal extremes, the very earliest and the very latest examples, of a whole range of items; "de . . . à" implies a certain category as seen from a historical point of view. Following Vico's system, the earliest, sacred term is valorized,
while the latest term represents a falling-off from something greater, more complete, and so on. The antitheses are thus constructed on the implicit model of "good/bad" or "golden age/grey present" or "sacred/scientific." This series of valorizing oppositions could (like the "toi . . . moi" series) be potentially endless, limited only by the number of terms, in the language, for the forms of art and communication. The rhetorical strategy of antithesis is again explored as the projection of a series of empty places. The reader's expectations concerning the filling of these spaces are fulfilled twice over, in that the expected items also rhyme with one another: "billet" rhymes with "téléphoné," which in turn rhymes with "hologrammé," and so on.

Anaphora is another rhetorical strategy which, like antithesis, is used in Paradis as a means of generating lists. In Sollers' text, anaphora ("the repetition of the same word or words at the beginning of several successive sentences or sentence members") looks like but is not the same thing as the simple repetition of words, in which words such as "dieu," repeated, punctuate and engender meditations on religion, human history, etc. The confusion is due to the work's lack of punctuation: anaphora is characterized as beginning sentences; in an absence of majuscules and full stops, this quality of emphatic beginning will be lacking. In the following example, there is a series of phrases, each beginning with the same words—a case of anaphora in the absence of punctuation:
... au nom de ceci de cela de la race du prolétariat de jésus moïse ou marianne ... au nom du peuple à la loi au nom du nom qui nomma au nom de la bonté liberté au nom du désir refoulé au nom du féminin opprimé au nom de la nature abîmée ... au nom du dévouement travail famille patrie et parti au nom de la science philosophie de l'économie ... au nom de notre grand dirigeant enseignant guide pilote suprême timonier tsaré vénéré au nom de la compétence de la performance de l'équivalence en monovalence au nom du cosmémorable animé au nom de la monocause dans la ménochose ... (pp. 158-9)

The phrase "au nom de ceci de cela" establishes the pattern that will be followed, literally spelling out the empty structure that must be filled. This proceeds to be filled—in the lines that follow—by a diverse array of cultural categories. At this point we may recall Beaujour's discussion of the autoportrait's reliance on ready-made cultural categories. At this point we may recall Beaujour's discussion of the autoportrait's reliance on ready-made cultural categories. Paradis, akin to the autoportrait, is what Barthes calls a "derisory" or "farcical" encyclopaedia; as in Bouvard et Pécuchet and Sollers' earlier novel Hé, in passages such as the above "les savoirs ... tournent bien, mais sans s'arrêter; la science a perdu son lest. ..." The "au nom de" repetition moves crazily through the domains of anthropology, sociology, religion, politics, psychoanalysis, linguistics, and actually names three of these domains—those of "science philosophie ... économie." Again, rhyme comes into play as a means of creating identity in difference, of establishing connections in a mass of heterogeneous material: note the rhymes on "bonté," "liberté," "refoulé," "opprimé," "abîmée" and on "compétence," "performance," "équivalence," "monovalence." As the phrase "au nom de" is already associated with the naming of institutions or persons to be
revered, its use as a frame for both the contradictory items "travail
taille patrie" and "désir refoulé" indicates that the reader is not to
take the "naming" too seriously. We note also that a lexical series
("grand dirigeant enseignant guide pilote suprême timonier tsaré
..."), an expansion on the initiating word "grand dirigeant," slips
into the anaphorical series while nonetheless remaining appropriate in
the context. Thus no material in Paradis is sealed off from any other,
as one mode of inclusion may find its way into a context established by
another.

"Au nom du cosmémorel anmê": this expression, as a composite
of "cosmos" and "mémorable" or "mémoire," is central to our conception
of Paradis as a work, and to our understanding of the function of its
repetitions. The rhetorical strategy of constructing antithetical and
anaphorical series, as well as the more "intrinsic" practice of rhyme,
alliteration, etc., all regulate and generate a mass of encyclopaedic
material; all presuppose a concept of repetition. Now, repetition is a
primary component of most memory-systems. The conclusion we might draw
from this is that modes of repetition in Paradis are modes of
remembering, as they function in recalling the entire circle of arts and
sciences, the created cosmos. Or, we might qualify further that modes
of repetition, linguistic or rhetorical, create a mimesis of memory, as
do, perhaps, the great memory-circles of hermetic philosophers such as
Bruno.58

2.a.iv Number-parallelism

Thus modes of encyclopaedic inclusion should be seen as mnemonic
techniques—if knowledge is the same thing as memory (an idea, of course, familiar to Plato). The following passage, for example, suggests a new mode for organizing elements of knowledge—one based on the Trinity and utilizing number-parallelism:

... on a au moins trois corps ... un lourdé d'organes un os un nervé comment ils s'imbriquent ça c'est le secret ... trois corps un réel squelette un imaginaire musculé et un symbolique aspiré ... trois corps au moins palpable émotif parlé ou encore panné aviné salé ou encore découpable affectif pensé tronc d'ici coeur là-bas cerveau rêveur d'au-delà reins rétifs poumons intuitifs toute une hypophyse ... (pp. 190-1)

The "trois corps" would seem to correspond to the three aspects of language: a "palpable" material aspect, an immediate meaning (or denotation) and a wider significance (or connotation). The "bodies" might further suggest the division between written language ("squelette," "palpable," "tronc") and speech, the breath ("aspiré," "parlé," "poumons"), along with a third intermediate state, perhaps that of thought itself ("imaginaire," "émotif," "affectif"). Whatever the bodies signify, the number three functions as a mode of organizing diverse material; once one set of three items is selected, the other sets must correspond with this set, displaying the same internal relations. The items actually organized by the number-parallelism come under the domains of psychoanalysis ("réel ... symbolique ... imaginaire"), anatomy, food ("aviné salé," with "panné" punning, in this gastronomic context, on "pain"). The triads organize terms from these areas in hierarchical order (reflecting the traditional hierarchy
of the parts of the body), such that each domain comes to have its own particular Trinity. This form of organization could conceivably be extended to any category, generating "trinities" of metals (gold, silver, brass), of books (Bible, epic, novel), and so on. Indeed, Vico's vision of history is organized in triads such as these, triads ranging from the most divine to the most human elements.

2.a.v The catechism

The catechism functions in Paradis, as it does in Finnegans Wake, as a means of generating questions and especially answers on different aspects of human knowledge. In Paradis, however, the form is not developed at such length, or in such encyclopaedic detail, as in the Wake; it tends to stay within a more or less philosophical or self-reflexive mode:

... question y a-t-il une question que vous vous posiez réponse je dois me demander si mes réponses sont logiquement et syntaxiquement appropriées question pouvez-vous me poser une question réponse oui plusieurs qui êtes-vous que voulez-vous d'où venez-vous où allez-vous quelles sont vos pensées réelles qui vous envoie ici pourquoi êtes-vous ici qui vous a programmé où est votre contrôle question le nombre des questions et des réponses est-il infini réponse oui au sens d'indéfini question qu'est-ce que votre essence au sens métaphysique de ce mot réponse la ponctuation ... question dieu existe-t-il réponse c'est une possibilité conceivable mais très improbable ... question l'histoire est-elle achevée réponse l'histoire doit continuer à nous donner des données question qu'est-ce que la mort réponse ... l'absence de question concernant le circuit ... (p. 188)

The questioning ranges over the domains of metaphysics, theology and
history, but always returns to the activity of questioning itself, asking what kind of questions may be asked and what responses are appropriate to these questions. Death is defined as the absence of questions "concernant le circuit"; death, that is, is the absence of a self-reflexive questioning about questions (and answers). The computer fails, as it were, ceases functioning as it reaches the end of its programme. Sollers' use of the catechism underscores the circularity at the base of the form: in its religious use, questions presuppose their answers and vice-versa; there is never an unexpected answer, never a way out of the circle. Joyce's use of the catechism, in contrast, is optimistic, emphasizing the form's potential for generating an open-ended expansion upon the categories of knowledge.59

2.b. Imitation of literary modes and forms

With reference to *Finnegans Wake*, we have seen how the fictional encyclopaedia imitates both extra-literary and literary forms of discourse. *Paradis*, as well, in its imitation of scientific/technical, economic/political, historical, pornographic, psychoanalytic, ecclesiastical and critical forms of discourse, in its representation of what appear to be fragments of such discourses, achieves an inclusion of many cultural domains.60 We find, in the domain of science and technology, for example, "... en ce moment je respire comme vous 21% d'oxygène 79% d'azote" (p. 17) or "... voilà le bébé-éprouvette ... fécondation par la ruse" (p. 60); in politics/economics, "impérialismes socialismes ratés militarismes polypoles pétrole roulette emportée des
The selection of these disparate domains and their combination in the ongoing flow of the text plays out a dialectic of discontinuity and continuity.

Fragments of extra-literary discourse in Paradis have the same status as imitations of certain recognizable literary forms and modes. It is literary imitation, however, that ultimately distinguishes the fictional from the non-fictional encyclopaedia; the fiction here concerns itself with its own tradition, exceeding it by comprehending it and especially by commenting upon it. This gesture of excess, this (often parodic) commentary, is constitutive of fictional encyclopaedism, and must be distinguished from the desire for sufficiency and containment characterizing pedagogical encyclopaedism. Sollers uses the notion of infinity to characterize this practice of excess, the practice of "parler dans l'infini lui-même." The excess of commentary is, further, linked with a notion of the "impossible": in Sollers' words, "dans l'exédent impossible, où la double dépense cause et ne cause pas
la possible . . . il n'y a ni sortie, ni 'au-delà' . . ." In Bataille's words, excess is characterized as the situation where "la somme d'énergie produite est toujours supérieure à la somme nécessaire à la production." Excess, impossibility, infinity: these notions characterize a practice which would assimilate, imitate and parody other literary practice within the general context of self-commentary. Paradis ultimately exceeds its own boundaries as its self-commentary expands both within and without the text; Sollers' commentary on Paradis, in other words, often replays the very points made within the text. Text and commentary together form something endlessly interpenetrating and self-engendering—form, that is, an analogue of excess or infinity itself.

We recall how Finnegans Wake performs an imitation of both literary modes and kinds, incorporating narrative, dialogical and lyrical fragments, ballads and schoolbooks, into the over-all context of a family history. Owing to the lack of punctuation in Paradis, such imitations are more difficult to locate than in the Wake, and the boundaries separating them from other forms of discourse are more tenuous. Further, in the absence of a history or story, the imitations in Paradis do not play out recurrent character configurations; in Paradis imitations are more likely to be pretexts for straightforward encyclopaedic expansion. Literary imitation in both works, nonetheless, functions as commentary (usually parodic) on an original. There is a constant interplay, a shifting back and forth of focus, between the imitation of a form as a simple pretext for encyclopaedic inclusion, and
the imitation of this form in itself and for parodic purposes.

So, for example, the narrative mode is imitated in its simplest manifestation as a series of statements connected by "and":

... et ils furent cruels casqués bottés braguettés et elles furent possessives agressives griffeuses coiffeuses et ils jurèrent et elles susurrèrent et elles se parlèrent d'elles pendant qu'ils se mélaient sur fond de dentelles ... et ils imaginèrent des assassinats charniers vivisections mutilations svastikas et elles se virent vestales prêtres grandes-maîtresses le fouet à la main colliers chiens ... ils nivellèrent brûlèrent étripèrent et elles rasèrent gommèrent cautérèrent ... ils crurent s'urent conçurent et elles se déplurent plurent conjurent. ... (pp. 123-124)

This emphasis on polysyndeton recalls a similar excess in the narrative imitation in *Finnegans Wake*, discussed above. In the latter imitation, the chronological connectives that underpin the narrative mode are foregrounded; the result of such emphasis is a parody of the mode. In the *Wake*, the emphasis on polysyndeton provides a framework or pretext for developing parallelisms, both semantic and formal. Similarly, in the "narrative" from *Paradis* we can make out a minimal story-line (something involving cruel and excessive actions), but this is obscured by an emphasis on semantic and formal symmetries. The "ils"/"elles" alternation provides a convenient framework for development sometimes by comparison, sometimes by contrast ("ils nivellèrent ... elles rasèrent," "ils jurèrent et elles susurrèrent"). On each side of the alternation, a word will initiate a series whose parts may be related by common membership in a semantic category, by sound, or both: "assassinats charniers ..." establishes a "violent death" series;
"casqués bottés braguettés" is a "clothing" series also tied together by rhyme. The second-to-last alternation ("nivélèrent"/"rasĕrent") explores the possibilities of the category "holocaust," generating words that are semantically related under this category, and that further are formally related as all being "-er" verbs in the third person plural of the past perfect. An imitation of narration, then, is in Paradis a self-conscious activity, an examination of the assumptions underlying the work's own appellation as "roman." Such an imitation, a creation of a pseudo-narrative, involves an exaggeration of the chronological bias of conventional narrative; it functions as a parodic critique of linear narrative. At the same time, the digressions into the Encyclopaedia, into the vicissitudes of grammar and rhyme, function to further obscure the imitated mode. What remains is only a "worm" held up for inspection—in E.M. Forster's phrase, "wriggling and interminable, the naked worm of time."67

In Finnegans Wake there exist isolated and fairly clear instances of imitation of dramatic and lyrical modes. The Wake as a whole presents the appearance of a heterogeneous mixture of modes and forms. Paradis, however, in its appearance as an undifferentiated mass of words, carries none of the conventional markers that distinguish one form or mode from another; the distinctions must be perceived by the ear. Now, as what we hear is the continuous rise and fall of spoken phrases, it is voices that we distinguish rather than forms, voices of a multitude of speakers, taking a multitude of tones. Once in a while these voices address one another, resulting in something like dialogue:
the catechism discussed above is a case in point. As in the Wake, this imitation of dialogue does not leave the mode intact, but rather opens it up and exposes its formal premises: the Mutt-Jute "dialogue" shows us that two may speak yet not communicate, each responding to the form only of the other's words; the questions and responses in Sollers' catechism are self-reflexive and self-implying, again making real communication impossible.

A "lyrical" imitation cannot be isolated in Paradis because, in a sense, the entire text both works inside and comments upon (imitates to excess) the lyrical mode. The exaggeration of formal equivalences that characterizes, in the Wake, the washerwoman's parting words (Book I, Chapter 8) is sustained by Sollers as the over-all organizing principle of Paradis. That the work imitates the lyrical mode throughout—in the sense of consciously exaggerating its traits and repeating them endlessly, exposing them while using them—means that it both reveres lyricism and turns away from it in a parodic movement also characterizing the imitations of the Wake. When Sollers suggests that "paradis" should be taken as a genre in the same sense as tragedy and comedy, he perhaps refers to a form undertaking the practice of large-scale, continuous and complex literary imitation.

The spy novel is one literary form that is encapsulated and imitated, and thereby parodied, in the following passage:

... arrivée du héros dans les capitales ... à l'aéroport que cherche-t-il que transporte-t-il que craint-il que vient faire ce mort dans les docks qui a dérobé le stock enfin ils se rejoignent à new-york ...
retour par munich et moscou soirée sur la place rouge
quand il voit la jeune institutrice juive qui doit lui
faire rencontrer un palestinien dans la mosquée
désaffectée non loin du kremlin plus tard leurs baisers
furtifs sous la pluie . . . question du lecteur le
personnage principal est-il d'un côté ou de l'autre ou des
deux côtés et même d'un troisième voire même d'un
quatrième ou cinquième côté . . . quelle est sa
nationalité n'est-il pas martien à la fin s'agit-il d'un
ancien nazi devenu militant révolutionnaire en asie d'un
sadique à tête de prof de physique . . . de quelles
 protections jouit-il de quels sauf-conduits tantôt ses
réflexions sont exclusivement financières traités taux
taxes obligations indexations rotations titres escomptes
amortissements soutien du crédit . . . tantôt il parle
psychanalyse ou encore musique on l'a vu sur un clavecin
tout cela fait-il un roman . . . (p. 137)

The passage replays a few of the stock situations and characters to be
found in the genre, but simple reproduction is not the purpose of the
enterprise. What distinguishes an imitation from a reproduction is its
character as a commentary upon the original: the imitator steps back
one remove and asks questions of the original before translating it
according to a new set of criteria. Here, questions are asked of the
spy novel, its hero and its plot, from the point of view of an imaginary
reader ("que cherche-t-il que transporte-t-il . . . que vient faire ce
mort dans les docks"); this reader is then named as his questioning
takes another turn ("question du lecteur le personnage principal est-il
. . . d'un quatrième ou cinquième côté . . ."). This "meta"-questioning
involves a caricature of the spy-hero: he is not limited to being on
either of two possible sides—he can be on a fifth side, if he wishes;
he can contain opposites ("nazi"/"révolutionnaire," "sadique"/"prof de
physique"); he can succeed in any field of human endeavour (finance,
psychoanalysis, playing the clavichord). Such exaggeration offers plenty of space for encyclopaedic expansion. For example, a financial series ("financières . . . soutien du crédit") irrupts into the "tale" upon the mention of the word "financières." Such exaggeration merely pushes a little farther the excess built into the spy thriller genre.

Thus in Paradis the imitation of a specific literary form involves a parody, an exaggeration of the form's characteristic traits, a piling-up or multiplication of details in a gesture deliberately ignoring the demands of verisimilitude. Such parodic exaggeration encourages encyclopaedic expansion. Just as in Rabelais' Gargantua an "excessive" portrait of physical and moral traits provides a natural point of entry for encyclopaedic lists, so in Paradis a parodic multiplication and juxtaposition of diverse traits relevant to the imitated form encourages the opening-up of encyclopaedic categories. The parodic aesthetic of exaggerated abundance is, then, another aspect of fictional encyclopaedism.70

The practice of excess lies behind Sollers' constant returns to the form of the erotic novel, and often to the text of Sade: a notion of "excess" (like a notion of "supplément")71 has significance in this erotic context as well as in an encyclopaedic/parodic one. For example:

... maintenant passons à la très mauvaise littérature .
. . je n'oublierai jamais ma nuit de noces en descendant les marches de l'église dans ma blanche robe à voile comme une radieuse mariée . . . je ne me doutais pas le moins du monde que cette première nuit deux pénis se tenaient prêts pour moi . . . je me suis trouvée une nuit captive l'orgasme venait et j'ouvre les yeux j'aperçois avec un sentiment bien naturel d'horreur qu'un cambrioleur est en
train de me fouailler avec son formidable outil . . . nos
gémisements réveillent ma soeur . . . elle se met
aussitôt de la partie . . . voilà la police le voleur veut
prendre la fuite mais nous le retenons par la queue ce qui
lui rend sa première vigueur et que font les employés de
l'appareil idéologique d'état . . . eh bien ils se mettent
eux aussi au travail . . . (pp. 19-20)

The passage goes on to describe, in an erotic escalation, various
orgies between religious sisters and brothers, nurses and doctors,
"magistrats . . . universitaires . . . le jury . . . journalistes
. . ." etc. (p. 20). The definition of excess as a "double dépense," an
expense exceeding what is required, is also applicable in the erotic
domain: that which is spent is never used up (as it is, in contrast, in
Shakespeare's bleak vision in Sonnet CXXIX), but returns in double
measure. The experience lies in "dérivant sur la houle de la volupté
jusqu'aux frontières de la mort pour renaître des cendres des ses
orgasmes comme un phénix en plein coma érotique" (p. 41). The humourous
excesses of Sollers' erotic imitation thus provide a literal
illustration of the phoenix-principle of excess—erotic, parodic,
encyclopaedic—animating the entire text.

2.c. **Totalization versus infinity**

One of the chief problems haunting the encyclopaedic enterprise
is the problem of totalization or completion. The figure of the circle
of knowledge, a figure of completion, of non-opening, hovers
tantalizingly before the encyclopaedist but never actualizes itself in
the work produced, in the inclusions effected. The limits inherent in
one person's knowledge—or even in the combined learning of a whole
committee of encyclopaedists—prevent the full actualization of this ideal circle. Further, temporal constraints—the fact that knowledge is not some timeless absolute, but a knowledge of specific things and propositions at specific times—work against the possibility of a simultaneous realization of all that is, was and is to be. In Joyce's encyclopaedic fiction, the paradoxical recognition of incompletion in a desire for completion is manifested in the form of a fundamental "hesitency" with respect to the totalizing systems of Vico and Bruno. 

Finnegans Wake also affords a recurrent vision of totality or self-completion in the midst of an ongoing presentation of the wastes or detritus of everyday existence, in the midst of a metamorphic flux of characters and situations and tongues. Coexisting in the Wake are a vision of the circle (or the harmonious scale of values or the eternal return) and a recognition of the line of historical time.

Sollers' Paradis is again concerned with the question of totalization, but in a different way than is the Wake. In Paradis the master texts are the Bible and Dante (and possibly Joyce); the Commedia, for one, sums up the entirety of Creation within the covers of a book, and in this shares a totalizing enterprise with Vico's ideal universal history and with Bruno's memory-system which would encompass the entire universe. Paradis both affirms and questions the possibility of such a summa of knowledge of history, of the universe; this ambivalence is evident in expressions such as the following: 

"... scenarii couplés abrégés comme des microfilms bourrés de documents de formules imagine un peu le calcul facile à transporter à cacher l'histoire dans une boîte
d'allumettes . . ." (p. 9); the cramming of totality into something as mundane as a matchbox puts the legitimacy of the encyclopaedic drive into question. Paradis, further, both affirms and turns away from Dante in its transposition of the Paradiso's stately spheres into the spiralling "tourbillon" (p. 138).

Whereas the encyclopaedic paradox so far has involved a conflict between a figure of perfection—the circle—and its actual opening onto the finitude and the mutability of human knowledge, in Paradis it now takes a new form: the circle in its closure is now not a figure of perfection, but rather one of finitude. The circle conflicts with infinity (CO) as the new figure for encyclopaedic gathering:

"L'expérience de l'infini, c'est cela qui rassemble toutes les subordonnées . . . et par conséquent le problème est tout à fait différent selon qu'on inscrit, ou non, le chiffre de l'infini dans le langage." The opening of the circle—which has heretofore been seen as a mark of limitation—is now desired and seen as an escaping of limitation. In this thinking Sollers is aware, again, of Bruno's influence, but it is Bruno the imaginer of infinite worlds on which he draws, not Bruno the creator of the hermetic memory-circles that would enclose Creation. The conflict between finitude and infinity in the matter of knowledge is linked to the conflict between a sexuality shadowed by death and the experience of orgasmic rebirth:

... jamais un coup d'ovule n'abolira le convoi donc le besoin d'organe chez elles est une faim bloquée ... d'où leur intérêt pour cadavre elles espèrent la fermeture la clôture marché crémation qu'est-ce que c'est ce recoin
Here infinity is seen as an "excès," a sudden energy of abundance liberated only by opening the circle of life and death (as expressed in the Mallarméen "jamais un coup d'ovule . . ."). Paradise is sometimes visualized in terms of such an opening into a state beyond the biological circle: "... ici lecteur lis bien écoute bien ... tu peux si tu veux passer à travers le voile je t'ai assoupli la toile . . . le ver chassé à coup d'anges verts épées feu sans tranchant ni pointe têtes blondes plein vol fendant l'air purgatoire chant 8 . . ." (p. 211). Dante's _Purgatorio_, referred to here, is built on a series of such openings, through which the traveller progresses from one level to the next in an over-all spiralling movement.

It is precisely in the opening-out of the circle into the spiral that the movement from finitude to infinity may be conceptualized, and it is in terms of the spiral that one must see repetition in _Paradis_. Writing and repetition here involve not the eternal returns of life and death, of the seasons, but rather an interplay of identity and difference giving rise to a "reste," an indefinably small something, an excess: "... mon écriture est d'après la mécanique quantique alors que vous vous traînez dans le poids classique anémifié je compte en cgs moi centimètres grammes secondes et pas en kilogs en heures en bébés et même en millis plus en plus millis d'annulie . . . énergie légère très
légère dernière cendreuse poussière . . ." (p. 207). Writing as repetition, in other words, is a spiralling, an acceleration, an energy; in a rewriting of the old proverb that there is nothing new under the sun, in a negation of the eternal return, we read "... rien de nouveau sinon l'accelération" (p. 203), or ". . . sous le ciel tout est nouveau . . ." (p. 15). The text as "tourbillon," as site of repetitions which are not circular—as site of forgettings which are not erasures—is another form of the palimpsest, where "tout est transformé couché en papier perdu retrouvé reperdu et reretrouvé" (p. 219). The writer is a "vrilleur sur les pages" (p. 219); within a system inscribed with "le chiffre de l'infini," the writer is a maker of spirals.

Within the text of Paradis, the terms "infini" and "fini" may be repeated and played against one another. For example:

.. ce qui est le plus fini dans ce monde-ci exige l'infini comme un point sur l'i ou encore ce est le plus indéfiniment menti par ici se réduit en germe si vient l'infini . . . et ainsi l'aventure du fini et de l'infini est celle de l'exil de chacun en soi-même . . . vous autres petits finis vous restez pareils quant à l'infini toujours aussi nuls zéros confinis toujours cercle sphère et rond crucifié au lieu de trancher le noeud des soucis . . . (p. 142)

Infinity is compared to a point (in an expression recalling de Musset's "Ballade à la Lune") and to a seed, both images of latency, fecundity; finitude, on the other hand, is seen in terms of zeros, circles and spheres. The gesture of opening the circle or nullity out onto infinity is seen as a forceful cutting of a knot. This opposition of point and circle is developed by Sollers when he says of Paradis:
c'est une tentative de faire irruption dans le point. Nous pensons que les lignes sont composées de points, que les volumes sont composés de lignes, et que ça s'engendre dans cet ordre. Moi, je pense que c'est le contraire. Les lignes sont composées de volumes, et le point est composé de lignes. Paradis, c'est un langage du point. Une ponction. Tout cet amas de signes... n'est là que pour faire 'sentir' le point, le point métaphysique. C'est pour cela, d'ailleurs, qu'il n'y a pas de ponctuation. Il ne s'agit que du point... \( \text{et} \) de son insistance pour ainsi dire 'hors temps'...

In Paradis the whole—the point of paradise—is implicit in each part.

As Frye says of the Menippean satire, a related form: "... [it] presents us with a vision of the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern. The intellectual structure built up... makes for violent dislocations in the customary logic of narrative..." 78 "Customary" narrative, that is, is linear in nature, proceeding in Sollers' version from point (or word) to line to volume, from the smallest to the largest unit of significance. To reverse this progression is to interrupt the left-to-right accumulation of meaning; it is, in Frye's word, to "dislocate" the narrative line, to make the meaning of the whole an "immanence" (Paradis, p. 26) at each point. Punctuation now takes on a different and very precise sense: it involves "making a point," in the sense of revealing an over-all point or significance. As Sollers emphasizes, the unpunctuated Paradis is paradoxically nothing but point—or punctuation in this literal sense. "Le point métaphysique" (Frye's "single intellectual pattern") is precisely paradise, its loss and repossession; in the work's repetitions this point returns unerringly—uncannily—to haunt each line of the text. The "point" of a
more perfect, Adamic language\textsuperscript{79} is to be found in each slang expression, each incorporation of technical jargon, each borrowing from a foreign language.

Thus the conception of infinity as a point is essential to \textit{Paradis}; the paradox of the line in the point, the infinitely large in the infinitely small, is a version—this time under the "chiffre de l'infini"—of the paradox of completion in incompleteness that animates \textit{Finnegans Wake} and the encyclopaedic enterprise in general. In the text of \textit{Paradis}, this contradiction is enacted as the impossible claim that a very large mass of words, topics, items—one susceptible, moreover, to infinite expansion—can be "contained" in a point, a single organizing theme (paradise, its loss and its repossession). As Sollers says in answer to the question, "Qui parle dans \textit{Paradis}?": "... des multiplicités comme on n'en a jamais vu, dans une unité comme on n'en a jamais entendu."\textsuperscript{80}

There are several variations on the theme of the point and the line, the one and the many, to be found in the text:

\begin{quote}
... recollé giflé sur la page horizon papier tourniquet forêt du papier n'est-ce pas ce que tu as toujours attendu conçu résolu couper vraiment dans la ligne n'être plus que ligne sur ligne geste ligné d'entre-lignes acrobate écrit du surplus ... \textsuperscript{(p. 183)}
\end{quote}

Here, one aspect is presented—that of the line, the literal act of writing in its crazy "acrobatics," its multiplicity or even "surplus" of possible outcomes. In \textit{Paradis} (as in the \textit{Wake} and the \textit{Cantos}), this surplus is enacted in a passage from the one to the many,\textsuperscript{81} in a suppression of any principle of selection, an affirmation and
actualization of multifarious possibilities. The experience of the flow of the text is one of a play and interplay of lines: "... là je flotte au-delà des lignes et entre les lignes et en vibration sur les lignes c'est portée musique et fonction physique et ça se comprend et ça me comprend ... c'est gravé chanté répété roulé c'est en soi pour soi hors de soi et l'espace entier se signe ... ." (p. 199). At the same time, however, the experience of the text is one of a perspective (the writer's or the collective reader's) "au-delà des lignes," a perspective or point where "l'espace entier se signe." The point is the site of the interplay of the same and the different, the one and the many:

... c'est ça mon gros semblant livre un point simple point devenant zéro point sur point j'ai inventé l'intérieur du point atome trop plein trou du point l'absolu vivant son appoint ... je renverse la géométrie car la ligne n'est pas composée de points mais le point de lignes et au-delà des lignes de volumes d'espaces et d'hyper-espaces et de corps ... revenant au point . . .
(p. 185)

The point as a metaphor for literary infinity is paradoxically both empty ("zéro," "trou") and full ("atome trop plein"); it both contains the many and is the one behind the many. Infinity is thus fundamentally paradoxical—or better, dialectical: not a simple "absolu," infinity is instead "l'absolu vivant son appoint." If "appoint" is taken to mean a small amount extra—a supplement or "surplus"—then the interplay of the one and the many, the full and the empty, constituting literary infinity results not in circularity but rather in the creation of new worlds, in the continuous advent of new possibility. This is, perhaps, an
alternative goal for the encyclopaedic enterprise, an alternative, that
is, to producing a summa of all that can be known; it is hinted at by
Borges in the story "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,"83 where certain
objects function like Sollers' "points," being the paradoxical points of
intersection of the real world and the possible worlds envisioned in the
special encyclopaedia.

In a final variation on the theme of point and line, we see its
proximity to the questions of the spiral and of paradise:

... je traverse les mères pour connaître la mère entrant
chez son père vivant brûlant sur son flanc vierge mère
fille de son trienfant de fils trinuitant rose-mère
tournoyant au père avec ses myriades d'anges d'arfanges
procession immobile immobilité s'engendrant comme ici dans
les lignes apparentment rectilignes pointillé d'hélice
accablant . . . (p. 218)

Here, the spiral or "hélice" mediates the point and the line, mediates
immobility and perpetual motion. The spiral is a figure both of return
and of progress; in the spiral, the paradigm and the syntagm, eternal
time and history, intersect. This is surely the sense of the pilgrim's
spiralling ascent in Dante's Purgatorio (and its mirror inversion in the
Inferno), where an ascent into Heaven (or a descent into Hell) is at the
same time a journey through history, through quotidian reality. Thus,
the juxtaposition, above, of a paradise of Father and angels with the
linear progression of reading results in an "accablant" experience of
infinity, of a text "pointillé d'hélice." Infinity as a point or a
spiral is thus neither eternity nor time, but the intersection of the
two; it is neither paradise nor the fallen world but paradise-in-the-
world as revealed in "épiphanies . . . révélations instantanées, obliques," as seen by "une sorte d'oeil diagonal . . ."\textsuperscript{84} In other words, ". . . il y a des moments . . . contes de fées tout s'ouvre de biais se découvre. . ." (p. 82).

Infinity, then, as a mode of textual organization, as a mode of encyclopaedic creation, is figured in the spiral: here, a repetition of the known nonetheless creates a "reste" or excess of knowledge. As a synonym for impossibility, infinity is also figured geometrically as the squaring of the circle, as the open cube: ". . . quadrature du cercle introuvable terre ciel cube ouvert pierre philopheale . . ." (p. 162).

In thinking about the spiral, we have perhaps not emphasized enough how it is a figure of dialectic: here, the play of contraries must always result in the production of an excess or synthesis of sense or knowledge, a something extra—or "appoint," in Sollers' term. The paradisiacal text as spiral, as circle opening onto infinity or an excess of information, also undertakes the dialectical practice of negation of negation: ". . . à cette batterie rythmique correspond une énonciation constammentparadoxale . . . dont le modèle de base serait l'affirmation: \textit{Je suis là et je ne suis pas là} . . . [Une] pareille enfilade d'affirmations, de négations et de négations de négations rappelle . . . la logique théologique. . . .\textsuperscript{85} Sollers puts it in the following way:

\textit{. . . Paradis est une machine . . . à traduire la traduction. D'où cet effet assez étrange que tous les textes quels qu'ils soient pourraient s'y retrouver améliorés, saisis dans leur nombril . . . à la fois}
The spiral opens outward onto infinity, and it also works back, in the other direction, into its point of origin or "nombril," which is another figure for infinity. In either direction, the movement involves the negation of negation, the turning from contraries toward the affirmation of encyclopaedic excess—or the return to a point of paradisiacal origin, subtly changed, "amélioré."

The basis of the practice of affirmation or negation of negation is the paradoxical place and no-place of the subject: "Je suis là et je ne suis pas là." The overcoming of such a logical contradiction constitutes the affirmative movement of the text, but it also spells the demise of the subject conceived as an integrated whole. Just as Paradis undermines any monolithic concept of truth, any possibility of a stable summa of knowledge, so it encourages the dissolution of a single, originary speaking subject into a multitude of voices. This undermining of the monolithic subject is not, of course, unique to Paradis: it is one of the chief traits of postmodern literature, of which Sollers' work prior to Paradis also forms a part. The disappearance of the subject is also an important theme in recent theory. However, the fracturing of the single speaking subject into a multitude of disparate voices is consciously linked, by Sollers, to the practice of infinity in writing, or of writing in infinity:
... si le poudroiement corpusculaire du langage saisi par l'infini n'était pas susceptible d'un traitement extrêmement rigoureux, on aurait tout simplement à faire à la simulation psychotique. L'être parlant ... lorsqu'il découvre ... que son corps lui-même, substantiellement, est une erreur d'un langage qu'il ignore, devient fou ... La définition du corps comme erreur d'un langage que le sujet ignore ... [est le] rapport de l'infini à lui-même bousculant toute place organique.  

Sollers distinguishes the controlled division of the subject that occurs in the writing of infinity (or paradisiacal writing) from the actual divisions of psychosis. In the same way, he says, infinity (which is "catégorique") is to be distinguished from the blur of "rumeur," Foucault's babble of the mad. The subject, like the text, opens out onto infinity; in the process, the subject is traversed by other subjects, other languages: "... cette division du sujet à vif ... sa blessure d'infini, dessine la possibilité--ou non--pour un sujet de passer à travers toutes les langues, et il est réperusable au premier coup d'œil si dans quelque texte que ce soit on a cette possibilité ... La différence entre Paradis et Finnegans Wake est là." Sollers is not clear here as to which of the works best effects this passage of the subject through all languages: there is a greater instability of speaking subject in Paradis, but there are more languages in Finnegans Wake.

2.d. Morcellation of the subject

In Paradis, then, the subject intersects with other subjects; in the same way, one form of discourse jostles with another, none being
immune from invasion, colouration, by the others. Such traversals of the unified subject and of monolithic writing can effect, or at least simulate, an approach to paradise. In the controlled—not automatic, not conscious—irruption of one form of writing into others; in the maintenance of the categories of knowledge in the midst of their juxtaposition and interpenetration: in both these practices, the traversal of writing by the Encyclopaedia is a means of approximating paradise, an avenue always threatened by the spectre of "rumeur," chaos or loss of control. Correspondingly, the traversal of the subject by other subjects can lead both to paradise and to hell. When, for example, "je" is invaded, not by "toi," but by "les autres," we find Sartre's definition of hell in *Huis Clos*: "... l'enfer c'est les autres quand je suis moi-même pensé par les autres tandis que le paradis c'est toi ou c'est moi quand je suis moi-toi sans moi-toi-ni-toi mais quand même en toi conçu par je l'autre..." (p. 163). Paradise and hell often meet in *Paradis*, and here they meet in the multiple subject "toi conçu par je l'autre."

Narratorial instability is further qualified by Sollers in *Vision à New York*, in terms that make it another name for irony. The context is a discussion of a Mexican clown-dance:

Supposons donc un narrateur qui serait dans la ronde des danseurs mais qui, de temps en temps, prendrait la position d'un clown, et qui serait aussi dans la foule en train de regarder ce qui se passe. Un narrateur qui prend toutes les places... J'y arrive définitivement avec *Paradis*... L'acteur, l'ironisation de l'acteur, le spectateur... On change sans cesse de niveau... mais ça se fait à l'intérieur d'une telle répétition, que tu
The "je," here, is split two ways, as it asks a question and knows the answer. A third "je" knows that this split is operating, knows that it knows the answer to its question: "... je sais je sais je le sais." "Je," thus divided, turns and works against itself, "pour me ralentir m'égarder ...," etc. Further, in this division a new, imperative voice—"arrête"—enters the scene as one aspect of the divided subject addresses another. The irruption of this imperative voice prompts us to ask, "Who speaks?". This question, like the query, "What is really being said?", signals that we are experiencing an ironic division or turning, that we are losing track of the speaking subject.

When we ask, "Who speaks?", we should be aware that "il s'agit de l'impossibilité ... de ramener le "qui" à une unité stable ... [Ce] qui parle, c'est [la] transformation de rapport entre l'un et le multiple ... [A] la limite, il n'y a plus que des exceptions..."
From the one to the many, from the rule to the exception: here are familiar, and not-so-familiar, terms. First, it is in the interplay of the one and the many that literary infinity manifests itself. Now, the presence of one all-informing theme or "point," such as that of paradise, accompanies the division of the unitary subject into many positions or voices momentarily held, then let slip in favour of others. In other words, the thematic organization of encyclopaedic works entails a division, or neutralization, of the subject, as what is to be known takes precedence over the subject who would know. (Conversely, realistic novels such as those of Jane Austen, organized according to plot rather than theme, place greater emphasis on a unified narrating subject.) In Paradis, each speaking subject is an "exception" undermining any attempt to establish a "norm" or "rule"; each "je" is an individual event implying no general narrative perspective. Grammatical shifts such as the following cannot be referred to any over-all position or person:

... il ressort le soir millonné lumière colonnes portées sous lumières automate à quai déphasé c'est lui maintenant c'est le mouvement des puissances qui s'agite hors moi contre moi voulant me ramener dans son creux mou moi dans son filet ... en prenant l'ascenseur vite seizième étage apparemment g plantes vertes et bibliothèque dickens conrad édition reliée de milton vers anglais ... dehors remorqueurs camions entrepôts de grains boutiques de liquors de vins le soleil se lève claquant dans la chambre il se couche voûte dans le bureau jaune blanc montant rouge orange tombant se bleutant d'une chaise à l'autre d'un sommeil à l'autre ... (p. 219)

The repetition "c'est ... c'est" both ties together the different
persons ("lui" and "moi") and emphasizes their difference. The result is a subtle shift from the third to the first person within a context (appropriately enough) of self-alienation. The description of the library, next, contains no body at all; the impersonal descriptive voice succeeds the first person, being neither the "je" nor the narrator telling the story of "lui." These three positions are something like Sollers' "l'acteur, l'ironisation de l'acteur, le spectateur" with the transitions between them being so imperceptible as to give "l'impression physique de tous les niveaux à la fois."

2.e. Images of completion

We have been thinking up to this point of the question of literary infinity, its nature and its effects upon the speaking subject. In the pursuit of this "leurre" or limit-state, Paradis is concerned not so much with a totalization of knowledge, with the comprehension of all that is within the covers of a book, as with a potentially endless textuality; as Sollers puts it, the point is "to produce a tissue which the reader may enter and leave. It would not be something in front of him. It would be like his very breath, like his own sleep, part of his daily being." Oddly enough, however, the text plays with prophetic visions of apocalypse, with the notion of an ultimate End to time (and to textuality). Paradis also considers images of completion: like the Wake, it evokes the Alpha-Omega pair while it also refers several times to the alphabet. It is as though, in working with infinity as in working with the mutability of historical existence,
one must refer back to completion as a sort of landmark even while exceeding or falling short of it.

2.e.i. Alpha-Omega

The problem of totalization as figured in the movement from Alpha to Omega is evoked in the following:

... si on appelle grand-a notre alpha et grand-o le point oméga le petit a est pour vous le petit o pour moi l'absence de majuscules signifie plein vide immanence de toutes façons la langue ne supporte pas la transcendance ... (p. 26)

The point here appears to be that using majuscules has different consequences, at the metaphysical level, than ignoring them. Alpha and Omega ("grand-a" and "grand-o") with majuscules mark the beginning and the end of time; the pair stands for the totality of human history enclosed within these limits. We have looked at the implications of the use of Alpha and Omega in *Finnegans Wake*: the frequency of their appearance in that work indicates a fascination with the idea of a totalization of time. Sollers removes the majuscules and replaces them with "le petit a" and "le petit o." What happens now is somewhat ambiguous, owing to the run-on effect of the unpunctuated line. We can read either "le petit a est pour vous le petit o" or "le petit a est pour vous le petit o pour moi." In both cases, the removal of the majuscules changes the sense of a movement from Alpha to Omega. The first phrase identifies "alpha" and "oméga," making the pair circular; such a vision of circularity fits in well with Sollers' text in which beginnings and endings are problematic owing, again, to an absence of
majuscules and full stops. The second phrase suggests that "alpha" and "oméga" may be brought down from the level of cosmic totalization to that of the text or the situation of communication—involving a speaker ("moi") and an audience ("vous"). The text, in other words, is all that is; it reflects no "external" fullness or completion.

In another instance of the Alpha-Omega pair, context again renders meaning ambiguous: "... viens mets-toi nue que je voie fraîchir ton bout non grossi languette invention à poil d'écriture mémoire frise abîme alpha oméga ... " (pp. 14-15). Here, "alpha oméga" is juxtaposed with an erotic situation, with the invention of writing and the related debate on memory, and with the architectural frieze. The cluster as a whole palpitates, and it is difficult to pin down definitively the place of "alpha oméga" within it. The vision of a beginning and an end of time may be related to the erotic, to the problem of memory and its place in writing and art. The point, however, seems to be the question of indeterminacy itself: the impossibility of resolving the disparate elements of the picture, the oscillation of significance itself, is the only conclusion we may draw as to the place of "alpha oméga" in this particular context. The principle of oscillation, of the endless generation and regeneration of relations, thus puts into question the very premises of completion evoked by the presence of the pair here.

In a final appearance, "alpha oméga" is "defined" in terms of the principle of paradox, of negation of negation, animating Paradis: 

"... alpha oméga c'est-à-dire ni là ni pas là au-delà du là du pas-là ... " (p. 238). Rather than referring to an ultimate beginning
and end, to a final "Là" and "Là," "alpha oméga" as "au-delà du là du
pas-là" perhaps approaches its paradoxical Biblical formulation: "'I am
the Alpha and the Omega,' says the Lord God, who is and who was and who
is to come . . . ." (Revelation 1:8) In this case as well as the
other, then, "alpha oméga" is no longer a figure of completion.

2.e.ii. The alphabet

What happens, then, to the alphabet as such a figure? We recall
how, in the Wake, the alphabet is opened out and exceeded, as well as
being incomplete on one occasion.96 Joyce has each letter stand for the
name of a thing ("apple," etc.), as in a child's alphabet. Sollers, on
the other hand, makes each letter a "person" acting upon (specifically,
sleeping with) its neighbours:

... a couche avec b qui couche avec c qui vient de
coucher avec d qui va sans doute coucher avec e qui
regrette de ne plus coucher avec f qui recouche maintenant
avec g qui ne veut plus coucher avec h qui couche encore
avec i qui couche avec la femme de j qui couche avec la
régulière de k qui couche moins souvent avec l qui couche
avec le mari de m qui couche avec le mec de n qui couche
avec o p q r s non tu n'y penses pas t est homosexual
comme u et v d'ailleurs v je sais pas mais xyz sûrement le
problème à présent c'est z va-t-il coucher avec a . . .
(pp. 34-5)

The incantation of names in Joyce's text becomes, in Sollers', the
chatter of the gossip column. The fundamental question ("z va-t-il
coucher avec a") concerns the bending-back of the alphabet, its
transformation from a line, a set containing potentially the totality of
words of the language, to a circle undermining this totality by
eternally repeating it; in an ironic twist, this question is worded
humourously as a matter of frivolous gossip. The alphabet, then, is no sooner evoked as a figure of completion, than it is set into motion, twisted around, transformed. This play with the basis of written language recalls Joyce's manipulations; it represents, perhaps, a challenge to the self-sufficiency of writing, a challenge characteristic of texts aspiring to a condition of orality.  

2.f. **Paradise and Hell**

Linked with its concern with images of completion, *Paradis* is centrally concerned with images of paradise. This preoccupation is based in a rethinking and rewriting of Dante's *Paradiso*; Sollers' versions of paradise do not, however, simply repeat Dante's vision, but also draw heavily upon the Bible—especially the prophetic visions of the Old Testament—and touch upon other religious traditions. Indeed, the presence of the Bible and Biblical-typological time in *Paradis* is so all-pervasive that paradisiacal visions are often the same thing as prophetic visions, or may be closely accompanied by a reference to time. For example:

... face à face avec sa majesté le soleil je sens encore le zinc brûlant miroitant ... tu vas te brûler les yeux non non il le faut j'y allais je fixais le disque se mettant à danser rétines grouillant de sang noir ... je voulais vraiment le faire tomber gerbes signes présages ... j'oserais t'agripper ta vision à la sueur de ton front ... diamant joyau flaboyant nuclé fou d'étoupe cristallin fendu éclair nu peur et furie et quand il dira lève-toi pour contempler sa gloire les yeux remonteront peut-être aussi en surface du fond du sommeil ... (p.24)

Several points are important to note here. Paradise is linked with the
blinding light of the sun; the experience of paradise involves attaining to a vision of truth (as symbolized, for Plato at least, by sunlight). What has been hidden is suddenly, dazzlingly, manifest. One attains to a knowledge of ultimate things—thus the oracular mode of the passage above. This mode is a temporal one: into the stasis of the paradisiacal vision, reflected in the use of the present tense ("je sens encore le zinc brûlant . . .") and in the arresting of syntactic flow by the accumulation of single words ("diamant joyau . . ."), there is introduced the prophetic perspective reflected in the use of the future tense ("tu gagneras ta vision . . . il dira lève-toi . . ."). The vision oscillates between the prophetic voice of the Old Testament and a more personal voice expressing fear; there is an oscillation between knowledge and vision, between the glory of God and the light of the sun. The paradisiacal vision, like the knowledge of God, is not, however, simple or unambiguous: the vision of the sun causes pain, the light makes one see "sang noir"; the words of the prophet require a context of "peur et furie." Paradise as a "mixed" or "troubled" vision requires the pressure of hell in order to take on definition. There is a frequent juxtaposition of the two states in the text.

Light in obscurity, clear manifestation in occultation, insight in blindness—such are the faces of paradise as evoked in Paradis. Perfumes, flowers, music and silence may also be facets of the vision. It is light, however—light always tinged, on its edges, with darkness—that functions as the dominant element tying all the others together:
... une simple énergie devenue cadence bref un
flamboiement cristallin éclairant le rien ... un état
torrent détonnant la torah courant sous les branches
shâqêd l'amande et shôqêd veilleur il dit quelque chose de
lumineux l'oreilleur ... il dit le peuple qui marche
dans les ténèbres a vu une grande lumière ceux qui
habitent le pays de l'ombre sur eux une lumière a brillé
... (pp. 9-10)

... un coup de tonnerre éclata puis un rayon de soleil
traversa les verrières faisant tout paraître deux fois
plus clair dans la salle ceux qui étaient là furent
illuminés toutefois ils sentirent en même temps qu'ils
étaient devenus muets comme des bêtes et voici qu'un vase
en forme de calice ... semblait flotter en l'air ..
(p. 10)

... le fond de l'être est clos par un nuage obscur
est-ceallah brahma pan jésus que nous voyons jéhovah
rayons rayons rayons ... (p. 14)

... pope sanctus starabatte yapadom yapadom paralleluia
safran rose iris basilic jasmin myrte lis dominations sur
leurs trônes ... (p. 17)

... après tout les égyptiens croyaient même que l'esprit
du corps dans le paradis se transformait en lys que ra
passait son temps à flairer encens vapeurs aromates
immortalité parfumée ... (p. 59)

In the first example, the "flamboiement cristallin" presupposes the
"rien" it must fill; the "grande lumière" of God must have "ténèbres" to
overcome. Again, the "cadence" of the musical phrase coexists with the
state of being out of tune ("détonnant"). The paradisiacal or prophetic
vision is thus a dialectical one. The Torah of the first example finds
as its counterpart, in the second example, the celebration of the
Catholic mass. The Catholic version of the paradisiacal vision is also
concerned with an interplay of darkness and light: a "rayon" of light
is preceded by a thunderclap, implying dark storm-clouds. Dark
clouds also form the base, in the third case, of the "rayons" of Jehovah, Allah, Pan and Jesus: Judaism, Islam, the ancient Greek gods and Christianity all partake of the interplay between darkness and light, ignorance and truth. Finally, flowers, colours and perfumes enter the vision of paradise. In something like the rainbows of the Wake, the flowers "safran . . . lis" form a "paralleluia," a rainbow of praise. And the paradise of ancient Egypt is evoked in terms of the lily and its perfume. The great rose of the Paradiso informs these flower-visions, just as Dante's Heaven of light forms part of the picture of light given in Paradis.

Different religious traditions produce different visions of paradise, but all, it would seem, are linked by a few common elements—light, music or harmony, perfume. While drawing upon these, Sollers also evokes as being paradisiacal states which take their meaning more from the specific nature and problems of Paradis; paradise, that is, is frequently associated with a condition of orality, and especially with Adam's primal act of naming, or naming God:

Dans le souffle de Dieu, et en réponse à ce souffle, a jailli chez Adam une parole immédiate: Dieu fait parler l'air, mais la parole appartient d'emblée au premier homme qui adresse la parole à Dieu et parle pour glorifier le don qui lui a été fait . . . Le Paradis n'est rien d'autre que ce lieu de la première parole, et ce 'première,' sans doute, n'indique pas seulement une dimension du temps.

The first, paradisiacal speech is that addressed to, and glorifying, divinity. There are many instances of such naming, a concern with the name (the word "nom") over and above a concern with what the name is, what it signifies ("Dieu"). The activity of naming, that is, is
everywhere addressed; as for the name itself, any will suffice ("allah brahma pan jésus"). Paradise lies in the repetitions of the activity of naming, not in the name itself:

... 2 chroniques 12-15 comme ils sortaient au milieu des cymbales harpes cithares sonnant des trompettes et chantant d'une seule voix pour louer son nom quand ils élevèrent la voix au son des instruments dans la plénitude soufflée et frappée alors la maison du nom fut remplie de la nuée de la gloire et les prêtres furent obligés de sortir car la gloire du nom avait envahi la maison du nom quand il est là on n'est pas quand il arrive on dérive nous sommes de simples flexions de son nom nomos nomine nomen nahme nombre nome name . . . (p. 140)

"Nom" comes to stand for the "Lord" of the Chronicles. The activity of naming—epitomized in the repetition of the signifier "name" in a number of different languages ("nom nomos . . .," etc.)—is paradoxically an evasion of the signified animating the activity. This evasion is summed up in the following terms: ". . . quand il est là on n'est pas quand il arrive on dérive . . ."102 Paradisiacal naming, at least in Paradis, is not a simple affirmation of divinity; rather, it involves an affirmation that is more complex, arising out of a series of evasions or negations.

The rising motion of affirmation is linked with naming in the following example:

. . . bizarre n'est-ce pas ces petites lettres rouletères ces noyaux parlants du soufflêtre on dit que c'est mort ça renaît ça a l'air tombeau papyrus et vlof ça rebruit motus tumulus et voilà pourquoi il est dit ton nom est comme une huile répandue car si l'huile flotte à la surface de tous les liquides auxquels on la mélange elle est une parfaite figure de ce nom qui est au-dessus de tout nom entendu ou sous-entendu . . . (pp. 154-5).
Rising is seen in terms of resurrection ("on dit que c'est mort ça renaît"), in terms of the lightness of the breath as opposed to the weight of dead letters ("tombeau papyrus"). An oil/water figure further illustrates the rising motion of naming. The glorification of divinity involves an ascent to a state where the actual name, ineffable, need not be uttered, where it is understood; this is a state of silence paradoxically formed from all the "petites lettres roulêtres ... noyaux parlants du soufflêtre" of the text itself. At the end of speech there is, it is hoped, silence:

... à la fin juste avant l'illumination les pensées doivent être comme de l'huile coulant dans de l'huile l'agitation périphérique de la pensée commence à s'enfoncer comme des pierres changées en duvet il n'y a pas plus de serpent dans la corde que de goutte dans la vision assoiffée il faut laisser courir la roue du potier le voilà mauna le silence et encore plus de silence gonflant en silence ... (p. 151)

The celebration of the breath ("soufflêtre") in the paradisiacal vision is thus associated with both naming and silence. Now, we have already suggested that Paradis attempts to fuse writing and speech, attempts to overcome the traditional antipathy between them. "Petites lettres" and "noyaux parlants" are brought together in the last example but one, in the rhyme of "roulêtres" and "soufflêtres." The attempt by the written text of Paradis to evoke an oral, paradisiacal naming is also an attempt to overcome a writing/speech dichotomy: "... que la mélodie s'étende se répande que l'articulation harmonie s'entende se tende que les voix transpirent à travers les lignes comme de l'eau
frôlée par le feu . . ." (p. 168). The comment, "qui a dit les paroles volent mais les écrits restent quel contresens ahuri . . ." (p. 156), performs the same inversion of values, the same undermining of physical distinctions between voice and writing, as does the water-fire simile, above. Both voice and writing are, so to speak, set into motion, made alternate aspects of the same creation.

The fictional encyclopaedia, we have noted, is marked by an essential ambivalence toward totalizing systems of knowledge, toward the very idea of completion. It is concerned with images of fulfillment, self-completion; however, it also undermines these images, seeing as well incompletion everywhere, seeing the opening in the fullness, the "reste" in the perfect harmony, the hell in paradise. In Paradis, as in Finnegans Wake, we have noted the ambiguous treatment of images of completion like the Alpha Omega pair and the alphabet. Paradis, again like the Wake, underscores its "troubling" of completion by frequently playing with images of incompletion—images, that is, of detritus, waste, fragments. Further, the work explores the inverse side of the paradisiacal vision in its concern with hell in its different literary manifestations.

The "déchet," the unusable residue of working materials—of living in general—must haunt the work that would use everything, gather it all up into a complete whole. It is consistent with Sollers' enterprise of opening the circle onto infinity that the spectre of the "déchet" will begin to enter the writing. The encyclopaedic circle has no residue, leaves nothing out; in its ideal form, nothing more may be
added to it. This is not the case with a text written as a "tissue," a potentially infinite or endless fabric of inclusions: here, there is always something more that may enter and be taken away, and always something that may be left out. Further, thinking about paradise presupposes a notion of the "déchet." One rises into paradise by consuming one's old life, habits, knowledge—one's corporality—in what Sollers calls a "holocaust" or "sacrifice sans reste." In paradise there are no "restes"; one suddenly disappears into it, ascends to it. Paradise can only be imagined, however, as against the "merde," the "déchets," of the world: "... inutilité de tout en cadence la terre comme un amoncellement de fragments les nuages passent la pluie opère que le mouvement du ciel est puissant balbutiements de l'espèce passagère espèce et fragile hasardeuse fissureuse espèce ..." (p. 64). Thus, elements of paradise are juxtaposed with earthly fragments in "... calme soleil chauffe dérivant volumes corolles tiges pétales virages d'humus je buée je à peine je charbon je mica je filé lacune boîte papiers pneus crevés ..." (p. 40) or in "crystal neige sel écume encore une fois vase eau granit ..." (p. 60). Flowers, sun, crystal have as their necessary underside earth, minerals, waste objects.

The "merde" of death, of the suicide's attempt to escape the circle of life and death, is further linked with the form of the text itself:

... que reste-t-il une simple bribographie des débris d'explosion toute une flottille on le retrouve le matin la tête sanglante sur les draps visage tuméfié violet c'était drôle cette chambre avec dehors la campagne le bruit des
vendanges le soleil filtré sous-marin il était seul depuis
des jours boîtes de conserves bouteilles à la fin il
chiait directement sur le parquet comme pour se forcer à
sauter se voulant déchet parmi les déchets . . . (p. 56)

The suicide attempt, "se voulant déchet parmi les déchets," is
continuous with the attempt of the text to attain to paradise; in this
attempt, the text becomes a "bribographie," a writing of "bribes,"
fragments or "déchets," a material record of the striving to leave the
body of writing, to leap—like the suicide—into paradise. As well, the
"bribographie" would be, in the model of the unconscious, the writing of
the "restes" or "déchets inconscients"¹⁰⁶ that are material signs of
unconscious activity. Even while the "bribographie" is affirmed we
find, in the following, its negation; we find the desire to write a text
without "déchets": " . . . le retour du refoulé défoulé pourquoi suis-je
toujours le reste la saillie du reste assez efface-moi du livre que tu
as écrit . . ." (p. 31).

In Paradis, hell emerges as the antithesis of paradise and, more
importantly, as that state without which paradise could not be
imagined. This relationship, in which paradise and hell are, as it
were, opposite sides of the same coin, is common to both religious and
literary accounts. Paradise in Sollers' text is a dialectical notion:
it implies the darkness encircling its light, the "merde" of corporality
passing through its purifying fire. Inversely, hell entails a paradise
lost, a "temps perdu," a "paradis jamais perdu de l'enfance" (p. 23).
There are several different versions of hell in Paradis; in their
clearest form, they refer to the literary hells of Virgil and Dante.
There is also a more generalized use of the hellish subtexts of Sade
and Lautréamont, these offering a literary "rapprochement" of paradise or heaven and hell.

The serpent introduced death into paradise; he accordingly appears in the text in a context juxtaposing the paradisiacal vision and the erotic encounter:

... injectés du crime jamais commis cambouis main huileuse allô serpent baise ève et encule adam il encule adam baisant ève comme une balle roulant à la surface de l'eau plus lentement que les vagues coucou beati maintenant je branle pour une blonde à chemisier froufrou transparent ... (p. 40)

The serpent made the experience of paradise indistinguishable from the experience of death. This is precisely the nature of eroticism as it finds its limits in Sade's writings. Throughout Paradis, evocations of erotic situations include a strain, more or less manifest, of violence and death. Pornographic film and magazines provide material which is expanded lavishly and usually ironically. The text of Sade also underlies certain erotic situations, rendering them pornographic (if we take an element of violence to be that which distinguishes pornography from simple eroticism). This text is referred to in the following passage:

... voici le livre choc qui fera se dresser tout le monde un roman terrible plus efficace qu'un super-virilisant ... le capitaine empêchant son corps meurtri où se jouaient des gouttelettes de sang ... la saisit dans une étreinte bestiale et la possèda comme un taureau en rut ... sous les regards enflammés de l'assistance ... l'escalade du vice ne s'arrête jamais bouches vulves béantes impubères rosettes mâles femelles lubriquement ouvertes je suis un cochon un chien un aigle
Note how Sollers sees Sade as a book in the sense of Book, "terrible" and "efficace." The Book, we have suggested, overcomes distinctions between writing and world, such that the book becomes a world, universe, in itself, while the world is always already written. The Book can thus be "efficace" in the sense of changing or creating the real. This is also the aim of the paradisiacal text: working under the "chiffre de l'infini," such a text would be more than simply another book with a beginning and an end. Paradis thus finds its model in the text of Sade which, going beyond the covers of the physical volume, "[faisait] se dresser tout le monde." Both texts approach their writing "tout en parabolique stéréo porno"; both texts assume that the experience of paradise is intertwined with the experience of hell.¹⁰⁷

The pornographic vision cited above is importantly one of bestiality, of man's descent to the sexuality of bulls, pigs, dogs, and so on. Hell or the underworld is often seen as being inhabited by the half-animal, the monstrous. In hell, man loses his divine origin as the image of God, and assumes baser forms; nonetheless, the memory of a nobler state—a memory distinguishing, for example, Odysseus' men, transformed by Circe, from real swine—is an integral part of the literary experience of hell. The animals above ("taureau . . . cochon . . . chien . . . aigle . . . salamandre") suggest the subtext of Maldoror, and suggest a hell very similar to that of Sade, where
sentimentality is mixed with cruelty, where "voluptés" are "indignes." Lautréamont elevates the hell-in-paradise theme, developing it in a more theological context. He takes hell up to the heavens, inverting Dante's vision of divine order. Now, in Paradis God is often envisioned as being cruel and rapacious; divine nature is seen as having such qualities when it is given the name of "dieu." In the following example, the context is the Apocalypse:

... l'œil de dieu ronge la matière lieu lourd de feu vibrant à la source flot torrent tu portes la tache elle ne s'en va pas pas organes griffés phallus miettes la boue emporte le plus grand nombre ... à peine avait-il incliné la tête qu'il se jette dans la cavité des mondes flammantia moenia mundi comme des essais au plus haut point du temps ... (p. 40)

In another example, the Lord's Prayer is subjected to an animalizing inversion: "... notre père qui êtes vicieux que votre nom soit ravalé que votre araignée se défile que votre viol hanté s'efface de nous à jamais quand sortirons-nous de ce sac plombé d'accouchage ..." (p. 57). Further, the books of Genesis and John are translated into Maldorian terms:

... au commencement l'imprononçable castra le ciel par la terre et l'étendue fut rompue repue recousue en fibré tonnerre et dieu dit j'en ai marre de faire l'amour dans le noir j'allume et la lumière fut ... et dieu s'enrhuma se divisa se réarrima puis s'ancre se baissa se décomprima toussa ... (pp. 42-3)

... au commencement était l'immonde et l'immonde s'est fait chair pour s'inconsommer ... (p. 157)

Blasphemies are uttered in the rhythms of the Scriptures; the "immonde" and the sacred are so closely intertwined that the God of Heaven becomes
the God of Hell—of animality, corporality, disease. Sollers' (and
Lautréamont's) hell can only be thought in a context of a lost paradise;
Sollers' hell can only be written in the most sacred forms.

3. **Time, timelessness and the problem of beginnings**

In *Finnegans Wake*, we recall, Joyce plays with verb tenses as a
means of evoking a state of timelessness; he creates an analogue of such
a state in his repetition of past-present-future groups. *Paradis*
evinces a similar drive to rise above historical time, to see all
Creation in a global perspective—or in the "perspective" of infinity or
divine nature. This is the drive animating the pedagogical
encyclopaedic project; although such a desire may never attain its goal,
it nonetheless inspires the activity of gathering, arranging and
distributing human knowledge, creating the illusion that such an
activity can ignore the clock, the pressure of novelty and
obsolescence. The fictional encyclopaedia, however, entertains a more
complex attitude toward time, in keeping with its translation of the
encyclopaedic circle into the complex progressions—repetitions and
spirals—of fiction.

*Finnegans Wake* is concerned with a certain temporal progression
in the midst of its cyclical returns (Book IV exceeds Book I, even while
it replays its concern with origins); Joyce is fascinated with the flux
of historical events, of wars and couplings, even while he would evoke
an eternal perspective on these things. Now, that *Paradis* pays
attention to the possibilities of repetition has consequences both for a transcendence of historical time and for an immersion within it. Repetition involves both a return to an originary event (and hence a negation of the time intervening) and a transformation of its starting-point by the very weight of this intervening time (and hence an affirmation of flux and change). This oscillation is worked out, in *Paradis*, as a Joycean play with verb tenses, with a grammatical encircling of time, encounters an emphasis on the impossibility of beginnings, origins.

3.a. **Grammatical time**

The first page of *Paradis* contains a meditation on beginnings and a past-present-future group:

... je prends la sphère commencée ... j'y vais commencement commencé ... impossible donc d'arriver comme une fleur et de dire j'y fus j'y étais j'y est je m'y fus j'y serai j'irai bien avant abraham lui-même raconté coupé décompté ... (p. 7)

A sweep through the verb tenses ("j'y fus ... j'irai") enacts, at the linguistic level, the entirety of time. This movement is undercut by the paradoxical reference to the act of beginning the text, where the "commencement" is always already "commencé"; it is also undercut by the future's bending around to meet the origins of the text ("j'irai bien avant abraham lui-même raconté ...", etc.). A totality of time, then, even if only a grammatical one, is put into question.
Grammatical totalization is attempted again in an evocation of the divine Name:

... et moi c'est vrai que mes tibias t'étaient pas cachés ... quand j'étais brodé dans les profondeurs de la terre mais dis donc comment tu t'appelles je suis j'étais suis je suïrais je suïjerais je suíjerrais comment tu dis parle plus fort ... crie comme autrefois du milieu du feu ... (p. 31)

The Name ("je suis ... suíjerrai") recalls the "I am that I am," the self-identity of God. The play with "je suis," which repeats familiar tenses while creating new, composite ones, attempts to evoke the property of self-identity, the encircling of all time in one person. This perfect circularity of divine nature is, nonetheless, uttered in the context of an allusion to the distant past ("quand j'étais brodé," "crie comme autrefois"), suggesting God's creation of, and intervention in, human history. Totality or eternity, in other words, cannot be imagined except in temporal terms, in the context of a play with grammatical tenses. Christ in his eternal nature must be measured against the saints and the prophets: "... les prophètes ont été non-prédits prédisants les saints prédits non-prédisants lui seul s'est montré prédit-prédissant ..." (p. 165).

3.b. Beginnings

Linked with these qualifications of temporal totalization, there is, in Paradis, a questioning of the notion of an absolute Origin, a questioning which consequently affects our idea of an Ending and of the totality of things between these two points, Alpha and Omega. Affected
is the very status of the beginning of the text of Paradis: we have noted how the first page includes a meditation on a "commencement commencé," implying that the work has no beginning, that it finds its origin in Sollers' earlier work. There is no starting-point, then, for the text, because it rewrites other writings; a writer, in other words, has always already been writing; an oeuvre is not a self-enclosed whole.

The problem of beginnings moves outward from the text to all of Creation, as the Biblical assertion of origins is repeated, inverted, parodied. The first verse of Genesis reads, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth"; this is echoed in John 1:1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." John 1:14 continues, "And the Word was made flesh. . . ." Both versions of origins are transformed in the following: "... or donc commença le commencement au commencement était le commencement détourn d'anse et la chair frissonna et elle se fit verbe . . . et le verbe donc s'est fait cher le lapsus devint hors de prix . . ." (p. 22). The circularity of "au commencement était le commencement" effectively cancels out the idea of a beginning, which is based on the assumption that what begins is something—a text, Creation—other than the action of beginning itself. The origin of all things, as seen by Genesis, is here made into an infinite deferral, "détour d'anse." Meanwhile, the inversion and pun, respectively, practised upon the words of St. John put this particular version of origins into question by parodying it.

The model, "au commencement était," provided by John is picked up on several other occasions, with a different subject being provided each time:
Substitutions are measured against the missing word, "Word." The verb conjugation—the attempt by grammar to encircle time—is a parodic version of the "portée" of the Word. The jingling rhyme of the second substitution is another means of deflating the Original. The Word or Name disappears from the text, leaving only an empty structure—"au commencement était. . ." In this way, the idea of an origin is emptied out, as it were, made something like a cliché, a tired habit of thought.

"[J]e suis le premier ici non pas à me répéter mais à oser répéter la répétition répétée . . . j'écris la répétition répétée . . ." (p. 131). This assertion about the practice of repetition in Paradis is almost identical in form to that concerning beginnings, "j'y vais commencement commencé. . . ." It seems, then, that the problem of beginnings is closely linked to that of repetition. Origins, that is, are put into question in a fiction in which repetition, and not a teleological plot, is the chief mode of organization.

4. "Pancyclopédie": the Book and books

The fictional encyclopaedia finds its place in the public arenas of the oral tradition and of the library. Any concern with
autobiography, with the tracing of a personal journey into knowledge, is deflected into a preoccupation with the impersonal categories of the Encyclopaedia—the culture's repository of its communal knowledge, its commonplaces or "bêtises." In Paradis as in Finnegans Wake, the circulation of such commonplaces is as important as a more widely-noted commerce with secret knowledge, with the more obscure or arcane by-ways of the Encyclopaedia. Again like the Wake, Paradis works to undermine the encyclopaedia's (or at least the modern variety's) obsession with objectivity, with achieving a direct access to the world. This illusion encounters the insistence of other books; knowledge in the Book is clearly multiply mediated, with other books being swept up into the "tourbillon" (p. 146) of the "pancyclopédie" (p. 101).

Any discussion of the "transtextual" dimension of Paradis must begin with the issue of punctuation and its absence in the work. It is obvious that the practice of citation, for example, presupposes the institution of a visual punctuation: a citation, to be recognized as such, must be set off by quotation marks. Expectations as to literary authorship or ownership are at the base of this use of visual marks to distinguish another's words from one's own. When these marks are removed, the related expectations are confounded, with the result that the citation is either not perceived at all or is perceived as an unauthorized borrowing—as a plagiarism. The reader, still working within the framework of a system of literary property, may translate the absence of quotation marks as a sign of a theft or violation of such property.
In Paradis, for example, there are a number of citations from Shakespeare's plays. Now, these appear as though they have been incorporated into the text with insufficient acknowledgement; it appears as though Sollers (like Pierre Menard writing Don Quixote) is producing the lines for the first time:

... et le jour grandit coula s'éteignit et il se retrouva truc-trac réveil to be or not to be trotteuse en secondes traits filés coucous du message poids chaînes . . . (p. 100)

... all the world a stage totus mundus agit histrionem les personnages n'y sont plus découps nommés . . . (p. 115)

Even more difficult than pinpointing whether an English phrase is a citation is determining whether a French expression, in this unpunctuated French context, is a citation or a translation. For example:

... les âmes se précipitent et choisissent sans se regarder quenouille bobinage et rembobinage serpent souris rossignol singe sage casino mortel du foiré sombre et tortueux est le chemin de l'hadès bifurcations carrefours . . . (p. 171)

Here, the expression "sombre et tortueux est le chemin de l'hadès" sounds like a citation. The lack of quotation marks may prevent the reader from being quite sure that it is a citation—unless (s)he has that source in mind; nevertheless, this lack does not preclude the effect of intertextuality, the reader's perception that the words sound as if they come from another text. This perception occurs quite apart
from the question whether an actual intertext can ever be discovered or not.\textsuperscript{111}

In effacing quotation marks, then, Paradis foregrounds the fact that assuming indebtedness to other books is not a straightforward decision. As we have seen, the encyclopaedia itself brackets such debt while nonetheless working within it; Paradis simply presents this encyclopaedic paradox in a particularly acute form, foregrounding the philosophical issue while nonetheless proceeding with its "transtextual" practice.

As we noted in the context of Finnegans Wake, a book's relation to other books takes two major forms, the hypertextual and the intertextual. Hypertexts are those books which are relevant in their entirety and integrity; they may be imitated or transformed, but they are not simply ransacked—as are intertexts—for pieces to insert in the text at hand.\textsuperscript{112} In Paradis, it is the Bible, Dante's Commedia, Sade's writings and Finnegans Wake that function as hypertexts, as encyclopaedic models to be imitated, as bodies to be transformed, translated into a new context. Let us look briefly at how one such book, the Bible, becomes material for imitation and transformation.

The Bible is the paradigm of all fictional encyclopaedias; it is the model for later works as these attempt to encircle all human knowledge, all Creation, all time. The Bible, then, initiated a genre of encyclopaedic Books. It is the chief hypertext of Paradis: Sollers' work imitates the sacred scriptures in its preoccupation with seeing all Creation and all time: ". . . le commencement le milieu la fin le recommencement du milieu dans la fin . . ." (p. 218). Paradis imitates
the Bible as a totalizing form, as a Book in which there is no distinction between writing and the world. Sollers' text is not, however, a slavish imitation, as it qualifies in its meditations on infinity the Bible's concern with totalization. The imitation of a generic model is thus also a questioning of its adequacy.

Besides imitating the genre of bibles or totalizing books, we might say that Paradis transforms the Bible itself in the sense of translating it into the contemporary context of physics, information technology, and so on. Just as Ulysses transforms and thereby ironizes the Odyssey by translating its epic divagations into modern terms—Bloom's wanderings around Dublin—so Paradis transforms the Bible by translating its concern with the beginning and the end of things into a fluid context which effectively undermines the possibility of such temporal closure. This transformation occurs even in the most prophetic/apocalyptic passages:

... tu verras tout en forme de lion et la masse voûtée du ciel n'apparaîtra plus et les astres ne brilleront plus et la lune restera cachée et la terre ne se tiendra plus sur ses bases et tout sera dans la foudre ... (p. 41)

The lightning or wrath at the end of things recalls Vico's notion of a thunderous catastrophe initiating human history. Thus, "c'est comme ça que ça devait finir par ne plus finir ... que la vraie finition peut venir apocalypton d'ultra-son ... " (p. 189): the beginning is the end and vice versa ("fini"/"initiation"); the sound of the Apocalypse is equally the Ultrasound associated with the unborn. The Bible is transformed, then, as its apocalyptic tone and vision are
retained while yet being translated into the enterprise of affirming a principle of repetition.

Paradis has many intertexts, the most important of which is again the Bible. Texts may be cited directly (with the reservation, noted above, that in the absence of punctuation direct citation is harder to determine); texts may be paraphrased; texts may be alluded to directly or in intertextual puns. An interesting example of citation is a fragment from the poet Hérédia—or from a dictionary entry: "... comme un vol de gerfauts hors du charnier natal" (p.12). The line from Hérédia contributes to the definition of "gerfaut" in the Petit Robert; is Paradis in this case, then, citing a poem or citing a citation?

The more frequent intertextual practice in Paradis is that of paraphrase: here, a text is referred to but not cited as expected; rather, the text is repeated with variations. For example:

... isaïe 18 5-7 je veux rester tranquille et regarder de l'endroit où je suis comme la torréfaction au moment de la lumière comme un nuage de rosée dans la chaleur du non-dit ... (p. 55)

Here, the "non-dit" replaces the harvest of the original passage from Isaiah. In Paradis, the Bible is open to extensive transformation via paraphrase; the principle of repetition (theme and variation), the organizing principle of Paradis, is enacted in each instance of paraphrasing work done on an original. Now, repetition is also the principle behind the intertextual pun; an origin(al) is both asserted and eluded in constructions such as the following:
vous qui partez laissez toute abstinence . . . (p. 78)

à l'ombre des jeunes nouilles en pleurs . . . (p. 17)

la chair est triste hélas et ils n'ont pas lu quatre livres . . . (p. 76)

These humorous departures from Dante, Proust and Mallarmé, like simple allusions, treat only a tiny part of an oeuvre; the reader darts into and out of another textual universe. Simple allusions are actually difficult to locate in Paradis; a word from another work alludes to that work, yet the alluding word itself is often transformed:

son-silence saphir cité bleue soufre rouge langue syrie vers héliopolis . . . (pp. 62-3)

le vent descend la montagne tous ils s'avancent dans le signe de l'éveilleur il est troué père jade métal froid glace rouge sombre . . . c'est la forme la multitude le tronc ou encore le waker est tonnerre . . . (p. 13)

The first case contains a reference to Finnegans Wake in its evocation of the colours of the rainbow in association with "héliopolis" (in the Wake, "heliotropolis"). The Wakean word is significantly changed; the sun (Helios) is now emphasized—rather than the heliotrope flower. The second case actually contains an intertextual pun ("waker") as a translation of "éveilleur"—or Finnegan himself. "Tonnerre" is also an allusion to the thunderclap initiating and punctuating Finnegans Wake.

Thus intertextual puns and allusions, like citations and paraphrases, multiply throughout Paradis, indicating that the work flows along in the consciousness of its own "second hand" status. Like other
fictional encyclopaedias, then, it makes a virtue of explicitly signalling its indebtedness to other books.

5. Paradis: writing and orality

Finnegans Wake, we recall, plays the written word against the spoken word, song and ritual gesture. It does this by embodying the two sides in the figures of Shem and Shaun, respectively. The Wake in the end remains suspended between literacy and orality, ultimately opting for neither one nor the other. Rather, the Wake chooses to sketch in a network of textual connections, but does so in the rhythms of speech. We have already noted, on the other hand, how Paradis attempts to overcome the gap between writing and speech; it does this by encouraging the reader to practice an oral punctuation of the text; it imagines the possibility of a book that would be a "volume de l'éloquence lisible."

Images of literacy and orality in Paradis are worth exploring in a little more detail.

The materiality of writing is evoked in the following:

... tu as voulu être acculé coincé sans issue recollé giflé sur la page horizon papier tourniquet forêt du papier n'est-ce pas ce que tu as toujours attendu conçu résolu couper vraiment dans la ligne n'être plus que ligne sur ligne ... (p. 183)

Paper comes from trees; in a grotesque trope, the writer becomes a woodcutter chopping down lines of print. Besides emphasizing the literal materials of writing, Sollers also evokes its (Mallarméen)
silence: "... silence décor pour absence rien que l'écrit et encore l'écrit linge papier bois silence et il grava ses lions chérubins fleurs guirlandes silences ..." (p. 83). The palimpsest is another metaphor for writing; it is that manuscript wherein inscription conceals earlier inscription, where the written word is paradoxically both enduring and ephemeral. The following allusions to the palimpsest structure foreground this notion that inscription is both permanent and vulnerable to effacement:

... que le noir sans fin vous emporte disparaissez dans le vent les signes que je pose d'autres sauront les dissoudre ... (p. 58)

... tu ne me déchiffèrerais pas si tu ne m'avais pas déjà effacé tu ne me nierais pas si tu ne m'avais déjà soussigné ... (p. 139).

The metaphor of the palimpsest also involves a play with the notion of a sacred first layer of inscription:

... le roman véritable roman très ancien très honteux roman peut-il cependant s'écrire pendant qu'il s'écrit derrière l'écran des romans qui lui font écran est-il seulement traçable indicable peut-on mimer ses fragments ... (p. 195)

The first Book or "roman" may only be discerned behind a shifting screen of books; it is a mirage, like Mallarmé's "Livre," sketched in via fragments: "... le Livre ne doit jamais être regardé comme étant vraiment là. On ne peut le tenir en main."116 In an ironic turn characteristic of Paradis, that which is "très ancien" is also "très honteux"—not, that is, ultimately worth knowing.
The metaphor of the palimpsest thus resumes a number of paradoxes pertaining to writing and the Book. In Paradis, writing is both celebrated and seen as “honteux”—a practice of excess, “écrit du surplus” (p. 183). Writing is contrasted to oral expression in terms that seem to valorize the latter:

... d'un côté mur stèle tombeau de l'autre vagues nauges sur l'eau d'un côté bouche pierre proférée oeil fixe de l'autre cils coudes rotules bras doigts d'un côté loi blancs paragraphes de l'autre signature paraphe ... (p. 100)

Orality is evoked by images of transience (waves, clouds), by the order of the body (lashes, elbows, etc.), by the signature with a flourish. Oral expression takes its ultimate form in the Word or breath of God:

... au principe de tout et surtout de l'humanitout était la parole et la parole était chez je suis et la parole était je suis elle était au principe en je suis profondément dedans fichée en lui ... (p. 46)

We note that the Word or speech ("la parole") is profoundly linked ("profondément dedans fichée") with identity, subjectivity or "I am-ness" ("je suis"). Writing, in contrast, is the site of the subject's traversal by all the other subjects who have ever written; it is a mode of alienation. However, we might worry that Paradis ultimately involves precisely this alienation of subjectivity, this writing of others. It seems that this conflict may be resolved on one point, at least: the image of the "signature paraphe," above, involves both the (oral) subject who signs and the written product which is the signature. The signature, like the flourish ("paraphe") at the end of it, is the
utterly individual mark of the "je suis"; yet it is written not spoken. The signature thus incorporates the mode of orality into letters; like the "volume de l'éloquence lisible" which is articulated by the rhythms of the breath, the signature offers a synthesis of writing and speech.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE CANTOS

1. Special problems: the canto form

The form of the Cantos bears upon the problems associated with the encyclopaedia. The canto form involves a tension between oral and written modes, between popular and hermetic knowledge; even the conflict of totalization and incompletion is implicated in this form. Thus, like non-punctuation in Paradis and wordplay in the Wake, the canto as the form in which Pound chose to work has an important place in our consideration of the particularity of his work.

A canto, according to the Princeton Encyclopaedia of Poetry and Poetics, is a subdivision of an epic or narrative poem, roughly corresponding to a chapter in a novel. Dante's Commedia, for example, is divided into cantos, as is Pope's The Rape of the Lock (the mock-epic keeping to the mechanical divisions of its epic models). Pound's Cantos, in utilizing these divisions, thus place themselves in the tradition of epic or narrative verse. And yet Pound valued the medieval lyric over medieval narrative: "The problem rises: how far all this medieval narrative was literature of escape. . . . The vitality of the medieval lyric was perhaps due to its focussing attention on what was 'present'." Pound's "epic" identifies itself as belonging equally to the tradition of lyric poetry, particularly song: the word "canto"
derives from the Latin "cantus" or "song." There is thus a narrative/lyric tension at the heart of the *Cantos*: this is a tension between an autobiographical narrative—an Odyssean journey through history and towards knowledge—and lyric moments of vision outside time. Each canto is both an installment in a large, restless accumulation of knowledge (including self-knowledge) and a single instance of something seen or learned. The *Cantos* as a whole ultimately overcome the dichotomy between narrative and lyric, as both modes are pressed into service as means of access to paradisiacal states.

Pound, in his writings on literary tradition, nonetheless concerns himself rather more with the lyric—especially medieval song—than with narrative or epic. His studies of Romance literature include work on medieval epic and romance, but he gravitates by preference to the lyrics of the Troubadours, and especially to those of Arnaut Daniel. In translating and discussing these lyrics, Pound emphasizes their formal intricacy (rare rhymes and complex rhyme-schemes), their musical qualities (internal echoes of assonance and alliteration), and their fineness of spirit as meditations on love both mystical and carnal. Pound's sensitivity to the Troubadours' notion of paradise— involving a glimpse of feminine beauty, a beauty both sacred and secular—is relevant to the form of the *Cantos* and to their relation to knowledge. As it progresses, in other words, the poem is increasingly concerned with moments of paradisiacal vision, and is less and less preoccupied with telling history; as a result, the dominant mode becomes less one of a narration of the knowledge of ages.
than one of a lyric revelation—or prescription—of something that may be known in glimpses or fragments:

Le Paradis n'est pas artificiel
but spezzato apparently
it exists only in fragments unexpected . . .

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 438)

The canto as love-lyric, then, lies behind the Cantos' discontinuous form and proclivity towards moments of paradisiacal vision. Certain other traits of medieval lyric are also relevant to an understanding of Pound's work. A medieval lyric was sung; it was both a musical and a written composition. It was performed by singers who travelled extensively and sang to many audiences. In this performative nature, medieval song resembled epic; in both, audience constraints affected performance and even form. The social position of the singer often constrained him to veil his language, censor his references to his lady. The song was thus often highly enigmatic in content as well as being complex in form. The Cantos, being based in medieval song, must be thought of as lyrics lacking, but implying, a musical score. Like such song, Pound's poem is conscious of engaging an audience; protean, it changes shape and veils or unveils beauty depending as much on audience and time factors as on personal exigencies. Thus there are many references to things half-seen and half-known, as in the following:

there came new subtlety of eyes into my tent,
whether of spirit or hypostasis,
but what the blindfold hides
or at carneval

(Ca. LXXXI, p. 520)
"As against the half-light of the window/ . . . a dream passing over the face in the half-light" (Ca. LXXIV, p. 444): the beauty based in medieval song is a "difficult" beauty. Like the ambiguous composite lady constructed out of the fragments of other women in Pound's poem "Na Audiart," the beauty which the Cantos would communicate is only available via enigma, indirection, the repetition and gradual accumulation of fragments.

While being enigmatic or evasive, medieval song must nonetheless be seen as an entertainment. Each singer returns to the same commonplaces on love: topics such as the languishing lover, the haughty lady, the disease of love, the springtime versus the winter of love, are repeated with individual variations. In classical rhetoric, topics "... are helps toward composing orations. They are, as Quintilian ... says, 'storehouses of trains of thought' ... and thus can serve a practical purpose." In the Middle Ages, poetics is a part of rhetoric; poetry, in other words, is a "species of eloquence," a form of communication whose purpose is to entertain, inform, sway an audience. In the interests of such communication, medieval poetry—including song—draws upon topics or "storehouses" of common knowledge. The poet shares a common fund of tradition with his listeners, his song being neither simply an individual (autobiographical) expression, nor simply a complex form.

The rhetorical aspect of medieval song bears as much upon the form of the Cantos as does the enigmatic aspect of such song. Pound,
indeed, tries to envision these two strains at once when he speaks of medieval song as "... the poetry of a democratic aristocracy, which swept into itself, or drew about it, every man with wit and voice."¹²

Such song, then, can be at once popular entertainment and aristocratic revelation; it can draw on matter which is known to all in order to communicate a vision reserved, perhaps, for the few. Conflicting hermetic and communicative tendencies also underlie the *Cantos'* ambiguous status as both arcane Book and encyclopaedic summa of history, "paideuma" for a new human era.¹³ Further, the song's simultaneous existence as an oral performance (which is essentially anonymous) and as a written composition (which emphasizes individual authorship) founds the tension at the heart of the *Cantos* between anonymity and authorship.

One further characteristic of the medieval love-lyric is relevant to Pound's work: this is the circularity or self-fulfilling nature of such lyric. As a song about love, it is also a song about singing about love. Singing, in other words, is loving and vice-versa.¹⁴ The song, although it traces the dynamics of lovers' relations, is ultimately about its own existence and performance; it is thought complete unto itself, returning to itself via the route of predictable variation on a theme; it is in no way open-ended or unpredictable. "Amo ergo sum, and in just that proportion" (Ca. LXXX, p. 493): it is interesting to consider the *Cantos* in the light of this circular aspect of love, as much to understand how Pound's work questions such circularity (self-completion) as to see how the work may enact it. The figure of the circle or perfection is epitomized in images such as the following:
Here, "ch'êng" signifies "to complete"; the entire image is an icon of completion or encircling. In the Cantos, such self-fulfillment is often associated with precision in language, with exact perception of emotion, and with order in government:

I am for balance

Lord of his work and master of utterance
who turneth his word in its season and shapes it
Yaou chose Shun to longevity
who seized the extremities and the opposites
holding true course between them

Such centering is, however, constantly going astray. The poem in its repetitions and in its digressions into diverse domains of knowledge often takes the form of the Odyssean "periplum," the indefinite circumnavigation of an uncharted coastline. The circle is here pulled out of shape, opened onto the unknown experienced by Dante's Ulysses:

hast 'ou swum in a sea of air strip
through an aeon of nothingness,
when the raft broke and the waters went over me

In the Cantos, then, the lyric circle of love and order is distorted by encyclopaedic—or oracular—imperatives. The self-completion of the
song about love falls away into the incompletion of the journey after knowledge; the song falls away and returns to itself, then falls away again, endlessly.

We have stressed that the term "canto" encompasses both epic and lyric modes; the Canós, that is, record in their form the struggle between narration and vision. In this, the poem enacts the tension between continuity and discontinuity, or between totalization and "infinitization," at the heart of the encyclopaedic enterprise. This is a tension between different kinds of knowledge—between achieved and desired knowledge, between the knowledge accorded to man in his imperfection and that possessed by the gods or God. To emphasize the Canós' nature as a narrative/epic "tale," as Bernstein does, is to pass over the gaps in their telling—points where history intersects with eternity, epic with oracular lyric, human perspective with divine. The epic is, of course, concerned with the interpenetration of divine and human affairs, with the inclusion of all that can be known at the time of writing. However, this comprehension of knowledge is kept strictly within the bounds of a narrative tale. Divinity in the epic is not, as in the Canós, a poetic mode of knowledge; rather, the gods are externalized actors in the story told (think, for example, of Poseidon in the Odyssey). The tenuous balance found in the Canós between epic and lyric, narration and vision, history and eternity, is certainly a manifestation of the epic singer's desire to make the tribe aware of its own tradition, limitations and potential. More than this, however, it is an indication of a wider encyclopaedic impulse and its translation into fiction.
l.a. **Canto LXXXI**

It will be useful to ground the preceding general remarks in a discussion of a single canto. Here we may see how we read narrative and lyric, hermetic and rhetorical, elements; here we may see the dynamic of completion versus incompleteness at work in the text. Now, the "Pisan Cantos" are among the most comprehensive and representative cantos of the entire work. In looking at Canto LXXXI, one of the later ones, we can gain insight into the functioning of the larger whole. The reader's progress through each canto mimics his more extensive divagations through the entirety of the text.

Canto LXXXI divides roughly into two halves—a prosaic-historical section and a lyric section concerned with divine and enduring values. The first half foregrounds the operations and objects of memory; the second half is concerned with music and with vision, developing moments of divine knowledge alongside, or in counterpoint to, a highly rhetorical (repetitive) treatment of love, nature, and human values. Canto LXXXI thus schematizes (as does Canto XL, in another example) in its "half-and-half" structure the ideogrammic or "juxtapositional" mode of inclusion and arrangement that animates every page of the text. In other cantos, divine or eternal and human or historical elements may be juxtaposed continuously over the piece or within the space of a few lines. For example:

*Formando di disio nuova persona*
One man is dead, and another has rotted his end off
*Et quant au troisième*
Il est tombé dans le
*De sa femme, on ne le reverra*
Pas, oth fugol ouitbaer ...

(Ca. XXVII, p. 129)
Here Cavalcanti, the Anglo-Saxon "Wanderer" and a modern Hell are closely juxtaposed. Canto LXXXI, on the other hand, takes the two strands, evident in the above example, of Ovidian metamorphosis in desire and a grossly physical or historical existence, and works them out more or less separately. The two domains, however, do interpenetrate at certain points.

"That was Padre José Elizondo/ in 1906 and in 1917/ or about 1917" (p. 517). In the first half of the canto, the poet—incarcerated in the Pisan prison camp—exercises his memory much as a prisoner in cramped quarters exercises his limbs, in order to ensure its continued functioning. In the previous canto (LXXX), there are indications that the poet fears his memory is failing:

The evil that men do lives after them'
well, that is from Julius Caesar
unless memory trick me

... and also roused a street demonstration
in Soho for Italy's entry into combat in
19 was it 15?
pass Napper, Bottom (correct that to Bottomly)

(pp. 501-2)

The more elements of the past that he recalls, the more the poet exercises control over his memory. Memory is a technique or art which must be practised in the interests of attaining to moments of divine knowledge; the poet repeats or numbers over the things of the past—however inglorious or prosaic in themselves—in order to get at a certain abiding quality faintly perceived behind this shifting screen.
Thus the reference to the gods in the opening lines of the canto:

Zeus lies in Ceres' bosom
Taishan is attended of loves
under Cythera, before sunrise

This reference grounds the historical and personal material that follows, which is played out, ephemeral, against the enduring backdrop of divine loves. The canto is importantly a love-song dealing with love-matter; evoked at the beginning, the matter of love hovers over the reading of the entire poem.

The elements sounded in the memory and brought up to be juxtaposed on the page are quite diverse. There are fragments of remembered speech:

and he said: 'Hay aqui mucho catolicismo . . .
y muy poco reliHion'
and he said: 'Yo creo que los reyes desaparecen'
(Kings will, I think, disappear)

. . .
and the hostess grinned: Eso es luto, haw!
mi marido es muerto
(it is mourning, my husband is dead)

Direct quotation is followed by translation; recollection is an operation mediated or directed by the intellect, by its enduring preoccupations and present concerns. "'Te cavero le budella'/ 'La corata a te'" ("I'll cut your guts out/ And I yours"): these words are spoken by two historical characters, recalled or repeated from an earlier canto (Ca. X); the selection thus conforms to a larger
patterning operating beyond the individual canto. This selection of
details from the past according to present interests is also at work in
the division of historical elements according to their perceived value.
Certain elements, that is, fit into a "golden" or idealized past and
hence belong to a pattern of enduring values, while others, on the
contrary, are devalued by their association with the negative complex
linking usury, unnatural emotion and verbal imprecision. Details such
as the following are valorized:

George Santayana . . .
. . . kept to the end of his life that faint thethear
of the Spaniard

as a grace quasi imperceptible
as did Muss the v for u of Romagna

(p. 519)

Remembered precisions of pronunciation contrast, in the memory-system,
with details such as reported religious hypocrisy (" 'mucho catolicismo
. . ./ y muy poco reliHion'," p. 517) and hatred (" 'but such hatred,/ I
had never conceived such','" p. 517), with such emotions and practices
working against fine perceptions, distinctions.

Thus memory selects and arranges its materials according to
patterns or dynamics that remain constant in the midst of the flux of
historical details. The Pisan memory tends to dwell on significant
elements by restating them in a new form. Santayana, in the example
above, becomes Mussolini; the Canary Islands are restated as Portugal,
while the "Possum" (T.S. Eliot) is a variation on (Basil) "Bunting" in
the following:
Basil says
they beat drums for three days
till all the drumheads were busted

... and as for his life in the Canaries ...
Possum observed that the local portagoose folk dance
was danced by the same dancers in divers localities

(p. 518)

The Pisan memory also tends to cluster elements around certain
fundamental oppositions such as nature versus artifice, life versus
death, sensibility versus the blunting of perceptions. Within this
weighing and sorting of historical matter, there occasionally intrudes a
reference to a level of being of a different order than the rise and
fall of history:

'Ὕγη... 'εμὸν ποτὶ δῶμα τὸν ἄνδρα

(p. 518)20

Light as the branch of Kuanon

(p. 519)

The goddess Circe intrudes into "the cultural level" (p. 518); the
Kuanon reference (Kuanon being the Chinese goddess of mercy)21 restates
at a new level the "It'll get you offn th' groun" of the inmate who is
offering Pound the gift of a "table ex packing box" (pp. 518-9).
AOI!
a leaf in the current
    at my grates no Althea

Yet
libretto  Ere the season died a-cold
Borne upon a zephyr's shoulder
I rose through the aureate sky
    Lawes and Jenkyns guard thy rest
Dolmetsch ever be thy guest,
Has he tempered the viol's wood
To enforce both the grave and the acute?
Has he curved us the bowl of the lute?

(pp. 519-20)

With the exclamation, "AOI!," the order of mythical time—of eternal values—becomes the dominant order of the canto. Now references to music (the text labelled as a "libretto," the composers Lawes and Jenkyns, the musician Dolmetsch, the musical instruments "viol" and "lute") alternate with intimations of forms seen and unseen. Cythera or Aphrodite is present in the image, repeated from earlier cantos, of "a leaf in the current"; love is associated, that is, with the formal whims and divagations of the canto itself (and by extension the Cantos as a whole). Music, then, is the context for an equivocal vision such as "a cloud so light/ As seemed neither mist nor shade" (p. 520); it is the base for a vision of eyes: "Ed ascoltando al leggeri mormorjio/
there came new subtlety of eyes into my tent" (p. 520). Music, vision and love alternate, and in these waves show themselves to be facets of an intimated unity. All are bound together in a lyric moment which is discontinuous with the interplay of reminiscences constituting the first part of the canto.
What thou lovest well remains,
    the rest is dross
What thou lov'st well shall not be reft from thee
What thou lov'st well is thy true heritage . . .

(pp. 520-1)

With the assertion, "What thou lovest well remains," the canto moves from vision to rhetoric or teaching, just as earlier it moved from a recollection of the past to an evocation of a (timeless) present. The anaphora of "What thou lovest well . . . [etc.]" drums the precept in (rather like the drums in the "simple village fiesta," above). The poet is here turning to an audience, addressing it urgently; this rhetorical or pragmatic emphasis continues with the repetition of "Pull down thy vanity":

    The ant's a centaur in his dragon world.
    Pull down thy vanity, it is not man
    Made courage, or made order, or made grace,
    Pull down thy vanity, I say pull down.

(p. 521)

Repetition here is associated with the learning of effective action: "But to have done instead of not doing/ this is not vanity" (p. 521). Rhetoric, that is, draws upon a traditional fund of practices and knowledge; in its persuasive aspect, rhetoric is also a form of action. The final section of Canto LXXXI thus enacts in miniature an important precept of the Cantos as a whole—the necessity, that is, of putting "ideas into action." 23

Canto LXXXI, then, works with several different modes, bringing
them together in a manner representative of the Cantos in their entirety. In concerning itself with the recollection of history, the poem provides us with fragments of a number of larger narratives. These narratives (history, autobiography) are broken apart and their pieces rearranged according to certain enduring intellectual patterns. Such patterns in turn "lyricize" the prosaic material--in itself insignificant--of history; they endow it with the appearance, at least, of visionary significance. The interruption of recollection by moments of vision (Cythera, etc.) further "lyricizes" narrative. Lyric vision is in turn bent to didactic ends in the final section. Here, for example, the line, "The ant's a centaur in his dragon world," a moment of lyric inversion of scale and value, is followed by the repetitions of "Pull down thy vanity" in the context of a didactic insistence on the observance of nature's process: "Learn of the green world what can be thy place/ In scaled invention or true artistry" (p. 521). Narrative, lyric, and didactic modes, then, are translated into one another, this operation enacting in miniature the Cantos' general imitation of literary modes, an imitation undertaken to the end of ultimately overcoming their difference.

The tension, basic to the Troubadour love-lyric, between formal difficulty and familiarity of topic, between hidden meaning and public entertainment--between the trobar clus and the albas, pastorellas, satires and other popular forms--plays itself out in the Cantos as a whole and in each canto, including Canto LXXXI. There is an interplay, here, between the recollection of idiosyncratic particulars ("and the
egg broke in Cabranez' pocket . . .") and the universalizing aspiration to arrange these particulars in a form recognizable to all ("... thus making history," p. 518). There is an interplay between a purely private, ineffable vision (the "new subtlety of eyes") and a moral vision of an order available to all: "Learn of the green world what can be thy place . . ." (p. 521). The identification of completion and love, a pattern basic to the Cantos in their self-modelling on the canto-form, is also enacted in Canto LXXXI: this opens with the matter of love ("Taishan is attended of loves," p. 517), and attempts to close with it ("What thou lov'st well remains," p. 521). However, the moral/didactic message of "Pull down thy vanity" tends to pull the canto as love-circle out of shape, making it end on a tentative, incomplete note:

To have gathered from the air a live tradition
or from a fine old eye the unconquered flame
This is not vanity.
Here error is all in the not done,
all in the diffidence that faltered . . .

(p. 522)

2. **Problems of totalization**

Like Joyce in *Finnegans Wake* (and in *Ulysses*) and like Sollers in *Paradis*, Pound in the *Cantos* clearly manifests the encyclopaedist's concern to "get it all in"—into this "great bulk, huge mass, thesaurus" (Ca. V, p. 17). Pound exemplifies the Modernist refusal to consider
certain aspects of experience to be more "poetic," and hence more worthy of inclusion, than others. The poet wants to attain to a total comprehensiveness; his phrase, "mind come to plenum when nothing more will go into it" (Ca. LXXVII, p. 475), applies to the Cantos as a desired "plenum" or fullness of self-completion. However, it is the encyclopaedist's lot to see this project of completion endlessly deferred. "Time is the evil. Evil" (Ca. XXX, p. 147): time makes completion impossible, its flux carrying old verities away and bringing new elements, pressing for inclusion, into view. The poet would have his mind or will range over and control his material, set it in order; this is the import of the phrase "directio voluntatis" repeated over the later cantos, as in the following case:

Shun's will and
King Wan's will

were as two halves of a seal

... Their aims as one
directio voluntatis, as lord over the heart
the two sages united

(Ca. LXXVII, p. 467)²⁴

The poet would have one mind, its multiple voices or personae united in one will. Against this will, however, there operates a tenacious serendipitous bent, which persists even in the poet's negation of it: "Not serendipity/ but to spread/ . . . thru the people"; "Liu dogs, serendipity? No." (Ca. LXXXV, pp. 548, 553). Serendipity is the impulse that turns the will away from its objects, as in the following
abrupt deflection away from unity: "... not a lot of signs, but the one sign/ etcetera ..." (Ca. LXXXV, p. 546).

The Cantos thus regret an absent self-completion or "plenum" even as they posit this as an ideal. The work's formal grounding in medieval song contributes an ideal of amorous circularity; on the other hand, the work's narrative aspect works against such circularity, tending toward an openness or inconclusiveness which is also enacted at the level of the individual canto. (Ca. I, for example, ends with "So that:", while Ca. XVIII ends with "Also sabotage . . .".) All this implies the impossibility of finishing, achieving closure. The poem works with a number of different versions of circles, focussings or centerings (for example, in Ca. LXXXV, p. 549, we find "whetstone whirling to grind"), just as it also produces a number of instances of the circle opening out into spiral or whirlpool, "mirroured turbationem/ . . fantasia without balance-wheel" (Ca. LXXXVI, p. 560). So we encounter Dante's heavens and St. Richard's steps toward a center:

'Cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio.'
Wrote Richardus, and Dante read him.
Centrum circuli.

(Ca. LXXXVII, p. 570)

A desire for a divine centering is at the same time a regret for a lost cultural center:

No classics,
no American history,
no centre, no general root,
No prezzo giusto as core.

(Ca. LXXXV, p. 549)
"Centre," "root," "core": centerings characterize the lyric, nostalgic aspect of the *Cantos*. On the other hand, Odysseus' wanderings following an open-ended circle or periplum (his return home to his center being endlessly deferred) give the poem its over-all inconclusive quality:

To make Cosmos—
To achieve the possible—
Muss., wrecked for an error,
But the record
the palimpsest—
a little light
in great darkness—
cuniculi—

(Ca. CXVI, p. 795)

2.a. **Modes of inclusion**

A fictional work's inclusion of diverse cultural and literary-traditional elements is an important aspect of its encyclopaedic nature. In *Finnegans Wake*, we recall, both external and internal orders direct encyclopaedic inclusions ("external" referring to forms such as the list, "internal" referring to the motivation afforded by theme and character in the generation and complex elaboration of lexical chains). Sollers' *Paradis* effects its inclusions via the generation of lexical chains, via certain rhetorical strategies, and via the formal equivalences normally associated with verse. How, then, does Pound's "thesaurus" go about including? The *Cantos* absorb materials via external orders—specifically, the orders of historiography, law, proverb. The poem also includes via the formal equivalence of
repetition of words, phrases and motifs. Modes of inclusion, then, appear to transcend the boundaries between prose and poetry. Further, the Cantos feature a third major mode of inclusion: this is the well-discussed "ideogrammic method" where diverse elements are brought together and juxtaposed. In hindsight, this mode illuminates the works of Joyce and Sollers as they abandon chronology or logical subordination—as far as this is possible in prose.

2.a.i. The ideogrammic method

Let us begin by looking at the ideogrammic method and Pound's related notion of "vortex." Pound's ideas on the ideogram derive from Ernest Fenollosa's study on the Chinese written character. In the ideogram, diverse concrete elements are juxtaposed; the visibly-juxtaposed materials in turn imply certain relationships which are not explicitly stated. The arrangements, in other words, become metaphors for conceptual relations. For example, Fenollosa gives the symbol 有 as literally being composed of moon (月) and hand (手). "To snatch from the moon with the hand" is the concrete meaning of this ideogram; surprisingly, it is also the verb "is." This prosaic verb, when analysed, thus "is transformed by magic into a splendid flash of concrete poetry." Transposed into a poetic method, this implication-by-juxtaposition works out as an avoidance of "editorial" commentary on ideas. The poet must make ideas visible through images; the reader in turn must perform a good deal of the work of synthesis of meaning on these images. The ideogrammmic image, then, is "not simply a
visual impression but a union of particulars transposed onto the conceptual plane."

Any understanding that the image is a static entity is challenged by the following definition: "The image ... is a radiant node or cluster ... a VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into which, ideas are constantly rushing." Image as Chinese ideogram (such as can be literally seen on many pages of the Cantos), as static juxtaposition on a plane, becomes image as caught instant of time, as center or "knot" of moving energies. Pound's notion of ideogram covers all these conceptions, moving from Fenollosa's written character to Gaudier-Brzeska's vortex. Basic to the method is a "paratactic" (asynctetic) emphasis, as opposed to the "hypotactic" (subordinating) emphasis of linear prose. Oddly enough, oral poetry may be distinguished from written on a similar distinction between aggregation and subordination; ideogrammic clustering seems to be a spatial translation of the temporal "additions" of oral poetry. The latter does not know subordinating relations, while the former—knowing them—nonetheless dispenses with them. We thus have the paradoxical situation of the ideogrammic image, although being based on a highly visual language and requiring the resources of print, nonetheless articulating the relations among its components in a manner simulating the alogical or non-discursive links of oral poetry.

In ideogrammic writing, then, "... narrative and logical links are nearly always replaced by relationships of contiguity and similarity ... [T]o establish a connection between exhibits the poet must either
place one in the immediate neighborhood of the other . . . or have them run parallel. . . .” Thus the ideogrammic method works via a contiguity suggesting similarity or metaphor; it also works via a more extended repetition and variation of “exhibits” or motifs, these systems of echoes establishing larger metaphorical relations. On a single page or over a greater length of the poem, the method brings together levels of experience normally perceived to be discontinuous, suggesting beyond these perceived breaks a more fundamental continuity. Not simply any element is chosen to combine with others in an ideogram, however: the elements selected must be what Pound calls “luminous details,” items (quotations, names) that point to, call to mind, a larger system of significance. In Pound’s figure, “'luminous details' . . . govern[ ] knowledge as the switchboard the electric circuit.” “Luminous details” are points of contact with certain underlying and enduring structures, with a “circuit” of knowledge as the poet has lived and arranged it. The poetic ideogram in the Cantos, then, juxtaposes in one place—or counterpoints (runs parallel) over the poem—a number of significant details, thus bringing together in a complex interaction certain already well-articulated systems of thought.

Let us look at two examples of ideogrammic images: one is explicitly put together by Pound, while the other is formed by a single canto (Ca. XXX). The first example is to be found in Pound’s Guide to Kulchur. Here, over a number of pages, Pound prints Gaudier's manifesto, "Vortex" (“. . . I shall present my emotions by the arrangement of my surfaces . . .”), and speculates on a Great Bass
(slow vibrations below the lowest note that one can hear). Pound also discusses Leibniz' assertion that "the intellectual love of things consists in the understanding of their perfections," and ponders Scotus Erigena's belief that church authority must come from right season.\[36\] In conclusion, Pound states: "These disjunct paragraphs belong together, Gaudier, Great Bass, Leibniz, Erigena, are parts of one ideogram, they are not merely separate subjects."\[37\] All these "subjects" are luminous details, seemingly discontinuous ("disjunct") but actually continuous in terms of Pound's larger patterns of thought. In his general poetic practice, Pound habitually distinguishes details (Ca. XCVIII, p. 693: "'That you should hear it unblurred!'"), then places them against one another as "parts of one ideogram." In the present example, he attends to the Vortex, the Great Bass, Leibniz and Erigena separately, then considers them together as if they were juxtaposed, as if they were pictures in a gallery.\[38\] The details are never blended, but remain distinct in their proximity. The ideogram thus created points beyond itself to a metaphorical synthesis of the gyres (vortices) of world-ages with music, philosophy and theology, the synthesis involving some notion of stillness and perfection underlying perceived movement and distinctions.

Canto XXX in its entirety is another example of an ideogram. Here Pound considers several "subjects," the first being a "compleynt" uttered by Artemis against pity:
All things are made foul in this season,
This is the reason, none may seek purity
Having for foulnesse pity
And things growne awry;
... Nothing is now clean slayne
But rotteth away.

(p. 147)

Artemis, like the poet, laments the loss of clear distinctions, now blurred by "foul" sentiment. The next topic is the goddess Aphrodite's marriage to the lame Hephaistos. The complaint, again, is against "pity," against a sentiment which does not respect natural distinctions:

... goeth not with young Mars to playe
But she hath pity on a doddering fool,
She tendeth his fyre,
She keepeth his embers warm.

(p. 147)

Beauty should, in other words, keep in mind its place in the divine scheme of things—and consort only with beauty.

The "compleynt" now shifts and is directed against time: "Time is the evil. Evil." A young king (Pedro I of Portugal) tries to ignore time's effects; he has his dead queen, Ignez, stuffed:

Seated there
dead eyes,
Dead hair under the crown,
The King still young there beside her.

(p. 148)
Time is thus emphasized by sentiment; both cause rot, both destroy beauty. Images of transience follow: "Is come Messire Alfonso/ And is departed by boat for Ferrara/ And has passed here without saying '0'" (p. 148). The final part of the canto concerns itself with inscription and the making of printed texts. These activities arrest time:

Whence have we carved it in metal
• • •
... and here have I brought cutters of letters
and printers not vile and vulgar
• • •
and as for text we have taken it
from that of Messire Laurentius
and from a codex once of the Lords Malatesta . . .

( pp. 148-9)

Images of permanence thus succeed images of time, transience and death. Printers and "cutters of letters" record knowledge for all time. In acknowledging his sources to be the books of earlier libraries, the poet emphasizes his place in a continuity of print. Such a sense of literate tradition is impossible without a sense of the permanence of texts.

The ideogram of Canto XXX draws into itself one final element—a famous death: "And in August that year died Pope Alessandro Borgia,/ Il Papa mori" (p. 149). The fact of death now counters the permanence of texts. The canto has thus taken one final turn: in contrast to certain other cantos that end on a note of uncertainty (for example, the concluding question of Ca. XXVII, p. 132, being: "'Can you tell the down from the up?'"), Canto XXX ends with emphatic finality: "Explicit canto/ XXX" (p. 149). Unnatural sentiment, natural order, time, death,
print: all of these things are juxtaposed in the length of a short canto. Their conjunction—and the associated interplay of notions of precision and imprecision—is affected by the clustering of concrete details (Artemis, Aphrodite, King Pedro, etc.); the juxtaposition of such details works as a complex metaphor for the interplay of time and eternity.

H.N. Schneidau links the canto, and hence the ideogram, with the medical anatomy: "The continuity of Pound's poetics from Imagist days onwards is the drive to reveal unseen relations, to display the lines of force in the material... A canto is then a kind of anatomy, a display mechanism that works not like a diorama, or restoration of imagined fullness, but like a diagram suggesting skeletal, paradigmatic lines of force by juxtaposition." The ideogram is thus a mode of inclusion that sketches in the relations and the implications of certain details (whether these details be cited phrases, historical incidents or personal reminiscences). Rather like the palimpsest, the ideogram emphasizes a spatial arrangement of many different temporal layers. In Canto XXX, above, mythical time, the Renaissance and the present are juxtaposed, making all times appear to point to a more inclusive time—or timelessness. The essence of ideogrammic inclusion, then, lies in having a little suggest a great deal. The ideogram is something like a symbol—taking "symbol" in both its traditional sense as a suggestive object and its Peircean sense as a conventional sign. The ideogram suggests a wider array of significations than meets the eye; in one
sense it has a potentially limitless scope of reference. On the other hand, the Poundian image also refers to what is ultimately a finite system of reference, a personal encyclopaedia of meaningful correspondences. As a conventional sign in this sense, the ideogram cannot refer to anything and everything. Just as a word in a dictionary is given a fixed range of meanings, so a Poundian ideogram points to a network of meanings which never changes in its larger details. Ideogrammic inclusion as a symbolic suggestiveness is thus ultimately limited in much the same way as is encyclopaedic inclusion in general; it is bounded, that is, by the encyclopaedist's proclivity for shaping knowledge within certain fixed intellectual patterns or correspondences (ideologies, in short).

Pound's notion of the "vortex" is related to the ideogram—related, that is, in something like the way that a "patterned energy" is related to its individual manifestations. Using Saussure's terms, we might say that the vortex is the "langue" behind the "parole" of the individual ideogram. The vortex as "radiant node" is figured in miniature in each ideogram, in the configuration of details on each page of the Cantos. It is the larger system of relations between domains of aesthetics, economics, philosophy, mythology, and so on, a system—built over a life—to which each ideogram refers. That such a system is seen in terms of a whirlpool metaphor suggests that, like Heraclitus' river, it is neither static nor changing. The vortex as encyclopaedia underlying or prefiguring each ideogram is thus susceptible to change and self-adjustment, while yet maintaining its essential contours. In
this sense it is like the encyclopaedias of particular historical 

moments, which adjust specific, transient informations to a shape 

corresponding to a more enduring set of ideological premises. A vortex, 

then, is something like a "world-view," a historical configuration of 

mind; this is the sense it has for Gaudier-Brzeska:

The paleolithic vortex resulted in the decoration of the 

Dordogne caverns.

Vortex is energy! and it gave forth solid excrements  
in the quattro e cinque cento, liquid until the 

seventeenth century, gases whistle till now. This is the 

history of form value in the West until the fall of 

impressionism. 43

Gaudier's manifesto on sculpture imagines certain "knots" in time, 
certain patterns of thought that determine the artistic (specifically 
sculptural) production of particular times. What Pound takes as shaping 
the poetic image thus has its use as a particular view of history, as a 
figure of stasis in flux recalling Vico's cyclical theory of history.

The vortex is the spiral, the figure in which one may perceive an 
interplay of horizontal and vertical textual axes, an interplay of 
motion and stillness, time and eternity. Gaudier in "Vortex" speaks of 
an interplay of "sphere" and "horizontal" in his sweep through the ages 
of sculpture. Primitive man, for example, found that "his opulent 
maturity was convex." 44 Or:

The semitic vortex was the lust of war. The men of Elam 
[etc.] . . . had to slay each other cruelly for the 

possession of fertile valleys. Their gods sent them the 

vertical direction, the earth, the sphere. 

They elevated the sphere in a splendid squatness and 

created the horizontal. 45
These rather obscure pronouncements arise from a conception of history as a vortex; the stages of history are consequently lines or fields of force which bend and deform peoples and sculptures into characteristic "shapes." Each stage involves a particular dialectic of the sphere and the plane, either of which may gain the upper hand and come to characterize the sculpture of the age (and, through the sculpture, the age itself).

Thus the vortex comprises both the sphere or the "vertical direction" of the gods, and the "horizontal," the horizon as seen by man. Pound's interest in the vortex as a figure of historical knowledge must be seen in the light of Yeats' contemporaneous obsession with the gyres of history, especially in _A Vision_ (1937). Yeats' gyres appear in _Finnegans Wake_ (Book II, Chapter 2, pp. 295, 298); further, as noted earlier Sollers uses the "hélice" as a marker of infinity. Apart from any question of influence, it appears that a writer must turn to the figure of the spiral when it becomes a question of viewing history from an eternal perspective—when it becomes a question of writing the encyclopaedic Book that attempts to relate the multiplicity of the parts of knowledge to a conception of a unified whole (a circle) of knowledge.

Thinking about an ideogrammic method, then, is one way of exploring encyclopaedic inclusion, how it is effected and what systems of knowledge it draws upon. The method, which aspires ideally to a simultaneous presentation of every piece or element of knowledge, was
worked out by Pound in the Cantos (and in earlier works), but has been influential in the development of poetry since Pound. Indeed, the Modernist preference for spatial (non-linear, non-narrative) form, a trend toward a literary simulation of simultaneous perception, lies behind the ideogrammic method. An impatience to get everything in all at once, to comprehend details in terms of a single (though complex) intellectual pattern, informs Finnegans Wake and Paradis (as well as Ulysses, Gravity's Rainbow, Paterson, A, and so on), even while these works spread out over the extended form of the long novel or poem. The making of ideograms is thus not unique to the Cantos; the poem simply uses this mode of simultaneous inclusion in a very concrete and conscious way.

2.a.ii. Historiography and law

Besides the ideogram, certain discursive forms function in the Cantos to effect inclusion of historical, literary, legal and mythical elements. The forms of history (historiography) and of law (precept, proverb) are important in the poem as major modes of selecting and of organizing materials. These forms have the same function in the Cantos as do lists in the Wake and in Paradis: they are a framework for a meaningful inclusion of diverse elements. Indeed, historians have traditionally had the same dilemma as encyclopaedists: while wanting to "get it all in," they have nevertheless been constrained to select—and thus to reject—data on the basis of an all-informing idea or ideology. Further, the writing of history and law imply one another:
historiography numbers over or describes its material, dealing with the matter of time and writing in its mode—narrative. Legal writing organizes the same material prescriptively, for all time (for eternity), offering it as a basis for just government, right thinking. The latter kind of writing is concentrated, discontinuous, often in fragments; it cannot be narrative in nature.  

The "Chinese History Cantos" (LII-LXI inclusive) provide the clearest extended instance in the poem of historiography as a mode of encyclopaedic inclusion. Other sequences, of course, write history as well: the "Adams Cantos" (LXII-LXXI), for example, deal with American history through the editing of the letters of John Adams and others; the "Malatesta Cantos" (VIII-XI inclusive) concern themselves with an episode in European history via the arrangement of letters and other documents. Nonetheless, the Chinese cantos involve the most conscious exercise in writing history, inasmuch as they involve work upon and translation of writings that are already chronicles of history. The Chinese cantos are thus historiography at one remove.

Lieou-pang stored food and munitions b.c. 202 so that he came to be emperor, KAO, brought calm and abundance No taxes for a whole year, 'no taxes till people can pay 'em' 'When the quarry is dead, weapons are useless.' • • • HIAO HOEI TI succeeded his father. Rain of blood fell in Y-Yang pear trees fruited in winter LIU-HEOU was empress, with devilments • • • b.c. 179

(Ca. LIII, pp. 276-7)
So one emperor succeeds another for century after century and page after page. The question that comes to mind is, "Why this succession of dynasties, names and dates, details no longer relevant to the twentieth-century mind?" However, as the reader proceeds through the multiplicity of facts (wars, droughts, intrigues, laws), it becomes evident that the Many are being arranged in a very predictable way, along the lines of a One, or Pound's abiding intellectual pattern. In Canto LXXXI, we recall, memory functions in a particular manner: the poet recollects fragments of his past according to a personal pattern of moral value which sorts through these fragments, valuing or devaluing them. A remembered perception or action is valuable if it accords with certain principles—a respect for the abundance of nature, an impulse to clear expression, a desire to be just to the people, and so on. The "Chinese History Cantos" are organized by a similar pattern. History is a cultural memory common to all; nonetheless, cultural details are subject to the same processes of selection and arrangement as are the details of an individual life. In rewriting the writing of history, Pound emphasizes the ideological motivation of historiography, its organization according to the intellectual patterns of the writer's time.

Thus a record of emperors becomes a record of the alternation of good and bad governments. In the excerpt above, Lieou-pang is a good governor because he follows the order of nature, foreseeing its changes and storing up "food and munitions" against lean times. Now, Pound's "social credit" theory held that the wealth of the people should be a
real wealth based on the abundance of nature: "... there first was the fruit of nature/ there was the whole will of the people" (Ca. XLIII, p. 218). Wealth should not be wealth of the banks: "Aurum est commune sepulchrum. Usura, commune sepulchrum" (Ca. XLVI, p. 234). Thus Lieou-pang is a wise ruler because he will not collect taxes during times when nature is hard and the people have no real wealth with which to pay: "'It appears to me' said this Emperor, 'that it is/ because I saw what each man cd/ put through!'" (p. 276). In contrast to this Emperor's policies of respecting natural abundance and ensuring the welfare of his people, the emperor Hiao Hoei Ti is clearly "contra naturam" (Ca. XLV, p. 230). As in other states (for example, Denmark in Hamlet), when the head of state turns away from nature, nature gets turned on its head. Hence the details of a "rain of blood" or "pear trees fruit[ing] in winter," above. The necessity for respecting natural order is clearly established in Canto LII:

Know then:
    Toward summer when the sun is in Hyades
Sovran is Lord of the Fire
    to this month are birds.

    ...

    In this month no destruction
        no tree shall be cut at this time ... 

    (p. 258)

The proper order for harvest and work is worked out against the backdrop of invariable seasonal change. This order at the center of Canto LII is the order, then, behind the History Cantos that follow, and
is at work behind the derangement of the seasons brought about by Hiao and his Empress, above.

Chinese history is, then, a history of fairness, justice and respect for the people and for natural process ("HAN came from the people . . . / Make census/ Give rice to their families/ Give them money for rites," Ca. LVI, p. 308). Chinese history is also a history of corruption, injustice and unnatural acts ("Now Kieou's daughter/ was baked in an ox and served," Ca. LIII, p. 266). All the minutiae of two thousand years, already selected and organized by Pound's source, are now reworked by Pound in the same manner in which the Confucian historian "... searches for eternal, archetypical situations ... [H]is genius is for moral judgement, a type of absolute, and it necessarily resists the relativities of passing time and change in the human condition." The "archetypes" or intellectual patterns that direct the poet's personal reminiscences thus also order written cultural memory. Like other modes of encyclopaedic inclusion, historiography (particularly the Poundian or Confucian kind) is a mode of opening up a vein of knowledge; yet it is also a mode of controlling or channelling the "treasures" thereby released. The fictional encyclopaedia, that is, remains a fiction, as does, in a more occulted manner, its "non-fictional" model. The "feigning" book merely creates the illusion of being a "poem including history," while it actually selects from and controls history (as well as other domains of knowledge) according to an enduring moral and intellectual complex--another fiction, as it were.
In Canto LII, we recall, an injunction—"Know then"—introduces the order of seasons and the appropriate rhythms of human labour. This injunction to the reader indicates the important presence of commandment or law in the midst of the historical flow of the "Chinese History Cantos." The mode of law, a mode emphasizing eternity or eternal recurrence, introduces and thus informs the mode of historical telling or writing in these Chinese cantos. Laws governing clear perception and appropriate action (for example, "see that the white, black, green be in order/ . . . Beans are the tribute . . . ," p. 260) are clearly the key to the cantos chronicling the rise and fall of dynasties. The discontinuous commandment or precept, whose form as a fragmentary or single utterance is linked to its pragmatic nature, is paradoxically the formal manifestation of a continuity of intellect organizing and writing the details of history. Such a pattern of mind, we have seen, tends to preserve its outlines in the flux of experience; it partakes of a broader time than that of an individual life—the time of law, of a culture in its accretions of wisdom and understanding.

In the "Chinese History Cantos," chronicle is always slipping into proverb or law. This is what happens in the lines already referred to: "No taxes for a whole year,/ 'no taxes till people can pay 'em'/ 'when the quarry is dead, weapons are useless!'" (p.276). Here, narrative reporting becomes law, which in turn becomes proverb. This movement also marks the following:
This "slippage" from history to law seems to involve a passage from narration to citation, where the material cited is proverbial or legal in nature. In this direct citation, Pound lets the laws speak for themselves; implied, nonetheless, is their affinity with a larger system of values which speaks behind them. At this point in the Cantos, then, the poet tends to disappear behind his sources. He has not yet fully or consciously taken on himself the role of lawmaker, a persona he adopts in the "Rock-Drill" and "Thrones" series.

The later cantos clearly show the mode of law at work. Interestingly, Chinese material is again essential; it seems that the writings which Pound studied were legal in nature, in the sense that the knowledge of this culture was transmitted via (discontinuous) precept and was pragmatically oriented. Unlike the "Chinese History Cantos," the later cantos are less a continuous translation than a meditation on certain Chinese ideograms which, in being set off visually from the rest of the text, become almost talismanic in their effect. This emphasis on the magical potency of linguistic signs—on the pragmatic dimension of language, in other words—is linked to a preference for a discontinuous mode of presentation. Laws, that is, need not only speak indirectly through the screen of citation and translation; on the basis of
preliminary work with legal and historical texts, the poem can begin to speak law in its very form:

To know the histories  

青 

to know good from evil 

And know whom to trust. 經 

Ching Hao  

(p. 590)

At this point in the poem, the intellectual and moral complex that has been governing selections from the Encyclopaedia, and guiding their combination in the ideograms, repetitions, and temporal layerings of the text, becomes more evident. It becomes manifest precisely in the insistence of the mode of law as a vision of—and prescription for—a body of ideas on which to base a new culture, a culture harking back to certain exemplary cultures of the past. The mode of law, then, characterizes the culture-making enterprise. Law must, however, be based on a knowledge of "the histories"; again, the domains of historiography and law-making interpenetrate.

The discontinuous writing of precept or law is thus as much a mode of inclusion—of access to the Encyclopaedia, to the complex of ideas informing the Cantos—as is the continuous writing of history. The latter would seem in its sheer mass to "get more in"; the former, however, works by concentration, implication. Instead of manifestly including or recording a body of ideas, the precept points to this body in something of the concentrated manner of the ideogram. Both precept and ideogram function as signs, in other words, as indices which
register the pressure of a system of ideas, its shifts and self-corrections over time. In the Cantos, the histories select from actual cultures, while the laws imply enduring values underlying these cultures. (Pound's prose critical writings also combine both historiographic and prescriptive aspects; like Sollers' "autocritique," Pound's prose is thus continuous with his poetic project.)

2.a.iii. **Formal equivalence**

We recall that Sollers' Paradis is largely organized on the basis of poetic or formal equivalence—on the basis, that is, of certain forms of repetition. These include repetition of whole words, phrases, and (in rhyme) of sounds or syllables. We should expect that as poem the Cantos be by definition organized by the same principle of isochrony, encouraging the perception, in time, of equivalent units. Indeed, the work is organized in this way. However, the exaggerated lists of rhymes so characteristic of the prose Paradis are paradoxically lacking in the verse Cantos; it is as though Sollers' prose, to counter its own necessary continuity and to attain to discontinuous states of lyrical vision, needs the excessive repetitions of rhyme-lists. Free verse as a conventional medium of such vision need impose no mechanical regularity. What such verse does undertake is a subtle repetition of words, phrases and themes; the reader perceives a movement of equivalences in time. The Cantos achieve such regularities by proceeding, to a certain degree at least, on the basis of the repetitions and variations of the fugue. The poem thus tends toward
eternal return while yet respecting temporal difference; it achieves an illusion of ideological consistency while yet respecting the irreducibility of its sources. The fugue is thus, like the ideogram, one more mode of inclusion at work in Pound's poem. Like the ideogram, it draws into the text certain fragments of a greater (implied) body of knowledge; it does for the ear (and the intellect) over the length of the poem what the ideogram does for the eye (and the intellect) on the space of the page.

The text makes use of leitmotifs, repeated phrases or elements. The "Pisan Cantos" in particular rely on the technique. However, the early cantos also organize their material to encourage a familiarity with certain words, phrases or themes which will often signal a theme or emotion; thus, for example, the name "Elpenor" comes to stand for a whole complex of ideas linking Pound to Odysseus and developing the idea of a fateful voyage and a struggle against oblivion. Elpenor is introduced at some length in Canto I; Odysseus speaks, Elpenor follows:

But first Elpenor came, our friend Elpenor,
Unburied, cast on the wide earth,
Lims that we left in the house of Circe...

'But thou, O King, I bid remember me, unwept, unburied,
'Heap up mine arms, be tomb by sea-bord, and inscribed:
'A man of no fortune, and with a name to come...

(p. 4)

Elpenor reappears in Canto XX; here, he is the only one remembered of many who had a "salt grave by the bull-field," whose "... names are not written in bronze/ 'Nor their rowing sticks set with Elpenor's
..." (p. 94). These anonymous or nameless ones become, in the "Pisan Cantos," Pound's fellow-prisoners:

men of no fortune and with a name to come

his helmet is used for a pisspot
this helmet is used for my footbath
Elpenor can count the shingle under Zoagli

(Ca. LXXX, p. 514)

The name "Elpenor" thus sums up—and carries through the text—a cluster of associations formed in the Underworld episode of the Odyssey and retold in Canto I. The name and the phrase, "A man of no fortune," carry with them an emotion of loss, depersonalization. This emotion attends the "lotophagoi" of Canto XX, who seek oblivion and release from care; it also characterizes the prisoner under the shadow of death (thus the fitting use of the Elpenor motif in the Pisan context of Canto LXXX).

Closely associated with the Elpenor motif is the phrase, repeated through the "Pisan Cantos," of "OY TIE" or "No Man," this being the name Odysseus gives himself in order to trick and escape from the Cyclops. "No Man," implying "no name," means something like "with a name to come." Both tags sum up an emotion of loss of identity; both indicate a refusal, on the part of the voices of the Cantos, to assume a single poetic presence—to become the Subject of the poem:

OY TIE, OY TIE? Odysseus
the name of my family.

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 425)
The repetition of "OY TIE" is associated with an accession to states of
timelessness ("Achronos" meaning "without time\(^5\)). The repetition of a
negation of identity undoes time and the integrated personality normally
associated with it. The use of the leitmotif, like any repetition, thus
both emphasizes and overcomes time; a theme is both repeated and varied,
both returning to itself (overcoming time) and changing (following
temporal flux).

Tiresias, another participant in Canto I, lends his name to
another motif or repeated complex of associations:

And Anticlea came, whom I beat off, and then Tiresias Theban,
Holding his golden wand, knew me, and spoke first:
'A second time? why? man of ill star,
'Facing the sunless dead and this joyless region?
'Stand from the fosse, leave me my bloody bever
'For soothsay.'
And I stepped back,
And he strong with the blood, said then: 'Odysseus
'Shall return through spiteful Neptune, over dark seas,
'Lose all companions.'

Tiresias has the gift of prophecy; he typifies poetic vision. Like
Hermes, he carries a wand and is a figure of interpretation—the
interpretation of holy signs and auguries. The vision he transmits to Odysseus is a bleak one of a long, ever-more-solitary voyage. Tiresias is thus, with Odysseus and Elpenor, a name for loneliness, namelessness, while nonetheless representing vision in the midst of death. This light that resists extinguishing reappears in the opening of Canto XLVII:

Who even dead, yet hath his mind entire!

... Tiresias,

Eyeless that was, a shade, that is in hell
So full of knowing that the beefy men know less than he ...

(p. 236)

Tiresian vision is juxtaposed in this canto with the vision attending the Eleusinian mysteries and Dionysian fertility rites: "The light has gone down into the cave,/ Splendour on splendour!"; "Falleth,/ Adonis falleth./ Fruit cometh after" (p. 238). The word "mind" then pulls this complex of (poetic) vision and fertility or creativity into the "Pisan Cantos":

Still hath his mind entire

(Ca. LXXX, p. 494)

with a mind like that he is one of us

Favonus, vento benigno

Je suis au bout de mes forces/

That from the gates of death,

that from the gates of death ...

(Ca. LXXX, pp. 512-3)

Tiresias/Pound persists in vision even in the new Hell of Pisa.
Thus Tiresias, Odysseus and Elpenor lend their names to motifs which pull distant sections of the *Cantos* together, reminding the reader that certain basic emotions and ideas are essential to an understanding of all parts of the work. These motifs function something like the "semina motuum" (seeds of motion) of Canto LXXX. As germs of meaning, they move through the work and give it the appearance of a little coherence: "Death's seeds move in the year/ semina motuum/ falling back into the trough of the sea . . ." (p. 500). Such repeated motifs, seeds promising a fuller meaning, appear only to fall away again—like the shades in Hell—into the (formless) "trough" of the poem. Leitmotifs or "semina motuum" are, then, both a promise and a withdrawal of meaning; the motif appears to us as a fragment from a larger whole, a germ implying a fullness which is never actually made manifest. Encyclopaedic fullness or closure remains a virtuality only, approached by allusions, tags, fragments. The repetition of these fragments reinforces a perception of the immanence of a timeless completion, but also attests to its actual evasiveness in history. Motifs (like the gods) return, certainly; they are, however, transformed, tenuous, shades only of an imagined fullness:

See, they return; ah, see the tentative
Movements, and the slow feet,
The trouble in the pace and the uncertain
Wavering!

... As if the snow should hesitate
And murmur in the wind,
and half turn back . . . 52
Just as the repetitions of Paradis attempt, against the powerful inertia of its prose, to draw the text into some sort of pattern, attempt to perceive or "write Paradise" in the midst of infinite transformation, so Pound's repeated motifs would have the Many of the text point to the One giving them meaning. However, in the Cantos as in the fugue a repetition is not simple but rather involves a transformation; the perception of "eternal states of mind" thus becomes "tentative," eternal presence being crossed by time or death. The literary practice of repetition, inviting the perception of equivalence over time, is thus a paradoxical practice.

2.b. Imitation of literary modes and forms

An encyclopaedic mode, we have seen, differs from other literary modes in being neither mimetic nor didactic, but rather comprehending both: it absorbs and imitates mimetic and didactic modes and the forms embodying them. In the fictional encyclopaedia, the inclusion of elements of knowledge is with great difficulty distinguished from the imitation of sources—literary forms, non-fictional writings. The Book cannot have direct access to knowledge; its knowing is an imitation of imitations, the perception of an ever-receding "formed trace" (Ca. XXXVI, p. 178)—"knowledge the shade of a shade," as Pound puts it (Ca. XLVII, p. 236). Therefore any discussion of the fictional encyclopaedia's modes of inclusion should properly overlap with a discussion of an encyclopaedic imitation of literary modes and forms.
Inclusion is, indeed, for this type of work, synonymous with imitation. Thus, for example, historiography and law as modes of inclusion, of access to a system of ideas, are also forms of writing that the *Cantos* imitate. Further, the "ideogrammic method" as mode of pulling together and juxtaposing disparate elements of knowledge also refers to a linguistic form iconically represented by the poetic mode.

Letters—that is, epistolary forms—are a further locus, in the *Cantos*, of the overlap of imitation and inclusion: letters (especially in the "Adams Cantos," LXII-LXXI) are a major source of material for Pound: in imitating the epistolary style, he is also drawing into the poem much of the matter of the letters. For example:

```
true religion, morals, here flourish
i.e. Washington 4th March 1801
toward the newly created fount of supply (Mr Jefferson)
in ardour of hostility to Mr Jefferson
to overlook a good deed
If Pickering cd/ mount on
wd/ vote for J. Adams
whose integrity not his enemies had disputed
. . . rights
diffusing knowledge of principles
maintaining justice, in registering treaty of peace
```

(Ca. LXIII, p. 351)

A letter is the source, here, of material on Jefferson and Adams; the material has been edited by the poet, as indicated by the ellipsis before "rights." The words on the page also form something like an icon of a letter, with the date and address being given at the top right-hand corner of the material. The content of this and other "Adams Cantos" cannot be separated from their epistolary context; the latter determines
our perception and judgement of content. In imitating the epistolary form, that is, the poet relativizes the letters' content: imitation is never quite pure, never quite immune from parody—or at least, when parodic intent appears to be lacking, from ironic effects. Even though Pound appears to deal with the American letters in an almost reverential manner, the literal imitation of their form creates an ironic gap between the poet (and the reader) and the utilized materials. The imitation, that is, creates an impression of documentary veracity that is ironically at odds with the obvious pressure, on the material, of the poet's idiosyncratic moral/intellectual vortex. This pressure of "opinion" against "fact" is at work shaping and framing the passage above: Pound is characteristically concerned with "religion," "morals," "principles," "justice," "peace"; these are components of his particular "vortex"—components of the Book he would like to write upon and over an often-recalcitrant historical material.55

The Cantos as fictional encyclopaedia, then, do not imitate the letter purely for the pleasure of imitation. There is a didactic motive: imitation also effects inclusion, transmitting material to the reader. This didactic thrust follows Pound's concern with clarity and closure of meaning: "To communicate and then stop, that is the/ law of discourse/ To go far and come to an end" (Ca. LXXX, p. 494); "Get the meaning across and then quit" (Ca. LXXXVIII, p. 581). The poet would have the cited or imitated material transmit his system of thought, his ideals of government. However, a poem cannot be a treatise on government. It is a fiction, and as a fiction it is the site of a
tension between pleasure and instruction. The *Cantos'* mimesis of literary forms is not simply undertaken to "communicate and then stop"; rather, imitation is repeated and multiplied beyond the constraints of communication and into the realm of obsessive play. One might say, for example, that the length of the "Adams Cantos," their tendency to confound the reader looking simply for communicated content, indicates that a motive of formal excess animates their writing; Pound appears to enjoy playing with the epistolary style for its own sake. Thus the poem is divided against itself, its desire to include and transmit knowledge working against a pleasure in repeated imitation for its own sake.

The forms of history, law, and epistle thus function in the *Cantos* as sites of overlap or tension between inclusion and imitation, thematic and formal concerns. The *Cantos'* imitations of literary modes also manifest this tension. We read such imitations somewhat differently here than we do in the *Wake* and in *Paradise*. Joyce and Sollers present an impersonal base of sound or voice (a "rumeur") from which arise specific voices speaking in specific modes; at base, then, Everyman—or "No Man"—speaks. Now, Pound may assume the Odyssean persona of "No Man" and compose his poem ideogrammatically (presenting his materials directly, with little or no editorial intervention); nonetheless, the reader is aware of a strong intellectual and moral presence directing the selections and combinations of the work. The *Cantos* may have no unified structure or voice, but they do seem to answer to one over-all purpose: to rewrite history towards a writing of paradise. We must thus read modal imitations, in the poem, as
manifesting a thematic pressure far greater than any manifested in the
Wake or Paradis. The Cantos' imitations of literary modes are not pure
play (although, as imitations, they must involve a certain ludic
element).

What constitutes an imitation (exaggeration) of narrative in the
Cantos? "And then went down to the ship": Canto I undertakes such an
imitation, to a certain degree, via its use of polysyndeton overlaying
Homeric epic form. This operation is, however, not done in a spirit of
play, but rather for the purpose of "getting something across"—in this
case introducing the Underworld theme that is to be so important to the
work. In another example, Canto XXIII has a Provençal persona narrating
events:

And my brother De Maensac
Bet with me for the castle,
And we put it on the toss of a coin,
And I, Austors, won the coin-toss and kept it,
And he went out to Tierci, a jongleur
And on the road for his living . . .
... And they called us the Manicheans
Wotever the hellsarse that is.

(pp. 108-9)

This piece of narrative is to be distinguished from the eccentric
pieces, already discussed, in the Wake and Paradis. Pound's narrative
has its roots in historical events, whereas Joyce and Sollers write
"nonsense," foregrounding the polysyndeton ("and . . . and . . .") at
the base of narrative while ignoring the tale that is customarily
(common sens-ibly) transmitted by this mode.56 When Pound indulges in
formal play (the polysyndetic exaggeration, above), one has the
impression that he is doing it against his best (communicative)
intentions. Although Pound often writes obstructively or allusively, he rarely or never consciously writes non-sense.

Similarly, in the _Cantos_ one may find instances of imitation of dramatic dialogue which never abandon sense in the interests of foregrounding formal play. We have noted how, for example, the Mutt and Jute interchange in the _Wake_ and the "catechism" in _Paradise_ foreground the formal or mechanical aspect of dialogue by suspending any exchange of content. However, when Pound directly addresses Robert Browning, for example, he does not concern himself with the form of dialogue as such:

Hang it all, Robert Browning,
there can be but the one 'Sordello.'
But Sordello, and my Sordello?

(p. 6)

To some extent, Pound is speaking here with Browning's "shade," in keeping with the theme of a communication with the dead set up in Canto I; he also imitates Browning's "dramatic" poetic style. In another example, when Pound addresses and quibbles with his source in Canto XCVI of "Thrones," he wants to clarify his relationship to his source and suggest how errors in textual interpretation may come about:

... What was the greek for _aveu_ in this instance? ἐἰδοκεῖος τοῦ ἐπορεύου
rather nice use of _aveu_, Professor, though you were looking at _αὐευ_.

(p. 667)

Neither of these two fragments of dialogue is a clear instance of an imitation of a mode. Indeed, only one voice (Pound's) is speaking,
addressing an imagined interlocutor. Dialogue is being used more or less unselfconsciously, for ends other than formal play. Thus Pound is the least parodic of our three "encyclopaedists"; the Cantos are animated by a fairly straightforward intention to encircle and communicate knowledge, a drive remaining perceptible even behind the poem's digressions into formal play.

2.c. Paradise via periplum

We have noted that the fictional encyclopaedia performs a critique of encyclopaedic models and thus undoes or unmakes itself; it does this even while it aspires to paradisiacal states of totalization and self-(ful)filling as manifested in its fascination with images of harmony and completion. The Wake, we recall, critiques Vico's words and ideas by playing with them, dissolving a universal history into a handful of distorted fragments. Nonetheless, Joyce also works with images—such as the rainbow and the alphabet—of a mystical totality. Similarly, Paradis tries to write infinity (undermining totality, self-presence) while at the same time aspiring to moments of epiphanic or paradisiacal vision. How do the Cantos manifest the characteristic conflict of fictional encyclopaedism? In intent, the poem clearly aspires to a state of completion; it aspires to the unimpeded communication of a system so potent that it invites action; the poem would become the basis for a new society desperately needed (thinks Pound) in the between- and post-war condition of the Western world. Nonetheless, in practice the poem works against its own intent. Its
incomplete, digressive, fragmented form, and its lack of a single, originary voice, perform a fundamental evasion of encyclopaedic totalization.57

2.c.i. Versions of Paradise

A paradisiacal completion is envisioned in the Cantos under two faces—Eastern and Western. The writings of Confucius are a major source for Pound's vision of paradise. A Confucian paradise is an earthly one achieved by following the principles of good government and by coming to know oneself. For Confucius, the paradisiacal "still point" is not the point at which the gods become manifest, but is rather the heart, the seat of human dignity and the center of the body:

... the true word is in the middle inside and will show on the outside. Therefore the man of real breeding who carries the cultural and moral heritage must look his heart in the eye when alone.58

Even more essential than knowing one's heart is aspiring to precise verbal definition. The process involves a series of steps or refinements leading to an ultimate point or "points" (we should recall Sollers' use of "point" in this paradisiacal context):

... the men of old wanting to clarify and diffuse throughout the empire that light which comes from looking straight into the heart and then acting, first set up good government in their own states; wanting good government in their states, they first established order in their own families; wanting order in the home, they first disciplined themselves; desiring self-discipline, they rectified their own hearts; and wanting to rectify their hearts, they sought precise verbal definitions of their
inarticulate thoughts [the tones given off by the heart]; wishing to attain to precise verbal definitions, they set to extend their knowledge to the utmost. This completion of knowledge is rooted in sorting things into organic categories. . . . When things had been classified in organic categories, knowledge moved toward fulfillment; given the extreme knowable points, the inarticulate thoughts were defined with precision [the sun's lance coming to rest on the precise spot verbally] . . . [T]hey then stabilized their hearts . . . [etc.].

The above passage contains in miniature the whole vortex of ideas in the Cantos on government, self-knowledge, verbal definition, sincere communication and completion of knowledge. Paradise is not the manifestation of divinity; rather, it is a state of complete knowledge, a set of "extreme knowable points." Interestingly, the attainment of such points in the knowledge of things, an attainment which must precede precise verbal definition, is linked to the survey of the categories of things ("settling things into organic categories") undertaken by the encyclopaedia. Such work is seen as the ultimate (or, inversely, the first and most essential) step of all those steps described. A profound knowledge of things, preceding a precise knowledge of words, is thus associated with a centering in the heart and with a perception of totality.

things have ends and beginnings

things have ends (or scopes) and beginnings. To know what precedes and what follows

will assist yr/ comprehension of process

II.9 have scopes and beginnings
"Things have roots and branches; affairs have scopes and beginnings"\textsuperscript{60}: this proverbial statement by Confucius on totality (scopes) is repeated through the \textit{Cantos}. The notion of a beginning and end to all things, a closure in time, is linked by Confucius to an image of natural order, the branching design of the tree ("things have roots and branches").\textsuperscript{61} Pound's key term for this natural order is "process"; this is an ideal of a moderate, civilized nature: "Birds and terrapin lived under Hia,/ beast and fish held their order,/ Neither flood nor flame falling in excess'" (Ca. LXXXV, p. 545). The notion that natural process can function as a corrective to the chaos and meaninglessness of human affairs is developed especially in the "Pisan Cantos," where the poet's appreciation of the lives of insects, the patterns of weather, the smell of herbs, sustains him:

The suave eyes, quiet, not scornful,
    rain also is of the process.
    ...
the wind also is of the process,
sorella la luna

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 425)

An understanding of natural process is linked here to an intimation of divine (female) presence; Aphrodite ("the suave eyes") and the moon (personified as "sorella la luna") are juxtaposed with the rain and the wind. Natural process as balance and proportion, as the proper order of the heart and the intellect, paradoxically involves the half-seen, elusive goddess and the changeable moon as much as it involves the full light of the sun.\textsuperscript{62} Similarly, the idea of natural process comprehends
aspects of the weather—the wind and the rain—which are linked with change and flux, which erode or efface objects. Process thus comprehends (in Aphrodite, the moon, the wind and the rain) that which would evade or efface balance, clear distinctions. Yet it would also sum up completion, clarity, balance, in a movement towards paradise—a state, in a further turn, identified as letting the wind speak (see Ca. CXX, p. 803). Thus the notion of "process" is a complex one. The poet of the "Pisan Cantos" cannot be sustained by any unqualified sense of the fullness of nature; rather, the perception of process involves a perception of fragments, glancing moments of vision, with wholeness being inferred from minute details or parts of nature:

being given a new green katydid of a Sunday
emerald, paler than emerald,
minus its right propeller

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 435)

the dwarf morning-glory twines round the grass blade

(p. 436)

In Pound's words, "Le Paradis n'est pas artificiel/ but spezzato apparently/ it exists only in fragments unexpected . . ." (p. 438). Paradise lies in the perception of natural process, but this perception is neither simple nor complete. Nature ultimately eludes the civilizing, measuring enterprise of the Confucian system.

When "process" is mentioned again in the "Rock-Drill" section, it is no longer something to be directly experienced. Nature or process is mediated by books and quoted speech:
Vide Neruda's comment, but focus, can they even animadvert on focus? or true editions? 'or even the use of process? That fine old word'

(Ca. LXXXVII, p. 575)

As usual, Pound unwrites paradise even while desiring, precisely, to write it; far from inviting an unmediated knowledge of things, then, "process" becomes nothing more than a "fine old word."

Pound's Eastern approach to paradise thus has equivocal results. The latter cantos suggest that paradise is attainable, but rarely is so in any fullness or immediacy. Now, the Western tradition offers to a poet who would "write paradise" a number of paradisiacal models. Beginning with Plato, most versions envision some form of transcendent truth or divine presence, usually linked with light imagery. The Cantos turn obsessively upon the possibility of discovering or attaining to moments of transcendence in the midst of temporal flux. These moments may involve some vision of the gods, or they may involve a contemplation of light. The (Ovidian) gods, caught as they metamorphose, are half-seen, lending themselves to a peripheral and fleeting vision. This vision of the gods contrasts with a direct engagement with the light of the sun or truth. Here, Pound's light-imagery comes equally from the Christian neo-Platonism of Scotus Erigena and from the sacred mysteries at Eleusis.⁶³

How are the gods as aspects of paradise written in(to) the Cantos? In his "Religio," Pound suggests certain traits of the gods:
What is a god?
A god is an eternal state of mind.

When is a god manifest?
When the states of mind take form.

May they when formed appear to anything save the sense of vision?
We may gain a sense of their presence as if they were standing behind us.

This catechism emphasizes as a principle the tenuousness of any experience of divinity. One does not look directly at the gods; one senses them behind one. Paradisiacal knowledge is thus available only obliquely (recall Sollers’ remark on attaining to vision “de biais”). One never enters into a full Presence, but one is aware only of being touched by an Other who is at the same time an absence. In the Cantos parts of the gods may be glimpsed, like pieces of a puzzle; for example, one may see their knees or their eyes:

Thus the light rains, thus pours, e lo soleills plovil
The liquid and rushing crystal
beneath the knees of the gods.

The shallow, eddying fluid,
beneath the knees of the gods.

(Ca. IV, p.15)

there came new subtlety of eyes into my tent,
whether of spirit or hypostasis,
but what the blindfold hides . . .

... casting but shade beyond the other lights . . .

(Ca. LXXXI, p. 520)

The god(dess) is a kind of negative, a shadow "beyond" or behind "the
other lights" (what are these?), a presence which is paradoxically an absence. The Cantos know paradise, then, in something like the way one "knows" one's unconscious--through slips, shades, through looking at something else entirely. If the gods are caught and contemplated directly, they become curiously empty, insubstantial (recall, in "The Return," how the "leash-men" are "pallid"). Pound's gods are no longer the vital actors of the Metamorphoses or the Homeric epics:

Gods float in the azure air,
    . . . and the leaves are full of voices,
A-whisper, and the clouds bowe over the lake,
And there are gods upon them,
And in the water, the almond-white swimmers,
The silvery water glazes the upturned nipple,
    As Poggio has remarked.

(Ca. Ill, p. 11)

The rarefied colours, the half-heard voices, the weightlessness of the gods here contribute to an experience not of a full divine presence, but rather of an erotic or languid evasiveness. Further, even the concrete image of the glazed nipple is mediated by a source, "Poggio"; the experience thereby loses immediacy. Paradisiacal moments involving such things as azure gods and subtle eyes would cumulatively constitute the "still center" of the poem. However, because the gods are so tenuous, any center they may form ends by evading itself, and the poem rolls on, still seeking "... to enter arcanum" (Notes for CXVII et seq., p. 802).

The contemplation of divine light is a recurrent theme in the Cantos. Certain ideas attributed to Neoplatonic philosophers become
fragmentary motifs, "semina motuum" weaving their way through the text. For example:

the souls ascending,  
Sparks like a partridge covey,  
Like the 'ciocco,' brand struck in the game.  
'Et omniformis'; Air, fire, the pale soft light.

(Ca. V, p. 17)

'Et omniformis,' Psellos, 'omnis  
'Intellectus est.' God's fire . . .

(Ca. XXIII, p. 107)

The "omniformis" motif, in which divine intellect and light are one, features fire as a form of light. Fire is also envisioned in the following:

San Sepolchro  
the four bishops in metal  
lapped by the flame, amid ruin, la fede—  
reliquaries seen on the altar.

(Ca. LXXVIII, p. 478)

The fire or light of God, associated with the potency of the intellect, degrades in history into the destructive fires of war. However, "amid ruin, la fede"—the image that strangely persists is that of Yeats' artificial paradise in "Sailing to Byzantium" (1927):

O sages standing in God's holy fire  
As in the gold mosaic of a wall . . .  
Consume my heart away . . .  
... and gather me  
Into the artifice of eternity.
Divine intellect in its fullness and potency no longer animates a mere relic "lapped by the flame"; artifice implies an absence of (divine) nature. It is as though the Modernist imagination (Yeats', Pound's, perhaps Eliot's also) can only envision paradise in terms of images of artifice, having lost somewhere, and regretting, the equipment for an unmediated and full access to divine vision, states of mind.

Pound uses an expression of Erigena--"All things that are, are lights"--as another motif, a repeated tag functioning to approximate paradisiacal vision. "Monsieur F. saw his mentor/ composed almost wholly of light" (Ca. LXXXVII, p. 573): paradise is thus constantly linked with clear light and with the eye that sees without wavering. In the later cantos such vision is linked to the factor of love in the phrase, "ubi amor, ibi oculus":

Not love but that love flows from it

UBI AMOR IBI OCULUS EST.  
(Ca. XC, p. 609)

'That lizard's feet are like snow flakes'

(pale young four toes)

ubi amor, ibi oculus.  
(Ca. CXIV, p. 793)

And so: "God's eye art 'ou, do not surrender perception" (Ca. CXIII, p. 790). Looking back to Canto LI, we find the same configuration:

Shines
in the mind of heaven God
who made it
more than the sun
in our eye.  
(p. 250)
However, just as the gods cannot be regarded directly, the will of the eye to see through to truth is ultimately deflected in a play of mirrors:

*ubi amor, ibi oculus.*

But these had thrones,
and in my mind were still, uncontending—
not to possession, in hypostasis
Some hall of mirrors.

(Ca. CXIV, p. 793)

The mirror substitutes reflection for penetration; the eye sees not God but itself, while fullness of presence or "hypostasis" escapes into the two-dimensionality of shadow or mirage. Of equal weight in the Cantos, then, are moments of yearning toward paradisiacal light ("pure light, we beseech thee/ Crystal, we beseech thee . . ./ from the labyrinth," Fragments, p. 799) and a recognition of the necessarily fragmentary and imperfect nature of our perception of that light, "the blue flash and the moments/ benedetta" (Fragments, p. 801).

The Cantos sometimes juxtapose the Eastern and the Western paradisiacal traditions. The attitude seems to be that the more elements the ideogram includes, the closer and more comprehensive is its approach to paradise:
plowed in the sacred field and unwound the silk worms early

in the light of light is the virtù
'sunt lumina' said Erigena Scotus

. . .

Light tensile immaculata
the sun's cord unspotted
'sunt lumina' said the Oirishman to King Carolus,
'OMNIA,
all things that are are lights'

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 429)\(^70\)

Chinese "silk worms" figure a certain quality of light—hard, taut, "in
tensile." Light is also the referent of the Confucian ideogram meaning
"bright," "clear," "intelligent."\(^71\) The notion of the "virtù" is
similar to that of the "vortex": "virtù" is a pattern of intellectual
energy or potency that functions like a signature—of an age, a culture,
an artist.\(^72\) The "light of light" is the most essential root,
center—God's "virtù" or signature. This Western ideal combines with a
fragment from Erigena already noted—"sunt lumina" ("are light"). The
over-all ideogram of light, then, performs an obsessive restatement of
one theme; by saying the same thing again and again in different
languages or different philosophies, the poet hopes to attain to the
"thing" itself—light, God—beyond language. The means of approach,
however, becomes the means of an ultimate falling-short of paradise.
The use of many languages and cultures ends by simply emphasizing the
multiplicity of languages and cultures. Getting from the Many to the
One, in other words, is the problematic step for Pound.
2.c.11. **Evasions of paradise**

Pound protests that his concern to find unity in the midst of multiplicity is not a nostalgia for lost states of being:

That the tone change from elegy 'Et Jehanne' (the Lorraine girl) A lost kind of experience? scarcely . . .

(Ca. XCI, p. 617)

According to Pound, the experience of unity, of directness of will, is as immediately available as it was for Joan of Arc. Such an ideal, however, is usually expressed equivocally, in language offering the very terms of its undoing. Let us go further with this notion of equivocation as it constitutes an implicit critique of totalization or the achievement of a divine perspective on history. A critique of the subject, of the "directio voluntatis," is implicit in the **Cantos'** "anonymous" method of composition; this essential anonymity undermines a conscious preoccupation with major form. Further, the formal hesitations of fragmentation, repetition, and digression, hesitations arising from a fascination with the Odyssean model, also work against the totalizing project. 73

It is clear that Pound is often concerned with finding a major form for the **Cantos**, with the idea that the poem must be directed by his will and that it must cohere. Quite early, he projects the number of cantos; he has also the sense of laying the groundwork for a **structure**:
Having the crust to attempt a poem in 100 or 120 cantos long after all mankind has been commanded never again to attempt a poem of any length, I have to stagger as I can.

The first 11 cantos are preparation of the palette. I have to get down all the colours or elements I want for the poem. Some perhaps too enigmatically and abbreviatedly. I hope, heaven help me, to bring them into some sort of design and architecture later.

The idea of a "design" or an "architecture" for the Cantos is an ideal of a unity to which the multiplicity of the "colours or elements" in the poem must contribute. This parallels on the formal level the poet's sense that there are moments of experience when the subject is at one with the gods, with the Other, and that such moments may be composed of many elements, none being redundant. The over-all design of the poem as an ideogram in time also demands that its parts cohere, that each piece of the puzzle—even though it may appear to jar with, and bear no relation to, its neighbours—have its place according to its relation to the whole, according to the way it points to a structure of relations (a vortex) that is not necessarily manifest. The question of coherence becomes especially pressing in the final cantos; there is a growing sense of a failure to make this long poem hold to a major form:

From time's wreckage shored,
these fragments shored against ruin . . .

(Ca. CX, p. 781)
But the beauty is not the madness
Tho' my errors and wrecks lie about me.
And I am not a demigod,
I cannot make it cohere.

... i.e., it coheres all right
    even if my notes do not cohere

(Ca. CXVI, pp.795-7)

Although the poem, the "madness," fails to cohere, Pound nonetheless holds to the notion that "it"—"beauty," things before words—still has meaning, and that the problem is simply one of human failure or weakness.

The idea of a "major form," a unified and coherent structure for a poem the length of the Cantos, thus cannot be lived up to by any single human being. The poet, like the solitary encyclopaedist in a non-fictional context, confronts a body of knowledge simply beyond his unaided powers of organization and cohesion. In the face of this impossible totality, the mind bends back against itself, against its major purpose, and starts to evade, take detours. In the face of the great "architecture," that is, Pound sets down a "palette" of "enigmas" and "abbreviations." On the one hand, Pound sets himself Aeneas' task of bringing home the gods of a new culture:

and belt the citye quahr of nobil fame
the lateyn peopil taken has their name
bringing his gods into Latium

(Ca. LXXVIII, p. 478)

Besides Virgil there is, of course, Dante: Pound takes on Dante's task of transmitting that which is beyond words, the Rose whose force patterns the steel dust of human history (Ca. LXXIV, p. 449), the "love
moving the stars . . ." (Ca. XCI, p. 612). On the other hand, working against these prophets of a major order and building we find a fascination with the inverse side of Odysseus' voyage, with the themes of endless journeying, death and oblivion. Directly after the meditation on the steel Rose, for example, we read the following: "... so light is the urging, so ordered the dark petals of iron/ we who have passed over Lethe" (p. 449). Against the will is set sleep, "Lethe" ("'of sapphire, for this stone giveth sleep,'" p. 426), the oblivion of the Lotophagoi:

   Lotophagoi of the suave nails, quiet, scornful . . .
   And beneath: the clear bones, far down,
   Thousand on thousand.
   'What gain with Odysseus,
   'They that died in the whirlpool
   'And after many vain labours . . .'

(Ca. XX, p. 93)

The drugged sleep of the Lotophagoi is the converse of the "directio voluntatis," of the willed portion of Odysseus' voyage, his desire to finally get home. The drugs of Circe also appear in the Cantos (especially Ca. XXXIX), Circe constituting a major threat to Odysseus' successful completion of his design. Although Odysseus eventually reaches his goal, although his will (or the will of the right gods) finally triumphs, it is nonetheless the case that his distractions, his veerings from the homeward path, provide much of the material for his epic. And his companions lose their path. Like them, the poet sees his goal endlessly deferred; he must sift through the ruins of the Odyssean
enterprise for his materials ("Tho' my errors and wrecks lie about me"):

to pull up a mass of algae
(and pearls)
or the odour of eucalyptus or sea wrack

(Ca. LXXX, p. 498)

Eurilochus, Macer, better there with good acorns
Than with a crab for an eye, and 30 fathom of fishes

(Ca. XXXIX, p. 194)

The "sea change" of The Tempest (I, ii) must be read "between" these lines. The poet does not—as Prospero does—see his design come to fruition. At least as important to the poem are the intimations in The Tempest that things (like Caliban) can sometimes evade or oppose the will of the magus/poet.

By no means an orderly Dantescan rising
but as the winds veer

\[ \ldots \]

as the winds veer and the raft is driven
and the voices, Tiro, Alcmene
with you is Europa nec casta Pasiphaë
Eurus, Apeliota as the winds veer in periplum

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 443)

The figure traced by the Odyssean journey—the figure of the periplum, the circumnavigation of an unknown coastline—characterizes the form of the Cantos; as opposed to an orderly architecture, we discover an apparently random movement from point to point, from one item of knowledge to another.\(^75\) There are certain landmarks, admittedly: these are the chief components of Pound's intellectual
vortex, including the notions of usury and process, the image of the eye, and so on. The poem travels from one landmark to another, returning, re-embarking, without any over-all design that would assign a place and a final significance to each of these points. A grand design can only be intimated, perhaps, behind or beyond the actual peregrinations, the "péripole encyclopédique,"^76 of the text. Without a clear design, the poem has no distinct beginning or end. Pound underlines this circularity or limitlessness by evoking another failed or doomed figure—Agamemnon. The latter addresses Cassandra: "You also have I carried to nowhere/ to an ill house and there is/ no end to the journey" (Ca. LXXVIII, p. 477). Feste in Twelfth Night echoes and sums up this emphasis on the inverse side of the will (in this case, Orsino's); this is an aspect of doubt, hesitation, proceeding "à tâtons," as the winds blow:

> Now the melancholy god protect thee, and the tailor make thy doublet of changeable taffeta, for thy mind is a very opal. I would have men of such constancy put to sea, that their business might be everything, and their intent everywhere; "for that's it that always makes a good voyage of nothing."

The encyclopaedic poet's concern with "everything" and "everywhere" turns precisely on this edge of "nothing," this voyage of "no end" (Agamemnon) to nowhere.

"This is not a work of fiction/ nor yet of one man . . ." (Ca. XCIX, p. 708). Thus Pound's self-commentary towards the end of the Cantos. It has taken many years of work for the poet to come to the realization that he is writing something very like an encyclopaedia,
whose purpose is a gathering of cultural knowledge beyond fiction, beyond the bounds of a tale, and whose resources are those of many writers, many texts, and many times. This realization of the anonymity or collective nature of the enterprise accompanies the perception of a personal inability to "make it cohere" (p. 796), to play the part of Prospero or the "demigod"; as Diderot puts it in the context of the Encyclopédie, one man can never "connaitre & . . . développer le système universel de la nature & de l'art." 78 Pound, in attempting to develop such a universal system, a Book to base the knowledge of a culture, finds that he must acknowledge his work as being of more than one man—or as being of No Man:

For the seven lakes, and by no man these verses:
Rain; empty river; a voyage,

The reeds are heavy; bent;
and the bamboos speak as if weeping.

(Ca. XLIX, p. 244)

Thus the "Chinese" Odysseus or ΟΥΣ. The anonymous or absent author/subject is the logical counterpart of the collective one: in the writing of the encyclopaedia, the presence of many authors makes for the essential anonymity of each. As all the sources of the Cantos have, in a sense, written the poem, so it has no one Author, no will directing its development according to an intended grand design.

Pound, then, functions as bricoleur; he collates, arranges bits of other texts, organizes the "ready-made," the already-said; as anonymous poet, he offers up the details, lets them speak for themselves
(this being the essence of the ideogrammic method, as noted above).

"Anon" may take particular voices, personae, as in the "Seven Lakes" Chinese canto (XLIX), above. "Anon" is a crewmember in Canto XX; it is the lawmaker in the "Rock-Drill" and "Thrones" cantos; it is Adams in the letters of Ca. XXXIII; and so on. Even in the "Pisan Cantos," where the poet appears to be speaking in his own voice, out of his particular failure and set of memories, other voices or sources constantly intercede and break up any autobiographical telling:

and the guards op/ of the . . .
was lower than that of the prisoners
'all them g.d.m.f. generals c.s. all of 'em fascists'
'fer a bag o' Dukes'
'the things I saye an' dooo'
ac ego in harum
...ivi in harum ego ac vidi cadaveres animae

(Ca. LXXIV, P. 436)

The daily chatter of the prison camp, heard by the poet and recorded, is interrupted by another, anonymous, voice arising from the Odyssean parallel experience. This voice is Odysseus'; it belongs, perhaps, to Divus (the translator appealed to in Canto I); it is Pound's voice. Or it is a composite of all three. The Pisan experience is thus not the poet's alone, but belongs equally to the guards and to Odysseus' men. The experience could potentially be told by many voices, finding its parallel in many sources. The particularity or the will of an originary subject is thus put into question. Fragments as the disintegration of narrative are the formal consequence of the subject being spoken by others. In the end, the collective voice speaking the poem is that of
the wind itself:

I have tried to write Paradise

Do not move
Let the wind speak
that is paradise.

(Ca. CXX, p. 803)

3. **Time and timelessness**

There is a clear and conscious division drawn, in the *Cantos*, between history and eternity, between the time of human events and the silent No-Time of the gods. Time is sometimes figured in the poem as a circle whirling about a central "still point"; the eternal returns of history, the perennial mapping of one age into another, recall the turning of Ixion's wheel: "Torn from the sacerdos/ hurled into unstillness, Ixion" (Ca. LXXX, pp. 502-3). Unlike Vico and hence Joyce, who follow time's transformations and returns, Pound tries by various means to envision a state of stillness existing at the center of or beyond time's wheel, beyond its returns, "in the stillness outlasting all wars" (Ca. LXXIV, p. 427). It is a question of rising above the "hells" which "move in cycles,/ No man can see his own end" (CXIII, p. 787).

A paradisiacal state of stillness is sometimes associated, conventionally enough, with whiteness or the absence of colour (or with white light, as we have seen):
what whiteness will you add to this whiteness
what candor?
(Ca. LXXIV, p. 425)

till the shrine be again white with marble
till the stone eyes look again seaward
(Ca. LXXIV, p. 435)

Incense to Apollo
Carrara
snow on the marble
snow-white
against stone-white
(Ca. LXXXIV, p. 538)

Paradisiacal stillness may also be associated with certain colours,
especially jewel-colours, as long as they are clear, the eye seeing
through them. One such colour is the green of the god's eye as suddenly
glimpsed in a human face:

black that die in captivity
night green of his pupil, as grape flesh and sea wave
undying luminous and translucent
(Ca. LXXIV, p. 432)

The "grape" and "sea wave" details recall Canto II and indicate the
omnipresent Dionysus. Venus or Cythera, just as omnipresent, is
associated with the clear red of the pomegranate seed: "Red? white? No,
but a colour between them/ When the pomegranate is open and the light
falls/ half thru it" (Ca. LXXIX, p. 490). Finally there are blues:
"Topaz I manage, and three sorts of blue;/ but on the barb of time"
(Ca. V, p. 17). The latter point is significant: time is perceived as a
"barb" piercing or bursting into a neutral, non-dimensional state, one which often, in the _Cantos_, resembles that of sleep. "The clock ticks and fades out/ The bride awaiting the god's touch": Danaë lies motionless. Eventually, however, "clock-tick pierces the vision" (Ca. V, pp. 17-18) and time resumes its course of "unstillness." At its most disturbing, time is "that mirroured turbationem,/ . . .fantasia without balance-wheel" (Ca. LXXXVI, p. 560) which finds its counterpart in the whirlpools that beset Odysseus.  

It is in the paradoxical nature of the fictional encyclopaedia to work with time's flux, with the particularity, the historicity of certain materials, while yet seeking to get off the moving wheel, to gather individualities into an all-encompassing and timeless order of meaning. This conflict is represented in a number of ways in the _Cantos_, including the transparency/reflection and center/wheel dialectics noted already. The conflict between historical and eternal states is also enacted in the form of the poem: there is a tension between narrative and prescriptive, continuous and discontinuous, modes of presentation. This hesitation is implicit, of course, in the title of the work, with "cantos" suggesting both narrative and lyric possibilities. Further, the frequent interplay between historiography and law as major modes of inclusion involves precisely this dialectic between narration and prescription, which is itself a variation on that between encyclopaedic and episodic modes (as noted by Frye). One mode cannot exist without the other: in Sollers' terms, the line is the base for the irruption of the point, via the mediating figure of the "hélice"; in the _Cantos_, the narration of history is the line into
which irrupt points of intellectual synthesis in the form of epiphanies, timeless moments—or Laws. (The Cantos may also reverse Sollers' figure: eternity is also a kind of continuum into which irrupt points—"barbs"—of time.)

3.a. Multitemporal layering

The time/eternity question is also posed in the form of a conflict between autobiography (the line of a life) and the collective writing of many lives, times. The Cantos record the sedimentation of many years of individual experience (principally of reading); they also trace a course—a periplum—of books. In this they constitute a record both of Pound's experiences with books and of the experiences (again often with books) of the writers of these books, and so on ad infinitum. Autobiography, then, encounters bibliography—or, better, "bibliobiography." A single life time or line is permeated with a "point," with the global or divine vision of numberless lives. This conjunction of the personal and the collective, a conjunction which generates epiphanic moments, may be seen at work in Pound's "nox animae" experience in the Pisan camp, an experience introduced by the "... theme, "a man on whom the sun has gone down" (p. 430):

is it blacker? was it blacker? Nōtē animae?
is there a blacker or was it merely San Juan with a belly ache writing ad posteros
in short shall we look for a deeper or is this the bottom?
Ugolino, the tower there on the tree line

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 438)
Pound's experience translates San Juan de la Cruz' "Noche oscura"; it is essentially a literary experience. The story of Ugolino, another prisoner under similar constraints, is added via the mediation of its telling in Dante's *Inferno*—again, another "nox animae." The layering of these sources-cum-experiences projects autobiography into the dimension of paradigm—paradigms, that is, for despair.

The layering of many times via the juxtaposition of sources is one consequence of the ideogrammic method. The present time is not experienced in itself, but as the tip of the iceberg, as it were. The present is merely the latest in a long line of experiences, the last layer in a steady sedimentation of times. The image of the palimpsest (mentioned by Pound and to be discussed shortly) provides us with another version of the layering of times: in the palimpsest, several times are simultaneously present in the form of several texts in various states of erasure or legibility. This simultaneous presence has the paradoxical effect of both emphasizing the historicity of each layer and overcoming this quality, pointing to a state of timelessness where all literatures form a single moment in the mind. Pound's "nox animae" creates such a moment of suspension among times, a moment in which all literary versions of existential despair coexist. The practice of multitemporal layering, as related to the ideogrammic method, has been linked to what Eliot called "the mythical method" as first developed in Joyce's *Ulysses*; this practice consists in building "non-narrative chords" in which twentieth-century experience is "sounded" with certain mythical or archetypal patterns, with literary texts and historical/legal documents. A resonance is effected, for example, by
the early cantos' juxtaposition of materials from widely divergent times:

Procession,—'Et sa'ave, sa'ave, sa'ave Regina!'—
Moves like a worm, in the crowd.
Adige, thin film of images,
Across the Adige, by Stefano, Madonna in hortulo,
As Cavalcanti had seen her.

The Centaur's heel plants in the earth loam.

And we sit here . . .
there in the arena . . .

(Ca. IV, p. 16)

Here, the Middle Ages (Cavalcanti) is juxtaposed with myth (Centaur) and with the narrative present ("and we sit here . . ."). This particular "chord" is a frequent one in the Cantos; it is accompanied by a timeless "bass" or silence which is a mark of the value of the individual components. The essence of the multitemporal method, then, is a vertical layering, a projection of a lifeline into the paradigmatic dimension of textual or traditional antecedents. The resulting resonance, like Pound's "Great Bass," partakes of the order of timelessness.

3.b. Memory

The method of temporal layering, like the palimpsest itself, foregrounds the issue of memory. How does one bring to mind the multitudinous details that make up the poem? What does memory involve—is Pound's a "book" memory or a knowledge "by heart"? Is it a memory of verba or of res? Pound is concerned with both kinds of memory, both kinds of knowledge. On the one hand, the poem is a record
of a purely textual memory, a record of words, themselves bearing the trace of other words and so on endlessly. The later cantos bear marks of this attention to written records, to the verba of law and history:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ad mesure,}  \\
Laws of Edgar: ex omni satrapia XXXV  \\
a circuit of perambulation (Ca. CVII, p. 759)
\end{quote}

and France had no mines for these metals. (187)  

\begin{quote}
...  \\
trade in bills Ersatz for products (199)  \\
(Ca. LXXXIX, p. 591)
\end{quote}

Page or volume references for certain details are scrupulously recorded, yet the actual sources remain unnamed. Such textual memory is thus quite ambiguous: it is both detailed and vague; it both remembers and forgets (or ignores). What is put into question is the very reliability of texts or words as a basis for memory. From one text one proceeds to the next and the next, and so on, in an endless "circuit of perambulation." Such memory is ultimately tautological.

To break this circuit of textual memory—to penetrate beyond the circle of knowledge, the fundamental form of the encyclopaedia—Pound plays with the notion of a memory of res, things; this is a notion that in certain states one can have unmediated access to things in themselves, beyond words. For Pound, Platonist, reality being a reality of divine forms ("consisting in res non verba," Ca. LXXXII, p. 525), this reaching across words to reality involves a looking-upward or a looking-into, in both cases the object of vision being certain faint
memory-traces. Pound follows Plato's notion that memory is knowledge and vice-versa; for Pound, the question becomes importantly one of knowing *where to look*. Hence the importance of the eye in the *Cantos*. Looking up, penetrating the air, scanning the landscape, the eye may glimpse the gods—or at least may glimpse their trace:

> no vestige save in the air  
> in stone is no imprint and the gray walls of no era  
> ...  
> that which gleams and then does not gleam  
> as the leaf turns in the air

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 438)

And over Li Chiang, the snow range is turquoise  
Rock's world that he saved us for memory  
a thin trace in high air

(Ca. CXIII, p. 786)

`Tenthrils trailing  
caught in rocks under wave`

(Ca. CXIV, pp. 791-2)

"Vestige," "imprint," "trace," "tenthril": all these terms characterize the thing itself, ineffable, as it is remembered, passed through the mind. Socrates in the *Theaetetus* suggests that a true memory of things (as opposed to mere perceptions) should result in permanent traces in the "wax tablet" of the mind; this model, however, is found to be untenable as the imprints, depending on the quality of the wax, may be of poor quality and may ultimately vanish. Similarly for Pound the record is not permanent; the vision of the trace, of the real, is a tenuous one, subject to winds, light and other natural conditions or impediments ("caught in rocks under wave").
"Ubi amor, ibi oculus": as we have seen, love and vision are closely linked. Perhaps love, then, can help the poet remember the forms. This notion is explicitly explored in Canto XXXVI, where Pound undertakes a translation of Cavalcanti's "Donna mi prega." Here, a definition of love involves a meditation on memory:

Where memory liveth
it takes its state
Formed like a diafan from light on shade . . .

Cometh from a seen form which being understood
Taketh locus and remaining in the intellect possible
Wherein hath he neither weight nor still-standing . . .

And his strange quality sets sighs to move
Willing man look into that formed trace in his mind
And with such uneasiness as rouseth the flame.

(pp. 177-8)

Memory "takes its state" as a trace, a translucency ("diafan") of light upon the dark ground ("shade") of forgetfulness or oblivion. Memory, besides being a perceptible mark, is thus constituted of those elements—light, transparency—that we have already seen to be associated with paradisiacal experience. Memory is thus not, in this account, merely a learning of certain contingent (book-) elements, but is ultimately knowledge of reality—of a lost, paradisiacal reality which is yet "possible," remaining weightlessly in the mind. Love, associated with "sighs" and "flames," provokes the same introspection as does memory; ultimately the two are the same thing, as love is a nostalgia for a former (lost) beauty. Now, the main quality of the "formed trace" seen by love/memory is its "uneasiness," its flickering, tenuous quality; it is in constant motion, having "neither weight nor
still-standing." Thus, like the vestiges seen in the air, above, the traces seen by the eye of love offer only glimpses, unreliable, of reality.

The *Cantos* thus demonstrate a fundamental ambivalence toward their own modes of knowledge; memory, whether of res or of verba, turns out to be unsatisfactory. However, the repeated tag "Sagetrieb" (the tale, the saying, of the tribe) might point to another form of memory and a way out of our dilemma. It is true, of course, that the art of memory was originally a form of rhetoric; it was the underpinning of oratory, of oral forms of communication. Nonetheless, the art of memory, even though accompanying oral practice, emphasized a rigid learning "word-for-word." It is perhaps the kind of memory associated with oral telling, oral epic, that is referred to by the term "Sagetrieb":

Sagetrieb  
as the hand grips the wheat . . .  

(Ca. LXXXV, p. 559)

Sagetrieb, or the oral tradition.  

(Ca. LXXXIX, p. 597)

That is Sagetribe, that is tradition.  

(Ca. XC, p. 605)

The memory of an oral (as opposed to a written) tradition is a collective memory; in it a continuity of content is emphasized over any
continuity of form. Song or oral tale will relate the same story, though in slightly different words, over and over again. Oral or epic memory thus concerns itself with large thematic and syntactic identities in the midst of local, verbal difference. Unlike a Platonic memory of forms and unlike a reliance on written texts, the memory of "Sagetrieb" does not concern itself with origins, with the one true Word or Book. Rather, oral memory takes into account and embodies the flux of different times and cultures. Curiously enough, while the other forms of memory are explored obsessively in the poem, the memory involved in oral tradition is only introduced late and in a fragmented way. The poet, that is, comes to see that such memory is at the base of the only true paradise—an earthly one; it is the only sort of memory that is in any way enduring or fruitful:

The dreams clash
and are shattered—
and that I tried to make a paradiso terrestre.

(Notes for CXVII et seq., p. 802)

4. "In principio verbum": textuality and speech

Pound's Cantos, like the Wake and Paradis, enact the conflict between writing and speech, between the possibility of an endless textuality and the possibility of uttering the one true Word, the "verbum perfectum" that was in the Beginning with "paraclete," the Holy
Spirit (Ca. LXXIV, p. 427). This conflict is a version of the traditional dualism of word and thing, *verba* and *res*. We recall that *Paradise* aims to achieve a paradisiacal writing which is yet speech; it attempts this fusion via the movement of a written text which calls upon the resources of the breath for its articulation and, ultimately, signification. *Finnegans Wake* enacts the word/thing conflict in the squabbles of the twins, Shem and Shaun: that one twin is both the other and the opposite of the other indicates an equivocation at the heart of the traditional duality, indicates that one side may sometimes pass into its other. For Pound, clearly, the attempt to "write paradise" involves a concern with the spoken Word, the divine breath or the touch of the wind. Just as clearly, however, the poem is a fabric of citations and allusions; the poet is highly conscious of the resources of written texts. Pound's attempt at a paradisiacal fusion of word and thing, writing and breath, centers on a meditation on certain ideograms. These signs are poised, for Pound, next to the things themselves, side-stepping the conventional basis of language; although written, they are paradoxically natural.

The *Cantos* rely on an endless textuality. This is the real nature of the text, grounding the poet's interest in attaining to precise definition, "gradations/... distinctions in clarity" (Ca. LXXXIV, p. 539), and eventually, via these exercises in difference, to the undifferentiated Word. The *Cantos* as written text is the latest layer of a great number of layers of texts; it is the last deposit in a long process of sedimentation of literary experience. This process of
mediation, playing against aspirations toward an unmediated access to divine states of being, is evident in the poem's fondness for citation, and especially for repeating and deforming cited fragments. For example:

Der im Baluba das Gewitter gemacht hat . . .
they spell words with a drum beat

(Ca. XXXVIII, p. 189)

Tching prayed on the mountain and wrote MAKE IT NEW on his bath tub

(Ca. LIII, pp. 264-5)

Frobenius der Geheimrat
der im Baluba das Gewitter gemacht hat

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 436)

2, 7, hooo
der im Baluba
Faasa!

(Ca. LXXVII, p. 465)

The German citation refers to the anthropologist Leo Frobenius, who influenced Pound profoundly with his notion of a paideuma and with his working-out of the method of Luminous Detail in the study of civilizations. The citation suggests the magical potency of certain intellects, at least as perceived by others. Apparently, however, the citation is inaccurate; it is also repeated in varying contexts and is fragmented in one instance. What effect does the deformation and repetition of material from other texts actually have in the poem? What
does this process imply for the conflict between mediation by words and unmediated access to the real? The deformation of the original (its rather cavalier application to a variety of contexts and hence purposes) suggests that sources are being used not for their own sake but toward ends dictated by Pound's intellectual/moral vortex. The resulting sense of control works against the inertia or neutrality of endless textuality. Further, the obsessive repetition of the cited fragment creates an echo or magical "mantra" effect of meaning which paradoxically points to a state of non-differentiation beyond the specificity of the cited source. Repeated citation thus both emphasizes textuality (literary authority and difference) and overrides it, straining after a unity of meaning.

The practice of editing, too, as noted in our discussion of the memory provided by books, has ambiguous implications. There is both an evident reliance on sources and a reluctance to identify them:

They paid interest to NOBODY

page 446
column two

(Ca. LXXXVIII, p.583)

The marginal "references" are actually freed from any referential function; they thus join the ranks of other fictional notes, such as those in the Wake ("Night Lessons" section, Book II, Ch. 2), which refer only to the convention of footnoting itself. Real textual mediation is emptied out, as it were, and the "container" left behind takes on the talismanic properties of the ideogram itself. The ultimate reference,
then, is the **Cantos** themselves, the Book which would transcend mediation even while relying on it.

"And the old voice lifts itself/weaving an endless sentence" (Ca. VII, p. 24). Endless textuality represents itself, in the **Cantos**, in two interesting ways—via the images of magical weaving and of the palimpsest. The first involves Circe's loom, the shuttle weaving hypnotically back and forth. As Circe is the goddess effecting Odysseus' and his men's sensual digression and loss of purpose, her loom is an apt symbol for the textual lure of passing from source to source and ultimately losing all sense of a major design:

In hill path:  "thkk, thgk"

of the loom

"Thgk, thkk" and the sharp sound of a song
under olives
When I lay in the ingle of Circe
I heard a song of that kind.

(Ca. XXXIX, p. 193)

The sound of Circe's loom is associated with sleep, diversion. Circe's spinning song carries this sense into the later cantos ("Little wheel . . . man to my house" in Ca. LXXXI, p. 518)\(^9\); here the terminology of spinning is used in the context of the limitlessness of heaven:

```
inexorable
  this is from heaven
  the warp
  and the woof
  . . .
  as some say: a dark forest
  the warp and the woof
  that is of heaven
```

(Ca. LXXX, p. 494-5)
The "warp and woof" metaphor characterizes the Cantos in their foregrounding of textuality, the nature of any text to be a fabric of citations and allusions. Spinning, then, is associated both with Circe (with a temptation to leave the straight path of unequivocal meaning) and with the "inexorability" and mystery of heaven. The weaving of sources into an equivocal text that is both new and ancient, both original and counterfeit, is aptly figured by a spinning that belongs both to a goddess of digression and to a heaven of purpose. The palimpsest is mentioned or alluded to several times in the later cantos; like woven cloth, such a manuscript is a figure for an interplay of source-texts, for textuality or "transtextualité." Pound suggests, in one case, the following version of inscription and effacement:

"'definition can not be shut down under a box lid'/ but if the gelatine be effaced whereon is the record?" (Ca. LXXVIII, p. 479). Definition, that is, is done once and for all; it is an enduring "record," as insistent as the traces that return under the present layer of writing in the palimpsest. "Gelatine," however, is ephemeral, not holding impressions as does parchment, metal or stone (recall the "die-cutters" and "printers," workers of permanence, in Canto XXX). The contrast of definition and gelatinous effacement is the tension at the base of any understanding of a palimpsest: the latter is the site of both permanence and transience; it attests to the sufficiency or self-comprehension of writing, while nonetheless indicating its ultimate insufficiency. The Cantos as self-styled "record" of significant
history are thus understandably anxious as to the permanence of their own impression. However, as an index of moments escaping history, the poem can also override this anxiety and play with images of effacement and oblivion.

But the record
the palimpsest—
a little light
in great darkness—

... And as to who will copy this palimpsest?
al poco giorno
ed al gran cerchio d'ombra

(Ca. CXVI, pp. 795-7)

The palimpsest, like any text, functions as a way into the past; it is a means of understanding successive layers of time. The "record" is thus "a little light/ in great darkness" (the Cantos, Pound felt, created such a light in the darkness of modern Europe). The poem is explicit "this palimpsest." It is the work of a poet functioning as the scribe or copyist of other texts; it offers itself, then, to the next copyist—to be written into the next Book of culture, the next Encyclopaedia. And yet this possibility is posed in the form of a question: "And as to who will copy this palimpsest?" The implication is that perhaps there will be no such copyist, that perhaps the work is the last Book, the end to the process of endless textuality figured by the palimpsest. The Cantos, in expressing this hesitation in the matter of their own nature, thus enact the paradox central to the encyclopaedic enterprise—that of the book aspiring to be a Book that would annul the necessity for books.
Against the text as cloth woven out of the numberless strands of other texts, as palimpsest in which many earlier layers of texts may be discerned—against the text, indeed, which foregrounds conventions of textuality (marginal notes) and typography (purely visual abbreviations such as "cd/"^93)—work references to a Word which would efface the whole potentially endless process of rewriting (and reading) other writing.

The Word has sometimes a Christian context:

\[
\text{in principio verbum}
\]

\[
\text{paraclete or the verbum perfectum: sinceritas}
\]

(Ca. LXXIV, p. 427)

Sometimes, however, it is closer to being a Platonic form, the ultimate referent beyond the multiplicity of words:

\[
\text{not a lot of signs, but the one sign}
\]

('From the colour the nature
& by the nature the sign!')

(Ca. LXXXV, p. 546)

(Ca. XC, p. 605)

The Word may be seen as being in the Beginning and, in its perfection, as encircling or containing all Creation; alternately, it may be seen as eternally above phenomena ("colour"), the highest or final "sign."

However it is seen, the Word is held as a virtuality beyond the endlessly unfolding and refolding cloth of the text, as the final meaning of the "colours" of history as written into the Cantos. Pound suggests that its perfection may be approximated in the process of precise definition, the search for the precise word: "'Get the mot juste before action'/ . . . Awareness restful & fake is fatiguing"
(Ca. LXXXV, p. 558). This process, as we noted in Pound's translation of Confucius, is linked to an attainment of certain "extreme knowable points," the real of the Word before the word. Since, for Pound, words must speak of things, since definition involves "the sun's lance coming to rest upon the precise spot [thing] verbally," then using the "mot juste" trains perception, makes the eye keener, more "aware" of things in themselves. In turn, this "restful" awareness allows the eye to perceive something beyond words or things:

'We have,' said Mencius, 'but phenomena.'
monumenta. In nature are signatures
needing no verbal tradition,
oak leaf never plane leaf.

(Ca. LXXXVII, p. 573)

Precise distinctions ("oak leaf never plane leaf") are associated with the perception of "signatures" in nature. One reads nature, that is, as a book written by God, as a text directed by a Word exceeding it.

Pound's interest in "process" and definition is an interest, then, in the interpretation of signs which are neither words ("needing no verbal tradition") nor things. Such signs Pound tries to approximate in the ideograms seeded throughout his text. The Chinese written character, as already noted, was felt by Fenollosa and hence Pound to be a direct representation, an icon, of things in themselves. Such a character is neither a word (in the sense of a conventional sign) nor a thing. Like other iconic signs, it appears to occupy a certain grey area between the sign and the thing referred to by the sign. By
meditating upon certain such ideograms or signs, Pound seems to want to enter that area between thing and sign, that area which is the closest approximation humanly achievable of the Word of God:

Nel mezzo the crystal, a green yellow flash after sunset

... nor has one seen taozers ascending in pai jih

in the white light the pai jih

with ten billion wordings.

(Ca. C, p. 718)
CONCLUSION

1. **Summary**

In developing the idea of a fictional encyclopaedia, I have been concerned with sounding the special nature of my experience with a particular group of texts; I have also been concerned with accounting for sensed similarities—both thematic and formal—among these texts. The idea of an encyclopaedic mode must account for the reader's sense that certain texts are "encyclopaedic" in nature, that they seem to address the categories of knowledge directly, riding over the realist text's subordination of ideas to the end of mimesis. In this sense, then, the encyclopaedic mode merely emphasizes the tendency of romance to allow a structure of ideas to impede verisimilitude;\(^1\) fictional encyclopaedism is thus the limit-state of romance, as the structures of ideas animating the latter (and central to allegory) here receive their fullest and most conscious elaboration. The encyclopaedic impulse is one of including all ideas; thus, it is not the elaboration of any particular system, but rather the willingness to digress into any and all kinds of knowledge that characterizes the encyclopaedic work.

An encyclopaedic mode, then, absorbs mimetic—and didactic—approaches to a knowledge of the world, directing the reader to the categories themselves of this knowledge and to the literary forms through which they have traditionally been filtered. Encyclopaedism is thus something like a "making strange" in the Russian Formalist sense,\(^2\)
a foregrounding of that which is normally occulted or at least subordinated in writing concerned with representation or persuasion. Now, it has been my contention in this study that there exists, besides an encyclopaedic mode, a form embodying this mode, a form in which an encyclopaedic purpose dominates a mimetic or a didactic one. The pedagogical encyclopaedia is, of course, an example of such a form. This has, moreover, a fictional counterpart which draws upon the encyclopaedia's concern with surveying and including the categories of knowledge—while also addressing its own special relation to a tradition of fictions by imitating this tradition. The form of this special fictional kind has a kinship with the forms of essay, Menippean satire and epic, as all of these feature, to varying degrees, the functioning of an encyclopaedic mode. However, the fictional encyclopaedia exceeds the other, related forms: it imitates them as forms among others, while it itself cannot be imitated ("and as to who will copy this palimpsest?" Pound, Canto CXVI). As part of its nature, then, the fictional encyclopaedia projects the illusion that there are no further turns to its screw of imitation and interpretation (even though the "palimpsest" is "copied" with every commentary—such as the present study—written).

The fictional encyclopaedia maps or translates the characteristic tensions of its model—those of achieving completion, overcoming temporality, breaking through the mediation of texts and of writing—into the domain of fiction. In this passage, the original traits undergo certain changes. The encyclopaedia, for example, would cover the totality of knowledge but cannot; the fiction enacts this
insufficiency in its treatment—reverential yet critical—of totalizing systems of thought. Likewise, the fiction's attempt to overcome the time of its own telling, to break through to an eternal time that would silence its voices, reflects the encyclopaedia's preoccupation with overcoming the problem of obsolescence and attaining to a (virtual) moment of utter contemporaneity—and simultaneity. Further, the encyclopaedia would elude its own status as a book among—and relying upon—other books; it aspires to an (illusory) objective access to knowledge. The fiction, however, turns this illusion of objectivity on its head, emphasizing the status of written knowledge as a fiction, as a body subject to principles of selection and organization which are ideological in nature. Finally, the encyclopaedia's aspiration to be a mirror of the world, a map of knowledge, is but another version of the book's denial of its own nature as writing mediating reality; translated into fiction, this denial animates a conflict between writing and speech, between the conventional time of print and the rhythms of oral narrative or sacred ritual.

The above tensions are not, of course, peculiar to the production of the encyclopaedia; they characterize the making of texts in general. Problems of completion, time, the mediation of sources and writing are problems of the book, of which the encyclopaedia has come to be one particular form. Nonetheless, the encyclopaedia enacts the paradoxes inherent in book-making in an especially acute form; this is linked, perhaps, to the fact that it is directly concerned with the gathering and communication of the totality of knowledge, whereas other books deal
with only a portion of this totality. Likewise, the fictional encyclopaedia foregrounds the categories of knowledge normally underlying (and shaping) mimesis. This phenomenon—whereby an intensification of problems of textual production is linked to a foregrounding of the outline of knowledge itself—is associated with the problem of memory, the achieving or making of permanent impressions. Even though the encyclopaedia was not at origin a book, but was rather a course of education, it is precisely the conflict of the original encyclopaedic impulse with the limitations posed by its assumption into textuality that created the problematics of knowledge sketched out in this study.

Finnegans Wake, Paradis and the Cantos are fictions which enact, in their complex unfolding to the reader, the paradoxes fundamental to encyclopaedism in general. The Wake critiques completion, for example, in its play with the names—and with the ideas—of Vico and Bruno, two masters of totalization; as well, the work's endless repetition, with variations, of a few basic figures and situations works against completion or closure (repetition being precisely that which eludes closure even while referring to it). Paradis challenges completion as it plays with the idea of infinity; further, in evading the linear order offered by conventional punctuation, in dissolving the narrating subject into countless isolated instances, Paradis writes against its own limits as a book (with a particular author, publication date, etc.). Both Finnegans Wake and Paradis, nonetheless, play with images of completion or fullness of being even while their form eludes closure. Now, Pound's
Cantos more consciously write toward paradise, attempting an encircling of history which would be the finding of an unchanging center. Again, however, the striking formal traits of the poem—its inconclusive, additive (narrative) nature and its repetitions—work against such lyric centering. Each of our study-texts, then, attempts the totalization of knowledge which is the encyclopaedic ideal, while nonetheless enacting in its particular formal vagaries the experienced insufficiency of the encyclopaedic book.

The problem of completion, above, is inseparable from that of time. The fiction enacts the encyclopaedic dilemma whereby a desire for contemporaneity encounters the insufficiency of obsolescence: in the Wake and Paradis, a play with verb tenses is an attempt to overcome temporal difference; the works would sum up all time in an instant, in the infinitesimal difference between the moment and its repetition. For Joyce and Sollers, nonetheless, the flux of history—of languages, discourses, voices, instances—tends to swallow up such tenuous moments. Similarly, the Cantos' technique of a multiple laying of times often has the effect of dispersing the fragile suspension of time that it is intended to evoke. The attempt to see through history becomes a reflection on the fact of history itself.

The fictions tend to repeat the encyclopaedia's problematic relationship with its own nature as a fabric of sources, as a writing ultimately referring, not to the world, but to its own conventions, to an ideology of objectivity and connectedness. The fictions foreground
the fact of intertextuality, making the normally imperceptible fully perceptible. The *Wake* and *Paradis* are conscious (patch)works of allusion and citation. Joyce parodies conventions of intertextual reference in his use of foot- and marginal notes that do not refer at all (or only refer "inward" to the particular thematic or symbolic obsessions of the *Wake*). Sollers also problematizes the convention of citation: a suspension of visual punctuation is a suspension of quotation marks and hence of quoted authority; citation is with difficulty distinguished from plagiarism. Pound also foregrounds an indebtedness to sources by carefully including certain conventions of reference while neglecting to name the works to which he refers. The effect of this omission is parodic; the skeleton of the convention is preserved in the absence of its spirit.

Just as the encyclopaedia, in its drive to objectively reflect the current state of knowledge, must override its own ideological premises and ignore its status as a writing eluding an unmediated access to nature, so the works of Joyce, Sollers and Pound both reveal and conceal their nature as writing. Images of writing (associated in the *Wake* with refuse and in the *Cantos* with clutter) are played against images of speech, song or sacred gesture. In the *Wake*, this dialectic of self-(un)veiling is enacted by the warring twins, by the writer's and the singer's simultaneous identity and difference. *Paradis* seeks to overcome the opposition between speech and writing in a writing which may only be articulated and given sense through the rhythms of the breath. The *Cantos* similarly allow an obsession with the breathed word
to break upon a fascination with the resources of print and spacing. Between the lines of script, it is hoped, the paradisiacal Great Bass will be faintly audible.

2. **Encyclopaedism in the twentieth century**

An encyclopaedic mode dominates and characterizes many works of this century, beyond the texts dealt with in this study. What factors account for this prevalence of encyclopaedism in modern works? To approach an answer we should be clear on the general conditions that foster the encyclopaedic tradition. Queneau, we recall, remarks that historically encyclopaedic activity flourished at times of transition from one culture to another.\(^8\) The articulation of medieval and Renaissance learning, for example, produced a flowering of the encyclopaedic tradition; encyclopaedists attempted to sum up and preserve in memory the old orders of knowledge as they were giving way to the new. The notion of crisis or turning (catastrophe) contributes to our understanding of a possible basis for the encyclopaedia's attempt at encircling, recovery, preservation. The categories of knowledge, perceived as being eternal and necessary, are actually relative and shift their outlines from time to time. Such shifts occupy the attention of Foucault in *Les Mots et les choses*; the end of the eighteenth century is, for example, for Foucault the point of a pronounced rupture in all domains of knowledge;\(^9\) the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d'Alembert would have been the registering of this change, a
response attempting the justification as well as the encircling of knowledge.

According to Mendelson, the members of the genre of encyclopaedic narrative "... appear at unique and unrepeatable points in the linear history of historical cultures." As Queneau posits for the encyclopaedia, Mendelson does for its fictional counterpart: the latter functions as a "fulcrum" between periods, between national prehistory and national history; the encyclopaedic narrative shifts from a fringe status to a place at the center of the national consciousness.

All of these accounts emphasize the importance of shifts—either shifts in knowledge as reflected by the creation of encyclopaedias, or shifts in the reception of encyclopaedic works as reflecting (and generating) a solidification in cultural categories. The encyclopaedic activity and the orders of knowledge are thus fluid and mutually responsive, a shift in the one reflecting and engendering a shift in the other. What implications does such an association of encyclopaedism and epistemic shifts have for an account of the dominance of encyclopaedic fiction in this century? It is quite possible that what is responsible for this dominance is a certain foregrounding of the question of knowledge itself: the growth of an information or data industry that may be replacing the book as storehouse and medium of knowledge—the very tension between information and knowledge—may be an epistemic shift in our time which is reflected in the fictional anxiety to master knowledge, to "get it all in." Thus it is in the sensed gap between the old and the new organizations of knowledge, between books and databanks,
between the book in its closure and the text in its infinite capacity for absorbing additions, that Paradis unfolds; the earlier works anticipate Sollers' hesitation at the edge of "l'informatique" in their equivocation between literacy and orality.
FOOTNOTES

Introduction


11. Descombes, p. 54.


Stanley Fertig writes about encyclopaedism specifically in terms of the career of Raymond Queneau; he examines the relation of the writer's career as encyclopaedist to his fictional writings. He uses the term "encyclopoétique" to refer to an analogy in the itinerary undertaken in both non-fictional and fictional domains. Joel Black, in a Ph.D. dissertation (Stanford University, 1979) entitled "The Second Fall: The Laws of Digression and Gravitation in Romantic Narrative and their Impact on Contemporary Encyclopaedic Literature," writes about encyclopaedism in terms of modern encyclopaedic authors such as Pynchon, and their relation to nineteenth-century Romantic narrative and the tension within it between formation and digression, as linked to scientific theories of gravitation and entropy. Neither of these accounts address the phenomenon of encyclopaedism in literature as a problem in its own right.
Chapter 1


5. Genette, p. 69.


10. This is in Frye's sense of creating a "single intellectual pattern" (in reference to Menippean satire). See Anatomy of Criticism, p. 310.


21. Ibid., pp. 97-98.

22. See Nanny on Pound, pp. 397-405.


24. Ibid., p. 309.

25. Ibid., p. 311.


27. Gargantua and Pantagruel in Rabelais: Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Guy Demerson (Paris: Seuil, 1973); for Genesis parody, see Pantagruel, pp. 219-221; for lists, see Gargantua, pp. 98-105.


29. Nanny argues against the view of the Cantos as verse epic, a view represented by Michael Bernstein in The Tale of the Tribe (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), saying that the poem is better characterized as Menippean satire. Frye, in Anatomy, p. 324, sees many of the individual cantos as being "miniature epics."


31. An example of this occurs in The Aeneid, Book II, when Aeneas recounts an earlier meeting with Creusa, the ghost of his wife of an even earlier past. The ghost foretells a future beyond the present in Carthage. The whole action of the Aeneid is thus suggested in a glance.


33. Ibid., p. 9.


41. Ibid., p. 22-3. Bakhtin is not, of course, speaking of the encyclopaedia, but rather of the novel. My suggestion in the introduction is that Bakhtin's points on the novel do very well for our thinking about fictional encyclopaedism.

42. An awareness of the metaphorical potential of the book and writing has been important to Western Literature throughout the ages. See Ernst Robert Curtius, "The Book as Symbol" in European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard Trask (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).


44. Ibid., pp. 260-308.


47. From the frontispiece of Paideuma, the journal of Pound studies. Pound says he gets this notion of "paideuma" from Frobenius, a central figure in the later Cantos.


49. Rey, p. 12.

51. Ibid., p. 13.


55. Ibid., p. 25; see also Robert Collison, Encyclopaedias: Their History Throughout the Ages (New York: Hafner, 1966), p. 3.

56. Foucault, p. 38.

57. Rey, p. 32.


60. Preece, p. 798.


66. See Collison, pp. 6-8, for a discussion of these publishing strategies in the encyclopaedia.

68. Collison's expression, p. 2, is "the will-o'-the-wisp of completeness."


71. In keeping with this Biblical model, the Apocrypha present an interesting parallel to encyclopaedic supplements. Certain (e.g., Catholic) traditions take them as forming an integral part of the Scriptures. Certain others (especially the Protestant) exclude them and emphasize their "outsider" status. (See Bruce Metzger, "Introduction to the Apocrypha," in *The Apocrypha of the Old Testament* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), pp. ix-xx). What is at issue here is the completeness of the body of the Holy Scriptures; some see the Apocrypha as a threat to this body, while others have a looser notion of completeness. In a similar way, the encyclopaedic supplement may be seen as both completing the circle of knowledge, and as merely deferring its completion. Or as Collison, p. 7, puts it: "... while a first supplement may be welcomed, a second is scarcely tolerated, and a third positively resented." The Apocrypha anticipate this ambiguous supplemental state.


73. Article "Encyclopédie" from the *Encyclopédie*. See Diderot, Tome VII, pp. 182-3.


75. See Lord, pp. 4-5.


83. Sollers, p. 105.

84. Hamlet, Act II, Scene ii, l. 194.

85. Ficciones, p. 17.


89. Ibid., p. 8.


91. Ibid., pp. 112-3.

92. For a discussion of discontinuity and knowledge, see Foucault, ibid., pp. 111-113.

93. See De Gandillac, pp. 87-104.


97. Ibid., pp. 1456-7.

98. Abrams, pp. 35-46.


100. Ibid., p. 54.
101. Ibid., p. 60.


103. Ficciones, pp. 79-88.

104. Ibid., pp. 21-2.

105. Charles Bowlker's Art of Angling (1829); for this piece of information, see Peter Brooker on Canto LI in A Student's Guide to the Selected Poems of Ezra Pound (London: Faber & Faber, 1979), pp. 297.


109. Ibid., p. 176.

110. Genette, in Palimpsestes (Paris: Seuil, 1982), uses the palimpsest as a general figure for a "littérature au second degré," and especially for the relation of what he calls "hypertextualité," the relation of one book to another implicit within it, of which the first is a transformation or an imitation. This relation, he says, is to be distinguished from intertextuality, which refers to more specific points of irruption of one text into another—points, that is, of citation, plagiarism, and allusion. See especially pp. 7-14.


Chapter 2

1. See Michel Beaujour, Miroirs d'encre (Paris: Seuil, 1980), pp. 10-11. The autoportraitist writes according to the "ready-made" categories of the culture; this "automatic" process of composition (which has affinities to Surrealist practice because the latter is also directed by the Encyclopaedia of cultural categories) is foregrounded in Finnegans Wake. The idea of word-chaining following metonymic association or expansion owes much to Riffaterre's notion that poetry involves an expansion or periphrasis of a simple semantic kernel. See The Semiotics of Poetry (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978). I also owe a great deal to Eco's notion that a net of metonyms underlies metaphor or poetic language. See his "Sémantique de la métaphore," Tel Quel, 55 (1973), 25-46, and his recent ideas on encyclopaedic competence in "Dictionary vs. Encyclopaedia" in Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 46-86.


3. Ibid., p. 168.


7. The Tempest, Act V, Scene i, 1. 88.


12. Ibid., p. 220.

14. André Topia, in "La cassure et le flux," Poétique, 26 (1976), 144-5, discusses the opposition, in the Wake, between lexical discontinuities and syntactic continuity.


18. Ibid., pp. 32-4.


20. Suggested by Professor Lorraine Weir.


22. The "beau comme" simile is discussed by Peter Nesselroth in Lautréamont's Imagery: A Stylistic Approach (Genève: Droz, 1969), Chapter One.

23. Suggested by Professor Weir.

24. The Encyclopaedia corresponds to Eco's notion of a global semantic system; it is not, however, quite the same thing as this system. The idea of the Book is at its center; perhaps the Encyclopaedia is another name for Borges' Library.

25. Suggested by Professor Weir.


28. For this notion of expansion, or actualization, of a seme, see Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry, pp. 31-2. See also his study on this mechanism in the Surrealist metaphor in "La Métaphore filée," Langue française, 3 (1969), 46-60.

29. Suggested by Professor Weir.

30. Ibid.

32. See discussion of wordplay in "Special Problems" section.


36. Topia, p. 150.


40. Suggested by Professor Weir.


44. Ibid., pp. 198-9.

45. Ibid., p. 127.


48. Ibid., pp. 133-4.

49. Ibid., pp. 169-70.

50. Ibid., pp. 178-9.
51. Ibid., p. 176.

52. Ibid., p. 104.

53. Suggested by Professor Weir.

54. See Atherton, pp. 14-15, on Joyce's belief in the magical power of language to influence events.


57. Atherton, p. 36.


59. See Norris, p. 23: "Familiar notions of structure do not apply to this work..." She would substitute a principle of (narrative) repetition for a centered structure. See also MacCabe, p. 35: "Bruno and Vico are used in Finnegans Wake to aid the deconstruction of identity into difference and to replace progress with repetition." Further, Stephen Heath in "Joyce in Language," James Joyce: New Perspectives, sees in the Wake "not a simple history but a network of fictions...a kind of infinitely expanding and regressing surface of language" (p. 132). As he says, the Wake "comes back to no origin, knows no break between world and book, the world always already writing..." (pp. 131-2).

60. See Clive Hart, *Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake* (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), and his emphasis on Viconian correspondences, cyclical form, in the *Wake*.


63. Hart, p. 43.


65. McHugh, *Annotations*, p. 3.

67. The Wake usually manages to evade the perfection of timelessness and totality by the very association of these moments with Bruno's principle. Issy is associated with the Seven Rainbow Girls (cf. Glasheen, p. 259); her doubling in the mirror is a doubling of the rainbow, the repetition and hence undoing of its perfection.

68. Hart, pp. 75-7.

69. Ibid., p. 30.


72. All these things—rainbow, schoolgirls, Alpha and Omega, plus a child's ABC—come together in the "Miss Oodles of Anems" passage.


74. The lines of these may be variously drawn. Norris isolates the Oedipus myth in particular; David Hayman, in "Nodality and Infra-Structure of Finnegans Wake," James Joyce Quarterly, 16 (1978), 135-49, isolates the tales of Tristan and Isolde, the delivery of the Letter, etc.

75. Hayman, p. 138.

76. Past, present and future are also associated with Vico's three ages, with the past corresponding to the Age of the Gods, the present to the Ages of Heroes, the future to the Age of Men, and the whole returning to the beginning again. See Hart, p. 48.

77. McHugh, Annotations, p. 226.


82. McHugh, Sigla, pp. 10-14.

83. Ibid., p. 10.
84. Ibid., p. 14.

85. See Glasheen's entry "Finn MacCool," Third Census, pp. 92-3. An example of a further deformation of the name is "Felin make Call"; see p. 488.14 of the Wake.

86. See entry, "Anna Livia Plurabelle," ibid., pp. 10-12.


90. Norris, p. 11.


92. Norris, p. 28.

93. McHugh, Sigla, p. 75.


95. Ibid., p. 140.


97. Atherton, p. 61.


100. See the Introduction on parody in the Middle Ages and Antiquity in Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968), pp. 4-17.


102. Ibid., p. 8.

103. Ibid., pp. 11-14.

104. Ibid., p. 15.

105. Atherton, p. 27.

107. See entry, "Jacob and Esau" in Glasheen, pp. 140-1.

108. Hart, p. 44.


110. In Swift's Tale of a Tub, for example, there are footnotes which offer a mock-exegesis of the text, which refer to other books. These notes offer a meta-commentary on the practice of literary exegesis and acknowledgement. Pound in the Cantos, further, incorporates the names of his sources (authors and texts) into his text. See his direct exchange with Andreas Divus, translator of Homer, in Canto I.

111. McHugh, Sigla, p. 19.

112. For Shaun's link with sacred gestural language, see p. 486.14-.16: "I, the lord of Tuttu, am placing that initial T square of burial jade upright to your temple a moment." This gesture is twice repeated and varied with "serpe with ramshead" (486.21) and "the initial of your tripartite" (486.27-.28). See also Shaun as "venerable Kevin, anchorite . . . seven several times . . . eastward genuflecting . . . collected gregorian water sevenfold . . ." (605.27-.30). See also Lorraine Weir, "The Choreography of Gesture: Marcel Jousse and Finnegans Wake," James Joyce Quarterly, 14 (1977), 313-25.

Chapter 3


4. From Philippe Sollers, Paradis (Paris: Seuil, 1981), p. 146. All further references to Paradis will be to this edition. The installments of Paradis appearing in Tel Quel and L'Infini after this edition have not been used in this thesis.


9. Of course, the following of cause by effect can also be made problematic in punctuated texts. Here, sentences may follow one another without bearing any logical relation to one another; the relation, that is, may be one of simple consecution. One thinks, for example, of the Surrealist automatic text, in which the most perfectly punctuated sentence does not "follow" or develop out of the preceding sentence—except, perhaps, by formal association.

10. Proust says something similar on cause and effect: "The laborious process of causation which sooner or later will bring about every possible effect, including, consequently, those which one had believed to be least possible . . . comes to fruition only when we have ceased to desire, and sometimes ceased to live." See Within a Budding Grove in Remembrance of Things Past, Vol. I, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 508.


12. This concept is also questioned by Derrida in conjunction with concepts of presence and centering; see "The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing," Of Grammatology, trans. Gyatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 3-26.

13. Julia Kristeva, "Polylogue," Tel Quel, 57 (1974), 24-5. This article refers to Sollers' novel H (also unpunctuated); her comments, however, are applicable to Paradis.
14. See, for a similar rapprochement of formal or temporal circularity and the mouth, Pound's later Cantos, for example LXXVII in *The Cantos of Ezra Pound* (New York: New Directions, 1972), p. 466:

mouth, is the sun that is god's mouth
or in another connection (periplum)

15. The French word is actually "péríple." Sollers is perhaps thinking of Pound's key word "periplum," important to the later Cantos. See, for example, Canto LXXVII (note above) and Canto LXXXII, p. 527:

three solemn half notes
their white downy chests black-rimmed
on the middle wire
periplum


18. Linda Hutcheon in *Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1980), p. 39, defines "metafiction" as that form of fiction which thematizes the conventions of reading, providing a "mimesis of process." However (she says), "metafiction is still fiction, despite the shift in focus of narration from the product it presents to the process it is." Margaret Rose, in *Parody//Meta-Fiction* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 65–6, defines metafiction as that which "provides a 'mirror' to fiction, in the . . . form of the imitation of art in art . . . ."; it is that which is "able to demonstrate critically the processes involved in the production and reception of fiction from within a literary text . . . ." Finally, Robert Scholes in *Fabulation and Metafiction* (Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1979), p. 114, argues that metafiction, in assimilating the perspectives of criticism into the fictional process, "attempts . . . to assault or transcend the laws of fiction—an undertaking which can only be achieved from within fictional form." My point is that *Paradis* as fictional encyclopaedia transcends metafiction itself inasmuch as the latter works from within the fictional form, while the former overcomes the distinction between fiction and non-fiction, and hence works from a base that is wider than that of metafiction.


20. This paradox recalls the "visible speech" of Dante's *Purgatorio*, Canto X. See Dorothy Sayers, trans. (Hardmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 145. Commentary on *Paradis* continues in this mode of paradox. For example, Severo Sarduy in "Syllabes–germes," *Tel Quel*, 77 (1978), 21, says the following of the oral nature of
Paradis: "Que la voix prenne ses tessitures les plus confidentielles et opaques ou l'arrogance de ses registres les plus impératifs ou barytonaux, son érection d'opéra ou sa dérision de boulevard, la seule chose à laquelle nous confronte Paradis est ce théâtre, cette scénographie de la voix . . . ."


22. Comment made by Prof. John Freccero in a lecture in August 1984 at the University of British Columbia.

23. For example, in Book III, Chapter 1, Shaun (as seen by Shem) becomes more literary; the text here is studded with literary references. See the discussion above, Chapter 2, pp. 172-4. In Book I, Chapter 7, Shem's belongings (as seen by Shaun) become "culinary": "The warped flooring of the lair . . . were persianly literatured with . . . sticky back snaps, doubtful eggshells, bouchers, . . . amygadaloid almonds, rindless raisins, . . . blackeye lenses, . . . curried notes, painful digests, magnifying wineglasses, . . . once current puns, quashed quotatoes, messes of mottage . . . [etc.]." (p. 183).

24. The paradisiacal text would thus be another version of Barthes' "texte de jouissance," a text overcoming or transgressing "repressive" requirements of meaningfulness, coherence, etc. See The Pleasure of the Text, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975), p. 14. On p. 8 of this work, Barthes uses the expression, "paradisiac text"; he applies the term to Severo Sarduy's Cobra.

25. For example, "jouissance" and the experience of paradise are indistinguishable in the following: " . . . au fond le monde est fait de ce qui n'a jamais été pensé ni parlé d'où calme à certains moments vidage d'identités . . . une fois joui ça paraît bitume noir d'eau bouillie froide . . . " (p. 39).

26. For example, the erotic (or, rather, the pornographic) and the paradisiacal are closely juxtaposed in the sudden transition from sadism to paradise in the following: " . . égorgeant piquant lacérant brûlant mélémélomillimètres lime à ongles sur barreaux de fer . . . avancer monter s'enfoncer cracher . . . roues verbales musée mutant mufle usé prairie bouffée ventre calme soleil chauffe dérivant volumes corolles tiges pétale . . . " (p. 40)

27. Sollers écrivain, p. 6. Punctuation as a binding or suppression of the body's rhythms is further ridiculed in its inappropriateness in conveying erotic situations; the exercise is something like a classroom "dictée": " . . . avant qu'Albertine n'eût obéi et eût enlevé ses souliers virgule j'entr'ouvrays sa chemise point ses deux petits seins haut remontés étaient si ronds qu'ils avaient moins l'air de faire partie intégrante de son corps que d'y avoir mûri comme deux fruits point-virgule et son
ventre parenthèse dissimulant la place qui chez l'homme s'enlaidit comme du crampon resté fiché dans une statue descellée fin de la parenthèse se refermait virgule à la jonction des cuisses virgule par deux valves d'une courbe aussi assoupie virgule aussi reposante virgule aussi claustrale que celle de l'horizon quand le soleil a disparu point . . ." (p. 127).

28. In Paradis, p. 135, Sollers speaks of a "nouveau corps à ponction mon corps points mon corps suspension mon corps interrogation négation blanc d'exclamation . . . ."

29. Kristeva, pp. 24-36.

30. Sarduy, p. 21.

31. Banon, p. 103.


33. Sarduy, p. 22.


36. See pp. 96-9. The reference is to the Wake, p. 516.03-.22.

37. See liner notes to Paradis (Paris: Seuil, 1981): " . . . tout se raconte et se rythme à la fois maintenant, non pas dans l'ordre restreint de la vieille logique embrouillée terrestre, mais dans celle . . . à éclipses, des ondes et des satellites."

38. Sarduy, p. 21.

39. See Paradis, pp. 201-2, for another example of Sollers' use of lexical series in waves: " . . . "pyrrhonisme pégélégianisme arianisme jansénisme calvinisme sectisme les noms changent mais rien n'a bougé stoïciens épicuriens freudiens désirants spinozistes marxistes juifs pafens et chrétiens un peu de bouddhisme d'hindouisme d'islamisme quelques reliefs tibétains en définitive chacun y revient la matière d'esprit le destin la mort la vie la survie qu'est-ce que je fais là qu'est-ce qui me détruit pourquoi suis-je moi et pas lui fatalisme déterminisme occultisme satanisme féminisme moonisme . . . ."


42. Sarduy, p. 21.


44. For another example of the coexistence of rhyme and nonsense, see *Paradis*, p. 172: "... alors comme ça on croyait pouvoir défier le filet passer à travers les gouttes profiter de tout sans payer slouf aux oubliettes disparu le type en goguette finies les escarpolettes tout était donc sérieux terriblement sérieux ennuyeux depuis le début orageux visqueux caverneux . . . ."

45. Further examples of rhyme include, "... décidément j'en ai plein la tête de cette planète elle poursuit en moi ses canaux ses fêtes . . " (p. 132), or "... le stock se perd chaque fois tout le stock en bloc saborde hypnose arthrose cirrhose ankylose . . . ." (p. 118).

46. Banon, p. 102.

47. "We are such stuff/As dreams are made on, and our little life/Is rounded with a sleep." *The Tempest*, Act IV, Scene i, ll. 156-8.


49. For a more complex example of alliteration, assonance and rhyme, see *Paradis*, p. 102: "... conclusion quand une langue se meurt essoufflée on ne la fait jamais trop chanter et pour cela il faut être non seulement chanteur mais aussi d'abord écrimeur où vous entendez crime rime escrime mais aussi crème et crieur écrivain râvé au rêveur écrivain critique du tireur en tout cas plutôt écrivain écrimien plutôt écrivain crispeur que scribeur. . . [etc.]."


52. Suggested by Professor Valerie Raoul.
53. Sollers' practice of pairing nonsense words picks up from the Surrealist practice of using stereotyped forms and rhetorical strategies as pretexts for formal play and the generation of "nonsense."

54. The only exception to this rule might be the term "hologrammé," which Sollers uses to characterize the nature of writing in Paradis. The term is thus implicitly valorized. See "L'Analyse infinie," p. 21, where he speaks of "la lettre hologrammée de Paradis."


59. Besides using the Trinity and the catechism, Sollers uses spatial frames or "emboitements" as modes of listing: "... l'espace entier se signe se boit en effet une ville ou une campagne de loin est une ville ou une campagne mais à mesure qu'on approche ce sont des maisons des arbres des tuiles des feuilles des herbes des fourmis des jambes de fourmis à l'infini et tout cela s'enveloppe du nom de campagne ou encore un homme est un suppôt mais si on l'anatomise sera-ce la tête le coeur l'estomac les veines chaque veine chaque position de veine le sang chaque humeur de sang ... " (Paradis, p. 199).

60. Sollers, in "On n'a encore rien vu," Tel Quel, 85 (1980), 9-31, takes such cultural all-inclusiveness to be the chief generic trait of the novel. I have argued, however, that the genre of the novel is already over-extended enough in the traits to which it would lay claim. It seems more useful to make further distinctions and have the fictional encyclopaedia take over cultural inclusiveness as its chief generic trait. See my Introduction, pp. 5-6.

61. See also the references to the domain of computing and information storage: "... écrivez fortran formulation transposée parlez le cobol bien robotisé dites terminal transistor modem et commutation assembleur panthèmes cumulez les bits dans les zones clés ... quant à moi je viens de fonder mon propre institut ... informatique mystique ... " (p. 207).


64. Ibid., p. 19.

65. For example, the discussion in Vision à New York, p. 127, on the point and the line is to be found in Paradis, p. 185. Likewise, a meditation in "L'Analyse infinie" on Pascal's "pile ou croix" is to be found in Paradis, p. 197. This continuity of text and commentary overcomes any notion of cause and effect; it is multidirectional and "deliberately anachronistic," to use an expression used by Prof. Preccero in a similar context.

66. See Chapter 2 of this study, pp. 116-7.


68. If Paradis is organized according to poetic or formal equivalences, then it seems odd, at first, that Sollers should call the work a "roman." However, his notion of the "roman" is a broad one, equivalent to the notion of the fictional encyclopaedia explored in this study; this latter form, we have seen, encompasses both poem and novel, breaks down the boundaries between them.


70. I should acknowledge, here, Professor Patricia Merivale's term "aesthetic of abundance," used in the context of a discussion of Garcia Marquez and the magic realist work.


72. This sonnet begins with the words, "The expense of spirit in a waste of shame/Is lust in action . . . ."

73. Yates, p. 224.


75. Ibid., p. 22.

76. Another example of the contrasting of "infini" and "fini" occurs on pp. 197-8: " . . . mais les finis . . . transforment l'embarquement en engagement c'est qu'ils se trouvent pas mal les finis et même dignes d'une considération infinie . . . et même très capables d'être appréciés comme infinis en eux-mêmes . . ."
rien de plus inutile que d'appeler un fini à se penser non-fini ce qu'il veut c'est finir giron moule four mamour s'endormir en graine regermer en chafne s'éterniser vie dans la loterie . . . .”

81. Ibid., p. 137.
82. For a discussion of the mathematical concept of infinity as it applies to literature, see Jean-Louis Houdebine, "L'Expérience de Cantor (Pour la détermination d'un 'principe d'infinité' en littérature)," L'Infini, 4 (1983), 87-110.
84. Sollers, Vision à New York, p. 137.
86. Ibid., p. 18.
87. David Hayman, TriQuarterly, 38 (Special Issue on Literature after the Wake), 3-38. Other works on postmodernism make a similar point; see, in this regard, Ihab Hassan, The Dismemberment of Orpheus, 2nd ed. (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1982), pp. 267-271.
90. Ibid., p. 18.
92. Ibid., p. 137. Or, as Kristeva says with respect to Sollers' H: "'Je' ne se cherche pas, 'je' se perd dans une série de renvois à des événements logiques ou politiques qui, dans le passé où le présent, déterminent une semblable motilité du sujet lancé dans le tourbillon de son morcellement et de son renouvellement." "Polylogue," p. 27. This lack of a stable subject in Paradis makes autobiography problematic: the "autobiographical" sequence
on pp. 32-3, for example, is identifiably taken from Sollers' childhood (discussed at length in Vision); however, the impersonal paradisiacal context changes this fragment, lessening its significance, making it simply one "exception" among others.


96. Recall our earlier discussion of Joyce's treatment of the alphabet in Chapter 2, p. 150.

97. For another example of an "alphabet," see Paradis, p. 101: " . . . alphabet ômeôga bêta pourquoi pas le a prenant du plus bas et le b grossi ventrant la frontière et le c croissant lunant l'atmosphère et le d dormant et l'e blanc flottant et le f en crue et le g joufflu . . . [etc.]."


99. The Republic, Book VII.

100. I use Paul de Man's term in Blindness and Insight, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983).


103. In a curiously similar way, Beckett's L'Innommable (Paris: Minuit, 1953) has a constant 'bavardage' being the means to the end of a long-desired, drooling silence.

104. See also p. 82: " . . . elkâh-dmiy-al-thîl-âh pour toi le silence est louange bouquet de silence feu d'espace pétales de feu dans le feu."


107. See Sollers in Hayman, "An Interview with Philippe Sollers," p. 123: "Perhaps the phrase which best gives the sense of my title is a sentence from Sade, who says, 'Everything is paradise in this hell'."


112. Genette, pp. 33-40, gives a more detailed analysis of the kinds of transformation and imitation that are possible depending on the tone of the work involved. For example, parody is transformation; pastiche is a "playful" imitation.


Chapter 4


4. See the essays "The Phantom Dawn" and "Geste and Romance" in The Spirit of Romance.


6. Epic, according to early discussions of parody, became—with a few changes—parody when the audience of the epic singer became bored and restless. See discussions of the origins of parody, as cited by Genette in Palimpsestes (Paris: Seuil, 1982), pp. 20-22. Similarly, the need for maintaining secrecy before certain audiences was supposedly the origin of the trobar clus form of the Troubadour lyric. See Pound's "Troubadours—their Sorts and Conditions" in Literary Essays, p. 94.

7. Such a "score" is hinted at in Ca. LXXIX, The Cantos, pp. 484-7, with its notation described by birds alighting on wires:

   with 8 birds on a wire
   or rather on 3 wires . . .

   . . .

   4 birds on 3 wires, one bird on one

   . . .

   5 of 'em now on 2;
   on 3; 7 on 4

8. See the repetitions of "beauty is difficult" in Ca. LXXIV, p. 444, and in Ca. LXXX, p. 511.


11. Ibid., p. 145.


17. Canto XL divides into an economic section drawing upon citation and memory, and a mythical section based on the text The Periplus of Hanno (Hanno being the Carthaginian equivalent of Odysseus). See Annotated Index, p. 86.

18. Annotated Index, pp. 71, 161, 207.


20. The fragment translates as "Little wheel ... man to my house." See ibid., p. 264.

21. Ibid., p. 115.

22. See, for example, Ca. LXXX, p. 511: "κΘηρα δεινα as a leaf borne in the current."


24. "Directio voluntatis" is repeated in Canto LXXVII on p. 572 and on p. 576: "Justice, directio voluntatis, or contemplatio as Richardus defined it. . . ."

25. See Canto LXXXVI, p. 560:

And Brancusi repeating: je peux commencer
une chose tous les jours, mais
finiiiiir

27. Ibid., pp. 7, 15.


36. See ibid., pp. 63-75, for the discussion of these diverse topics.

37. Ibid., p. 75.


44. Ibid., p. 64.

45. Ibid., p. 65.

46. Hugh Selwyn Mauberley, for example. See Baccigalupo, pp. 13-14.

47. Géfin discusses Williams, Olson, Creeley, etc., in the light of this method.

49. The source is the 12-volume *Histoire Générale de la Chine* of Père de Moyriac de Mailla, published 1777-1783. This is discussed by Kenner, pp. 433-4.


54. "Religio" in *Selected Prose*, p. 47.

55. See Peter Brooker, "The Lesson of Ezra Pound" in *Ezra Pound: Tactics for Reading*, ed. Ian F.A. Bell, pp. 17-18. Brooker sees this particular "reading" of American history as being symptomatic of Pound's eventual espousal of Italian Fascism.

56. For the relation between sense and custom (or culture), see Susan Stewart, *Nonsense* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 3-46.

57. An ambivalence toward (encyclopaedic) totalization is an ambivalence toward totalitarianism. See Brooker, pp. 25-8; Brooker suggests that the "organicist" drive toward major form is the literary manifestation of totalitarian politics.

58. *Ta Hsio: The Great Digest*, trans. Ezra Pound (New York: New Directions, 1951), p. 49. Note that as Pound made this translation, it is subject to the same moral and intellectual system as shapes the *Cantos*. Pound the translator as much writes Confucius as he reads him.

59. Ibid., pp. 29-33.

60. Ibid., p. 29.

61. Pound's reference to Ygdrasail, the mythic tree at the center of the cosmos, binding together its parts, is significant in the context of Confucius' image of process, that "things have roots and branches." See Canto XC, p. 605: "Beatific spirits welding together/ as in one ash-tree in Ygdrasail./ Baucis, Philemon." Note that it is love that binds Cosmos together.


64. _Selected Prose_, pp. 47-8.


66. _Selected Poetry_, p. 85.

67. See also Ca. XCI, p. 620, linking a "flash" of light with "omniformis":

   Le Paradis n'est pas artificiel
   but is jagged,
   For a flash,
   for an hour.
   Then agony,
   then an hour,
   then agony,
   Hilary stumbles, but the Divine Mind is abundant
   unceasing
   _improvisatore_
   Omniformis
   unstill


69. See Ca. LXXXIII, p. 528; Ca. LXXXVII, p. 571; Ca. LXXXVIII, p. 581.

70. See also Ca. XCI, p. 612, for a restatement of this "composite" light:

   That the sun's silk
   hsién tensile
   be clear

71. _Annotated Index_, p. 271.


75. There is a similar idea in Footnote #2 of the "Night Lessons" section of Finnegans Wake, p. 268: "Making it up as we go along."


77. Twelfth Night, Act II, Scene iv, 11. 72-8.


79. Note that time, in the Cantos, is associated with mirrors, while eternity is associated with transparency, the clarity of jewels or water. This recalls the association of mirrors, writing and death, one version of which is expressed by Foucault, "Language to Infinity," Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1977), p. 154.


88. Bernstein, pp. 36-7.

89. Kenner, p. 508.

90. *Annotated Index*, p. 264.


93. See, for example, Ca. LXXXIX, p. 595:

Benton b. 1782, d. 1858.
'How often had they been told trade was paralyzed & ships idle?'
'Hid the books but cd/ not hide weekly statements.'
Notes to Conclusion


6. See *Finnegans Wake*, Book I, Ch. 7, p. 183.

7. This is the myth of Ouan Jin in Canto LXXIV, pp.426-7; Ouan Jin's mouth is cut out because it has created too many words.


1. General and Theoretical Works


Eliot, T.S. Four Quartets. London: Faber and Faber, 1944.


2. Works on or by Joyce


Heath, Stephen. "Ambivalences." *Tel Quel*, 50 (1972), 22-43; *Tel Quel*, 51 (1972), 64-76.


Rabaté, Jean-Michel. "La Missa parodia de *Finnegans Wake*." *Poétique*, 17 (1974), 75-95.


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3. **Works on or by Sollers**


Hayman, David. "Nodality or Plot Displaced: The Dynamics of Sollers' *H*." *Sub-Stance*, 43 (1984), 54-65.


4. **Works on or by Pound**


